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IftRODUOfiON 
1. Problem .. 
~e primacy ptWpose of this dieawtation 1s to compare 
' 
soma ot tne baaic ax1olog1oa1 concepts 1n the thougnt of 
E. s. B1'1ghtman and A .. N. Whitehead. A $ubord1nate purpose 
is fulfilled 1n a 1"1nal oom~at1 va eva.lua. tion and a brief 
est1mata .. ot the ~elevancy of theilt ax1olog1eal 1ne1gb.ts for 
contempora~y soo1at~. 
a. Method .. 
In fulfilling the aim of the dissertation it is reoog• 
niaed that there are no exact equi va.lents 1n the thought of 
the two men. Xf such were the oasa1 comp~1son could go 
little bey-ond the stated .tact or such a1m1lar1ty. Fl'uitful 
oompax-!eon depends on the juxta.pos1t1on·· of ideas which :r-epre-
sent different propoaed solution$ to the same problems. The 
method, therefore, 1s to bring together from ea.ch man the 
most s1gn1f1cant d.ata which ~a pertinent to the five gen.-
~al areas selected tor compa.xaison, viz., ( l) theil* concern 
fo'l! val.u& problems as seen both in the qua.nt1 ta.t1 ve e,nd in• 
tarnal aspects of the~ thought, {9) the nature and o:tt!teria 
of value, (3) the function of God in their v~ue structure, 
(4) theit- views on the meaning and f!OUl'Ces ot disvalue" Slld 
l 
(5) the religiou$ e:a:px-ession o.t·values. Although some oza1t1cal 
----------~~---------------· ··-··-·--··--···- -·-
- -j --
com:ments and oomps.l!'ative eve.lua.t~ons tll*e .offered z-egu.laxtly-
th:rtougb.out the dissertation, the "Compal:*ativa S•l.1l'llf19.r7n 1n 
each ot the first five ehapte~s will serve to point up simil~ 
u1t1·e$ and d11'1"e:renoGa + fh& final. cha.pta:t* is more broadly 
evaluative, ·containing (l) a. survey o~ some of the nmjoxa 
o~itioiams wougb.t against the thought of the two.men. (2) a 
statement of the pos$1ble~relavancy ot the~ value theo~ias. 
and (3) a final. section Ulunma.l:*ising the oonolusions and oOlli-
pal'ative value$: :t'evealed in the whole stud7. 
3. Pl'evious Literature. 
7:b.$ ~evious litepa.ture dealing with the spec11"1c topic 
o:f this dissertation 1s ~aotieally- non .... existent.. !fha onl7 
I 
axceptiona lie in the ooeasione.l and mostly isolated re.fer-
eneas which may indicate some point ot simil.wity in the 
thought of' the two .man~ For $lWlnples 1 D. D*' Williams liats 
Bt-1ght:ma.n and Whitehead among so.rne other nehristian philos-
ophers Who have deve~oped on rational and experimental grounds 
th$ meaning of God's suffe:tting_,»1 w.., p., Mc:~Wen baa b:rought 
Brightman and Whitehead togetheJ:t 3,n EJG'Veral mean1ngflll com .. 
pa.risons especially 1n his e.xpos.1't1on of self-consciousnesa 
aft a craa.t1ve. synthesis. B:a says: 
That selt ... conaciou.s.neas is aueh a un1que·oom.• 
plex unity of given expe~ienea is a fundamental 
1. Williams, WPTT, ll4ll 
2 
I 
---- -- -
principle of the organic pl1ural1am advocated by Brightman and Whitehead. 
~aken separately there is still· not an over~abundance 
of l1tettature apecU1oally conoevned with the V,alue theory 
(or closely' related top1oa) of either. man. 'J.Ihere is lese 
matex-1a1 on Bxtigh'I;Jqan than 011 Whitehead. The basic writings 
pertuenfi to the topic of the i11sartat1on are.noted below~ 
a. Wx-1t1nge on Br!shtmants Value ThG?J7• 
Several recent docto~a~ dissertations sbrow some light 
on val*ious aspects ef BPigbtnuu:t•s thought. Geox-ge Straton. 
J:hlds tbat 
Brightman's 1s a vigorous and courageous at-
tempt to deal Pealiatically with the ~oblem 
of evil at its most acute epot••the Burd~ un-
necessary evUs of p~ioal prooesa .,2 
Hia conolus1ono, howeveP1 show some m1sundeFstand!ng ot 
Brightman's doctrine of The Given. Be says. tor instance~ 
that uBr!ghtman splits the personality of God in such a war 
that the outcome 1s not eoherent.n3 
In a oompar idem of some conceptions of personality in 
Eowne and Brightman, M. B. Queen observes that B.P1ghtman's 
chief contributions to a methodology of ~actical judgment 
The supremacy of the criterion of eohex-ence 
as applicable to all judgments and' especiall.J' 
1. McEwen,. ES, 257. Of. also 2381 239-240, 955. See a re• 
view of ES br Millard, Art. (1950), 1n which the posa1b1lity 
of a synthesis between tha two men is indicated at thiB point. 
2.- St:Paton1 BPG, lOOw :s. Ibid .. , J:.Ol .. 
to philosophical judgmentSJ the cent•~ function 
of personality 1n all judgments; a.nd the power 
of tveely pers\UUlod, agreeing persona alone to 
establish values.~ . 
The problem of d1svalue.reoe1ves some attention 1n a 
atudy ot B.ztightman's view of God b~ A. r. Glea.eon.2 'l'be 
value ot his ot.t1t1que1s g:reatly lessenjd 0,. a. somewhat 
careleaa statament ot Brightman's position •. Gleason teela 
.. ;, I I 
that the n.ot1on of Wb.e Given •makes God two sepa:ttate beings ....... 
one God the othe~ Satanic l1ke.u3 Ve~ contradict~ to the 
f1nd1ngs ot this pxtesent d1ssel'tat1on 1s GJ.eason 'a oonclusion 
that the "solution offered J:by :Brightma!Y fw the problem ot 
evil 1s or no religious or pbiloeophio value.•4 
More pe~t1nent to ~ightmants the~y ot value 1s one 
ot the most !'scent doctoral disaer"t;ations I by J. a. GQ.ltdner ... 5 
He finds merit 1n Brightman's values 1n that ttth$7 oonnote 
a genuine •elation. with existential reality and thus Pl"e""' 
serve the seeke~ foP values ~om ~ustration and disappotnt-
,6 
ment .u H1s ohief witiof.sms of Br'1ghtman are SunrtrJ.Q.Xtised in 
the .followinga 
B~ightman eShibits weakness {1) in his view of 
the 'Supreme Sout-ce' of value, {e) 1n his ten-
dency toward c1roulax"1~, (5) in his assertion 
that 'mind. is the only datum,' and (4)!1n hie 
disproportionate emphasis UPGll reason.· 
1. Queen, PPJ, 150. 
a. Gleason, CG!B. 
a. IJ;Jia •• .-.. 
4. Jbld., 260•26~. 
5t~ Gvdnw • REV. See especio.Uy Chap. IV where he :tteviews 
Brightmants value. theoey~~ 
6~ Ibid~, 105~106* _ 
7 .. Ibid., 2. 
4 
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Gardner r s wox-k has its pr !mary s ign1f'iea.nce 1n bringing 
togethe.v the thought of l.al"ightme.n and c. I. Lewis. 
Some helpful evaluations of Brightman' a thought are 
found 1n the xaeviews of his books" Among the more represen .... 
tat1ve are the following& 
Xn a ;pev1ew of NatUXte and. Valut1a, J. It. Howson sqsa 
The EWgumen'b is a seBJ'chiD.s c~1 tiq,ue of the 
superficialities of much ccntemparary philoso• 
ph1aing that claims for 1ts conclusions the 
certainty assogiate4 w1~ the ~eason1ng ot 
exact eo1ence .. J. 
Reviewing the same book, Jsmes Gutman reflects a less 
f's.vox-able :reaction when he says of Brightman's use of cex-ta1u 
tel'WJ the.t ttoontus1on can be hardly worse contounded.ua 
B. c. Hol trtelaw in a x-ev1ew ot ~ .. ,J?qi~oso,t?hl; of Ideals, 
says that 0 the volume sums up admirably the arguments tor 
pex-sonalistio ideal!~ and is a valuable contribution to the 
Ph11osoPb1 of values.n3 
'l'he high value of BP1ghtman.•s ~o Spiri~u.al I,ife, is 
.. 4 5 
brought out by A. c. l.'nud.son~t and A. G. Wid.gary. 
Two reviewa of ~Q rroblam of God represent different 
opinions. A. s. Woodburne is not unfavorable, but he :raised. 
this quest!ona 
What we have to decide is whethe~ the concept 
ot infinity is really one ot re11g1ous value 
5 
wh1eh we cannot abandon, and more ulti-
mately whethe:r there is evidence tw an 1 infinite Being behind this finite unive:rse. 
Unusually e:r1t1cal 1s the view Gf G. w. B$1swe.nger that 
8 the Prob~em of ~od belongs to the Ptolemaic era in the 
pb1losopb¥ of re11g1on.02 He accuses Brightman of not 
'Ulldel'Sttmding what is b~.ing done about the iciee. of God 1u 
other fields, a. g ... , psychology, aooialogy. nit is almost 
inoonoeive.ble," he says, "that ~ person could s$ utterly 
. 'lt3 misunderstand what, his own age is doing. 
P. A. Bertooc1 bas given a helpful e.nd fa.!t'ly exten ... 
aive ane.lysia in a review o£ p._.Ph,.;oaoJ!.I;y;,()f·Rel1Gipn.4 
·s e Some ot~ reviews are by A. E. Ave7• A. E. Gax-vie• 
. ., . 8 9 
W. G.., ~e~der• .. H. L+ Searles, . lit. 0·• Otto. 
Articles hav1ng part!~ar ~elevano1' for Brightman's 
doctrine ot God are by D .. o. Mao!ntosb., 10 And.xtew Banning, 11 
Rolarid Stabl.12 P. A. Bel'toooi discusses the 1ntel"relat1on 
. . ~ 
of the self, person, and the bo47•13 P. B. Johnson,~ and 
6 
' 
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Cornelius Krus$1 show the place of Brightman in contempo ... 
rt1U7 philosophy- w. o. Muel.Cler haa witten on Bl'*ightmanta 
social pb1losoph7~2 
Many contemporary books in the field of ph:t.los ophy 
and religion give mere or less attention to personalistic 
idealism as represented by Brightman. OPinions and crit1~ 
c1sms tztom many. ot these tUte :represented in the subsequent 
discussion. 
b~ Writings on Whitehead's Value Theory. 
For a treatment of Whitehead's ph1loaopby as a whole, 
Dottotny mmnet•s work on WhitaheaCJi",~"·PhilosoP& of .oP~nnism 
(1932) ia helpful 1n providing summary and olA1'1fioa.t1on 
of bls main ideas.- A. B. Jobl:laon, one of th$ most prolific 
commentators on Whitehead has written 11eoantly on White-
h,eac1's_.~eou. o~ ,neali!az. (1952). A French authw, Felix 
Cesseltn. has also.prepared a gen~al a~vey of Whitehead's 
main concepts in ,La, ,PhilosoRhio Orsm;g.us de t"Jhitehea~ (1950)" 
i 
Leas favorable towvti Whitehead thea the above writers 
are ll. K. Wells, who writes c~!tical.ly 1n Process and Unt'1$al.-
1tz (1950), and E. p. Shah.a.n 1n his book on Whitehead's 
~~oorx; o:r.,~er1enco,.· (1930). 
on the religious aspect ot Wh1teheaitts thought, s. L. 
Ely's monograph on The Religious Ava1la.bil1t:y: of Whitehead's 
, ..• 1 ... _, . - - • - .. 11 ... -· f -- ..... 
Go4 is a negative critique. 
~ ' 
1. -Eruse, ~t.(l953). 
s. Muelder, ~t.(l950). 
' . 
7 
It the book be taken as e. whole, .rr:he .. Philoaosv of, 
Al.fred .North VJhitehead (1941), edited. ~ p. A. Sch1lpp,. 
is quite 1ncU.spense.ble for a broad Sut.*Vef of Whiteheadts 
thought. In th1fil volume the art1oles by Lowe,l Gcheen,8 
B~ler,& and H~tahorne4 ~s ~ticu~ly helpful for the~ 
insights ato Whitehead's value theo17 and relevant probl·$JFUJ. 
The wol'ks of Cb.e.l'les I:Iel'tshorne, particularly Man_1_e 
Vision ot GQd (1941), and The D1V1n5l. R~lat1_v1tll: (1948), pxto• 
·-- ·- ·•·-" • • • •• - 4 • t --- - . . - -- - . . - - . 
vide occasional commentary and elab~atian of Whitehead's 
1d$aa .. 
In ~UX'!ps Sa.tisfaotio~ (1949),. w. P. McEwen goes 
pr1lnax-1Jty to Whitehead for a metapeys1cal basis fora his 
. concept ot the sp~1tual growth ot the 1nd1v1dueJ.. 
Some doctoval dissertations have contributed oonsid• 
erably to the Whitehead literature. 
E. J. Pols has explox-ad the idea of freedom in White• 
b.Gad'a thought.5 Roland Stahl has traced some of the po«Ss1,.. · 
ble influences of Bergson on Whitehead, including severa1 
ax!olog1oal insights. 6 A. 11. :taut.tma.n baa selected and 
disedsed the snalagous concepts of $~ vital, nisus, and 
creativity f:rom the thought of Bergson, Alexande:r 1 and Wh.1te..-
hea.d. 7 w. P. MOEwEm has explored the meaning anct powt:b. or 
8 
I 
individual pers~nal1ty 1n terms of Whitehead•s metap~sics.l 
Mo~a pevt1nent to Whitehead's specific value theo~ 
lllZ'& %:'aoent diaaez-tations by w .. 11. Leue.9 and R. M4 Mill.Bl'd. 5 
Laue findS the following "stutengthe" in Whitehead's notion 
ot values 
l. /JI.i/ points to a possible way out of tha 
Tmj'asse into which the study of the theo%7 
of value has C:Witted. 
2. His notion of value has an expanded univer .... 
$G.lit7, extending the discussion of values 
to fields trom which 1t was fovmerly ortan 
excluded. 
&. Bis theo17' sb.ows at least the pl*om!se of 
adequac,.··to deal with tlmdamenta.l value 
pPoblems-
4. W.a th$o;py seems te be su.pwiw to most in 
adaptability to changing concrete value 
a1tuat1ona,4wtthout resorting to complete relativism. 
Laue pioka the following as the main "weaknesses" ot White• 
head 1a'value tb.eOX'J"I 
1. It is based on vague, subjective and !r.-
rational stande.I'ds. 
S,tt It 1a one•sidea., giving a d.1spropwt1onabe 
amount of weighu to esthetic experience. 
3. It does not p:Povide a firm ba.aig foxa olJlll 
enlightened eth1eal principles. 
Millard • s wo:fk probabl-y eontains 'bhe most sustained 
account of Whitehead.ts theory ot value so ta.r- e1tten. Its 
1. Maben, WMI. 
Sit Laue, MFWV. 
3~ M!llarit P~. 
4.- Leu.e, MFTV ~ 442 • 
s._ Ibid,, 446.-
9 
oh1et value lies not only ~ the careful attention he gives 
to the development of Whitehead's axiology but in elucidating 
the metaplqa1ca.l prasuppoe1t1ons which make e. value structure 
possible., ~e ~1wu7 motif ot the diss~tat1on lies 1n the 
contention tba.t 
it is 1naccuz-a.te to speak ot Whitehead as hold ..... 
ing to a s 1ngl$ theor,- of va.lua.. Rather he 
tends to· move fltom a ooncept1on or intrinsic · 
value na 1nd1V1dual,- e:a:per1ent1al, m.ee.n1ngtul• 
teleolog1oal, active, atXJue.~, feeling syn• 
thea1s• .... tha concept d0ll.l1mult thl*ough.t~Ub his 
majo~ wnrks~~to a conception of a realm or 
objeotiva, subsistent, etema11 and unchanging l'l.atontc values in wh1oh the· tiltinite flux of 
feeling of the wol"ld of fa.ot . mexaely p&Ult1cd.• 
pates ....... tb.e oouoept dominant in his last pub ... 
lished workS .,.J. 
~e per1od1oe.l. literature on Whitehead is fairly ex ... 
tanaive~ not Qll ot it pe~tinen' to his ~iologr. Fo~ 
discussion or general or specific aspects of his thought, 
the follow!Qg are helpful# 
A. Ii-. Johnson, 0 Tb.e Intel11g1bU1t3"' of Whiteheattts 
PhUosopey,"e constitutes a repl,- to Urban's claim that 
the:re are un1nte~l1gible elemt.lnts !D. Wh1tehee4.3 His ~­
t1cle on 11 'Truth, Beauty and Goodness• 1n the Philosophy 
o£ A. N. Whitehead"' elefll"s up some diffieultiea raised b7 
others 1n regax-d 'bo these conoepts 1n Whitehead. The long 
~t1ole en "Whitehead's ~eory at Actual Entities: Defence 
1.- M1lla1*4,_ PVWT 1 49;, • 
e. Johnson, Al-t. [1943). . 
a. see Urban, Avt.(l939), and Art~(l944)~ 
4. Johnson, Art.(l944) .. 
10 
_ ..... 
and Or1tieism,111 al.tio by .Tobnuon, 1s a good int~oduction 
to Whitehead's though'b .Ill· 
Ohe.rlas Hartshorne's utlcle, nan Some Ol*1t1c1sms of 
Wh1teheadts Ph1losop~1 119 d.:tscuesas several. pertinent ~ob• 
lems sussestad b,V Whitehead's metaph¥s1os, p~ticulav~ the 
question of inclusiveness ~f prehensionth 'fhs.t he does not 
succeed 1s the contention of Jobn Blyth, who :tteplies to 
Hartshorne 1n the· article, "On Mr* ~'bshornett:J Undex-ste.nd-
ing of Whitehead's PhilosoPb.f•"a 
Everett Ball raises an interesting point of discussion 
1n "Of What ·use ax-e Whitehead's Eternal Objecte?114 B1a a-
ewer is that the7 Sl*e ot little ox- no use. Geel'ge oant17 
. . .. 
un.deP .a s1m1lar top1e, 11Eteli':n.al Objects mad the PhUosophy 
' ' 
of OVganism," contends an the ether hand, tha.t "the theOJT 
ot actual entities provides no basis for the explanation 
of the emergenc$ ot novel t~s.n5 Gent~ is alao c~itical 
of Wb.it&herutta doctPine of expe:rience in 9 The Subjeot 1n 
Whitehead's PbUosophy. nfl 1. M. Millard contendS in his ar-
ticle,. n!l!he Ghost of Ets:rnalism 1n Whitehee.d·•s Theory of 
Value," that Whitehead obanges .f:ttom a temporal. 1st to an. 
etwnallst. e · 
ll 
Other rep~esentative articles, v~iously related to 
Whitehead's thought, are by Vlastos,1 BoopaP,e Ushenko~8 
stabbing, 4 Fwsyth~ 5 l.lUnbam, 6 Laurence. 'I 
Key reviews of the books fltom Whitehead's metapbye1oal 
and value period are given by Swabey~8 Wr1ght,9 stebb1ng,10 
. .12 . 11 &u-n,U Ritchie, · Lath . 
MQre closely 1'elated te the problems aesooia ted with 
value are the toUowinga 
Morgan's art1ele~ UWhitehead's !he~y of Value."14 
shows that Whitehead's empbe.$ en value 1s an 1ntegl'al part 
of his thought.· Goheen Wl'1tes anotb.al;a ot the veey few art1-
oles on "Wb!teheaAts !be~ of Value.n;s Bixler's article 
on ttwhitah&e.d r s Ph11osoptq- of Religion, n16 Moxley on ttr.rhe 
Conception &f God m the Philosophy of Whitehead, u17 and 
Ba.rtshorne's discussion of 11Whitehea4's %4ea of God,n18 ee 
helpful in assess1ag Whitehead's views on rel1s1ous values~ 
12 
-In regard to the l*$leva.nc,- of Whitehead t s thought fo'l!' 
the oontamporel:'Y wox-ld, one ot the all too 1r.lf!tequent ap" 
p~aisals is the article by A• H~ Jolmeon on 11'l'he Social 
PhUesopey of A~e4 North Wh1 tehead. ul Ji., N. Bender- has 
also written an ~tiole entitled "Whitehead's Impl1e~ Social 
Eth1Cfh118 ~e articles by towa,3 Hal.'tshcnme,4 and Jobnsou5 
which constitute the small book, ~1ta,bead .. and. the. Mo(ie:rn 
Wo.Pld, give some f\u*the:P 1ns1gb.ts into tb.a relation or White"" 
head's thought to oontempwa.ey science and civ1lizat1orh 
l3 
CHAPTER ONE 
~ CONCERN OF BRIGB!MAN Aim WBXfmmAD WITH VALUE PRODLDS 
A. BP1ghtmma. 
1.. SUX'Vey of Writings e..a Related to Value. 
Bl.-ightm.an t s 1ntW$St in the problem of value goes baok 
to one of the ee,xtlieat phUosoph1ru:t.l articles he wrote en• 
titled "IJ!he Lisbon l'fal'thquekeo A Study in Religious Value. ... 
t1onn{l9l9l•l In this ru.-t1cle he shews how the great oatas-
tx-ophe of 1'755 affected the th1nld.ng of Vcltatx-e, Rousseau, 
Kant,. and ·wesley. Part1cul.erJ.7 · signitioant tot* this ohapter 
and as anticipative of his lat~ emphasis on oohePence as ~ 
oriter1an of both t:r.wu.th and valus·ia his declaration that 
8 1t iii! 1mpoas1ble to separate one's judgments of value from 
one's total system of ideas, and understand them 1n isolation 
•• , Valu.e .. Ju.tlgments are judgments of the whole personal lite. ~2 
The next ye~ ~ 1920, ~ea majC!' · ax-t1cl.es appeazaed, all 
" < 
of whiCh ax-e cbaraoter1zed by a.· e--ons eD\\')basis on the s1g• 
nif1aance of values. , In the fil"at, "Ph1loaopbT' 1n American 
Educat1cntt, 3 which he . contributed to the fil'st 1asue of 
Thef_PePs_onall:st, he declares that the ver7 aim of ph1lo,aop'b:y 
should be to st1mu.late student 1n1t1at1ve· towa.rds the finding 
14 
--
ot 1an intelligent 1.f~k1ng hypothesis as to the tonal meaning 
.. ~·. . . . 
ot life and its va1uee~n Be adds that 1f a philosophy deplU*t ... 
m.ent does not som~ do this "1t ta..Us to Sel''Ve as a u.ta.!..f1• 
ins and 1de~l1sms fox-ce in sduee.t 1m; it loaes the (P*eateet 
opportu.n1ty- opan to t:atg department et an American ·college.nl 
Ill the second Dt1cle, "fhe Personal.1et1o Method 1n 
PhUosop):Jwu,a Br1shtma:n closel-7 1cientl1t'ies pera.,..a.na. values~ 
It is ene of his oenclu~1ons that nparsonal1s.t1c method may •• ~ 
be rag~ded as the ~opev inst~t tor a ph1loap.pbf of life 
and V11lue.u8 F~om this oonelu.aian B.l.-ightman ~evea- variett• as 
his subr:u~quent 'flllit1ngs show. · 
fhe tb!.J:td Uttiole of that yaaJ:> wa.a titled 0 Medern :tdee.l.• 
1am11 , 4 71h1ch latex- beOG.m$ the basis o:t Chapter VI 1n his 
f.L .. J~4~q~oJl>.l ot Ifl.Gal.o and was called tb.e:l*e "Idealism as a 
Oontempo~ PhilosoPb,r.•5 In that ebapte~ be lists four 
cha:tt-aoteP1at1ct:r ef mode~n idealism. the last be1ng ita 
'*~phas1a on the problem ot values~ n$ 
liquall.i' ~1ch tor thea valuE! content were 'bh.\tee fll*t1• 
cles Viltibiu~n 1n .1911, each of wb.1-ah 'becge the aubstantial. 
basis fox-- later book_ ohap'bers. ·~e -:asks Oonfxtont:J.ng ~ 
15 
Pevsonal1$t1c Philoaop~1tl became "~asks Oonfltont:tng contem• 
porary- Idealism." 1n fJ. .. PhUQsun!;ll. t)f , Id.eals • 2 In the · B.Xtt1ole 
he sqs that "perhaps the meet important" task facing phUoso ... 
phy toda7 is tta. persons.l1st1e philosophy of value,.n3 In the 
ohapte!l he saya ot value that "ot all the ;pl'c'bl,lems of' philoso., 
phy none is closer to the b.e!U"t of 11f~ than this; indeed, it 
1s the Ve%7 :Pl'Oblem ot the heal't of 11fa.-u4 '.fhe :othe~ two 
artie1es, •!ne Mo.Pe"than8 Httman Values of Rel1g1on95 and 0fte~·. 
l1s1eus values and Recent Philosophy"~ 6 became Ohaptet-a v7 and 
VI ttespectively 1n !ie~yio'US. Value~, ·with no change 1n title 
and no substantial. altePa.tion of text • !fhese chapters ( es""" · 
peoiall'f.the torm.er) furnish ocmsidexeable matw1a.l. Zor.t lateX' 
discussion ot Brightms.n•s -rel1s1oua values. 
In 1918 two ma'or ~t1oles deal spec1f1ea11y with value. 
mtoept tot! vaey- minoXt Ohangee, the tf.t*st, entitled "fll'uth end 
Value 1n .Rel1g1cm",8 appefU:ted. la.te:tt 1n }1~11s1ous Values as 
Chapter. III under the aam.e ti'tllE:h ·The i'Jla!n ~oblems of the 
attticle Sl'e tbreea 1. A:l!e values aubjeet to logical 1nvest1-
gat1oa1 s- Does the value $t rel1g1oa demonst~ate its truth? 
l6 
a. How 'Wl'J true 'Vlllue be disttngu.ishad. from apparent value? 
fbJ.s chapter has oonsid~able s1gn1f1oance tor any discussion 
of the no1-ms of a-eligious values,. The second e.xaticle appeN.ted 
1n W1lm C ed~:), fi~udie,t:~ in. :,h1lqso.P8f and ,7.'heol()R• Wlde:tt the 
title. nuao.-.Fsal1at1o fheOl'ies of Va.lue,.nl Ot prime 1mpo:r'""" 
tance h~a is Brightman's criticism of the value8theor1es of 
Spaulding and Par~. 
Except .fox- a review, the onl,- two majoz- aFticles whieb. 
:Brightman wrote in 1924 were deeply conce:ttned with values. 
~e one entitled nfhe OontX'ibut.ion of Philosophy tc the Tb:eoey 
of nel1g1ou.s Educatio:o.na became the last ohaptw 1n .~el1&1ous. 
Val~e$ 1 thare callei 11lh1loaop~ and Religious Education." · 
fhe aben,sth of this ob.apter ia BP!shtman.•s insistence that 
religious education must be "rooted 1n a eohettent view ot re• 
l1gious valuaa.n3 fhe othe~~ ~~~Meaning of Obligation"~' 
was retitled "The Moral. Ba~J'1S 81: Religious Valuea" and in ... 
eluded as Ohe.ptQII II of ,Re;;iJ,31,0UiJ Ve.lut!s,. 6 'l'he conclusion of 
his lUltiole•chapter is that 11l.*ttl1g1ou.s values jJ #.rest on a 
mo:r:-al be.a1s.n6 
-~,- ___ - -r. 
l7 
l, Bx-.t.ghtme.n;a; Arih (1922 )1· 
s,. Bltigh'tlnan, Aztt * (l9S.4) ,. .. 
3. Bx-ight!Mn, llV, 241., This chapter and BPightmn's Ax*t.(l920}l 
constitute a sound ·basis tor ocnside%"~tion of Brightma.n''S 
educational ther>vy.- Jblcept for seattexaed refel"ences in his 
late~ ~1tings he does not alabo~ate his views, but eve~ 
oo~se he te.u.ght was a.·demonstz-ation ot the 1nseparab1l1t7 
of adu.oation and va.lu§• 
4~ BPightman,. Art. Cl9S4) • 
5,. See Brightman:~ RV • 14. 
e .. Ibid .. , ea •.. 
Bl-ightmante 1tel1(i1oue V'a:~u~s, five chaptel's ot whioh 
have al~eady been noted. appeared 1n 1995. This was one of 
his fi:rst books with a ph1loaoph1oal emphasis •1 Published in 
' . 
the same year was his In,~rt:Jduqtion t~ Ph.ilo.~o:p&,. Brightman r s 
th-st eystemat1o approach to the philosophical ~oblems of 
thought and experience.. !he la,vge place g1 ven to value 1!1 
th1s book 1s age.1n indicative of his concel*n with axiological 
poblems. Even g:aeafser empbaaie 1$ acoox-4ed to value in th& 
revised edition of the same wox-k published twenty .... s 1x yea:rs 
late.xa"' 
~e period just dese~!bed- ~om 1919 to 192~, rep~esents 
l.S 
a mountain peak of interest 1a value considerations. From .1925 
to 1958 theve B.l'f) no ma3or EU.'ticl.es or books with value as the 
main theme. ft. ,Ph~;tosophl of ,I~!!a;s, appe~ed 1n 1928, with onl7 
scattered ~eferenees to values, the most tmpo~tant of which 
have all'eady been noted s.bove~ In ~e Pltoblem of GOd (1930) 
two .tact a are wo:t-th7 or note t :First, Bt»1shtznan uses the oon .... 
capt of value as an ~gament for God,a and secand, the d1tt1• 
oulty 1n the attainment of value is indicative of God*a l~ 
itat1on~ In Th~ ~~1.fui~ns of. God (1931), a companion book to 
the former, 3 ~1ght:ma.n l'l'lakes the se~ch fol' God "a aearoh fo'l! 
the purpose of lite and tor an u1'1fa111ng souzaee ot eternal 
value.114 file neat ye9.1'1 J:t:lGQd aPerson (1932), was 
l. In 1918 he oollate4 considevable mateFial 1n a work called 
, ne Sources ot the Hexateuch. 'fbia was his fi:rst book. 
a •. :SZ.igiitmrin~ PG. l57w 
3., ~1ghtman~ FG, ll~ 
4. Ibid., as. 
l published. The most pertinent statement for the theory of 
value 1s his definition ot God as 0 one who wol'ks .. •whethel' 
with us o~ 1n spite of us-.... to attain the highest values and 
the most perreot love.112 
The aeoond peak o~ interest 1n value as revealed bJ" 
BPightman's W%'1t:1nga 1s with the appea.I'a.nce of Mo~al Lf1WS 
(1933). , As will be shown 1n the next section, this book, 
although a. work on ethics, 1s axiological tlwoughout. That 
the p>;-oblem of ethics 1S one of the major p%'oblems of a.:d.• 
ology, o~ v1oe versa, is implied 1n his view that the task 
ot ethics is to 8~eveal what value (good) ought (dutJ') to 
be obta1necl."3 
F.t-om 1934 tbl'tough 1940 the publtce.t1on with most s1g-
n1tioe.nce for Br1ghtmarr's value theery was his al't1ole, 
"An l'Bmp1%'1aal Approach to· God~,~ 1n which he shows the inter• 
relation between God, value, persons, bel metapb7sioa. 
~ginning with the prtnt~ng of A Philps,ol!BY . ot:. Reltston 
(1940) until 1945, anothel" mou.nta.1n range of 1ntereat ·in value 
1a atta~e4. ~1ghtman's conoe~n tor value 1n his religious 
thought is . considered 1n the next section ~nd will not be 
anticipated he:re. The same yea%', and quite important for an 
undezaste.nding of Bl'.-!ghtman' s social thought, is his a.tttiole • 
1. fb1s little book first Qppeared as a short series of leo-
ttn'es delivered befol"e the Y"" M. c. A. in Nashville., Tenn., 
See IGP, V11io 
2. Brightman• IGP, 4«?-47. 
3* Bltightm.a.n. ML, l.4at 
4'4 Brightman .. Art.(l937). 
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"Freedom, Purpose_ and Value.nl His emphatic presentation 
thel"'e is that ntzteedom .... ~posewvalu.e'* ia the "presu~osition 
or a.U social struct'UJ."e and ot all oommun1cat1on. They a.fle 
the social a prio~i.ua 
In l94S Bvightman p:Pov:tded. the entry on u.A:s:iolo§"a 1n 
Bunas (ed.), Aict.~Qrull'l-, ~.t' PhilosoP'b;t• It is one of the longer 
contributions, with mwe than two columna ot text. In the ap-. 
tiele he s1vea a brief historical sketch and then discusses 
the nature,. types, criterion, 
That sam.a ye~W b.1a book, 
and metaphysical status ot value. , 
The Sp~:t,tual Lite, was published. 
~· - - . .. - . . ..•. . .. -· - . . . ~ .. 
What he aaya about the ll'elat1onahip of spirit and values should 
not be ovel'looked in a.sseasing his total contv1bution to value 
lite~ature. Whe~etioal treatment of axiology Ear se ooQUpies 
no more than a score ot pages, but what is impo:rte.nt 1E& Bviaht ... 
man t s oonoept of the Llpbtitual lite as a· special dilnension Of 
value experience. 8 !he life of value aa a whole is the spir~ 
1tual 11re,n4 
Also pt-1nted5 1n 1942 was Bl:-ightman t s contx-1but1on to the 
Thi!'d Sympeeiu.m on Science, PbJ.losopb;r1 and Religion. HiS papw, 
"!be Problem of an Objective Basis for Value Judgments"~ as the 
title sugges,s, deals with a very tmportant aspeet ot value 
theOX'Y• 
TWo articles in 1943 and 1944 e.ra important. nvalues,. 
Ideals, Norms, and Ex!stence111 adds &ash inaigb.ta, and re~ 
veala a more relaxed app~oaoh, to the pape~ and problem men-
tioned tmmed1ately above. A paper entitled •Ph1losopbica1 
Ideas and lindur1ng Peaca111 wh1ch he oontro1buted to the Fo~th 
Symposium on Science, Ph11osopbr1 and Religion contains valu• 
able state~nts on the relation of values and persona. 
The pxtoduct1ve pexaiod f:ttom 1940 to 1945 was clima:a:ed b7 
the mcst intensive account ot value thewy in Bt-1ghtman's 
writings,. via., N~ttt:ra and VaJ.l1es ~ The book 1s s1gn1fioant 
on two counts: F1l'st, 1t appeal'ed 1%1 the yeB.f! that Wol'ld 
91 
wa:r. II came. to a close, when a value theme we.s very pertinent 
to the task of :reconstl'uct1onJ and s tutond• b7 its emphasis on 
personalism and tbei~ 1t offered a olear~cut alternative to 
1mperaonal1am, dialectical mate~ialiS.m, and naturalism. Based 
on his Pondxten Lectures delivered at Southern Methodiat Univer-
sity, the book elaborates Brightman's belief that "the spirit*" 
ual conflict und~l71ns the social turmoils of o~ age can best 
be understood 1n the light ot a philoso~ o:f personal1sm.11a 
In that £1a.me yaa.t:- he wrote one major article pertinent to 
value~thear,r ent~tlad "A Pe~sonaliatic View of Human Nature.~4 
S1gn1f'1cant tor th1a cU.soussion 1a the :t*elationship which h£t 
shows between value and ohoice.,l Also 1n 1945 are the ve:ey 
bl"ie.t entries • uAxiologr11 and 11Valu.e" in F~ ( ed. ) , :Enezclq ... 
aedia ,o~ ReliGion. 
Fx'om 1945 to 1.951 the only faot pertinent to the problem 
ot az!ology was the prominent place given to values 1n the 
revised edition of h1s ,Int~od.uct1_~ to P1lilo_so2h.V•· 
Brightman's 'O'n!versitJ'.Leoture, Pe~sons and Values-a 
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in 1958• ~ks not Only anothet- high peek of his ax1olog1oal 
wr1t1ngs, but it 1s the last,. and perhaps the most important, 
statement on values since the publication ot Natu:re __ and_. Val'tJ,es. 
It is fitting that this leoture should be, 1n a very literal 
3 sense, the last ma.3el" publ1o atatement of hit1 own philosopb;y. 
A study of the published monogttaph shows that it contains, 
in h1gbly ooncentx-ated fol'm.s the best that B%*1ghtman had been 
s~1ng about pe~sons and valu~s einoe 1910. 
In the above sketch of J.'W1gb.1sman*a value writings, :tour 
tU.sttnct peaks ·tl:t inte:t'eet are cbsenable* First, is the 
earl1e$t period of activity ~inattng 1n the publication 
ot Ro11§l1ousH Values, and ~t~cduotion tp Pb4lo!3o.P!§: 1n 1925. 
Tho aecond peak is the appearance ot MtWa~ _Laws 1n 1933,. The 
highest point is reached at the end of the th~d period, 1940• 
1945, with N'a.tve, und_ Ve.~~es. The final peak ie PersoQ ·and 
yalue$, the University L~otura ot 1962. 
l,. Bl:'igb.tman, Axat. (1945). 
2-. Afterwards printed 1n booklet to~ as py., 
a. At th1s time and until he 41ed 1n Feb~,-, 19531 his 
activities were limited to a v~y small teaebing load and 
a greatl,- ~educed. w:v1ttng schedule. 
B. Influence of Value Oons1de!i'at1ons in his Thought S.f\' 
a Whole. 
fhe Semin~ 1n 9 B1sto:ey of the Pl-oblam of Valuen which 
Bl'igb.tman taught at Boston Universtt,-1 was more than a his ... 
to~ical survey of aa1ology as t~eated b7 the great ph1loso• 
phers; it wa.s, R.eta ~.~, a signitios.nt value experience tor 
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eveey member of the class. It is one thing to read about e. 
phUoaopher•s value .the~J it is anoth&l' thing to he.v.e tlmt 
'hb.eo~ p:r:-opounded 1n person by one whose own 11f.e and thought 
were motivated and gu1d$d by au intense devotion to the deepest 
axiological. norms. No single tact discovered in :reseat'oh and 
px-operly embodied in a scholarly a:-1t1que could conve,- so well 
the truth that this section would coll'm.\U.n1cate • vis .. 1 tbat Bt-isht .... 
man's value theo17 1s the key not only to his life, but to his 
whole thought. It fact .rathe:r than feeling is neo:ess917 at 
tb.ia point, then one of Bl:&ightme.n's own statements 1s ample 
evidence of the opinion exp:tt"essed., He $&1d in one Sem:tna.x* ses ... 
sion, "Knowledge ot value is the No~th Star ~which I steer."9 
As seen above, the sheer quantity of Brightman's wr1tinge 
on value 1mpliea the importence wbioh axtolog!oal oons1dera. ... 
t1ons had in hie thinking. As xaelated 1ntel'nally to his 
thought struct~e* his ph1losopbical expositions proceeded 
&om one basic assumption, that persons and theil' values (and dia• 
values} are the onl.y real things in the wol"l.d. 'fhia 1s net to 
1.. 'l'he sollool year t 1948"""'9• 
2. Class notes, "H1sto%'7 of the Problem of Value 6 11 Boston Uni• 
vevsity, 1948•49. 
ah1tt the problem a.wa'll from values to pe:rsons, fo'f.' the two 
cannot be separated* "All ••• persons are va.luE!s,.-nl and val .... 
u.es, in tuxrn, exist only in persons. "It is unthinkable that 
any value should exist Bl11Where oX:" acyhow save in and :tor a 
personal oonsoiousness .••2 No ph1losoph1ceJ. theoxwr, thtiU.'efox-e ,_ 
can eaoape the axio--parsonal 1mpl1cations ot experience. 
uEvery problem of exietenee oent~a about the nature of per-
sons and the~ valuea,n aai4 ~1gntman in his Univers1t7 Lee~ 
5 
tura. All of the major philosophical issues with which 
Bl"ightman wrestled demonetx-ate this point of view., His main 
interests were etbiru:tt religion, and metapb.J"sics. The follow ... 
ina data show h&w in each of these s.:vea.a 111mowledge ot value" 
W'a$ indeed his guiding stal."t 
a. Bth1cs. 
Up u.ntU ·1933, Brightman had vitten five books and ~ 
EU"tiolas 1 but beyond two or tbzaee l*eviews and 1t1Jol.ated l:*'efa.r-
enoes thl'*oughout his writings, it· cannot be shown that Bxtight~ 
me.n had mozte than a pa.ssirtg 1ntereat in ethics as an area for 
:reseaitoh and study~ It is somewb.a.t s1gn1t'ioBnt 1 therefore~ 
that When he 414 ~oduoe a major work on ethics in Moral taws 
(1933) that the basic mot it sho'\U.d be a.x1olog1ea.1. 4 
1., Bl'ightman, PV, 16. See also NV 1 lEh "In personality is 
the only 'PUly 1ntx-1ns1o value we know or oan oonce1ve. 0 
2. BI-ightman, SL, llS. 
5. Brightman, PV, a. 
4. see B1'1ghtman, mz., 89, where a pz-el1m1ns.ry synopsis ot 
the entire system is given~ 
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Of the eleven moral laws wb1ob he enunciates, six are 
classitied under the seot1on which he o~lls ·~e Axiological 
Laws, 11 while two of the three propositions listed undw "The 
Pe~sonal1stic taws» are 1n terms of values.l BPightman sa7s 
of his own presentation that uit d$Velops from abstract fo~­
malism, IJ.. Eh j •The FOl'mS.l La.wa!l to concrete value and 
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atUl more concrete personalit7•"2 The Axiolog1oa.l Laws ex-
press the value p:tt1no1ples which a good will should embody, 
whUe the Pevsona.l1st1o Laws show what conduct ought to .follow 
from "the fact that Value iS alWay'S all. experience or pE)l•sons., n3 
A bvie~, cursory a~ ot .these laws will be suff1o1ant to 
subatantie.te the view that Bt-ightman's ethical theo17 1s 
~~111 axiolcgioalt 
All perst)ll.$ should be consistent in willing ends which 
ax-e not cont;ttad.1otoey. In a.ckaowledgillg ends o;r ideals • 
obligation to ob67 1s at once establ!shed. These moxae fo%*l'J'Ja.l 
aapeots.pass into the axiolcg1cal 1n the actual tmp1ementat1on 
. . 
ot· the willed ideals, where., 1'b fol.lna, (l) that only har• 
mon1ous values should be aoh1eve4• (2) that the consequenees 
of such ohoices be considered~: (3) that .tn eveey given sit• 
uation the highest value should not o~ly be selected, but 
(4) values i'elsvant to that situation should be developed• 
(5) the..t the widest l:lange ot value$ be realized, and (G) that 
1. tt~e Law of Individualism" and "fhe Law ot Altruism." 
2 • Brightman, ML, 9Ch 
a. Ibid., 90., 
all lesser values be controlled by the highel' values., As 
applied to peX'sons, these laws mean that eaoh 1ndiv1dual is 
not only ~espons1ble fer developing the m~un values 1n his 
own life, bUt must recognize the 1nt:t*.tns1c value of other 
pe~sons and the possibility of cooperative eff~t in the p~Q* 
duoflion and increase of values not possible fw tho individual 
alone. The ultimate guide bo the selection and a.tta!.mnent of .. · 
value ought to ba the ideal oonception of what a pexas·on can 
beootna as an 1nd1v1du.d. and as a member ot society. 
This pveponderantly ax1o•centr1e statement of ethical 
the0%7 carr!es out 1!1. publ.1c p~int what Brightman emphatically 
expressed 1n the olassroom, vis o, the opinion that "ethics 
ought to be derived f~omva1ues. !be theo~ of value is 
lal."gW than ethics. nl 
b .. '* lel1g1on. 
· It 1s p~t of the avowed pmapose o:t this paper to show 
that rel1g1ol.ls values fol'm e. major ptUtt of Bltightman's gene~al 
value theory; 8 hel\ce oill.y a. few prel1mina17 zaetnaX'ka need be 
made here to 1nd1cate_b1a. "ooneernu for value in the rel1g1nus 
aspect of his thought~ It is · BX*1gb.tman' s op1n1on that nou.x.-
experrience consists of ~ ent.ire oonseicnua l1fe"1 including 
the experience of ~el1g1on. ,It ~s .. an em;ebtiee.l fap,;t that lll&D; 
QX'e rel1s1ous, but what is religion? "The s~vey of tha taets 
. ·- . - . . . - - - , . 
1. Olasa notes, 0 H1st0l'J' of the Problem ot Valuen, Boston 
· trll1vvs1'by', 1948-49. 
2 • Pri..marily · Chapter V~: . 
S* J3lt1ghtman1 POR1 1., 
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ot rel1g1o.rt. •• has revealed the fundamental ta.ot that evel'y ra-.. 
lig1ous expeit1enoe 1s an eape!'1enee of value .... Religion ia a 
Ob.o1oe of value, a.. com.mitmen;h to 1t.n1 Like all other tra.lues 
religion. 1a subject to ox-1t1oal exam1nat1on and is not exemp~ 
from the neeessity of canto~ to the laws of reason and 
cohel'eno&. Because of its funet1on, however, as an expreas1en 
of devotion tc some valu$ tbat 1s oeu1drn-etl sup:t-eme 1 1t as• 
au.mea somewhat of a pPefer.l'ed. pasition 1D the hieral'ch'y of 
values. !his is Bt-1ghtman*s position, although not 1n the 
sense that relig1ou$ values have an1 ~eater intrinsic tmpov~ 
tance t;ban some of the others. It 1s impossible, says Bright• 
man" to gtroup the 8 b1ghe:tt values 1n a scale of 1nol'ea.s1ng ex• 
cel.lenee • 118 but it . is stUl probable that religious values 
have not onlr a ~eater.inolusiveneas, but imply a more baaie 
adjustment ·to t~ totality of the universe. 'fb.ia seems to be 
wha.t lb*ightwm is sa~!llg when he declares tbe.t nthe whole en• 
te~prise of ~elision 1a based on tbe faith that what is t~ 
valu.abl.e is also l'eal and eterne.1.08 This puts the appzaeo1a. ... 
tion of cosm1.c values ato the heart ot ~el1g1ous eape:r:t1enoe. 
nael1g1on is an exper1ede of value ••• :tt 1s also a faith 1n 
the ~1endliness of the un1ve~se to value.04 
1. Bltightman, POR. sa. · !h1s quo'baticn is not meant tc impll" 
that this is Brightman's full definition of·relig1on. 
O:t. POR, 17, But wha.tevett else xaeligion 1s_. it 1s. a.ceol*,.. 
ding to B:t'ightmsa, an eape:t~t1enee ot value. 
2. Ib1c:t.1 97. In ITP, 148• he does have such a scale with relig on as the highesu. 
1., Brightman, RV 1 74a · 
. 4, Brightman,. Poa. sa. 
Aa 1n his ethical theo17, so ln his re11g1oua outlook$ 
~1Qlogv is seen to be his bas1c motit~ B1s w~;a work, 
.~el:tsioua Vs.lueq, is the outaue.nding ~labore.t1on ot what re• 
11g1on means in an asiologioal context. Not quite so apecif!c 
in the development ot this relationship is his ~~ setrttual 
I41fe, but he is insistent that ttap.W1t is s. system ot personal 
valuea.ol Even mo~a at~ongly 1a his statement that uthe ~ife 
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o:r value aa a whole is the epil-itu.al 11fe,n2 The axiolog1eal 
ex.prea~1on of l'el1g1on is dominaDt 1n.h1s ~h~QS~RPf ~t ~ne11s1o~. 
~!'here ~lue eappeara as an flt2gwrten't tol' God,5 for ~alitt:v,:' 
while the Ve'l!'f worth of l'$lig1oua e.:£pel'ienee· itself' is established 
•- - ~ '. ' I 
only as it uoa.leseee with other values 1%1to a l1velg whole.,5 
~· ot his articles show no less intez.est .:f.n the ttelation ana. 
:tnterdepenctenoe of values and x-el1g1on. a 
th Metaphyates. 
In his tJn1V'era1ty LectW!"& BVigbtm.an gava the epitome of 
his pbJ.losopb3r when he, without. a.n,. qualitioation, said that 
ttave:ey- ~obltmi ot ex1&~;tenoe cente:ra about the na1n.wa ct parsons 
and the!x* Vf1lues.n'1 B:P!ghtman's own pb.ilosoph:!cal expositions 
adequately aemonst~ate oth& axio-peraonal ax1am. It is a rare 
cbapt~ ox- al'tiCJle that ~oea not refer directly or by !mp11oat1on. 
to the axper1eneing self as the starting point of all know-.. 
ledge and the locus ot au value experience.· The px-obl.ems 
ot metapt;wsios, which at tix-st glance might seem to be mwe 
detached f~am persons and values. are no less involved 1n the 
axio•peraona.l YJtllta:nrJ,oha.t;3l!Mi• Values and metaph;rsioa involve 
each othex-. It one thinks about the status of values in the 
universe, he cannot escape mstaphys1csl1 On the othel' band, e. 
meta.phy'sioal 1n.quir:r must eventually be :t.-elated to persons and 
their values .. 
If we wish to think truly about value. we must seek 
to think t7!ul:r about Peal.1ty as a whole. · OUJ.'i human 
values not only 1nteppenetvate each otheF, but · 
value and all realit,r also mutuall7 1nte.rpenet~ste.l 
fhe evidence for the vh'ttual 1dent1fica.t1on of the poblem.s 
of value ruad metaphws1cs in &-igb:bman' s thought !s by no means 
d1tt1cult to evtnee- It 1a his personalistic mata~sics that 
make$ both nature and values pa.rta ot the ax-ea. of experience 
Which ia open to mstapbys1oal investigation. Values ~e rooted 
deep in existence, th&~efoXte metaphysical methoda and norms ma.7 
be applied in. the 1nvest1ption of theJJ.;- status in the universe. 
Value ju.<i.gtn$nts must have an. ob3eetive :t'e.te:renee wh1oh makes 
possible the co~:reot1ng ot er:t-oneous elaims,. w val:ue expe:tl'1,enee 
1$ chaos. Such objectivity is found in the Suprem$ M!.nd who 
knows all tl'Uth and has appreciative experiences e.f val.ue norma. 
In b.xaiet, it is more coherent to say t:hat value judgments re~ 
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to objeot1ve cla1ma which reality makesl than to explain them 
a~ pa~chologioally. Metaphysics and values are inseparable 
because they refer to the same woPld. Aocprd1ng to pePaonal-. 
ism, the onlJ envil'cnment we have is · otb.er personality. 9 What 
we call nat~e is part of the divine experience which also tn" 
eludes values of the spirit., 3 !his . is not to make nature and 
values exactly coextensive, as value experience is probabl7 on 
a highel' level than that aspect of the divine consciousness 
which 1s expressed as ns.tut"e. 4 But in b%'1ng1ng them togeth~ 
1n the m1nd ot God the worlfl.is p:reserved .from a hopeless 
b1~oat1aa wh1chwoul4 el~tnate all seeming possibilt~ of 
,collaborab1on between the wwld ot nat'lU'e a~ the world o.f sp1:r1t. 
Personalism says the~e 1s one world.. 6 . Br1ghtm.an. t e whole 
book, Nature and .va~ues, 1s dedicated.to that pr-oposition. 
11What I want to know mo:r.-; thaa anyth1¥1g al.se, 0 he aq:;s, 0 1a 
whetb.el' the world of natura and the world of pe:rsons are on the 
side of 11.te r a b1ghes'b values or are l'Uthlessly 1nd1.fferent to 
them.n6 o~ a personalistic meta~s1ca, Brightman believes, 
. . 
gives the knowledge he seeka, via ... a universe 1nd1fferent 
neithex- to the cla~ of nature nor .to values. but a wo:rld of 
eeopwa,1ve effwt where the l'ealimation of the highest values 
~e possible, not in spite of, but beoause of the ~iendly 
and COII'lpat1ble envuonment which natura s.f'i"Ol"ds. 
B. Whitehead* 
l- S\Wvay- of ~itinga as Relata4 to Value., 
Since Whitehead has no syst·eme:b1G t:veatmant of value as 
such in either books o~ a~t1cl$S 1 the~e can be no ~eoounting 
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ot h1s vat.ue writings quit$ oomp~ablEt to the pretJeeding s~vey 
of Br!ghtme.nts wol'kS_. The VJ.f.\teXtie.l whi<lh follows consists of 
a b:r:taf' su:t»vey of some p~tioulu ~alu.e passages .. along with a 
utat~ment of tl::te books most eign1t1oan'b for an axpos1il1on of 
Whitehae.d. J s valu·e th<eovy. 
!l!he notion ot value at a majel' eono$pt in Whitehead's 
philosopbJ emerges at the beginning of what is known as the 
metaph7f!1oal pe:r;t1o4 of his life, 1~ e .. btom 1918 on,.l BefoJ.le 
that 7e~ two passagea are wortbJ of note. Both come in the 
twst ot his TarneXt Lect\U.'es wh18h l.a ter w~rs published as 
Th~ ~on~eat of N~tur~ {1910). ~a t~st pas4age indicates; 
p$llbapa, Whitehead's dawning d1saa.t1ataction. with the ability 
of liJ'()ienoe to explain the tolbaltty of experience. What 1s )\ 
needed in a pht~csoph:a' of the aoieu.&~u:,ut• he sa7s, ttis the 
s.tta1Nlleut of s ODW un1f;r1n.s concept wh1c)J. w!ll set :Ln asaigned 
relationships within itself e;ll. that there 1$ for knowledge, 
tor feeling, and for $ll'lOtion~.ul The second passage • wh14h he 
1. See Victor Lowe•s StlltVEJlr of Whitehead's philosophical devel• 
- opmenb, JWt. Cl94l.) • 
e .• Whitehead, ON_. s~ 
$eel'lia to drop 1n almost ae an aside frc;m his main thought • 
is more explicitly ant1o1pat1ve of h!a organic ph1losopbf: 
uThe values ot na:b\U'e are perhaps the key to the metapb.7sica1 
synthesis of eld.etence.nl 
With the publ1os.t1on cf Scienc~ and t _he 1\/lodel'n World (1925) 
the concept ct value begins te assume an 1no:reasingly signiti-
os.nt plaoe 11'1 Whitehead t a WJi'11s1ngs • Most important fozt ax1M 
ology is Ohaptw V, 11The ltomant1e Reaction, •• Which he desor1bes 
as "a proteat on beludf of ve.l.ue._ue It 1a also itt this oha.p .... 
te~ that Wh1tebaad•s mQet ~equent11 quoted definition ot value 
appears, v1s •l n 'Value t is the wwd I. use foP the intrinsic 
r-eality of an event;*n5 
The VW!Y next yaax- a.fte111 Sei-SrJ.C:e. and _tb.e_ Modern Wol'ld 
Whitehead del1ve~e4 tour lect~ea on ~eligion4 which were pub~ 
lishad a.s Rftl~S~.~~ ~1n th,fi.l ,L1!!5W• He aa:ys of theae leoturas 
that the same method which waa fiWplied to ll!Cience 1n the tox-• 
mer work u is he:re appl1e4 to religion. n& !hiE! book is proba• 
bly the key eouxace for insights into the :ttela.t1cn of values 
and 1'&11g10l'l 1n Whitehead' e thought .. 
In ehronological sequence the next book significant for 
1. Whitehead, aN, 6. 
S • Whitehead, SMW, 96. 
3. Ibid*~ 95. There are other very impcrtant value passages, 
espeoiAJ.ly sa; 110, loa, l7B. 
4.- ~e L&well LectUl'eS delivered in lttrlgts Chapel, Bos'boa,. 
Febl'ual'y 1926. See htetace, u. 
5. Preface, aM. · 
• 
Whitehead's ax1ologs- is, ot oolU'se, his .l'ltoc()as anc;l R~al.it;z 
(l9S9) .1 Victol" Lowe says that ••pn must always :r(;una1n the 
-indispensable book*na !heve ia no doubting of Lowe's est!mat$ 
aa s.ppl1&4 to a.r.s;y a_spect of Whiteb.ea.cl's thought, but nowhere 
is !'l'l()q~~a_, a,nd.. fl~al.itz more 1nd1spensab1s tban in the tol'mll., 
le.tion of Whitehsadta value thaoey..- Onl,- in th1a woXJk 1s there 
found an adequate delineation ot tbe metapb.ysioe.l system whioh 
makes his value struotu~e possible. ~ tollow1ng chapters of 
th:l.s d:taseX:'tation show how impolitant this book is. 
,'L'llG ;ti'~nc~,.~' ~t: E;ellB9!; a little book talso appea:ring :tn 
1929, has some insights valuable fox- thts study of Whitehead • s 
uiolO&'• Reminiscent of his early statement 1n the Oo~.c-eRt. 
ot Na.t_~e is his repeated emphasis he:ra tb.a.t ttwe shall neve:r 
elabo~ate an e~lanatory m$tap~$1cs unless we abolieh tbia 
notion of valueless, 'Vll.cuoua e:aistenee*n3 
It is Lowe' a op1n1on that after ;P~oce$.S, ~nd, Realitx; "no 
novel dep~tuves occ~ in Whitehead's system of ph1losop~.u4 
,Adyant~~!. of. ~d,(ia~ .• Which came in 193$, does not 1nve.lidate 
Lowe's estimate, but here tor th$ £~st tbna 1a a sustained 
effort by Whitehead to s.ppl7 to hiatovy- and o1v111aati.on some 
ot the metap~sical oonoepta workGd out 111 his eBPli@ writings, 
particularly Science and the _l'lodern Wot>ld and Proces~ and 
P.aa.l,i~z.1 The last part of A~~nttp-~s2 might bta ealle4,. not 
inaptly- the axiological section ~f the book. Here is his 
most taac1nat1ng• and one might say poetic, analysis of the 
aesthetic ch~aoter ot reality., including his controvel'tsial 
subordination ot the truth relationship to the aesthet1c.3 
Natlwe and Lit'e (1934) emphasiaes the dynamic. organic 
chtU'aoteta ot nature easentte.l to the kind of value structure 
which Whitehead p.l'oposEUh Its two short le·ctul'es -o~ oba.ptevs 
are later 1nc0ltpoztatad. in .~1()de_s .• o,£11.,~11J>~h~ (19~8) t 4 but px-oba .... 
bl.y the best value passage ot the whole le.rgw volume is .from 
the smalls~ wo~k: 
A d~ad n.e.tlll'e can give no reasor.u1. All. ultimata 
reaaons ~ 1n terms of aim at value. A dea4 
nature atms at noth1RS• It is the $SSenoe of 
11fe that it mats tO'I!' 1tg own aake, as the Ut, .. 
t:t'1ns1o reaping of values*~ · 
Besides the spec1t1o value passages of ~Tod;es of ~oue~. 
Whitehead's notion of ":tmpol'tanceu,. especially 1n the earlu 
pa.rt of the book- haa som.e significance tott his value theo:ey. 
Between Natlll"e a.nci Li~ and Mor.Ios of. 'I'ho~t. one article 
1. These two books, 1. e., SMW and PR, along with AX, tomn a 
sort of dominating tr1u.mv!Pate amo11.g his works • Whitehead 
ae.yQ that 0 ee.ch book oen be read septU'ataly; but the,-
supplement each otheJr's om1o.s1oJUJ or ~.tompressioru:hrt See 
AI, Vii. 
2., Dt.cl.,., P~t IV* 
3,. I'b1d., 344. 
4. Lect~es I and II o:r NL b&came Obs.pte:ra VII and VIII re• 
speetively in Mf· 
s. Whitehead., &,. l84J ~~ 9,. 
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ls especially- woxathy of note. It is entitled s1mpl.7 11Re• 
:marks", 1 and is 1mpo.z-tant fOJ' the pJ~esent study because of 
Whitehead's emphasis on aesthetics as the staxating pl.a.ce 
for his ph1loaoph'y. He say$# 
~ own bel1et is that at pPaaent the most ~uit• 
tu1, because" t,Se most neglected, st&V'ting point 
/Of ph1loaopl'Jil is that . section of value•thaory 
· Which we ter1n aeathetioa. OUf' enloyment or the 
values of human mat, · OX" na.bura.1 bee.u1;y o\U' 
b.oxwo:r at the obvious vul.gatt!tiea and !etaoe• 
menta wh1oh toroe themselves upon ua• ... all these 
modes or experience a:-e sutf1c1ent1y abstracted 
to be relatively obvious. And yet evid~ly 
they d.lsclose the VeJ!7 mefU'l;ng of things. 
The last ot Whitehead.'$ w:r1t1nge with s:.tgn!tice.noa tO%' 
axiology aJ!le two lectures deliver-ed at llarvard Univeztsity. 
. . 
'l'h&7 ~e "Mathematics and the Goo~03 delivered t'it*st 1n 1939, 
and "Inunortal1tr•4 given 1n 1941, the le. tter being his quite 
famous :tngePsoll Lectm!e • What these leoturres mean foP his 
uio1o§' are shown 1n tha bod7 o£ the subsequent at~. 
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O:f the above Wfl1t1ngs Which oovex- the metap~sical pe!'!od 
of Whitehead's thousb'bat it is appa.ren't that the eight OJ.I> n1ne 
yeu sps.n b'tom 1916 to 1933 1s the moat d1st1nctlyo axiolog1ca.i. 
Remova this sho:t-t pSl'iod of time and it· would be ve'.t7 diffi ... 
cult to show that Whitehea-d had mol'a than a passing intal*est 
1n value theory • 
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2. Influ.&nce ot VeJ.ue Oonaideratione in H1a ft!ought aa a. Whole. 
As seen in ilhe briet sketch s.boV$-t Whitehead's oonoept of 
value does not have atlV apt.ttl1e.l s1sn1t1oance or place in hie 
tho11ght struet~e unt1l the publ1oati on of sci~noe and the 
. . . -· -
M06.Wf.1 World. (1925)-. His statement .five J'GBrB ea:rlier in 
,Th~ Co~eeat ot. ~~t~~ that 9 the values of natve a:tte perhaps 
th& key to th.& metap~sioal synthesis :ot ax1stenca"1 !)l'ovea 
that he was alre~ thinld.ng of an ax1ocent:ric universe, al• 
thou.gh it is not until .~~o-~ef.J_~,f.l~d. Rea)_itz: (1929) that value 
1n terms or aesthetic h~ 1a :tu.ll,- re"Vealed •. Whiteheadts 
cosmological sehetna and vsJ.u.e are . thex-e seen to be inaept:irable 
1n that the very metaplWs leal structure of the universe is a 
teleological proceas with ~luG as the xaesultant emel'gent. 
It is easy, pel'ba.pa, to go be,-ond aotual ev1den~e 1n stating 
a thesis that on4JJ wants to defe:ndJ neverth.eless, it doea not 
seem .$.n over~statement to suggest that value cons1de%'s.t1o:na 
dominate Whitehead's whole metaphys1ce.l schema.$ ~ch of 
,;L)roeeaq ,a.ncl ,Rea1:1~z, fO'I! 1Qta.nue-~ a d1tf1eult book even w1th 
l.. Whit ehead1 ON, 5 • · 
s-. fhe 11place11 of veJ:ue 1a Whitehead's philoaop~ has e.lxaeady 
been ad.equa.tely shown by !4illax-d, PVWf. It 1s his op1n1on 
that value cons1dwat1cns. occupy the central plaee in 
Whitehead's mstapbysioal 4evelopment. 
the beat aids available, does become more 1ntellig1ble when 
~sad with value in mind. 
Most ot Whitehead's reasons fer his axiological emphasis 
arise fl'om his own method I;U'.J4 h1a own estima.te or tbs nature J) 
of a-eal1ty, but doubtless one majo~ ,exteXtnal oonsidel'atton {I 
gave hlm added incentive towud the development of an axio""' 
centwio mets.pb:ysie., This was his va't7 obvious d1ssatisfaot1on 
with "the na.x-row an« efficient sohenw of so1ent1f1o concepta0 1 
wbioh dcm1na.tet1 :mu.ah ot the ph.Uosopby of the 17th, 18th, and 
19th oentuza1es. soienoe had X'educed natUl'a to, a mechanism ao 
oomplete that man was helpless to cooperate with God 1n, the 
pl'oduot 1on of El.ft7 values 'Whatsoevez. • Whitehead :referx-ed to 
such meobanis~ as 9 tha monst~cus issues of limited metapbyaioa 
and, clear logical 1ntalleet .. • 9 MeChanism, in hia view, did not 
ad$quat~l7 account ro~ all aspects of aapa~1$noe, pavt1oular~ 
o:rganiamf.h He ~efexas te an unaol ved problem of 17th oentUX7 
sc1enoe ae foll~wst na1ven oont1~at1ons, o~ mattep with loco-
motion 1n space ae assigned by physical l.aa, to aooOUl'lt tO'I! 
living organ1ams.n3 'lbe major task of phUosophy d~ing these 
oe:nturiea was to get m:tnd, human suf'te:t-1ng1 life, be.ok into 
natlU"e., Berkeley b.$lped. m.uch- says Whitehead, by b.is ins1stanoe 
that mind is the only reality* nae oontenda that what constitutes 
the r-eal1za.t1on of na.tval entities is the being perceived within 
1. Whitehead, SMW, 75. 
2. Ibi4•• 76. 
3- Ibid., 41 .... 42. 
the 'W'lity or m1nd. 111 Fott Eel'keley-ts mind, Wh1t$hee.d sub .... 
st1tute4 "a. pxaocess of ~ehensiva un!.f"1cat1on"2 which oould 
account far both mechanism and o~gan1sm.3 
Somewhat paJJtldox1calq, howl\lv~- it was literature 
l.'e.thar than philosophy which ga.v$ expX"ess !on to the full. 
8 oonorete outlook of h'WnG.nit:y.n4 !he poets, part1ou.lfWly 
Wordsw~tht6 put back into nat~e what bad been d1$astrously 
omitted, "the haunting p,resencea",s the fee11ES of earth and 
sky and hills ana t~eas~ st~iet ec1ent1tio analys1a7 failed 
because its method did not allow fer feelings and val.ueEh 
When Whitehead came to bu.Ud his me1:ual)hytiJ1Cal aystem he eaw 
that What the poets bad d1seov$l'ed t?:tt expx-esaed was as much 
a. pBl't of' life as the "objeeie0 an4 Umotiona" and "laws" of 
science. He.beeame convinced that th$ v~y atm of metap~s .... 
1ca.l process was aesthet.to xaea:u.aat!on or the attainment of 
value. His whale metapb.yaieal aohema therefore becGlUes 
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1. Whitehead, BMW, '11.-
s~ Ibid*, 71. 
3. Retew1ng to SMW Whitehead says; "I would twm the doct:r1ne 
of these lectures, the theory of organic msoban1s~,u smw. ml. 4. Ibid. 76. . . . . . - ~ - . . . . - . . . -
a. In A.rl. (1941).- llS. Lowe aayat. "Some cf those who know 
Whitehead wontier 1f William· WOPdswoJ:tth did not influence 
h1m more than any oth$%1 man. 0 · 
6 • Whitehead,. SMW 1 Sfh 7., Whitehead's attitude to ao1enoe is a story in 1tae1t. 
With the conceptions of classic seienee he could never 
agree, e. s~, fixed space, sbatio.substanoe, "simple lo• 
cation", tndependent existents~ fhese concepts still 
haunt ae1enee- although they ~e fas• becoming obsolete. 
It u sign.Uiaant t'b..at the phUoaophers have often led 
· the WS."9' fttom "the notion of static stu.:t:".tu to 0the notion 
· ot :t:luent !ilnePQ•" See SMW, 60 tt., and PR, 470, 4'll. 
Note also m. 804. 
39 
11e. protest ·against the exolus1on of value tztom. the essence 
of me.tte:r of faot.,111 Value concepts are 1n'he%'Woven tbt*ough 
his whole thought stltuoture. not as a demand of a preoon• 
ce1ved philosophical metho4~ but baoa.use that !s the wq 
na~e 1s" "Value 1S. 'an element which permeates through an4 
tlll"ougb. the poetic view of natura .. n 2 Where there is aesthetic 
rea11aat1on there 11 value. All alee 1s abstraet!on. Value 
is realisation, 1. e •• actual1t~~ and aotual1t1 1s value.3 
Value is oon~ete taotJ 1t 1s Aot1vU~7•4 Value and the real 
wo:rld a%'e inseparable~. 
In l'el1g1on as well as metapb¥s1es, value is. the key-
word tw Whitehead. 'lb1s 1e because religion is dependent 
on metaphys1es, 5 which 1e to sar that 1n understanding the 
u.n1veJ~~se owtain intensities of expar1ence emerge whiah be.ve 
a spacial dJ.mer:wion expressible onl-7 as worsh1p cw kinship 
Ol' dependence. fb.ese at*e value expexa!.$noes • "The peoul.iar 
ohattaotel* of rel1g1ous truth Ls that 1t ax.pl.1e1tly deale 
with valuea.n6 But rel1g1on 1s davo1d of value it it be nov 
~ounded 1n metapbrs1cs. Rel1s1on is an experience based on 
the recognition of pe:rmanencea in °the universe which we ea.n 
cEWe tor. It thereby provides a meaning, 1n terms or Val\le, 
for our own existence, ,a _ mefU11~, wh.1oh !'lows. f:rcm the, nature 
f'Jt th_;n$S, .ul 
Again, value is the clue te Whiteheaclfs doctrine ot 1m_,. 
mQl'tal1ty1 a d.oct~!.ne full of promise 1n }!roceas_alld,Reali:!?z 
and comins to tull bloom in his Inseraoll Lecture. Precisely 
in what immortality cons1ata in ~iteh~d's thought !a-not 
always apparent. 1. e., whether the p$~p$tuation of persons 
or 1d~als ot:' aesthetic pattel'n$~ bu.t 1n any case value 1e the 
a~~. Sllfl .P~ll of any type of' immo:rta:l.iii~., Immortality attaches 
to the value real.iaed 1n tba worl4 of taot.. The presence ot 
~alue assurea the continued existence of actual oeoasio.ns of 
whiCh 0pe~sonal1ty 1a the e~trem~ example ot sustained real!• 
zation.nS 
As will be shown lat~. the p:r~ function or God 1n 
the univa~se is both the initiation of value possibilities 
and the oonse:rvat1on ot tha values actually realaed 1n th& 
experience of" actual entities. "Bia purpose 1n the wcwld 
1s qual1by of atta1nment.a3 
Inaofa.x- aa Whitehead has e.7J7 ethical theory • it is 
based on value oo:ns1ders.t1ons. "Goodness 1s a qual.if1cat1on 
belonging. to the constitution of x-ealityu which, 1n his 
thought• is good ,()Xill when 1t 1a bee.ut1tul..4 Among persons 
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ethics ita a matte!' of value r:alat1onsh1ps., A kay passage 
whi~h :rev.as.la his axiolog1oally' based ethical theory is 
wol*th notingo 
We have no ~1gnt to defaee the value~sxpe~ience 
which 1:a the VfJ'/!7 essence ot the universe. Ex-· 
iBtenca, in its own natnare, is the upholding 
ot value-1ntensit7., Also no unit oan septu"ate 
itself f:'om the othe;r:ts,. and from tb.e whole. 
And yet es.c.h un1t exists 1n 1ts own right., It 
upholds value@.intensity fOJ!' 1tself, and th1s 
involves s1Uu;t1ng value""'!nterm1ty w1th the un1 .... 
Vel'se.J. 
In the first sentence of this pausage is also a clue to 
his doetl'1ne of evil_, wh1e~ he explains 1n terms of aes• 
thetio destruction. 
Whitehead's thought tb:foughout adequately demo:nat:l'ates 
his own thesis that value~theo~ 1s the most f~u1tfUl pe~~ 
s,pective tl*m whi~h to develop a philosophy'._ 
o. QompEWat1ve S'Wlll'l'18.X7• 
Val.uit cons1ds.ttat:1ons have a dominating :ra:te 1n th$ 
thought; ot both .Bf:tiglltman and Whitehead. Brightman t s value 
e1t1ngs cove~ the whole span of his l1teravy ca:ttee%'1 .a period 
ot ova~ thJ_. ,-eal"s. 1. e., from 1919 to 19521 whveas the 
bulk or Wb.itehee.dts value vm1tings exten4 onlr t:rom 1925 to 
1953., 
The :tl*ela.tively shoX't uiological. pwiod tor Whitehead 
does not indicate an~ less intense devotion to value consider~ 
ationS.J 1t may, on ths Gont~ary. suggest that values had a 
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mol'e 1ntv1nsic :rtele.tionship to hia. n!eta.pbysical scheme which 
··was la.ttgely developedl over the same year$. It is true that 
the metapb1s1oal peesuppoaitions of Whitehead's aaiologr ~e 
oonste.ntl7, it not somewhat overwhel.1Xl1n..gl1, more 1n evidence 
than 1n Brlshtman's thought.1' Br1ghtm.an 'does go to meta• 
pbysioa to find coherent expl.amttion t01! value norms, but 
values fov him are always tb,s experiences of persons. Xn 
' "" . 
Whitehead, on the otb.~ hand• value& find thes_;-·~i!J:e!.~ exam-
. . . . . . . 
pl:i.t!cation 1n a sustained ~outs ot ooou1ons, 1. e., a pel"..,. 
son, but values 8.1'*& not l.imi ted to the cpe~ienoe of ent1t1ea 
with personal order&!' Value is the realization 1n actuality 
of anr aesthetic p~ttern~ 'Whethe~ of a low o:r high gl'ade 
oxaganism. This, ill afteot, ~ts tome value on a relatively 
impez-sonal metapbraical Pl,.a.ne, an hypothesis with whioh. 
Sl'ightman oould never agree., 
Xn thirlklng again of the x-elat1ve lengths ot thai~' ax!• 
. . . 
ol.ogical development, two or tbt-ee obse:-vations seem to be 
pertinent;. First, one is graa.tl7 1mprease4 by Bx-1ghtmants 
constant and insistent empha.s1s, over auch a long pe%t1cd, on 
the 1mpo:ftanoe or values tor 11etaphps1cs, religion, ethics, 
and sooiety. ~bat b1e tntereat 1n and commitment to the 
highest values nevev wantltd is scl:uu'-e.cte:tt trait of the highest 
Wde~.. On the other hand, the .sa~s;tr;~:r;t ot his value theW, 
1. Brightman was prepaFtng his only bonk devote4 wholly to 
· metap~sics whe:n he died* The tteal stature of his ·meta,.. 
ph:rslcal thought must be left to tutu.re evaluation. 
4S 
suttera fxtcm. a eerta1n sameness of pattern both 1n matters 
of emphasis a.n4 terminology. With one or. two exceptions 
which are 1ndica~ed 1n a l.a tar ohapte:t" 1 there fl.X'a ve'I!'Y few 
mod:lf1cs.t1ons ot theory watyle. Of oour$e, the:re may 
bs.V$ been no ree.~on to change h1s .. th~i£X, but the force .of 
his arguments would have been mwa compelling if there had 
been greater vav1ety and freshness in b1s_l1terary st~le. 
Of all his books• ;Tht:fu ~J!h-1~~3._ .~1te. (1949} is :Pl'obs.bly the 
gl*eatest depa:rt\U'e from his usual. st:yla :tn the dirteot1on o:t 
novel. emphases. In this oe.sa tbe subject matte~ may have 
suppl;ed the .1!1ap~at1on. It is ~egreitable tbat he did 
not use this very rich setting fbr more value exposition. 
What he does say 1s vigorous and stimulating. 
As tw Whitehead, the eompa:-at:tvely sho~t period 1n 
wh1oh hie value wr1 t1ngs eme:ttged did net provide much oppox--
tun1ty tor deb1l1tat1ng repetition; hence h1a exposition 
abounds w1th the visor ot origillal c11acova:f'Jc Whether or 
not after. thiltty years his :u.ter:ary expression ct value wcu.ld 
have remained as fresh is open to question.- !here is both 
advantage and d1aadvantage 1n Wh1teh$ad' s method. Ha ach1ev.es 
treshnese, but what he gains in v1v14nese he often loses in 
e1~1ty. 1'b.e reverse· 1s true to'Z! ~igb.tma.th His terminol .. 
·OQ if! simple and his meaning almost 1nvs,xtiably clear, but 
ms.ny times at the expense of ·C:r1g1nal1ty and spontaneity. 
Although differing quite radioall7 in style, the two 
man demonstrate a re~kable atmilar1ty 1n the~ concern 
fO'I!' values in the VatJiou.f:\1 ~amifica.tiona ot their thought. 
Both men subo~dtnate ethics to axiology, Whitehead ~obably 
more rigorously tnan· Br1ghtmath The latte:r would not ge so 
tlil.r ae to say the.t goodness is a mattw of bee.ut,"lJ for there 
are times when the path of 1'1ghtnesa OP dut7 D'Ja1 involve the 
Uil7 and the unpleasant J but he does hQl.d that axiology 1s 
mox•e inclusive than the ethical and the:retore exer-eiaes a 
cez-tain p%'1or1t,' ln the detexamhation ot ethieal laws. POl' 
Whitehead movality as well as t1'uth 1& always a function of 
value as expressed in aesthetic pattepn. Morality exists 
only because of value and not vice ve~sa~ 
In the realm ot religion, both Br ilbtman and Whi tehea€1 
find ita highest expression 1n te!'ms of value exper-ience, 
Bl'ightman1s Whole work,. Re;tsioua .v,a~op,,. and his repeated 
description of religion as a ts.ith in the fl'ienalineas ot 
the unive~ae to value 1nd1oate the aaio~~el1g1ous partne~· 
ship and the dependence of both on metapb1s1cal structu~e. 
Whitehead. describes rel1g1on ~ s. zaela.tionship tt? the un1verse 
revelat~ of value meanings. which flow f~cm the very nature 
of things. Eaoh man 1n hie ewn wa, irlaista on tho lnse~a"" 
bilit~ of Pe11g1on ant'l values from metapb.¥aios. Otily with. . 
suCh objectivity ie religious V$lue saved ~om Chaotic sub• 
Jeot1v1smwh1eh makes ~1tieal 1nvesb1gat1on impossible. 
All norms, rational and axiological, stand w fall by the 
' 
strength of the metaphy'aieal struot\'l.tle which suppol'ts them. 
!heh' geateat oonQelln with va.l.ue is retealad 1n thai:r.-
ommnon $lllpha$1s on the aa1olcs1cal fUnction of God, who 
originates, nonservea, and 1no:Peaaes values 1n th$ universe. 
Value 1n its pe~sistins qaal1ty is alao the Chief clue to 
thetr doot~ine~ of ~tality, 
Sufficient bas been ua1d in thie chapter to suggest 
the great OOJU:SSJ~n Of both Brightman and.. Whitehead With 
value oOllside:ttationa 1n the~ total thoughih Bt-1ghtman's 
e:s:.tenaive writings eonstitute a flu.1te obvious demonstration 
of his axiological emphasis, while 1n -the case of both 
lh't5.ptm.an and Whitehead the internal etnctlll*e ot their 
thought 1a 1next:rieabl.y interwoven with value implications. 
What val.u.a means and ltow it relates in peater· detaU to 
some of the me.jor- ~oas ot their thought 1a the purpose ot 
the following ehap~e~s. 
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Ohapter Two 
Tim NATURE AND .ORI!ERIA OF VALUE 
lh Brightman. 
l. Basic Oharaoter1at1es. 
The peypose of this chapter ia to establish as oleaxaly 
as possible what Bl'ightman and Wb.itehaad pxtopose aa the bas 1c 
meaning and crit~ia o:f value. All subsequent discussion 
will presuppose this ohapte:r; therefore clear definitions s.re 
neeessax-~. PeM7 points outl that no ma.ttex- hew loosely the 
more teebnioal terminolo87 of apee1al1sed fields 1s used, the 
speeial tnveatigato~ guards oel'tata terms with great eare. 
~he tel'lll 11val.uen itself 1s often used ve'l!'g loosely, but for 
the theo~ist of value, the word must be precisely defined.· 
Value 9 1s h1a careful wcl'd, n says Perey.,a 
Brightman, more than Whitehead,. delineates cr1t1.0all,-
and cf!U'lefully what he means b7 valuth· Most ot his books 
contain some aooount of values with definitions and descl'ip• 
tions •. The following representative statements are given 1n 
the!J:t cbronclosioal order. In R!Jlig1ou_c _ValueEt he sa.ya that 
eve17one will doubtless agree the.t by a value 
he me~ something that he priaes, somethitlg 
worthful, precious, desirable.: something that 
meets our need, something the.t tul.t1lla our 
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ideal or what ought to be.1 
In hie .Ph:ilosophz of ,~eli,s1on1 he defines a value as "what ... 
eve~ is actually liked, pri~ed, esteemed, desired, approved, 
ox- enjoyed by anyone e.t any time.n2 In The Sp.b:titue.l Life,, 
"a value is the experienoed tu.lfillment of OUX" liking,. the 
achieving of cur desSJ:te.u8 In NatUl'te. and. Values he desox-ibes 
it 1n tex-ms ot tt4atisfact1ona", npux-poses .tulfilled11 , ancl 
11ordern, 4 while 1n his Intrcduct~on he repeats the psycho* 
logical terms used hex-elofoJ'e.auoh as 8 11ked", npr1zed11 1 
•desired", but increases the scope of his definition by 1n• 
eluding 0wb.a.taVQt is ••• aalmcwledged as 1ntareat1ng, important, 
or wortey of s.ppr"oval. n5 
Beyond his be.aio d$f1nit1ons, Brightlnan makes several 
tmportant d1st1not1ons whioh illuminate aDd open up the 
he81't of his meaning. First there EU'e the differences among 
"value", "valuat1onn, and ttevs.lua.t1on,.u. Value is in terms 
1., Brightman, RV, 8l.a 
2 • Bt-ightman 1 POR• 88 • 3. Bxt1ghtman, SL, 64:. 
4 * Brighttnan. BV I 83. 
5 .• Bl*1ghtman, I7!P, l4l. !h1S d.ef1r.tit1on is bl'oader than the 
one given in the o:t'1g1nal edition of I!P. His use of the 
term "1ntevest1ngn suggests the· famous d,efbl1t1on of PerX7 
as 9 aey object of any interest", GIV, Chapter V. Pe:t?!"9' 
elaborates the same view 1n his work BV, where his det1n" 
1t1on readst ItA th1n8""...S.llY thing4'<•has: value o~ 1a valu.-. 
able, 1n the original and gener1o sense when it is the 
object of an 1nterest-EI.n7 intel'etat. ox-~ whatever is ob,.... 
j eet of intel'est 1a ipse facto valuable, u RV, a .... a. Fw 
Bxtigb.tman's critique ot Perl'J' {and ethe:fs) see·his chapter, 
"Neo•Real1stio Theol'ies of Value,n JLxtt,.(l922)2t ea ... a4. 
BriShtman's term "important11 ·suggests Whitehead's use of 
"importenoen as a value term, partioul.arl,- e, Obs.pter I. 
():t what 1s 11ke4 or p~iaedJ valuation, on the other hand, 
is the "experience of ascribing 1nt~1ns1c value to an ex• 
pe:rienee, OX' the mere feelir.IS of the value~ul Valuation ia. 
the action of the mf.nd :tn the presence of what is considered 
valuable, But valuation must not be contused with eval.ua...,. 
t1 on, which invol vea the napplicati on of ideals or norms to 
values.112 The torme!l' ia a l1k1n.s but uncritical proQess, 
whether. the object of desire is Bl'abms 's First Symphony Ol' 
tapioca, while the latter is a px-ooess ot critical judgJ1'1ent 
on the acceptability of value~elatms. 
Again, whenev~r.Brightman discusses value at~ length 
he makes the distinction between tt1ntrins1c11 and 0 1natrwnentalu 
values. "Intrinsic value 1s .IW1eed fe its own aa.ke ... -1t 1a 
inherent 1n the value 1tsel.tJ instl'Ul'nen'ba~ value 1s priaed as 
a means or a. eausa ••• ot 1ntr1n~1c ve.lue."a For illustration, 
he calla mus1o an 1ntr1ns1o value, while mOl'i$7 is 1nstrum.en-
tal.4 The distinction, of course, 1a not absolute, since a 
numismatist JUE1oY think· of money as an end 1n itself~ while a 
musician lflS.y eal'n his l1vhlg b7 his •s.io; hut in thinking ot 
. . 
the d1st1not1on it is the "end" which determines the status 
of the value. Money, a~ p~. except tor Sc:aooge or Silas 
MaA:lex-, does not satisfy a.nr inherent need, while "music 
insptrea and elevates c~aoter, thought. Qnd religious de~ 
votion.ul Wh$the~ value 1s instrumental o~ 1nt~1ns1c, there• 
fOX"s, depends upon a point of' v.iaw. It should also be noted 
that 1ntr1na1o values may themselves be instrumental to the 
discovery and enjoyment of other val.uesJ but whatever tha· 
ult!tnate appraisal, nthe fundamental meaning ot value 1s to 
be .found in its int:r1ns1o aspeQt~u2 
In his P)].ilcsophy of Relit)1,on,1 he d1tterent1ates be• 
tween a. "potential" and an "aotualn value.3 A value must al-
ways be the experience of a person, henee what is destred 
but not yet expe:r1ence4 1s a potential value. The value be-
comes actual in the act of expw1e.ncing-. Fw instance. one 
m1gb.t hear ot the Mona. Lisa and wish to see it. The painting 
·exists only as ~ potential value until seen and appreciated. 
There should e.l$o be· discs-imination among "empirical" 
values, "value ... claims", and "appEUJent11 valuea.4 An emp1x-1oal 
value is the value as a fact of experienoth People do have 
-~ 
values. With every value. howeve:r, is a oonaoious claim that 
the value now being expexaienced is a. tz-ue value. This ela1m 
ot oourse must be tested, and until teated it bas the status 
of an apparent value . wh1oh may o:r may not tvn out to be a. 
tl'Ue value • 
i'bis leads to what Brightman calls "the moat d1ff1cultn 
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flf all his val:u.e term1noloQ 1 viz. 11 "true val.ue" w 11real 
value.,ul What is a true value? That, ot ooUXts.e, is the 
question which Bl'igb.tman and other a:xiologists reoogni~e as 
the o~ ot the whole matter. some, e. g., the_ logical pc>si ..... 
t1v1s.ts, discount the pc.uulib1l1ty of an-iving at any standard 
at a.l.l, B im.ply beoe.use of the unver1fiab111ty of the ttunem...,. 
p!riealu ve.J.ue ... cl.aimsJ but Brtighisman joins himself with those 
who think that it is possible to test values and to ~iva 
at so:me ef.lnoept of a "truen val.u.e.s 
~o othw dist1notions fU'e made in his Introduction to 
,P¥losaP&•3 First, there 1s the ditfc:trence between "per .... 
manent11 and "tztansient11 val\J,es. Some v~u.esr e. g., health, 
wealth, s:va gtteatly p:ttized eithet" as intx-insic or instrwnen• 
. . 
tal, but they have :no guaranteed permanene,. and :may vanish 
:tn an ep1dem1o ·01" the crash ot the stock mwket~ On the ethel* 
hand11 "notbing." says Br.*ightman, 0 sav-e '11.1¥ own disloyalty. 
need eve:r sep!U'a.te me t"x*om truth and gooclnass, beaut,- and re,.. 
l1gion,u4 
The other distinction made hex-e is between the "catholic" 
and the "exclusive" value a. Some values by theht ver-y nature 
cannot be she.t*ed and ax-e l1mitecl. 1n thai%' appl1cationo The7 
a.:re exclusive~ "Such Ql'f& all values that depend on the pos• 
session of material things. u5 Othe:t" values are not exhausted 
by sueh :restx-icted app.l'ao1at1on., bu.t 'IIJil'l! be sb.atted. These 
are the catholic or universal values. 11 Xt is a1gn1f:tcant, n 
D%*1ghtm.an adds, uthat the same values that we found to be 
pevmanent ~e also oe.tho11o • ul 
So fa:t? Brightma.nta analysis of values adds up to th1S1 
Seside~ the original d1ff$Xf&ntiat1on between valuation and 
avalua.ticn, he olass1t1es values as 1ntr1ns1o1 1nstrw:nental1 
. . 
potential, actual, e~pb*~cal. a~ claims 1 appattent, tltue, 
pe:ttma.nent, t:ttan:d.ent • catholic, and exolus1ve. 
One other olass1f1oat1cn involves, a soale of the basic 
types of intttinaio val~es 1 but . that 1s given separate con• 
s1de:N:ttion in the next section. 
s. fable ot Value$:. 
Bx*1ghtman reoopiaes the p):loblem ct ol.a.ssuyi~ valu.ea 
aeoal"dil'ls to a a oale of higher and lowel:*, but he teals that 
11the attempt can scal'oely be abandoned. by one who desiz'es a 
ph11osoph1(Jal s~VSJT or value expeX'ienc~ • .u2 Doubtless com ... 
plete f.\gl:Jeement on any eompa:N:~.ttve scale wou.ld be unl.1kEtl.y,. 
even it an e~ct scale oould be wo~ked outJ3 but the:tte is 
value in px-eparing a table. espeoially as it shows what ap ... 
pellr'a to be revealed. in exper1en~e,. vu-- the 2.neseapable 
dependence ot veJ.uea Qn one another. .A.coor<U.ng to w. G. 
Bverett 1 whO waa Bl*ightman 1.s teaohe.t- and Whose intluenee 
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131-ightm.a.rl. acknowledges, l values a.xae not sepe.l*ate and inde• 
. pendent, but inte:rpenewa.t1ng in the whole organic stz.uoture 
of expex:-ienoe .a Sox-ley enl.Uloiates the same principle 1n his 
d1acuss1on c£ mOl'al values when he sa,-s that 0 4n.1' moral judg ... 
ment which is ve.lld must be coherent with all other moral 
judgments 1 at least; 1 t ca.nnot be 1noonsistent with e.n7. n3 
Brightman Sl~Ues both Everett and Swley when he reports 
Swle,-'s view that uvaluee form a system Xtather than a soala.u4 
~ightman ~anklf shows his dependence on Everett's 
1'ab1e, which b.& vefers ·to as »the standard basis 1n recent 
American litEJl'aturre115 of value classification. lt will be 
helptul·to include Everett's list hera, 1f fox- no othe:tt 
reaeon than to eb.Gw the major aow.so& of Brightman's own 
~able. His "clasaitioation ct buman values tn eight ~oups0 
is as follows; 6 
x. Economic Values. 
tl:. Bodily Values. 
III. Values of Recreation. 
IV., Values of Association. 
V. Oha.X'aotw Values .. , 
VI. Aesthetic Values .. 
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VIX. Intellectual Values. 
VIII. Religious Values. 
B~1gb.tl'lJtU1's Table includes all of Evwettts, the only vaz-1.,. 
a.tion baing 1n the ottder • Brightman has two lists$ both 
ot wnioh ~e given below f~ comparative p~poses. In the 
,Phi,lp~PRb.Y ot Rel1s1on he olass1f1es values in this oxadert1 
P'I.Ulel-7 Ins'Wumental Values. 
a* Nat\U'al values. 
b. Econamic Values. 
~he Lower Intxa1ns1c Values,; 
a. Bod.ilJ values .• 
b. l:lecreat1onal val'!J.es-. 
c. Wwk values. 
· 'lhe B!.gb.e~ Intrinsic Values,. 
a. Social valuea. 
b. Oharacte~ values. 
o. Aestb.et1o values. 
d. Intellectual values• 
e., Religious values. 
In An Introduction to Ph1loso;e!;t he classifies the 1ntl'1n-
, - J .f - . - - . - ·- -- -. - 1. . . ~ .. - -- - . -.- -
eic values as fol.lovma8 
Lower 1nt:r:-1ns1c values. 
Recreational (pl~). 
Bodily (health). 
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Social (assac1at1on). 
Le.bw (economic an4 other ) ., 
. ' 
Higher 1nt~ins1c values* 
lntallectual (kno'!ledse, tx-uth). 
Bathetic (beauty-) •1 
Character (goodness). 
Religious (holiness). 
' ' 
Tha slight cU.ffGJ:'ences b~tween Bltigb.tmants classification 
and .EV'SX'ettl's 3.s apparent~ as weU as the variations between 
h:ta own two lists"' It should be pointed out tha. t the la ttex-
liat had_ his latest attentiem, although it remains the sam.e 
as in th~ tU'st edition of hi~ ~t"Qc:iuct!o:n, with the excep..,. 
tion og "Labor",. whio~ he adds here am.ons the lower int:J:I'b.s1c 
values • The inclusion of labw seems to indicate a rethink• 
1ng of t~e pxtobl$nt. In. .:AP- Intx-od~otion to ._Philo:JOP$t (1926), 
he includes neither labor nor WQX'k., In Ph3.losoJ!& :o£ _Bel1J31on 
(1940), he lists eoonomie values, but emplliltieally denies 
,. ' 
them a.n,y _1ntr1ns1c standing. "One Who ttegards economlo val .... 
ues as 1nta-1ns1o is a misett1 11 he SEJ.7S• although Brightman 
1s quick te point out that "the abundance or def1c1enoy of" 
economic wealth baa a p~ofound ettect on both the quantity' 
and quality of :realisable intXtinsie val.ues.09 Eleven :yea:-s. 
l. There 1s no r-eason for the spelling "es.thetie" in this 
list, and naeathetio" in the to:ttmelf', except, pex-haps, a 
publisher's pretwenoe. 
2. :Bl"ightman, POH, 95. 
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latera 1n his revised ~troduotiOl.\ (1951) • labor, including 
the economic,_ is among the intt-insic value a 1 fhere is no 
specific evidence accounting to~ the change 1n emphasis• 
but the change itself is mildl1 elequent of a greate~ appre• 
oia.tion for the s1gn1f1oanoe and 1mpl1cat1ons ot human labor .1 
It is also significant to note that although social val• 
u.es had a hl-ief' elevation.amGtJg the higher intrinsic values 
1n the foX'l:ller list, they are back in the lower div1e~ion of 
the seoond list. To find the proper spot fcm the social 
values evidently save h1m mere difficulty than the others. 
He allows them a tempora17 fi:est division bex-th with much 
hesitancy, explaining that they are still ttthe lowest ot the 
higher values~ because mere association with others is al~ 
most uttexaly- devoid of worth ~ss some other value besides 
the social is being sought.0 Nevexstheless, "every tl'Ue value 
is enhanced when expe~1enced as a social value.n8 In the 
Itt.ttto,c:l\lot1~n 11st t Br1p'blD$n suspects that his tx-ee.tment of 
the social values will raise the ohiet obJeet1o:aa, and makes 
a. special point o1• clarifying w~ he includes them whex-e he 
does. Association itself • he says 1 1f:J not sui'fioient to 
guarantee the.t value shall be present. 
The Jteason for plaemg soeial values ~ela.t1vely 
low in the· scale ia that the value of assoe!a-
tion is dependent on the presence of the higher 
values. It is questionable Whether thel'e is 
l. See B:eightman, ITP:t 149*' 
a. Brightman, POH, 97 •. 
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tul'f intl'ina1o value whatever in seeial. :tsslat1ons 
txaom. which truth, beauty, goodness, and. religion 
are lacking •. · , 
fhe othatt oha.nsea, Eh g., the t:r-anspos1ng of the bodily and 
rec:tteational ve.l.u&IIJ 1n the l.owex- classit1ca.tion, and char .... 
aate:r.t and intellectual values in the highel:' group, have not 
come in for any special Justification. His placing o:t re .... 
l1gion a.a: the highest value x-emaina constant. 
With this la.st .f'aot the td.gn1f1canca of Brightnne.n t a 
table ~eallr ema~ges. Following as he does EveFettts view 
ot the 1ntwpenet~taticm of all values and the dependence 
of' the lower on the higheXt • Qns is not s'Ul'priaed to rind in 
Brightman a treatment of values 1n which the spacial in ... 
s"ights of :religion not only s.ppeal" .ttegulax-J.y but sexave as 
a pervasive and uniting factw fol" his whole axiological 
stx-ucture. 
Before oonsidal'irig the problem of ct"itex-ia, it will 
be helpi'ul to review in a brief' compass what Bxa1gh'fm1.a.n means 
bf value. baa m.ajol" po1n.ts emex-gat 
Values B.!'EI the pl*eferred objects of inte:r!est and deai:.t'a 
as e.aper1enoed. These we the ,emp11"1oal values. Which vaJ. ... 
u.as ought to be selected for en.joymen1; is the problem cf 
evaluation involving criteria and norma • After oztit!oal 
examination and te~ting, an amph*leU value ma7 emerge as 
a txwue value,., Some values: he..va little !)'r n" :tntr3ns1o worth 
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but serve as 1nst~umenta to other values. All values ex-
ist only a~ pote~tials until achieved in the experience 
ot persons. All values .1ntwpenett-ate, and because some 
values depend on others the need f()r a scale is empix*ics.lly 
grounded.,. although the relative impwtance of values is 
d1f.ticu.lt to deteX'mine. ~e need fo%4 ,e. discussion of the 
Cl"itwia ot values is at onoe a.ppa.x-ent. 
a. Critettia of Values. 
Be.f.'ox-e considering Bt"1ghtma.n's crite:ttia.l something 
must be said of the need for axiological standards. It 1s 
a tact that people have likes, aversions, and desires. 
~ightma.n calls such experiences "empi%-f.cal valuea_,nl They 
ax-e wha.t people do value, whether right w m-ons 1 e.estheti·o 
ox- unaesthetic, wor'bhy 0!" Ul'lworthy. Best ... saller lists 1 
Rocpe:tt :t"atings, election results • EWe public evidence that 
people have p:rete~enoe~h !rhere is no ph1l.oaoph1ca1 pxtoblem. 
involved 1n the matter of public preference as a :f.'e.ct J that 
.. 
ie more a problem of obse:ttvation and sts.tist1oal reeoitding. 
Pxr.eterencea beoom.e a px-oblem of philosopey when the question 
is asked6 Xs one experience more valuable than anothe~f or~ 
6'1 
Wbs. t is t~ valuable? Obviously, all possible experiences 
cannot have '1fr9' atten'b1onJ thettefore, choices have to be ma.dEh 
Furthermore. many claims are made foX' this or that alternative, 
all of which cannot be 0 :ttighttt or tttruau, espeoially when 
'contradictory assertiens l.U'e p:roposeO.. 
As Brightman eea~ it, the major p~oblema which arise 
1n any consistent philosopb1 of values maJ be summ~ized 
1 as folloW.st 
1. fhe psy-chology .ot valuation. 
a. !Che 1dentif1aat1on and olassi.f1oat1on of values. 
3o The criteria cf .values. 
4. The rele.tiorJ. of nun and nought." 
5. ~ subjectivity and objeet1v1ty of values. 
6. Value and pexasonal1ty. 
Blt1gb.tlns.n 'Waats the f~st p:r-cblemunder a brief d1scutts1on 
of t~e more or les~ classic psyohologioal accounts of valu• 
. . 
at1on, vis., the hedonistic, voluntu-~stte, formalistic, 
intuitive~ and sy-noptic (or personSl1st1o)-2 He acknowledges 
the element of truth 1n eaCh of these theories, yet he feels 
that each is onlf a partial picture. 
Hedonism attaches wwth to feeling aloneJ 
volunte.r-ism to xwealisat1on of d&sire alone; 
fottma.liam to rational will alcneJ intuition.,. 
ism to immediate insight alonEh Bach neglects 
ot' unclerempha.s1~es a.otua.l aspec'bs of the ex-
perience ot3<value in its special inta.ttest in one aspect. 
l:t 1s Bx-ightmants view that the synoptic, ol' personalistic, 
theories ot valuation do mora justice to the total facts of 
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expeJ:ienoe•-inoluding consideration fw the worth of all 
the previous theo:r-iea .- Only- a theery. eapablfii of embracing 
the total it,- ot a man t s GXper1ence is e.x1olog1cally sa. tis" 
tactot7, :1n Br1ghtma.n'a opinion. What such a theoey implies 
is brought out tn subsequent d1souss1on. 
Of the problems which a discussion of axiology ~aises, 
~obably the most pragmatically pertinent has to do with 
selection ot ideals. The etf~t to discover o~iteFia is 
not met-ely an SJ:~bit:ttary exercise 1n philosophical exegesis; 
it grows out of' the need of meeting life t s choices .. with some 
guide,. not only in the deoisiens which must be made but 1n 
the volunta.17 election of values which will contribute to a. 
well•or4ered life.l 
The neoess!ty ot finding some C1'1ter1on toF judging 
values is. made more acute when it 1a rea:u.sed that the val ... 
uea which men hold determirle the kind of lite that the7 
live. Life and its ideal oannet be. separated. TbeFe is 
the continual contliot of ideals, uh1sh and lew. spiritual 
and sensual, oleax- and vague, rational and ~:ttat1onal .. 0 
all of whioh nseem te strive tor the :maater:r of manta mind_.n2 
~o determine what ideals w:-e true and good ia not an easy 
task, bu.t it values are to be tested at all, B%-ightman 
1. In MI., 76, Brightman points out that acts of will xae• 
tleot both necessity and freedom. There 1s a oe~tatn 
0 g1vanneas0 1n most situations which makes a choice 
neeessaey, · yet the choice of altel*nativea fxtom the 
given situation reveals genuine fileedom. 
2. Brightman, PI. 64., 
59 
.:· 
enunciates two major principles ot judgment without which 
there would be only axiological chaos. These two principles 
ave coherenc~ and respect tor pe~aonality. They do not, of 
course, exhaust eve~y pos$1ble aspect of value ~iteria, as 
BI*1ghtman•a Moral ;.a.ws showa,l but no other workable com.,.. 
b1nation summarizes so well his over ... all view of the bases. 
ot value judgment. These !We the main pillars 1n his axio.,. 
logical structure. 
a.. Coherence. 
Bl'ightman defines cohex-ence as 111nclusive systematic 
oons1stenoy.n2 It should be emphasised that by oohe~enoe 
he means more than any na-rrow syllogistic 01' .formal type ot 
reasoning. Ita chief chal:taoter1stics are inclusiveness and 
togetherness. While it is correct that true propositions 
muet be consistent, consistency is not enough. Propositions 
may be consistent and be talse. He says, theretOl'e, that 
"any,propos1tion is t~e, if it is both salf•cottsietent and 
coherently connected with our system ot propositions as a 
whole.•3 
As applied to axiology • a ~e value 1a one that oo .... 
heres with the rest or expe~1eneth JUst because a value is 
a value does not grant !t immunity from the test o~ rational 
1.- To state the full eth1eal and axiological implioations 
of his oriteria would be to x-eproduce ML" 
a~ Erightman~ Ii'P, ea. ~is is the sense 1n which he uses 
it throughout his w~1t1ngs. See also his lexicon def-
inition,. ITP, 3S3. 
a. Ibid., se. 
eo 
.. ~ Cl ·l.P..JJ • A.l .& ... , .. 
wholeness. Values as well as any other area of expe:r1ence 
mu.st be tested by the m.ost :rigorous norms available~ nun ... 
defined and uncriticiaed values are no mora valid than ve 
unde.fined and uncriticiaed aense data-.ttl The experience of 
the senses 1a noto~iously misleading. Just as the data of 
sease muat be continuously tested and oorreoted by the mind, 
so must valuas be hav.moniously ~elated to the criterion of 
truth itself.. Nothing less will do than testing by all 
the .facts available, The ~ue value emerges only after 
judging "moxaal.ly, ac1ent1f1oally ~ eathet1oaUy, religiously, 
%iationally.--.1n the light of our whole mind, O\U." whole ex .... 
pe~1enoe.02 Bach state 1n the republic ot values may have 
certatn a~ton~, but "each state is subject to the ~ederal 
aonst1tut1oit' of reasonft"3 
Whatevel' violates the nwms of ~aaaon surely cannot 
be among the highes,t values, if a. value at all, fo:tt it is 
the very natve ot reason to want to see things 1n oonnec ... 
tion.. ttaeason is harmot17, unitT, order. wholeness, whenevex-
1t ex.Presses itself, and through whs.tevev medium* n4 Reason 
1s the synoptic vision of the. mind. All facts, from what• 
ave%* .eea of experience they emerge. must be seen 1n theiza 
x-elationship to the whole;; or the7 az-e distwted, abstract .. 
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and untrue. Truth is a matter. ot maximum oonoreteneas. 
That is why' &-ightman· insists that 11all tl'Uth claims Xte ... 
garding .facta w values mu.st be rat'e:e~ed to the sup.t."em.e 
oourt of ~eaaon, which alone has 3urisd1otion in oases of 
t:ttUth.ul It, after examf.nat1on and oritioism by the widest 
z-ange o.f facts possible, a value.-.ola1m proves to be b.ar• 
mon1ously related to the rest of experience, 
then we treat !t as a tl'ue value, Just as we 
t~eat a scientific or philosophical bJpothea1s 
as true fC'I! the· ss.rn.e xaeason: namely' 1 lhat the 
conditions of coherence are fulf1lleu. 
b. Principle of Respect tor Personalit,-. 
As e.beady shown in the pl*avious chapter, BrightmanTs 
own works have gone a long way 1n supplying the lack of a 
pereonal.istio axiology-. Probably no othel' representative 
of modern persona.l.ism has done more to put. value theo:t7 on 
the onl7 scmnd basis possible, that is, empir:loa.l self-. 
experience. fWo p~inciples reappear continuously ~ougn-
ou'fi his value ,expoa1tion, .fil*st, that all experience is 
self~e3Per1enoe and second, that values exist onlr 1n the 
axpevienoe of persons.. These two propos! t1ons £Ute succinctly 
described by ~1ghtman himself in the followtng two state* 
mente • The fil'st appefll's in a. discussion of tbe 11datum ... selfa 11 
The enttre present selt ••• is the present datum. 
The whole datum of any momentts oonerete ex• 
perience 1a the self of that moment, although 
• 
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usually- aome aspects are selected from the 
whole f~ special attention. !his datum-sal~~ 
this present ezpel."!enoe, is the onl.7 indubit.,. 
able fact we have.l. 
This might be well sUlF.IllUU'"U.ed 1n his saying that "the 
person 1s what he expsvienca.a himself to be.n2 !he seoolld 
proposition, 1. e •• the indissoluble ~elation of persen 
and value, 1a e2Cltt*eased 1n l!x'1ghtman • s categt'mioal op1n1011 
that 11wha:re thelle is a person enjoying a pra.fal":t-ei expex-1 ... 
snce, there 1$ a valueJ where there is no enjoying person 
there 1e no value .. n3 · In bx-ie.t, no pal'*son no value. 
The def1nition ot the &lllPir1oa.l person and the necea ... 
SNW axio•peraonal relationship az.e brought together in a 
single impressive passage in his oontr1but1on to the co-
operative work, F.t"o_edom,t , I~!J. lqe~~YJ3, edited by Ruth 
Anshen. Be aaysa 
The primaz*y ta.et, ~om which all raota ar-e 
de:ttived wh1eh all tb.ee-P1es in~Pl'et · and ~om whloh all bee action emanates, 1s the 
tact of the total· oonseiou.s s1tu.a.t1on which 
, 1. B:r1ghtman1 Arih {1929}, 560•561. See al,so PI, Ohaptel' I, 
and his Art .. (1950) to!' his fUll analysis ot aelt. See 
Max otto, AJ:lth(l929) tw w1t1oism of Brightman~s datum 
salt. Otto says there that ttarqone who olaimft that the. 
a ole da:tum is 1nd1 vidual mind faces the pzaoblem of sol1p• 
siam.," 499. · 
e. Brightman_ 1 P_V1 15. This was an ott•xaepse.ted saying of his 1n classxaoom J.ectures on the nature of the self. It never 
ta.1le4 to evoke considerable discussion, 1f' not opposition. 
Be found that the notion of self 1n te1"md of u soul sub-
stance" rathe:r than self•expe~1enoe was a deeply· embedded 
belief and most difficult to eradicate tx-om the :mindS ot 
students-. 
a. :Bl'ightman, ut.(l943), 220. See also PR,. l.7; SL, 44, ao, 
lGSJ Art.tl94G}, 371. wh$re personais dertned tn te~ms 
of abU1ty to eA."Perianoe values. 
is a person's present experience. In that ex• 
pex-ienoe~r vision, insight, and synopsis ye 
functions ot the will to purpose values. 
Bven mo:t-e apeoif'io is his statement that 11the e.etua.l facts 
of expax-1ence~ out of which all knowledge and belief arise, 
oons1st of personal conso1ousnass including personal val~ 
ues.n2 fJ:Ihts view cU.ae.~sociates tzrue value ,fifom any 1mper-. 
sonal stuff. If' there are v~lues the7 exiet in persons. 
Que.ntitat!:~el-, speaking, this means that whet'e there ta.re 
nlOX'e persons there are mwe values. ·- Bx'ightman allows fUll 
reeogn1t1on to this possibility • se:y1ng that it is supe~­
f1c1al not to reoQgn1ae it. nA universe with more persons 
1n 1tO!*Mand a !)X'inc1ple of val;ae at the heart ot 1 t ........ s.a mo:re 
ve.luable than one with fewer pel'sons in 1t.u3 Persona are 
valuesJ values are personal. 0~o ap~ove o~ respect a~ 
value is to app:t*ove ox- x-espeot pe:r-s ons in whom alone the 
values enst .... All pexaaons, then, a:re ve.luea.n4 He:tte 
~lghtman•s criterion of respect tar personality appears. 
It "personality' is tha Ol'll7 intrinsic value we know or can 
oonce1ve, 00 e.s ·he. oontencts, then it follows that the high•-
sat values are those which contribute the ttmost to the 
oohex+enii funct1on1ng and organisation of persona.l1t7 as 
1. B:t-1ghtman, Al't. ( 1940), 492 * 
e. B:vlgb.tma.n, FV; as. 
a .. Brightman, FG11 189-190"' Gordon H. position of Bl:*ightman's a~t·a basis 
man's doctrine of God. lee OVMT .. 
4• Brightman, PV• -18. 
5. Br1ghtnta1'1, w, as. Of. m., 135. 
C~k uses this 
of attack on Bright• 
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a whole.nl This :ts the heart ot personalism as Brightman 
.. . . 
understands 1t., ttrersonal.iam," he says, 9 is "the belief 
that oonso1oua paxasonality 1s both _the supreme value and 
the supreme rea11t7 in the univex-sa.u2 None of Bx-ightman'~ 
wwks fail to examplif1 the signif1eance of thit:l principle • 
:tt probably is the most ott""reourr!ng theme in his articles, 
leotUX:tes, aJ.?4 private conversations.. It is rel'J2Bl'kable 'f?ha.b 
!'agardless of the theme assigned to 131-ightman, whether con• 
tr1but1on to a book, jOUl'l'lal~ or s~osium, he ma.naged to 
' . ... . ; 
make pe-:asons and values oentl'al to b.1s d1eouss1on., For 
example, in his Un1vers1ty .Leeture, ~!gbtma.n points out 
that in the Elllnu.al.. Oonte~enoe on. So1ence, Philosoptw • and 
Religion, although its ~tioipants ditter .on many things, 
there. is "one principle on ~h1oh there has been u.nifal'm 
agresment• ... the ~ineiple ot: respect foX' pwsona.11t,-.u3 
B:f.'ightman's own ma.3or omtr1but1ons to seve.Fal of the an• 
. . . ~ 
nu.al symposia were in support ot that pza1no1plEh In b1a 
twst pa.pel', 0 fbe Problem ot an ObJective Basis felt Value 
Judgments$ n he x-e1terates the point made above that "where · 
peFsons IU'S _absent, value is abaent."4 , In his second pape1'1 
nPhi~osophioe.l Ideas end En.duving Peaoe1 " 5 he makes respect 
fo~ pa~sonalit,y the key to peaee and international unde~-
as 
standing, The following ~e hie six majo:t* po1nts:1 
1. Personalit7 is the seat ot value. 
a. Personality idea.l!ees. 
a. Personality is f~ee. 
4:. Pez-sons.lity" is social. 
5~ Personality is g%"Owth throougb. dlalect!oal tensions to 
6. Religious pel*Sonalit7 1s rational love. 
In h1fl veey powe:rful paper, 11 Autononw and 'l'heonotllS', u pzae• 
pa.:red tor the Twelfth Symposium, as late aa 1953, B he makes 
the tollowing his two bas1e postulateat 
1. ~e zaelat1ons o~ f%-eedom and authcvit7 are functions 
ot beliefs about values.& 
s. ~eiam. 1e true.4 
In elabwat1on he combines the two postulates 1n the state ... 
menu that "value expe:t-ienGEh ... implies tbe.t one pu:rapose of 
God~Mpe~haps His basic.tnt~tnsic ~pose~-1s the developmenu 
ot respect for persans.n5 
Here one might ask, not disl'espeetfully~ nwhat of 1tt116 
at-1ghtm.an's own anawe:r is tbat pe:c-aons _and values, whether 
~ecognised or not, constitute the basic 0~esuppos1tions ot 
. . -
and evidences for science,. and az*'b, moralit7 and :rel1g1on.,••7 
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This ia a large ola1m to make 11 but how can it be oontro ... 
vel'ted? Not even so1enoe, with its rigorous insistence on 
observation and meaaUl'ement, oan aaeape the personal equa-
tion without d1sc~edittng at the same time 0 its own obser• 
vat ions, methods, end applications. ••l ~is 1s because the 
ttpersonal reality is the only verifiable beingn2 in the 
universeJ hence, to get away from it ts to sacP1f1ce basic 
empil-1cal tact tor lass concrete data. The aim ot all 
soi.enee 1 religion, ph1losop~, therefoz-a should be d~aoted 
toward una growth $nd p~eservat1on of personal.values 1n 
the univezase., Whatever does not so oontxa1bute, whether it 
be a natural1st1e philoaopb,f or dialectical mateza1a11smt 
is unworthy of human et:tol"fi., "01v1ligat_~on needs a philoso-
P~ of .full and free and :reas~able pe:rsonal1ty03 for 1n 
personal experience is net on1T •the very stuff or which all 
value consists,n but "also the criterion for all cultural 
ach1evements.,n4 
Bxtightman•s two basic cza1ter1a or value, 1. e., co---
herence and the principle ot :respeet foX' personality, have 
now been set forth(l It :remains to speoity mo:re dh•eotly 
what value means in the light of these standru-ds. The two 
p:rtneiples ~e fo:rcetully united in Brightman's statemsnt 
that "value is, in any given situation, the highest which 
1. Brighinnanj PV, 24. 
2. Ibid., 25. 
3!11 Ibid.' 25-26., 
4. Ibid-.# 26,. 
67 
oontX'ibutes most to the cohe:ttent i\lnct1on1ng and w~ 
isation of pe~sonality as a W,bole.nl ~1ghtman woul« be 
quick to add that 11thia does not mean that we a:re to ap-.o 
p:t.tove of eveey- person as he is. uS I.f the principle d1c1 
~an respect for pe~sonality, without qual1f1oation, then 
one would be obligated to respect the crtminal as well as 
the district attorney. That would be a violation ot the 
other- pr1ne1ple, v1z., ooherenoGh The !)l*1nc1ple of zaespeot 
does involve, nevertheless, a.duty toward an incoherent 
pex-aone.lity. 11It means to love him, not ror what he is• 
but for wbat .he may be,. or even to love him as he is in 
ordeP that he may beoame better.uS ~1a 1nt~oduces the 
social d1mens1oth Ooha:rent ,z.espect. means active effort 
in the in~ease and conservation ot those values in society 
Whioh will contlt1bute the moat to all ooncem!ed., United., 
tha two principles become a balanced and all-inclusive 
guide not only for the individual person 1n his quest fw 
a p~inciple of p~ivate judgment but in his total community 
relaticm.ship:ih In mora religious language one might say 
that eoheranoe and. respect for personality beeoma .-.l..o~s-.os-. and 
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B. Whitehead. 
1. Be.aio Oharaoteriatics of Value. 
!fhe attempt to establish Wh1tehead•e specific 
meaning of value 1s a problem in itself, 1nvclv1ng more 
than a perfunctory reference to his det1n1t1on. which 
could then be set up as a fixed gu1de .... po$t to the mo:Pe 
involved relatioDS.hips of his value theory. If he had 
been oaretul to define, the purpose of this section would 
have been simply 1\tlf1lled1 as 1n the oase of Bl'1ghtma.n1 
by a care!'tll stating of his definitionJ but unfortunatel)" 
this is not the ·case., P~obabl:y the beat that oan be done 
1n lieu of spec1f1o definition is to set forth some of 
the basic obaracter1st1es o£ his concept, and then pvooeed 
to some of the d1stinot1ons that he makes •. ~is 1s not 
to imply that an exeroise 1n Wh1 tehead' s value theory is 
a forced enterprise; to set foxath any aspect of Wb1te-
head1an doetxaine calls tor a high measure of selectivit:y 
and discrimination, and px-obably to s. special degee 1n 
the axiological phase of his thousn'• 
a.. JTel1minary- Definition" 
The nearest that Whitehead comes to giving a spe• 
c1f1c definition is found 1n his Science and the Modern 
World. where he says: urvalue is the word I use for the 
- . . 
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intrinsic reality of an event."l What this statement 
tully .m.aans involves the whole of his metaphysical thought, 
the exposition of whilh is not within the proposed limits 
of this study. In lieu of such e~bo:ration, the next best 
altwnative is a survey of his doctrine of actual entities, 
To understand their function is to unclestand his cosmology" .. 
Some statement ot theix- meaning is necessary a.t this point, 
not onlf as a basis tor explaining the m~e inclusive term 
nevent11 in relation to value~ but as_a needed introduction 
to much of the subsequent exposit1on4 
b. Actual Entities. 
Two of Wb1tehead 1a definitions suggest the function 
ot actual entities: 
Pbst, "'actual entities•~ ... also termed tactual occa• 
sions t ...... a,re the final x-ea.l things o£ which the wOl'ld ia 
--Aa tt9 ~v U.Po 
Second, "each actual entity is conceived as an aot of 
experience arising out of data.u& 
The first definition ahows the ~elation of actual an• 
tities to Whitehead's metapl:cy's1oal system. Beyond actual 
1. Whitehead..- SMW $ 95. Shahan cails this and the 4onneot .... 
1n.g passage Whitehead's first referenGa to value. See 
his WTE111 7l. If he means it literally# then he overlooks 
seatte:tted references. e. g .. 1 181 sa,. and especially Whitehead.fa inclusion of vaJ.ue as one of the a!Jt notions 
with wh1ob a philosophy of organism xm.uat be ooncax-nedl 
89. There is also the key value passage 1n Bll, 5, wr t .. 
ten five or six yeaJ:I's earlier. 
S • Whitehead, PR, S7 • 
3. Ibid., as. 
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entities there is noth1ngJ they constitute the ultimate 
realit7. Even "God is an actual entity, and so is the 
most tr1v1a1 puff of existence in fSl'•oft empty spaoa.ul 
~e aeoond definition becomes more explicit with 
Whitehead's explanation that the "essence of an actual 
entity consists solely in tbe ract that it is a prehendtng 
ths.ng.n2 ~o prehend is to feel. The reality of an actual 
entity consists 1n its feeling of the data that are the~e 
for it, and those data are other actual entities#· An ac• 
tual entity does not exist by 1taelf1 ~s a stuft or a 
substanoa;3 it m:-isas n9ut of data.", 1~ e., it gets what 
it "wantfl" from the V8.1"ious elements 1n its envittonment 1 
all of which foxam a. unitT which 1s the e.otua.l entity-. 
Whitehead's metaphysical system is revealed at once as a 
-o-ast *'relational oomplex116 of mutually px-ehend1ng· entities. 
It is Q1?. organiem oons1st1ng of "entwined pxaehens1ve un! .. 
t1ea.88 
Some ot the key terms e.sst?cie.t$4 with actual entities 
!We concn-escence. pxaehena1on, eternal objects, sat1st*aot1on,· 
- . 
1. Whitehead, PR1 ss •. 
a. :tbict., ea. 
&. Whitehead repudiates the t:trad.1t1onal dootx-1ne o.r· sub• 
stance explainable in t~r~ of aubjectwpred1cate. Pa, 
Viii. -
4. Whitehead, PR, 321. 
a. Ibid., •· . 
6. Whitehead• SMW1 85,. Of his SI!W Whitehead sa.idt "I 
. would term the doetl'inEI of these lectures, the h1sto:J;7 
or CWBanl.O mao)lanism, n Sl • 
. -. - - . --. ·- . . . . I 
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ot these means wUl be treated br1efl1'• 
Oonc~es_cenoe. This is the tel'm applied to the coming 
together of the elements which make up the actual entity. 
The whole metaphy'aioa.l ongoing of the un1 vettse _ 1s e. con ... 
tinuous prooeas ot building up ''no~l togatherness"1 by 
prehensions ot the lt1!U'l1 date.. Bvel7thixlg 1ri. the universe 
is a possible element tn a new oonoresoence, 1. e., "it 1s 
a potential tor eV&V1 'becomtngt.nS Bow an item t.rom data 
.. . ~ . 
becomes a part of the new unity has• potentially, many 
possible fo1'mB 1 bu.t. what it becomes ia determined by the 
ooncreseanoe 1tsel.t., Whitehead speaks. of. the 11mode of 
1mpl1cat1on.113 Until the item is rec~ive4 into the con• 
creaeenca its "mode0 ia indet~minate. but 9 the indater~ 
mins.tion Lf.iJ :rendezaed determinate in the :real eonoresaenca. 114 
When the building-up reaches its full detel"ll11nat1on or cul~ 
. . 
mination the oonox-esoenoe is then complete. and takes the 
name of an actual entit,-.5 n 'Aotualit:yt means nothing ala& 
l. Whitehead, PR1 39:~ 
a. Ibid., 33. . . 
a. Ibid., 33. One pauses to wendel' how an actual entity-
can exercise such prerogatives as it seems. to do in the 
process ot coneresoenee, when the actual entit7 .~rses 
from the conoreseence. How an actual· entity can :tmve 
reeling when it ~ises out or feeling, has bothers'! '-
seve~al Oomntents.tox-s. en' Wfil\lehead.~ See Urban, Art. (lfl41) 1 
3l6J and Johnson" Art. (1945}, S9S. 
4• Whitehead, PR, 34. _-
54 L1te~al.17 • the- te:rms eonex-escenee and actual entity ax-e 
. not syno~ous, since the forme1' refers more 'be t;he de• 
velopmenta.l and the latter to the satiafaetion stage of 
the ooncrescenoe, which than becomes a datum fctl.' a new · 
oonoresoence.- ~e full concrescence, however, is the 
aotus.l entity, and Whitehead identities them in at least 
one place, Plt1 321. 
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than this ultimate ent~y 1nto the oono~ate.nl 
Prehension. ttAotUa.l entities involve each other b7 
reason ot their prehensions of eaoh othex-.02 P:t'ehena1ons 
a:re feelings, but not in the sense of the expe:rience of 
sensation or emotion. A feeling is the affective response 
of a concrescence to othe:r entities~ What anothel' entit,' 
1~ is a positive feeling in the first entity.3. That is to 
say that the onlz content of any prehens!ve unity or actual 
entity consists in elements from other entities-~and these 
are feelings il In brief, prehension is the teel1ng of 
otbsr feelings.4 It fellows that wh$re there is no feel~ 
ing there is no actual entity.. What bas been sa.~d doee 
not rule out negative prehensions. which refer to the 
feeling ot exclusion aroused by not,being a. positive ele,... 
5 . 
ment tn a concrescence. An actual entity, therefore, 
feela every othe~ entity 1n the universe, either posit1vel7 
or negatively. "The:re is no 11'relevance.116 Prehensions 
are also pbJsieal,~ conceptual,~~ bipolar.8 When an 
aetual entity prebends an ete:rnal objeot19 the feeling fer 
that eternal object is said to be oonoeptual.10 When othe~ 
1. Whitehead, Pit, 321. 
2. Ibid., 29. 
5. Ibid. • 66o · 
4 .. Ibid., 322. 
5. Ibid., 66. 
s. Whitehead, M'.r, 101. 
7. Whitehead, PB, 35~ 
e. Ibid." 1sa. 
9. Eternal objects are desor1bed immediately below. 
10. Whitehead, PR, 361 280• 
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entities at*e felt, the feeling is said to be phys1oal.l 
.~~epnal object!J,• Whitehead calls an sternal object 
a "pur-e potential fw the specific determination of fact#na 
a definition which is given some elucidation by saying that 
"fillY entity whose conceptual :t-eoognition does not involve 
a necessa:ry :refel'enoe to any definite aot~al entities of 
the temporal world is oalled an tete:rnal object r * tt3 This 
is tantamount to saying that they do not exist, s 1noe cnl.7 
aotual entities are real. Nevex-theless, they Sl"e, since .-.v 
----.... r" 
ttevax-ything l!l'lat be som.ewhere,04 and the 11somewherett tor rv'c,'.~ 
eternal objects is nthe non ... temporal. actual ent1ty,n5 1. e._. 
God., who continually envisages the xaealm of eternal objects .a 
As potentials, eternal objeots are indeterminate poss.ibiJ.-. 
ities waiting for aotualisation in soma conorescent process,~ 
Eh g4, round, blue, sw~et. "Blue" is only a potential until. 
there is a blue pen, a blue sky'. Eternal objects alta said 
\"''-to "inger:uJn,,actual entities w to beooma actualized 1n 
them by n1ngrass1on.,n7 The cb1e~ function of _an eternal. 
1. Whitehead, PR, 35. The feeling of eternal objects by 
actual entities seems to go against the view that on~ 
othe~ actual entities are felt* Foro an excellent review 
ot this and related problem$, see Hall 'a a%'t1olat "Ot 
What Use are Wh1te~ad's Eternal Objeots?11 ,. .A:ttt.{l930). 
s. Whitehead, Pa~ sa. 
~. Ibid" a :70. · Ct. Whiteheadta diSOUSSiOll on. 11vector Char• 
acter I~ PR, as, 133. 
4. Ibid.; 73. 
a. Ibid., 73. See also RM, 90. 
a .. Ibid •• 70. These ~tarnal objects a:re ol.osely related to 
the ltlaton1o forms or 1dea.st but Whitehead chooses rathat-
to use his own terms to a.vo1d "misleading suggestions, 11 
PR, 70. 
7. Ibid., sa. 
> I 
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object lies in its capacity as a "conceptual ltnte rw· 
feeling .ul Interpreted, this means that 11what an actual 
entity might be" is held out in .txaont as a goal 1n guiding 
the process of oonoresoenee. An eternal object is the 
bait held out by God to induce new actualities. Here lies 
the secret of process and p.x-ogl'ess 1n Whitehead's cosmo ... 
logical scheme. God envisages infinite potentia1itiaa for 
process which in his "plan11 he wishes to have actual1zet1 
in the ozader of nature. fb.e t akirlg of the lure by an a.otua.l 
entity conet1tutes the beginning of a new ooncresoenoe, 
which will :make one more step fo:rward in the teleologiee.l 
process-.2 
Satisfaction. In describing the process of ooncres-
cenoe the meaning· of satisfaction could not but be implied. 
Satisfaction "is the final phaSJ9 1n the process of con• 
cresoenoe, constituting an actual ent1ty.u5 The final phase 
ia reached when thGXJe n1s one complex, f'u.lly determined 
feeltng~n4 How the.prooess begins and what determdnes the 
satisfaction are the major p~oblema here. To StQte them 
b:rietly, the actual entity is initiated by God,5 but after 
l. Whitehead, PR, 131. 
2. Closely related 1s the notion of appetition, which White~ 
head deso~1bes as an element of ~est or urge within an 
actual en'k1ty towards 0 realiaat!on ot what 1s not and 
. may be," PR, 47, 48. In FB sa, he sa;ya tbat "the con ... 
nection of immediate tact wltb. the tut~e resides in ita 
appatiti on. u 
3. Whitehead• PR, 38. 
4. Ib1d,, 58. . 
s. Ibid.! 374. 
"oreationtt it is "responsible for the decision by which 
any lure for feeling is admitted to eff1o1ency.n1 What 
the satistaotion is which deter~s the end of the process 
is more difficult. Whitehead points out that "there 1e a. 
succession of phasas"2 1n the oonorenoent process, in which 
new feelings are added to the alrea~ existing 0 integrat1on 
of prehens1onscn ~heae are absorbed, 01- made a part of 
the pl'o<sesa which continues "till all the prehensions are 
components in the one determinate tntegral satisfaetion.n3 
This statement is elaborated 1n later discussion to maan 
that the culmination ot the process comas only when.there 
is established "a completely determinate bond with eveey 
item in the Wl1Vel'se.,114 '!his means that when .feelings of 
all other actual entities are f~lt 1n a prahens1ve unity, 
either positively or negatively, then the ooncreseence 
reaches se.tistaotion and stopsa Sa.tis.faotion "closes up 
the ent1ty.u5 
Sub,Ject•SUJ?G~.1ec~, The distinction must be made be ... 
tween an actual entity as the "aubJecttt or feelings and the 
consequent entity' which exists at the point of sat1staot1on .. 
An actual ent1tr is a subject in that it feelsv 0 The 
1. Whitehead, PR, 135., Cono:rescenoea as causa sui yet 
initiated by God pose a genuine antin~ for resolution. 
a p:roblam recognized and discussed in a later ohaptex-. 
2 .. Ibid •• 39., 
3* Ibid•• 39o-
4a Ibid.,· 71. 
5. Ibid ... l29. 
e. Xb1d., 35., Silt. 
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p!'inoiple by which feelings B!"e ·directed toward satistao ... 
tion ia the 0 subjeetive a1m11 ot the ent:lt;v. It is "the 
$Ubjeot 1tselt determintng its own self•creation as one 
· c:reatUI'e•"l. The manner' 1n which, ozt tthow that subject 
pxtehends0 a datum is known as the subjective tol'm of the 
entity42 Johnson calls it the •attitude" whioh is taken 
toward a d.atum.5 Whitehead uses such terms as 11 amot1ons, 
valuations, pu:f'posea, advers1ons, aversions, consc1ousness,n4 
as e:a:amples ot subjective fomn. 
By- using the tel'm aubject, howeve:tt, Whitehead does not 
wish to imply a substanoe wh1ob. has feelings "'5 The su.bj·eot 
is the 1nte~ation of fael!ngs itself, and bas no other 
existence. ~e concept of "a.n actual ent1t:r as the un""' 
changing subJect of change is completely abandoned.u6 ~ 
subject is the unity at whatever stage the ooncresoenae or 
actual $nt1ty is. Bu.t the 0 aotua.l. entity- is at once the 
subject e:&Parieneing and the suparject of its exper1encet:h"7 
'rhat 1a, ss a un1t;r it ae:t'ves as the home base tw other 
tealings, but when all the runa ax*e in, it is the total 
score, the );'feal1 ty of all the runs in one conCX'es cence, the 
l. Whitehead, PR, lOS,. 
a. :tb1d., ss. 
a. Johnson. A.rt.(l945), 2415. 
4. Whitehead• PR, 35. 
5. See Whitehead's list of repud1at1ona, including the "sub .... ject ... predioate .f'o:t'm of expression," :PR, v11i. See also 
SMW 64, ·where he says that 11substiance and. que.lity afford 
ano,her instance of the fallacy- of misplaced conoretenass. 11 
e. Whitehead, P.R. 43. 
7., Ibid-., 43. 
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aupel"jact,. As the t"esultant unity of its own feelillgs; 
the actual. anti t7 nhas beeome a beingnl and joins the 
wol"ld ot other actualities to become itself a new potential 
to~ othe~ baoomlngs, while its own subjective existence 
is no more. 
Whitehead contra4Jts his subjeot.-.supat'ject coneept 
with the method of Kant. For the la ttelt, the extel'nal 
wwld. was a construct of the m1nd1 nthe wwld em.e:rges fxaom 
the subjeotJn2 :tO%' the philosoptw of organism. the world 
supplies the data f()r the grow~h of actual. entities, "the 
subject emex-ges from the wcx-ld.u3 In brief, tw mm.t the 
wot-ld proceeds &om subject1v1ty te o'bjectiv1tyJ for White• 
head fxaom- objeot1v1tcy- to subject1v1ty. 
f.e~isb.1:S.· What is the status of an actual entity 
once it achieves its sat1sfaotion? Xt ia Whitehead's view 
that actual entities Ell:.'e Rperpetually per1sh1ng.n4 'l'he 
point at which they parish is the ultimate. moment of sat1s• 
faction. 0 In the QX:tganio pbilosophJ' an e.ctual entity has 
Jper1shed' when it is complete.no When the actual entitT 
has made determinate, av actual, all its potential feelings 
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tov eve:ray othe:r item in tb.a universe, then, like the dying 
P»enebtmm who lived cnly long enough to see Pal'is, it peJ:$1Shes. 
' 
Obja~t1v1~. Pnx-adoxically, pe:r:lsh:tng does not mean 
that the feelings wh1eh1 1n uni'b7, constitute the actual 
enti .. ~ have gone out of existence. !he aotue.l $nt1ty pe:r-
!shea 1n that 1t loses its own immediae,y aa that actual 
entity,l but it passes over into the prehension• or other 
· entities, thus aChieving what Whitehead calls "objectivity. n 
Objeot1f1ca..t1on nrefe~s .to the particulatt mode 1n wh1oh the 
't 
the potent1al1t1 of one actual entity is realized 1n an" 
other actual antity.n2 It gains not only objeet1v1tf but 
1mm.ortal1ty. "!he cx-eatUl"e pOl'iahes and is ilmn.ox-tal.ua 
. ---... ' 
Objeot1~1ty is the reverse of p~ehension. ~e t~ans1t1on 
f:t*om s·ubject1v1ty- t() Qbjaot1v1ty involves the doot:ttine ot 
1nhex-11Uuloe. 4 Aetual entities inherit .tx-om one another. 
What actual entity A loses by pe:rish1ng• 1. e. 1 tlWo~h 
.. 
objeot1tioa.tion1 aotu.a.l entit7 B includes subjectively, 
The }Jl*oeass is mo:t'e than a tempo~al ;;u~quenoe 1 however, 
s1noe eJ.l inhel"itance 1s ~ed~cs.te4 upon a ba~io inter:rela-
tednesa among all actual entlties. Whet'e the:tte is "a singl$ 
. . 
line of tnneritance" maintained f~om "gane~ation to genera• 
tiontt it 1s known as an. 0 e1'ldul*.f.ng obJeet,n5 which may take 
the fo:rm of "pe:rsowa.l CJ:~de:r.,n6 Whitebea4 also speaks o~ 
~~ . . 
"an end~1ng pe%'sone.l1t,- 1n the temporal world." whioh he 
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defines aa "a. t-oute of ocoasions in whiob. the aucoeasoXJs 
with some peculifu' completeness ei:unup the!:* p~edeoessox-s.,nl 
!t'o give the whole "case h1et0l-ytt of an actual entity-
is praot1ce.lly to repPoduce Process and Reality. Only enough 
L . - . - - - ~ . . . ·- . -- «£Yl 
has been g1tren tc ill,udnate fu.t'ther disoussiono To SUlll ... 
m.s.%'1BEU Actual entities SJ:~e the basic real.1t1EUI of the un1-
veree1l !he7 come together in prebensivo unities known as 
conweacencea 1 which, when they- have x-eached satisfaction., 
perishJ but in pel-iebin& they become objeotified in other 
entities whieh perpetuate what has been already attained. 
An actual entity ia a subject, but it becomes a superject 
when it t:r.-tU'.l.Scends its own experiences. P:rogress 1n the 
WOX'ld is tl'aeeabla to $ temal objects which a.t>'e l'Ul"'es fol' 
te•ling. 
c. Events .. 
The 4eac1'1pt1on, now., c:t an event is made possible. 
Event is more inclusive than the tem actual ant1ty, which 
Whitehead des.w~bes aa a "limiting type o:r an event with 
only one membel'.n2 An event, -on the otheP hand, usually 
r.efera to a. "nexus of actual oocas1ons, 1ntep ... ;related 1n 
some detel'mina.te fashion 1n one extensive quantum.~nS An 
event is •the ~aping into unity of a pattern ot aspects,n4 
It is Whitehead's substitute fC'I! the term "th1ng11 1 which 
so 
in the connnonly und.SXtstood sense does not axist f'or him. 
~here ax-e on:cy- events, ol.' assemple.ges ot 1ngxtedientn in a. 
apat1o~tem;poxsa.l un1t:y; but an event is not a. me:re assem-
blage:l 1t 1a a unity of data into one pattern.2 RealitY' 
consists 1n events ~nd notbing else. But ~eality is a 
pvooeaa. Events EUte born, live, a.nd pass on. 
Nature is a process ot expansive development# 
necesaax"ily tttanaitional from prehension to 
prehension. What is aehieved is theX'eby 
passed beyond, but it is also retained as 
havJ.ns aspects of itself pt:eaent to prehen.,. 
sions which lle beyond 1t.~ 
Bach evant bas a histor7. ~e~ent, past, and fUture. It 
relates to the present !n that it refl~cts nthe modes of 
its contemporariasJn the past tn that it preserves in its 
own stl'Ucture the "modes ot its p:redecessot-att J and it 
ttant1o1pates" i;iba futUl'e in the sense that tte.n event Jnb'trors 
within itself such aspects as the future throws back on .to 
the present a n4 In the langue.ge of ,ho~e_ss .. a.nd. ,Raalit;:y:, an 
l. Whitehead., SMW. 74. 
a. In disouasio~ Whitehead sometimes equates event with 
actual ocoas1on, actual entitr, o~ oono~esoenoa. ln 
SMW for.a exPosition pUJ.I'poses he make~ prehension synon~ous 
with event, but minimises "the awkward te:t'm p:r:aehens1onu 
1n tavr:tt!- ot event, 74!1 Xn later wx-1t1ng, however, pa:t" ... 
ticula:rly PR, event is uaed vary little • while prehension 
is the favored term. When he does use event tn PB, it 
uaut:1,1ly is as defined above •. 
a. Whitehead,. SMW, 73, '74a !rb.e doctrine o£ objeot1f1cat1on 
or immortality is most fully developed in PR.. Foil' all · 
Whitehead's oontessed ignorance of·Begel does not this 
beaz- close resemblance to Regel's conceR' of e.uffehoben? 
, See Whitehead's 0 Autob1ograph1ca.l Notes in Schl PPr: 
. PANW~ 7. 
4. Whitehead, SMW • 74. 
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event 1a 0 a. def1n1te fact with a. da1u~.ul. It may be thottgb.t 
of as g ooopl'Xtenoa. ():tt ma.7be as a. pulse beat ot reality· 
having a definite locale in time and spaca. Now value ts 
the inhel"ent ox- 1ntrSns1o veal.it7 of such an ev~nt as al.• 
:r.-ead7 quoted at the beg1lln1ng of t~ d1sousa1on. "li1vent" 
1~ not qu.ite strong enough to express exaotl:: what the tull 
reality of the patterned unity 1$ 1n its realisation. The 
poets have shown. that ~aallt7 1s poetio.2 ~hera must be 
sometb.1ng1 theMtor&, tu give fullezt ,exp:r.aes.sion. to the 
11element which permeates tbt-ough and tb.l:'cugh the poetic 
v1ew of na.t"ur;e.-"3 Whitehead calls 1t velue.., 
Remembering the poetic rendel'ing ot ouv con• 
Citete exper1enee, we see at Qnce that the 
element of value 1 ot being valuable, ot ha"Ving 
value • o~ being an e:nd 1n itself, ot being 
something wh:loh 1" for its QWn sake, must not 
be omitted in any account of an4event as the most eonc~ete aetual something. 
In the above quotation f~cm Science and the Mpdavn 
Wo~l.A, value is eeen as the 11lO~t HconFx:etE~ actual ;somethi!!S• 
Tha full force ot what he means emerges a tew sentences 
latex- when he says: "Raalaation ..... .1$ in itself th,e at• 
taimaent of value. u Passing to ~~o~e~s epd Realitz, where 
1. Whitehead$ PR, 35B. . · 
a. See Whitehea.ci te chapter, n~ Ro:mantic Reaction", SMW, 
75 ... 96. Wh1teb.ee.d'e theme 1s "that the nat'W:*e"'!"poet17 of 
the :romantic revival· was a protest on behalf "of the w-
ganic view of nat~e, and al$o a protest againat the 
exclusion of value from the easenoe ot matter of faot 1° 
· SMW' 96~ 
3. Whi'ehea_d, SMW, 95~ 
4w Ibid •• 95. 
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the term prehension, aa noted above, 7eplaces Whitehead's 
use of event, Whitehead retains his emphasis on the locus 
of value in. the self ... realiaation of actual. occasions. It 
is the coming to fulfillment or the ttattaimnent ot the 
pl'S,.y:e.te !deal which is the final eause of the concresoenoe.nl 
Value is actualit~, but it is private experience. In the · 
process of prehensive u.n1t1oat1on "the ma.r17 feelings, 
derivatively felt a.a alien, are transt~med 1nto e. unity 
of aesthetic apprao1at1on immediately felt as pr1vate.n2 
or more emphatically identifying the ma~ing of actuality, 
ttselt•rea.lieation 1s the ultimate fact of .taats. An aetu ... 
alit"N" 1s sslf..,real.iatng, and whatever is selt•realising is 
an a.etuality. n3 
R. M. M1ll.s.:rd states succinctly what Whit ahead means 
by- value in the following• 
The attainment of intrinsic value is the 
attainment of an inte~ated unit7 or feeling 
~ •• Int~tns1o value f~ Whitehead could well 
be des~ibsd as the autatnmant or self~ 
realisation of an ideal, divine in origin, 
1n an 1nte~te4 complex feeling unity 
wh1ch in.~~ its vaey a.tta.inmant. is sel.t'~tr.a.ns-. 
oend1ng.-= 
This 1s undoubtadly the ba.sio meaning wh1eh Wh1 tehea.d 
atts.ohea to the term value dl.lring the pe:r1od of the system• 
at1o al.ab01*at1on of his metapbysios ot value, embxsaced• 
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pX'~117, by t>roces~ and Raality.l · It is the m.ean1ng 
which is assumed in all subaet:~uent discussion in this 
di~ua~ta.tion~ although a late development in Whitehead'S 
thought D1.'U8t be taken into consideration. 
M1lla~d has made a etrong oasee r~ a second~y theoF,y 
of value in the last phase of Whitehead's though'b, baa1ca.lly 
in nMa.thems.t:tcs and the Good,u3 and 11 Immortality.n4 He 
Bbows that Whitehead's emphasis moves awa.~ from the 1dent1• 
.t'1oation of fact a.nd value in ~~~ess, ~ JlaeJ.,itJ; to a 
world of subsiatent • Platonic fcrma whi~h tend to become 
the locus of value instead of the wol*ld of aotua.l. entities 
w events. 
In a sense Whitehead t s value the017 baa com. ... 
pletel7 Pe~ersed itself in this final phase. 
No longer aan it be said that fw Whitehead 
no biful'cs:t:i.on exists between faet and value • 
Not only are fact and' value bif'uxtcated! the7 
tend to stand 1n extreme polax- oppos1t on.0 
Millard baeea his tnte~pretat1on on such passages as the 
· following* 
Oreat1v1t:r · involves the· px-oduet1on of value .. 
experience, ~ythe inflow from the infinite 
into the 1'uuta.e 
The Wo~ld which emphasises Persistence is 
the World ot value,. Value is 1n its natUPe 
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timeless and immoxatel. •• ;.fb.a 1mmed1a.cy of 
some mortal oircumatanee is only valuable 
becauae 1t shaJ;'es 1n the inlmo"ality of some 
value.l · 
In these passages, and other$ throughout • Whitehead has 
at least added am.biguit,- to b.is concept of value. It ia 
to be -s;rett&d that the last and most sustained account 
ot value•·although ocmp~tivaly b~ief~~in Wh1tehead1a 
writings should also be the occasion f07! a change in em--
phasis, especiallT as his :tamoua Ingersoll Lectm-e might 
well be only an cve:r•empha.sia. on what a.pp$~S to be a 
Platonic predi1action tbPoughcut the whole ot his meta• 
pbJsical writtQss. 
G~anted that Whitehead bas bifurcated fact and value 
in the sense that he sees a World of Value above the WOl'ld 
of events, ocoas1ona, prehensions. oonoresaenees,. 1. e., 
the w~ld ot tact or value 1n Science and i;';ha Modern Woztld 
- -
and ,P;-o,ceaa a;n.:d Roal,i!?%..--sra.nting this~ Whitehead still 
insists on the essential meaninglessness ot the World of 
Value w1thou.t the Woxald of Faet. 
b value inher-ent 1n the Un1v erae haS an 
essential independence of m7 moment ot time; 
and yet it loses 1ts meaning ap~t from its 
naaessfll.Xly reference to the Wox-ld of pass1hg 
tacb. Value ~afera to Pact. and Fact ~aters 
to Value -~s · 
Whitehead ia very Platonic when he says that "value 1s 1rl 
1. Whitehead, Art.{l94l)s. ea4. 
2. Ib:td. • 6B4o 
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its na.t~e timeless and innnol'ta:tnl but he soon dapa.ttts 
tx:-om the Platonic axiom when he insists that nvalue refers 
to Fact, and Fact refers to Value. n2 :tt is doubtful if 
Whitehead altogether intends to !~'amove value from its locus 
in the world or fact, although he does put an exaggerated 
amphasia on the "subsistent, unchanging, eternal, static 
objectivity o:r va.lues113 in his Ingersoll Leot~e. It could 
be, nevertheless, that by his World ct Value in the Leotln'e 
. ha still means to :J:teter only to what is possible for aotua.l-
isation., And even possibility must be somewhere, which tw 
Whitehead can mean only another actual entity, 1n this case 
God. 4 In the light of the increased Pla ton1o e:mphas1s, 
howev~, it will be necessary to keep clea~ly in mind what 
Whitehead's pv1m.e.Fy- value emphasis 1s 1 va •• that value eon .... 
sista in the sel:t-res.liaation of actual occasions,. In his 
axio ... metap~sical w1t1ngs this is the pa:ttamount meaning 
assigned to value. both implicit and explicit- A few other 
aspects of value should be noted briefly before passing to 
the px-oblem of orite:ria.. 
d. Lim.itation. 
i'he oonoept of l1m1 tat ion adds to the meaning of value. 
SV'EJ%7 event .per S$, is the tteal.ieation of value,0 8 but there 
1. Whitehead_ Art~(l94lls, eS4. 
2. Ibid. At this point the editor of PANW has added in 
brackets: "~his statement is a d!xtect contx-adiotion to 
Plato, and the theological tx-adition de:vived .from him. 11 
3.. Millard, PVWW, 4oo. 
4 .. Of. Whitehea:u1's "ontologi~al pr1nc1pleu., paJtticul.arly 
PR, 36 .... 87. 
5. But this does not mean that eve~ event !a good. 
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1s no such thing au mere value. Value is. the outcome of 
l1nl1tat1on.nl This is to se.y that "all event b.as value 
because it bas a finite structurs~n2 An actual entity 
represents a selection of data fl'om the envirolllllEtnt to 
rorm a ~monious togethe~nesa. Without the limitation 
of selection there would ba.onJ.:r 1n.d&f1n1te homogene1t7or 
'l'o exist a.t all is to be limited,, ·o:r to possess pattern, 
whether God ox- e. value. 3 n All value, 11 says Whitehead. 1n 
tt.Me.thexnatios and the Good, •• n1s the gift of t1n1t'Ude which 
is the neoessaey condition fw aot1v1ty.n4 But .form or 
pa.ttel'n~; although one ot the most basic aondit1ons of value 
' 
1n Whitehead t s thought, is not· in itself' the value. The 
"emphasis on the role of pa.tte:t'n as a condition of value, 11 
say-s Goheen, "must be OO%'Veoted b7 reference to the con-
crete event.u5 fbis brings the discussion baok to the 
oftw~epeated assertion that value 1s in the experience 
of :raalaat1on, o~, as Goheen says, :ln the tta.ot1v1ty" ot 
an event pattern.. Value, therefGl*e, mu.st 1'ulf1l at least 
two "gene~al ontological oondit1ona,n6 1. a •• patte~n, 
without which thex-e would be vague boundlessnese, and 
1. Whitehead, SMWJ: 95. In D, 103, he says it this 'W'a1* 
'":ehex-e is· no such thing as. bare value. There is always 
a speo1t1o value, which is the created unit of :feeling 
ax-iaing out of the SJG01.f1o mod,s ot cono:t?etion ot the 
divel'se elernante;h 11 · 
s~ Goheen, Art.(l94l) 1 438. z~ Whitehead, D, 153., Also AI, 375. 
4. Whitehe.e.ci, Art. (1941)3;., 674. 
a. Goheen, ~t.(l94l), 439~ 
a. Ibid,, 439. 
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activity, or r'&a11znt1on,. 11 I~1n1tu.de 1n its.elf is mean-
ingless and. valueless. It aequires .meaning and value b,-
its embodiment ot finite ent1'bies..,nl 
Again, there is ·the tulle~ ~eal~ation ot values 1n 
peFsonal 1dent1ty.1 Wh1tehee.d expres.sea vEUtiously his . 
mes.ning of pe:rson and personality. He flays that 11a living 
nexua., -.mal' suppo~t a 't_';hread ot pe~sonal order along some 
historical ~oute of its mem'be:rs J u3 again, that 11the en• 
duxt1ng peStsons.lity is the histor1c rout~ of living oooaa1ons 
which are severally dom1na.nt in the bod:r at sucoess.1ve 1n-
a.tsnts,n4 w more bz-1efl.y and simpl7• he speaks of. 11end.UP1ng 
objects w1'h personal o~4~~a5 fhe parson 1s Whitehead's 
answel'* to the question, »can wa find a.J17 general cb.ax-aoteli 
of the Worl~ et Fact which expresses its a43uatment for 
the embodime:tl'l~ of va~ue?116 Xt ia the ch.a.ra.oter1st1o of 
parson that it xretains in ~ta pesent 1mmed1aoy a ael.t• 
1dent1~ with it~ own past. 
!he one individual 1$ that cool'dinated stream 
ot perlilonal. exper1encea, which is my thread 
of life oP 70\ll' th%-ead of life-. · :tt is that 
succession of sel.f•z-ealuation, ea.oh oceaeion 
with its direot memor,r of its past and with 
its anticipation of 'hh.e future. That claim 
to and~!ng aelf•1dantit7 1s'our selt•asse~tion 
of personal 1dent1~.~ 
With such strong emphasis on "enduring self•1dent1t~0 it 
1e :readily' seen how the person becomes the key to the 
l"tllalization and continuance of certain aOh:taved val.uea in 
the actual world~~: 
some of the vital rel.ationsbipe between persona and 
values Bl.'e 'Wought out b7 Mol'wen 1n his study of "the mean ... 
1ng and growth ot e. lnlnlEln 1nd.1v1dualu 1n the light of 
Wh1tah~ad's m.etaphyeios .s The probl~ as he sees it 1s: 
whetha~ or .not 
au.ch emp!r!oal eapaoit1es as .mem017 of the · 
past, 1deal•value realisations 1n the pl'eaent ~ 
and zaet'le oti ve ant1oipat1ons of the tutrt:we 
eXhibit a purposive 1nte~at1an of given 
emotional e~erienoes !ato an achieved or-
ganic whole.~ 
On the lowez.t orgmtc levels ·of axper1enoe there 1u x-esponse 
to envi:ttol'.mlGnt, but it is ti.mtefleetiva, not having achieved 
the qpnsa1e>us ooopel"at1on with God which appears to b& the 
- - . 
,Sirlf!_ ~ue. no:q fO'J! the ptU.*pos!ve gl'owth of a. h'Unlal'l pex-son. 
That McEwen does find a n:p1U'pos1ve 1ntegtt"e.tiontt on ~ha oon"" 
soioua level adds stl"ength to the view of this paper that 
1• Whitehead, lf.e; 221"222. . 
2* MoEWen. WMI. Of. also$ IS• 
5i McEwen, ES; 215.. Of. also• WMI, lOS• where he defines 
· tb.G 11 oeneztete·St-owth ot a h'Umatl. 1nd1v1dual•n 
4. Of. Whitehead, PH, eat 245. 
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value real1JJSat1on eomes to its highest expx-ession in the 
personal oxade~ of existence. 'lhe role. of values 1n the 
~ooesa of selt~determination 1a indicated 1n the follcwingJ 
!fbe wea.t1ve synthesis of selfo!oodeteJ~mlnation 
is atilained tb%'eugh the purposive realaa.tion 
of ideal values. By vbatu.e of this self'• 
ereat1an ~e presant eapex-ience of a human 
.tnd1vidu.a.l is causalll' independent ot the 
1nteroonnent1on of his ex1atent1al envi~on­
men.t41l 
How the pe~son grows and becomes a p~tner with God 
in the p~eduotion of value 1s brought out 1n the following& 
God ••• a not a transaendenb crea:bol', since 
he d~ef:l not produce .the ox-eat1ve pxtflCess it .... 
self.. Nevertbel.esa,. no human individual 
could eome into being by virtue of its salt~ 
causation were 111 not fer God's tnte~attng 
a.o111vity ·with regard to et .. nal objects. 
In. this eoopere.tive pxtoeess cf creation,· a 
human ssl.t 1s being created at evt!Sf!'Y' moment 
of his temporal gx-owthJ fo'IJ self..-causat1 on 
interacts with and da~ives 1ts oontenb from 
vhe wisdom of Go4ts inlm.a.nen:h pvpos•,. twhich 
1s the attatnment ot value tn the te~al 
world. tS 
Here McEwen pt17a his :Peapacts to the problem which emerges 
tb.l*oughou.t Wbiteheadte wr11;1ngs1 partioultU"ly P.t'ooe~s. :and 
~~taa~i~z, via~, the :ttelat1onah1p betwe·an the divine oausal1t," 
and the aelf .... weation of 1ncU:v1dual~h !t'h$ simple answe:r is 
that it is a co8pera.t1ve eftort as McEwen states.. !l!le im• 
portant th1ng is tba.t there 11ll a. process which does attatu 
to oonacioua eelt~1dentity t~ough nthe purposive reall~ 
ze.tion of ideal values.,n& · 
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f. Oo8rd1na.t1on, 
Qnoe more, and without doing violeaoe to his own 
latlgU.age, Whitehes.d, like :Ji:b!i.ghtman, a~hasisea the inter""' 
penetration of ve.luea. One would expect this from his 
meas.physios. !'here ve no isolated ta.ots 1n Whitehead'S' 
un1vel*se .- l~ast o.t all independent a.nd 'U.!Wela. ted values. 
Where Sorley refers te u.oomprehena1vsnesstt t 1 Lah-d to 
ncomm.1ngling11 .a EVerett and :st»1ghtmn to ttinterpenet:tta.., 
t1on113 of values., Wh1tehead speaks of "eoordinat1on~u 
Ha apeak$ ot ~eac$ as a broadening or feeling due to the 
. . . . 
emergence ot •trams deep matap~s1oal .tnaigb.t• unverbalizad 
and 7et momentous 1n 1te cql:h:-d1natio~ . of. values. tt4 M1l.laltd 
as.ya that ":no 1ntr~1e values and · thu no o~oasion oan be 
considwa<\ apaxat trrom. the OOllltllUllity ot which it forms a 
(f 
parat.u6 1hti!J: suggests an interrelation of w community of 
vfllues which find the!%' highest xaeal1sat1on only 1n con• 
junction with oth~ values. Xn is~lat1on there is evil• 
ol' at least failuva to eontP1bute 'be the ha:t'll10n1ous gl'oup• 
:1ng r>f occasions which make up the totality of existence. 
In b:r1e.t sl.U!fl11W:71 values are seen to be the 1nt1'1ns1c 
rea11sat1ona of actual entities; limitation c:r p~ttern 
constitutes a basic condition for valu~otherw1se there is 
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meaningless infinitude. ln pel'sona there is fuller . 
realisation ot values, and stab111aat1on. The~e is a 
a., OtJ1:twa. 
In Whiteheadts thought the ata.ndaxwd.u ~ which the 
presencG cf value is det~ed are so.mewhat different 
bom Brigb.tJiaanf·s. o:tt1tet'ia~ A true value fo:t! Bl*ightman is 
a prafer.l.'e4 liking attet' be.1ng ju.dsetl by no~lllfJ of thought 
.and peraot1a.l1'hf~ For Whitehead value is a conditd.on cr 
function of an integx-ated unit~ of. te~l!ngs at thai!- me• 
mant of realisa,tioxh 11ftealiza.t1on ••• 1s in 1tsel.f the at• 
ta:tnm.ent of value.n1 01'1ter-1a~ tbsre.twe~ find more 
appl1oat1on Sn detfn'min!ng the kind and ~E)W o·f :vealua ... 
tion than in aa estimation ot worth. 1'hPee terms seem to 
gather up most o.f the mat~rial. ~elevant to. the rneasuvement. 
ox- determiru:l.tion of value, v1s.,. 1nteiirut1t,-, ~monT., eta ... 
b1l1t,-.8 
A n.ecesalU'r int~oduet;1on to these thl!ee ooncepte lies 
1n some ela.b~at1on of Wb.itebewi ts use ot nvaluat1on1• e.s a 
function ot o~gan1sata. He defines valuation a.s "the subj~ct1ve 
lo. Wbitehead, SMW 1 95. 2:. Whitehead· uses quite a. vaP1ety ot tel'!rlinolOS7 in making 
· qu.al.1ta.t1ve tJtatements about asiol*>&r! e.- g.,. adapts. .... 
tion, unit;r, eJnPbaSis, ~oxatance, reJ.evance, Eri. tl.la 
but nhaae aPe all related to the concepts seleetii ·above. 
See Mill~d' $ list of the 11categott1.es of 1%npotttartcett, 
PVW!l• l75., 
:twm ot a conceptual teeling,"l Wb.Ue e. conceptual feeling 
is the prehension ot an eternal objaot.S An eternal object 
is a potential fo~ realisation in aotual ent1t1ea.5 When 
an actual entity prehends coneeptuaU,. there is always 
awakened a contrast between the ~sent status of the aub• 
jaot and what it oan b~h4 Valuation is how the actual 
-
entit7 teels about the potential:tt,' implied. in the eternal 
object as a possibility fott real.aat1on* A subject ~ be 
favorable or untavc~able toward the conceptual tea11ng• QP 
it may eliminate it entirely from o~ns1derat1on.5 The 
i'Urlot1on of valuation is the 1ntrotiuot1on into the wcx-ld 
of "el'eat1ve purpose_.na Ret'a the x-ole.ot God 1n valuation 
is 1mpl.1ed.. He alone has ttoomplete envias.gement of ebex-nal 
objeota,u7 wb1Ch hs holds out as 1u~es to actual ent1tiea 
aoc~dtng to his awn ooneeptual valuation of the ~elevance 
for that p&X'ticula.r entity ol" society s~ entities. It is 
the tunotion of God tc ef.teot the _eonJlm.®icn of_ 0b~en ••• 
abstract potent1allt1es0 with 111dee.l ttea.lise.t1on.n8 
Be is the aotU$.1 entitT in v~tue C!f which the 
entire mult1plioity of ete~nal obJaets obtains 
lis g~aded ltelevance to each stage t>f concrescence. 
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Ap~t ~om God, the~e could be no ~elevant 
novelty. Whate~er arisas tn actual •ntities 
~om God's deeisio.n. ~1ses ftrst eoneeptual17• 
and 1s transmuted into the ~sica.l world.l 
!rhere is no doubt 1n such passages that th& oza1g1:nat1on of 
the atm ot actual entities is God's prerogative, but the ~ole 
of the subjeot as 11au.tonomoua maatel' of ita own conax-ascence112 
must always be kept in tnind,. God grades the relevance ot 
potent1alit1eB for various types of organiams, but there is 
no value unt1l potentials are real.ised 1n actual events .. 
11Tha e.otual1t:r 1s the valua.,n3 mow how is value measured? 
The anewer lies 1n the three terms suggested above. 
a. Intens1t,-.. 
Xn the twmation or p:reh&naive union of the feelings 
whioh make up an actual anti'b71 how eternal objects ....... in this 
case value potent1ala ......... a.I*e rece1ved into the datum indicates 
the t-elative importance ot that potential for the new con-
crescence. 4 Jaoh component ot the con.oresoenQe will b.a.ve 
l• Wh1ttbea.d1 Pft, S48• 2.. Ib1d. • 3'14. Ever ... preaen.t in. Wb.1teb.es.d. is the ant1nom.v be..,.. 
tween God's monoply of or1gina.t. ion a.nd the autonomous sub• jGct • This problem is oonaide%*&4 later and a. solution 
oi:.fered., 
s. Whitehead, sM.W, loa. 
4 ~ The values which contribute to the concrescent pxaooess of 
an actual entit,r maJ be.v1ew~d as ins~ental as ove~ 
against the 1ntP1nsio x-eali~ of the event itself. Milla.X'd 
says a . "The na.Wre of 1nstwmentSJ. value follows t'l-0111 the 
consideration of tntrinsio value. ~thing contributing 
to the becoming of an evenu is s.n·inatru.mental value. 
ThUs the whole re~ef pos$1b111ty or ideality bas in-
strumental but not 1ntr1n.s1o value. But $0 also do all 
othe:r events have instX'W!lental value to the beoomirl.S ot 
arty one event, u PVW!I!, l64a 
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1. Whitehead, PR1 388 .. 
2. Ibid., 3681 
5. Ibid·~ 366. 
4 .. Aversion is "valuation downwara.,..n Adversion is ttvaluation 
upwal'dw 11 See PR1 388* 
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which c~eat1ve order depends" would be 1mpoas1ble.l The 
right answer 1s that ve.lua:b1on is "the outcome of the sub ... 
jeot.ive aim of the subject. determining what 1t is itself 
integl'ally to be. n2 'l'he aim detem!.nes wba t potentials 
shall be admitted to effioiency, but the 1ntens1t7 of feel~ 
ing 1n the eub3aot is the a.otual olue to the measure of 
relevan07 and importance foX'. that ooncreaoeno&. Aversions 
and adversions EU.te decisions;3 decisions al'e \fudg.ments. 
By such judpen:ts in'elavant data B.l'& e.."toludsd and relative 
data brought togethw.. "JUdgment 1a a process of unifica-
tion. It involves the neeassary 4b!evanoe of values to 
each other.-114 A more 1nclue1ve gu!d.e is thex-eby suggeate4. 
b. Harmony'" 
Intensit7 of subjective form ia indicative of valuation 
in the earlier stages. of un1t"icat1on ot entities. What the 
final conOX'aseenee becomes is a pxaodu~t; ot both a1m and in .... 
tensity. ni'ha objective de.tum is the perspective of the 
in1t1a1 datum. n5 'l'his is to say that. the :tmpwtanoe of N'1T 
teeling 1n the concrescence is :reevea.led only b)" the total 
p<Wspect1ve ot the becoming subject. the end of whieh !a 
harmOrJ.7• Tb.e conc~e~lcent prooess towards satisfaction ia 
a sel'ies of a.dJustm.entsJ both 1n the internal structure of 
1. Whitehead, PR, 48~ 
2._ Ibid,• 369. 
3. Ibid.;, 388. 
4. Whitehead, Art.(l94l)2, 665. 
5. Whitehead, PR, 339. 
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the subject and in rela.t1on to its enviX'onmant in the 
d1reo:tion of 11ha.rmon1ous . com.patibUit7•ul This is the 
nearest that Whitehead comas to a value or1ta:tt1on based. 
on coherence, Wbieh appl1ea, however, on.ly in the cases ot 
. the h1ghal* Or'ganisms. ln his view 1 b 1s a sign of gt-owing 
consciousness When cOhe~ent·adjustments take place. Ad• 
vevaio:n and a.ve:J:taion fnte ds.f1n1ta 1nd1cat1ons. of a height ... 
ened intelleo~ual1ty. 
It is the mark of e: high•pa.de o:raan!Sm to 
elim!na.te, by negative prehension, th$ ~r ... 
relevant e.ocidents 1n its environment, an4 
to elicit WJ.Ss1ve attention to ever,- ve.X'iety 
of srstematie ~de~.2 
Whit$head aMs that tttor this pux-pose, the oategol'y o:t 
t~ans.mutatiotl is ~he maste~.;.;~1n.e1ple It ttl 'a'ansm.tlta.t1on is 
the feeling ot community based on the ~eaogn1t1on of anal .... 
e.gous elements 1u the raon3c1n1ng entitle Jot of s. nexus • 4 
Whe;P-& this feeling exists th&:r.-e is b.ax-mony, a concept whioh 
Whitehead mAkea one o:r hie n!.ne "Oatagoreal obl1gs.t1ons.5 
By' thta oatego:J:17 "tha coneeptu~l teE"Jlirlgs we :mutually d.&-
termS.ned. by their adaptation to be joint elements in a 
satisfaction aimed at b:r the subject.•6 01oaely related 
fUl harm.OnJ' 14 the notion <>t balance, which h$ defines as 
· 1. Whitehead. fR, 389 • · . 
a,. :tb14,.., 488. See also 8991 399. FOX' Whitehead's use of ooha~enUQ as a cx-1tel'1on ot truth, S$& where he apeaks 
of the eoherent l'$lation of a proposition w1th its ne=.s. 
nfh1s coherence is its tnth,u P!., 414. 
3. Ib1d., 483., 
4:. See Whitehead, PR1 593,. 3941 388. a. Ibid.; 40-. 
Eh Ib1d.tt, 5S9~ 
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•tb$ adjustment ot identities t~ the introduction of con8 
~ast with the avo1dane$ of 1tihibit1ans by 1ncampat1b111~ 
ties,. ul BQtmoey and balance 81"& thus ~u~en to be the chief 
attributes ot aeathet1c tact. lhutmony 1a :not necessarily 
s~neSSJ it is., rath'el:t 1 compatibility wh1t.:h allows fot.t 
oontltJast. Bal.anae is the i'$el.1ng of harmonic contrast 
with the 1nhib1t.tns !nfluenue of a lltu.al 1nccmpe.tibi11ty-
el:IJr.t1n$.tet!i., Gl"owing ·.rrom his view of ~~ is his fas.,;. 
oinat1ng s.oo~t ot beau~, which he defines aa "the mutual. 
*ldaptation of the $everal_ factors 1n an occasion of expa;r.-1 .... 
ent.u!t1 uS OX' again as ttthe ·pe:r.fet'tion •t Ba:Nllony-. na '.f.lhe 
lattex- exp~esaion ha. desc~1bee 111n terl'l!S ot the perfeGt1on 
of Subjeotive POl'll1 in detail and in t:Llla.l synthesis ,u4 
The aesthetie ~¥Ito~ achieved is at onee the locus and 
maasl.U'e of value. On this ba.s1s is the tultlllment ot 
p'\ll¥pose 1n totel. e~eri.snee to b~ judged• and it enta1l.s 
tha notion ot mol*al respons1b111ty-~5 
th Stability. 
Whitehead's system lnl1$t p:rov1de fot! a mode ot e:ad.$tence 
by oX" tb.roup which ce:tttain values can be achieved e.n4 :main~ 
te.ined, w his theory- .fails $.t a crucial point~ Some 
1., Wh1tehaa4, l?lt1 425.: · !fb.e notion ot evil 1a auggeate4 he~trt. How 1noompe.t1b1lit1e$ ancl inhibitions ara tx-eatecl 
~eesivea full atten'h1on. in the ohapte!f' on d1avalue .. 
a* Whitehead, AI, 324. 
s •. Ibid .. , 3Slh. 
4a Ibid., ssa. 
6'1\. Whitehead~ PI~ 589, 390• 
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stl'u.ctured societies of ceoaa1ons, 1. e •• "c17sta.ls, rooks, 
planet~J, and mmaul. mainta.hl an identity ·ttuaough ·thousands 
or ~ears, never al'l'1V1ng at the levela of OPganic life 
whe~e h1ghe~ types of value~·levels beyond me~e ~epet1tion 
*..-atte realized~ Ths answer to .fttl.le~ realization lies in 
the 
enhanced 1ntens1 t:r ot lfeeltns arising frol11 
contrast between inheritance Mil. :novel effect 
••• It has the weight cr repetition, the in-
tensity o£ oontraab, and the balane.e between 
the two faetJOX's o.t the cont:-ast .s 
xt is 1D. Personal. Ident1t7 that vs.lu.es find theil- outstand .. 
tng exemplification of real1aat1on and oonstancy.3 How 
stability is achieved is sQen 1n "he tollowingt 
A whole sequence of aetual. occasions. each 
w1 th 1tUJ own present iltl.nU:)d.iaey., is such that 
each occasion embodies in its own betng the 
a.ntecetlents .members o£ that s·equence with an 
emphatic experience of the self ... 1dent1ty of' 
the pasb 1n the immediaey- of the pxtesent. 
This 1s the real1Bat1on of personal idantity'.4 
fhs wwlds 'Of permanence and at:~tiv~ty, repetition and 
novelty. find syutheais in this identity whioh is a. form 
ot empl'.uas1s amid the endless detail cf the world et passing 
.faot.- ttfhe confusion ot var1$ty is transformed into the 
ec8rdinated unity of a dominant ehs.l"a.cte:r."0 Whitehead calls 
l.- Whitehead.• P1t1 155. 
a. Ibid., 42th 
3., See previous d1soussiol1 above· in seetion e on persons 
and .values.. See alsoafR1 1631 l64a 
4. Whitehead, A%.-t.(1941)---, eas., 
5., Ibid. 1 690. . 
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this aoh1evemen.:b "the eeaenee ot at-' and mo~al pux-pose. ul 
Without the empha$!s or d.ol111l1anoe or unit,. aohieved br per .... 
aonal. 1dent11t,. nthe Wel'ld ot Fact would di~solve into the 
nothingness of contusion. ttl · J\t"t • moralit,-1 the whole soa1a.1 
atvu.ot\We t <'1V11 law, Sl'e all based upon it:, even though 
the notion ot paxasontl1 identity iS. difficult as he e.d:ut1ta. 
But we cannot d1t~mias !t, he adds, *'without dismissing the 
whole of hum.til.n thought as expJ:te&uaed in evexay lansuage.u3 
. . 
To surmnarhe wietli'l Value 1s !!ecogniBE>d by the in• 
'• 
tena1t1 of the feeling ot a subJect to'l! the componenttt 1n 
its own oonerescence judgeS. a.ecol'd1ng to the perspective 
w subjeot1ve aim of the gl:'owtns subject. A more 1ne1u.sive 
tEutt 1a found in the hal*moJQ' of attties not only in the 
internal atrt~.o~e et a gtven n.e:s.us ·bu:b with the total en.-
vil*o=ent. The highest test of vs.1ua lies in its ability 
tt> aohieva sta.b111aat1m. ftlG:re fn'te 0ga4es of dominan«ln~ 
end grades o:t reoe~s1venesan4 but "'bhe extlr"eme e34mple ot 
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the susta.tned ~eal1sa.t1on. ot a type of value11 is persona:u.t,-.-5 
s~ ~the~ ampl1t!cation ot.tbeae oenoepts is made in the 
tollowtng d1Sttu$S1an en tbe pQs.s1bilit.y ot a table of values~ 
.L 'if-·_.)!. ·.· ·~- ... 1 ilf~ll. 
1., Whitehaa.d, ~t'-{1941)1, 690. 
2. Ibid., 690. 3. Ib~-- 890. 
4. Ibid •• 691. . 
s. Ibid., 890• ~ex-$ can be little dGubt that Whitehead 
~ans personal identity as exemplified by human pe~sons. 
He ues te:r;am$ like ttmanu and nhtUD:Em beings·" and his 11-
lu.stzaatioa of 1dGnt1ty t~ough ohange is a huma.n situa .... 
tioth see· ibid.,., 6891 690. Wbethex- Cl' not God is another 
example of pe:rsona.l1ty ·1a discustred in a late~ ~hapter. 
xn the light of the o~iteri~ whe~er o~ not a table 
of values,. comparable to :BY11ghtmanta aeale, oan be conjO;j 
atxaucted fltom. Whiteheadts thought !a approblem whioh retot 
ceives little attention 1n the l1terature.l The chief 
x~eason for the lack 1s due, prime.l'1l7, to Whiteheadfs own 
fa.ilUX'e to make .expl1o!.t the prino!plea. on which such a 
table could be formulated., Xt is p%tobable, howevel', that 
in the discussion above we have the best clue to e. posa~ble 
eoal~h In 'keeping with Whitehead's oer..rtt'a1 exposition of 
value, values ~e 1ndivid~l %tea11aat1ona,. but it does no 
v1olenae to hie view to suggest that there a:t-a lev·els of 
~ee.l1Sat1on. B1s chapter on "the b.ighe:tt pbAsEuil of ·exper1• 
ence" seems to ms.lte that ols~.a '!'h&X*$• it :ta the element 
of consoiouansasw~oh"~G the ab111ty to d1sttngu1sh be" 
tween the':lry and fact, 01- the abil1~ to contrast what is 
with what m!ght be3•.,..whieh makes a full.e:t type of :rea:u .. za..-
t1on possible. on;,- 1n the higher, orge.n1sma does c~nsoious..­
ne$a appear"' At best it 1s '$~Tat1ch "CoMQiousness flick• 
·el*a,n4 and although 1n Whitehead'$ somewhat singular view 
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consc1ouanass is not the "necesse.x-y p~s .. ~" of experience 1 
it is uthe crown of expevieno&*ul :tn enduring objects 
with personal wder ecmsciou.aneas ~eachea 1ts tztiumph. 
At this level the~ is not cnl7 ••the weight or repetition," 
but there is the added weight or ntntensity oZ oontrast.u2 
Here t:We the oonditiona ftttt higher value :realisations • 
~e ne~ast we have t~ an elaboration of value types 
comes pxtima.rily in Ad.ventUX»es. of Ideas., wb.el'e White.head 
s~a that 0 a. aoo1et¥ is to be termed o1v!l~ed whose m&mbera 
pal'tic1pe.te 1n the .five qu.al1t1es-•'fltutsh, Beauty, Adventux-e, 
Arb, Peaea~"a It is not beyon~ doubt that Whitehead in-
tended these five basic types of value to constitute a 
hie:ra:.:-c~ in an eaet ascend ins· scale. yet he does make 
some of the values subol'Clinate to the others.. For instance, 
'l'rubh and :eeau'by should go together in aueGJessfU.l art, fol' 
the "perfection of .axat has onl~ one end,. wh1oh is Trutbful 
BaaubyJ u4 yet it appeat*s that 1t 1s more serious 'to have 
!J!ruth withou-t Beauty tb.an Beau.bJ' without Truth. "Truth 
matters because of Beaut7•"5 The same goes tor m0llal1t,-. 
8 lfb.e real woxsld 1s good when it is beaut1tu.1.86 Beaut7 !s 
mol'& impox-ta.n.t than either vuth w morality. Bl.tt 1t is 
not enough to have mere coneern for the .fin$ arts., whioh 
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may be d:l.aaipate4 into a matter ot prasel've.t1on in "museums 
and $tud1ou~"l ~ou.sh it all ,there l'llUSt be Adventure, 
without which tto1vU1zat1o:n is in full a.eos.7.,"2 Oiv111za ... 
tion :rinds ita completion 1tl Peace, which bas nothing to 
do with political x-ele:bione. but is, X*S.thel', tta quality 
of mind staa~ 1n ita •eltanoe that tine aetion 1e t~eaa•. 
Ul'ed 1n the nature of things .ua Whitehead calls 1t the 
"Harmony ot Harmonies which ealms destructive turbulence 
and completes $1vilisation."4 Be finds Peaoe ver7 difficult 
to define, but it seems to be Ve'¥.7 a:tm:ll:.at' to the rn,st1c 
vision of the nat'UX'e of xreal1t,., or m.a.y be akin to the 
Buddhistic sense of eneness. "It 1s a broadening ot feel-
lOS 
lng due to the e~genoe of so.me deep metaphysical insight, 
unvettbaliasd end 7et mome:ntt::tUS in its eo&~d!nation of values •"5 
Besides the five ba.a1e oritera or civ1liaat:i.on which 
Whitehead enUlJ1Elratea, M1llax-4 brings togettber aome other ·· 
types to f'ol"m a mox-e extended table.· Be J-ecognizes the 
41f1:1w1ty of formirlg such a s·eale, but he auggests tb.a'b 
values achieved ean roughly be claasitied 1n 
Wh1tahead~'s thought in the fol.lowins ascending 
ovdel'it (1) Jl'linor beau~,. (2) survival, {3) fttee ... 
dam, (4} moral goodness, (5) Uttderst$11d1ng-{6) holiness~ (7) tputh, (Sl major beaut;rA (9) 
adventure, (10) o1v111sa.tion, (ll) peaofh13 
~e first two, Millard olasaif1ed aa the lower 1nt~1ns1c 
~alues; numbers three tc s~ aa the h18Qe~ 1nt~ins1c val• 
uea, and the last five as the highest 1nt~1ns1c values.l 
Ver~ s1gn1t!oant is Millard's statement which follows the 
above list, oalltng attention to the personal nat~e et 
these values. He says: "It will be evident that on t~st 
glance that with the exception of the .fb'at two all ot 
theae types ~e fully 11'ea11aable onl:y in human personal.-. 
ities and above.nS This not only adds st~ngth to the 
view euggesbed 1n the sections above, vis., that $tabil1~ 
ot o~tatn types of realization is pGSS1b1e only in per~ 
sonal identity, but reemphas1ses a strong potnt of s1m11~ . 
~ity with ~ightmsnts insistence on values as forms ot 
pevaona.l experience. 
o. Oo~at1ve S~. 
BJ:tightm.an's axiology is ch~aoteXtised by clarity and 
silnplicity, al:bhougb. h& doas make ~ distinotiona 1n hiS 
delineation of the nat\U'e of val,ues- Values are 1ntxa1rus1c, 
inst:rumenta.l, potential~ . s.ctu.al, emp!rioal_. apparent, per""' 
ma.nent, tl'ans1ent, catholic, . and exolusi ve. The o~.m. ot 
his e.xiologr 1$ hie definitiOn of ~!:!!!. values.· A tl'Ue value 
is any liking or preference that is .f.'aWld to be coherent 
after te1;lting. ey the widest :tJange ot experienee. All othe:r 
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values ~e only claims. 
Whitehead's axiology ie more compl~~r. His cone apt 
ot value mnat be understood in relation to the function 
of actual entities. Value is the eaper1enoe of individual 
self' .. !"ea.l.f.sation. Value Pefe!'s to taot. A mo~e Platonic 
emphas1a, aws:r ft*om the wo:ttld .of actuality, 1s a l.at$ d.e .... 
velopment, but Wh1tehea4ta major emphasis appees to be as 
defined.. The value eon•apt is e:nt*1ohed by the notion ot · 
11m1ta.t1on whi-ch conditions the rea.11~at1on of value. 
Without pa.ttH\)I'tl thette is mea.n1ng1esa infinitude. 
In rega.r-4 to the basic tLe.ture of value, it might be 
axtgu.ed that tOTf Brightman valu.ea are set fc>rth more oi'ten 
in p~yoholog1ca1 tel"mS o:r merelY. as th~ furu:tion.s of perw 
sons, whereas for ~tebaad value is ~e closely related 
t·o the metaphys1ca.l s:truotura ot the un1ve:rse • But this 
broad d1stinet1cn is mo~e app~ent than ~aal~ Late~ dis• 
cuse1on will_ show that the con41tiona tor value 1n Bright .. 
manta thought~ ~e ~ooted deep 1n the nat\l.re of the unive~se. 
. . 
On the othel' hand, while Whitehead* s uiologr 1& 1n one 
sense mox-a closely ~elated t.o the physical, at:ructure of the 
' 
universe, value aa experience is fundamental to his thou~t. 
%n either oaae t~ real1 t1 of value oonsia.ts 1n its s.otual ... 
ization. Brie;htma.n reiterates l:lia olatm. that va.lti$S to be 
values must be embodied in :the life of some pel'son, h\U!lQn 
0%' divine, while one o.f t~e most e1aal'Jl7 Gnunoita.ted.. dieta 
:J.n Whiteh$ad's thought 1s that value Nfel's to tact. 
1.05 
Fo~ bothJ values axae only poss1b1lit1ee or potentials until. 
~ealized either tn personal 11te or in the patte~ned sco1• 
etiea of actual entities,. In Whitehee.d*s.language,. the 
zoealisa.tion of value tor beth men must be 1n acc~dance 
with the 11ontolog1ea.l pr1nc!.pleu which deo~ees that "every .... 
thing muat be. aomewhe~J and hera tsom9whe.ret mean~ •some 
aotual entit,'. •"1 Value is tll.e experience of aelf-...realiza. ... 
t1on ot actual entities on whtt'beve%* level they exist. 
In Brigh'bl:rJarlts thought the baaic crite:rie. for.* the 
judging of values atte . cohe;,;renoe and the pxt1no 1pla of re""' 
apect to:r!' personality~ Fw Whitehead the supFeme teats atre 
intensity~ hQxlmony, and sta.bilit7.. . Bl'ightman has nothing 
that cowesponda axaotl:;v with Wb.itehea.d.ts notion of inten ... 
uity', but 1n cohereno& and hulncnr the:rae ia close s1m1lar1t;r. 
Ooherenoe fo'r' one is "1no1us1ve ayatemat1o eonsistenc.w,n8 
while tol" 'bhe other b.ax-xnon7 is the result of · elimina.t1<>n 
by a htgh•~ada organism. of nthe ~relevant accidents !n 
its environment" and of giving "maa$1Ve attention to every 
vaviet, of systematic. order.n5 Ino~he~enotes, 1ncompat1~ 
b1litieS, ix*Pel.evanciEUIIJ thU.$ fall . by ~he ws:s' as haV1118 110 
intrinsic wor1m w they ma.7 be positip diavalues •4 In 
either ease. theil' laok o.r value 1e recogniaed b7 fe.ilUX'e 
to fit a ooherent whole~ 
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Fo~ both men the relation of value to personality is 
the sup~eme test ot value. This is beoause pe~sonality 
exhibits the highest type of experience of wh1oh selves 
are capable. Brightman says that 0 peraonal reality is the 
only verifiable being"l 1n tha universe, while Whitehead 
speaks of uo~ indubitable self the foundation of our present 
ele1stenca. ua Values aPe realized on eveX7 level, but per• 
sons ha.ve the advantage of novelty and contrast beyon4 mere 
repetition. Fo:t- Bx-aightman the meaalU'e in which experience 
contributes to the coherent functioning of the total per-
sonality is the deter.m1nat1ve principle of value judgment. 
Fox- Whitehead, peraonal1ty is the key to the stabilization 
ot veJ:u.e. His s~atem px'ovidea no a.lte~na.tive for the per--
sistence of the p1Ba1t:1;~~ values in the WOX'ld of fact 
except in an historic rout a of ent1 ties w1 th pers ona.l order 9 
Values in the thought of eaoh ms.n are nevex- isolated 
phenomena.. !be h1ghes'b values are those which exemplifr 
the ma:kbnum concreteness. ~ 1nta.l'panetrat1cm and oohezaent 
. 1nterconneotedness of all values is an axiom with Bl-1ghtman, 
while for Whitehead "there is e. ayatemat1o framework per• 
meat1ng all ~elevant taot.a3 It is by reference to this 
framework that the "val'iant1 various, vagrant, eva.nesi!Jent 
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detaUs of the abund.s.nt wo:Pld.111 can be measured. Bta1ghtJ:ns.n 
speaks of the interpenetration of values" Whitehead of the 
coordination., 
Fov bo~h men the produetion and applioab111ty ot ~ 
u.es ~e at onee the end and measure of social organieaticm.. 
In the ongoing of civlliaation values veoGive theiV peatesii> 
- empiX'1~a1. testlns• :tt is Wb.1tehead•s opinion that "the no• 
tion of a purely abst~act selt•en3or.mant of values apar' 
.t:-om any r~fel'enoe to et.teotivene1is 1n aotion was the f'lm.da* 
mental el:'rW pl'evalent in Gx:-eek ph.1losop~.119 In Bright.;o 
manta thoughts 1 values not only m\Ult 'be tea ted 1ll the sooLal 
s1tuati1QI\1 but society iiaulll..t is the .me41wn thxtough wh1eh 
some ot t;b.e b!gb.est values alie ~oduce4. "fhe great ve.luea 
ot lite can be realiee4 1n theiv fUllest and r1oheat fo~ms 
lOS 
onl,- by a eeepera.tin.g community .ns . Ve.lues to'l! both BP1ghtman. 
and. Wh1teb.ea4 ue more than intelleetu.al o•lU,l'ructat the,-
are guides fo:r.- ~.tat1oh.a1 living. 
CHAPTER 'l'BBD 
THE FUNCTION OP GOD IN VALUE S!RUCfURB 
A· &:a1gbtman. 
1. Personal God as SoW!lce .. 
Bl*1ghtma.n says that evePyone who would be honest 1n 
his dealings w1th :t:tal1g1on must sometim.e ttemne to the point 
where he must state plainly his eonception of God.nl White• 
head oohcea the same thought when he decl~U'ea that "toda.:r 
there is but one religious dogma i..n 4ebe.ta a What do you 
mean by tGodt?nS The p:roblem is no less acute for meta• 
ph;rs1os 1 and is paxaticulQl'tly pexatinent to ax1ologv * In 8.flY' 
syatem.at1o attempt to account for the whole range ot hwna.n 
axperienoe, what 1s meant by God and the function he fills 
becomes the determinative tactol* 1n the pattel'n ot the total 
thought st.l'uoture. In both Bl'ightma.n and Whitehead theil' 
value systems 6.1'$ what they are beoau.ae God is what he is. 
Such an observation becomes more than a truism when seen tn 
the light of attempts to build value theo).l7 without himo 
Brightman's the~ of v~lues rests on the axiom that 
God is personal, and that ultimate values ~e his normat1ge 
appx-aoiat1o:ns. What oould any value be, he wou.ld ask, that 
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is not an expexzienee of some mil'ld, hllll'U.an nr d1v1ne'l »J:t 
is unthinkable," he says, "that a.ny value should exist B.117~ 
where or anyhow save 1n and fo'X! a p.erao:nal oonsoiouaness.,nl 
Br-ightman- 1n taking this strong position, ia a tollowex-
or Bowne, th& tound.e:tt of pe:rsonalism 1n Amel*icn. For Bowne 
all attempts·at metapbJSioal &~planation •on the 1mpe~sonal 
plane" a.l'e ta.1lU1'es.2 ns ~easons tor the J:<te3ecti~n of 1m.-. 
personalism tb:ro-w oCJnsidsrable light on the need for! pe:rson• 
al1tr as the onlr adequate ax1olog1oa.l px-1no1ple. First, 
if ~ere ba tntall1gence at all 1n tbe universe it ~t be 
conscious and personal; sinue unoonso1cus intelligence ea.nnot 
work to ends,. Hanoe the plwase 11uneonso1ol.ts 1ntell1gencen3 
1s a oontl'adiction~ Seoondr e:q aoausation of antbropomor .... 
:pldsm 1$ a complete m1sunderats.nd1ng ot what ia meant by 
seying God 1~ personal.. Pel'sonal1t7 mu.st always be distir.t ... 
gu1ahe4 .t'X'~m ooxwporeal1ty.4 ~dw a rejection of God as 
personal on the grounds that he is a.baolu.te and infinite ie 
also a misunderstanding of what theae t~ mean. God is 
not less abs~lute b7 existing 1n ~elation, "provided these 
relations ~e f:tteely pcsited br 1taelt, and are not forced 
on .:tt hom without."& Similarly, to be the ground of the 
finite 1s not t~ saoritice the a.tt~ib~te ~t infinity, unless 
1. B1"1ghtnuul1 _ SL, ll.S • s,. See fw.- concise atatement of his case, Bowne, ·!f.'lt.E, 
150 ft., also 523. 
a~ Ibid., 158, 1ao. 
4. Ibid., lS:t. .AntbltopOlllhrphism is one of' the fe.vo~1ta 
charges hurled at ifwsonal1sm. 
5. Bowne. THE, 164¥ 
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God be 11bound" to the f1n1tEt. FolU'th,. ttthe law of sutfi .... 
cient x-easonu ~emends a p-etasonal 1ntell1g&noe1 to't! only 
th&~$ can one stop 1n his thinking. To ask the source ot 
1n'bell1gence ia e. fallacy and enly commits one to the in""' 
.finite :regress. nWhen we have ~eaehed 1ntell1e;enee the 
~egress must end ••• Logio f~b1da us to ask a sufficient 
.ttea.son for a sufficient res.son,._na Fifth, only in conso1ou.s 
thought can eb.anga and 1dent1ty be :Peooneiled. Without the 
personal, reality is a diverse un.1ntall1g1b1l1ty.whe:re all 
$XJ2erienoe is mean1ngleaaJ the categories of thought vanish. 
Pe:t*aona.11'hf ass\Wes ol.'tder au meaning; and for Bxt!ghtman 1n 
particular, gl'ounda the only poss1bil~ty cf value. 11All thic:t 
we ma7 hold with r~ oonv1et1on,u says Bowne.3 
Bt'.tghtme.n builds his -e.xiologf.oal stx-uotlll'e squarely on 
the personal na~e of. the un1ve.t*se. In b~1ef' 1 without minda: 
to appreciate, thwe are ~o meilapbyaical.. £Wounds, on any 
le1Tel, fo:r the existence of valu.es.- That 1s wbr Blt1gb.tman 
calla the question of a personal God nth& most oen~al one 
·tor! a philosophy of ~elig1on.u4 · Whitehead agrees age.1n that 
the chief' issue 1:n attempting to desct-1be the natl.u-e ot the 
ult1me.te is wheth~ or not 1'b is pers":nal. Here "the gl"eat 
cleavages of rel1gieue thought att1se ~~~~5 
lll 
<m the 11,ums.n level valuation 1a a personal exper1enoe; 
it can be no othe~ kind. It 1s impossible to conceive oosw 
mio values except after the S$me Sbalogy~ Mere analogy 
does not px-ove. ot course, bnt as the only data we have 
az.e the experiences of finite minds, the cohe:rent account• 
1n.g of possible untve:raal. values :nmst be baae4 rumly on 
the facts as g.tv.en. No other solution 1s tenabl.t;tj 1t :r:aats1on• 
a11ty 1s to be ~1nta1ned.., Blt1ghtman•s eontr1but1on 'bo the 
'.fhiltd Sympotd:wn .on So1enoe, Philosopb.J'~t &rld Religion ·tn New 
l'orkl b~ou.ght th$ o:tt1tic1sm flaom. MaatlmU1e.n Beck ot Yale 
that BP1Sbtman's empbaa1a on pe~eonality as the key to 
. a 
value theor7 made man "the ott1gin ana. measU!'s ot value .. u 
Btaisntmanrs .-eply was that ha he4.· not made man the measwe. 
but had inB1ated on the obJee'81v1ty cf value, which 1s in• 
dependent ef man, but whieh ma.y be vea:u.eed 1n his pel?aone.l 
3 
conse1ousness* ~ere is a tempta1;1on, of OO'Ul'tta, to make 
man the mea.sux-e as well as th$ stu-ting poln'b J but te imply 
that Bl-ightman 1a s. follow• or the betago:Pem:1. 1:?-t;tmO Jl'le~at:U*s. 
tflnet is to do v.tolenee to h1a im.eught. :tt 'I1JS.'1 be pu.t dotm, 
the12et'oxae, a.s the ma1n cornel-atcn£J of Bt*ightman*s value sys-
tem tb.at 9 1t w st~t b)" eambd.ng the full ev14ent4e o£ 
human pe~sonality, 1t mar be that clear thinking will compel 
l• l3:righ1lma.n,._ Ax*ih ,1942). a• "O:r.-1t1eismtu Sl?ll, 6 ... 7·., 
3~ Repl7 t(l) i;~i'iticism, SP:R1 a •. 
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us to arx-1ve at a oonoeption of divine persona11~,.nl. 
From this conclusion thet*e seems to be no escape. Values 
SJ:te pe:rsona.l on the human level, but the;r al'a neither 
originated nor exhausted in human experience alone. The 
facta of finite human minds Ro~t to a source of values be• 
yond the human salt and sooiety:.- It is his conclusion that 
there is a Cosmic Being who · u is the gtaound of all existence 
and value.n2 True, »he is more than is ever disclosed 1n 
3 
our experience,"- but whether we ~eal1s$ 1t ~ not, he is 
present tot.t human fellowship "rboth as sueta1ner of Olll' ex1a .... 
tenoe and as sowee of what is given to u.s fxtom bey-ond oux-. •. 
selve:a.,tt4 
2 '\); God as Oonse:l*vel' of Value.·~ 
But God is mor:e than the o:t.tiginate of value a J he is 
also the~ oonaex-ver. Bl'ightman at.t'bu R8ffd1ngt s famous 
11a:x:1cm of the consettvat1on of valuett without agtteeillg with 
his impersonal un1ve~ae ¥ That R3:t"fd1ng coul.d coherently 
hold to both his axiom and !mpe!*aonal. svou.nd of l'ea.lity 
l.. ~1ghtmt':U1, PG, 58. Brightm.a.nts dependance on So~ley'a Ql'gument fo~ 'theism fltom moz-a.l values is very evident 
here. He says in PI Rthat • .-.the most valuable contraibu.-
tion that bas bean made ffio value theo:t'z( is that in 
Sorle t s Mora Values and the Idea of God which is 'bhe 
mos.t aa· 1st"aotory- a.:rgu.xi1ent .for·· s o ·all ivity of moral 
values and the dependence o:f all value upon pex-aonalit:r 
that I have see~,u PI! Sl.· l., See also his sho:ttt analysis 
of Sorley's argument n :a.v, 168 .... 1'70. 
2. ~1ghtman1 :av, sa. 3.· Ibid.;. las. 
4(1 :tbid .. , 158. 
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~ightman denies. The Danish philosopher sees no.need for 
going beyond the realm of nature to explain anr .aspect of 
values but his over•reverenoe fw science has bX*ought him 
to what Bt'ightman oalls "theophobu.••l To grant the need 
tor the conservation of. value but to de~ both personal 
God and 1mmo~tal1ty, as H6ffd1ns does, is 0 ltke granttng,u 
sa,-a ·ax-ightme.n. nboth premises ot a syllogism and :refusing 
to draw the oonflus1on.n2 
Ii8tfd.ing discusses the whole question o£ npersona.l 
beings in· wh0m men believe" as having little or no value. 3 
His ttta3or reasons fl.t.rnish some or1t1oal insights into the 
personal1st1o position. Fast_. he says that the ooncept 
ot personal1t,r is ambiguous. Personal1ty as commonl~ unde~­
stood "strives and strugglee, asserting itself in the tao& 
of oppositio:nJ04 but without $bat stX~Usgl.e the concept ot 
peraonal1tr is but an abstraction, ~ at beat an analogy. 
This objection is sound as an argument against absolutism, 
but it does. not hold 1n tha ease or &1ghtms.n since his 
theistic t1n1t1sm provides t,he VG'f!IT element which H8ffding 
s.a.ys is necessa17, 5 Seoond, he thinks that pers,onal.1ty be-
comes less applicable to God the mwe he is oonoaived aa 
absolute,6 a view wbioh has me~1t, although not altogether 
U.4 
valid since absolutism and personalism a~e not necess~1l7 
1 
mutually exclusive. Aga1n6 he sa1s that peraonal1V,V just 
ttcannot express the. 1naldlaust1ble principle which comes to· 
light in the V&'I!'J/ :tact o~ the existence of this wol"ld_.92 
Stttangeaas it seems 1 R&.tf'41ng avera that panthe1am-•o.f wh1oh 
., . :·: 
his own critical ~ism is a type~does not re:eot pe~eon• 
•t. 
alit,- ·because "it is too high but beeauae it is too low a 
determination ot the deity• !he de1t7 must be more than 11 
person it it is the principle wh1oh un1tes togethw the 
whole of be1ng,. 113 A f'o~th objection to the concept of Gocl 
as personal ~ises from the possibility of persona 0 fallingu 
into sin and error, Be says tbat it 11to .fall" 1s an essen.,.. 
t1al p~t of personal1~1 than this possibility must extst 
at the VS%7 heax-t of the Mi ve:rse, a situation which oe:r"'" 
tainly causes "d1m1nut1on or value.n4 Both this and the 
former objection fa:t.l 1n the light of ~ightmants oonstantl,J' 
8l*Ow1ng God Whf>se will is eveJr good but whose ertwts ax-a 
oonata.ntly impeded, though not permanently fl'Ust:rated, by 
oond.1t1ona which he does :not ~reate., 
Before leaving this section 1t may be pointed out that 
aeapite his ~pevsona11am• Blttdins goes beyond h:t.a axiom 
ot conservation of value and decl~es tb.Bt values must be 
- .. 1.- • ·~ 1 d . 1 fl!t; -··· 
1. F~ instance. Royce's system is absolutistic but God 1s 
conscious .. .and personal~ 
e. H8ftcU.ng1 POH, 84• · 
5. Ibid., 84. 
4 •. Ibid.' 84. 
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1n.exaeased in oxader to be eonaeXtved,l With this Brightman 
heartily a~e&s. It is impossible, he arguesf that there 
should be pres~vat1on without increase. A universe main• 
ta.in1ng only the ~tatus g;u.o, is death. •value rsquiras both 
repetition and vapiety.ua ~1gbtman, not ovarlr~siven to 
the coining of new philosophical tem1nol.ogy11 does contribute 
two words to the ~owing nomenclature ot axiology. He pro-
poses the word nax1oaotettia11 to expreas the concept of the 
conservation ot values, and "ax1ogenes1att as ~e:ssive of 
the 1noz-ease of values.. Using the new tem1nolog,-1 then. 
as 11l.uetrat1ve of the relationship betwfeen the p:reser4vat1on 
and 1no:r;aease of values, the point is aUtm'ilariaed by Brightman 
himself 1n the fo1"'l'nUla., ttno axiot:toteria without e.xiogen"" 
es1a.113 
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3., Immoxatality Necessary to .the Oott.Berva.t1on of Human Values .. 
Bl'ightman is o·f tha opinion that R81*fd1ng' s: d1sm!.s sal 
of the uio .... personal relationship is a too ... aasy disposal of 
the· problem. B& feels that personality, both human and 41• 
vine, comes netu.-e~ to val1ds:~1ng B8ftd1ns r s own ax10ltl than 
4 s.117 other possibility. 'l'he oont1nuanoe of values must be 
1. H8fi'd1ng, lOR, 11. Bl'1ptma;n points out that Soxaley 1n 
eritioism of B8ffd1ng missed this point~ SL, lGB-169. 
2. 13.t*1ghtma.n, SL1 168. _ 
3., Ibid., 168·· 
4. The tel'm. favored by P .• ' A. Bertooci l'athex- than oonse~va, .... 
tion. He also wB.l"ns against Dthe gl1b usa of the co~~ .... 
va.tion of' values to oove:r the whole:se.1e px-eaervation or· 
'va.:t:ues"we cannot spac1f'r ccncretely,n BAG, l65•l66. 
pxae41cated upon eontlnue.nce of pe.rsons • Hence the view that 
perso~ ~ the only beings ea.pabla of achieving and csonvev-
l.~7 
ing ideal values in the universe makes the p:robl.e~ o.f immo:P ... 
tali~ cent~al to BP1ghtmanta v1sw of the eonservat1on of value~ 
fhe question is: How a:re the achieved values conserved f 
~
:Br1ghtmants answe:r is 1n the continuation of personality ba .. 
yond pb7sieal death. He 1a eveJ7Whel'e opposed to ar11 cicg• 
mat1o a.pJ)l'oach to the veey difficult ppoblem of ~ta.lit,-, 
and he 1a Ve'l!'9' conscious or the disservice done to the doc• 
t~ine by the too aealous a4vocaoy ot weak ~gumenta to~ it~ 
on the othe:v handt he does not see the need of a.bandon:tng 
the notion ot 1.ttu:rtol*tal1ty on the basis of ma.ey vguments 
against it.l 0 fha only ~eally strong argnment against ~­
mwts.lity," he s.ayfl• 8 1s that based on a mate.ttialiatio inteJ.'e!l 
. m 
pretation ot pbfsiologieal psychologr.a fbis is the view 
that oonsc1ousne$S 1s tnsep~abla ~am uha physical b~a1n. 
It 1s ve'l*y d:lttioult, as almost acyone would adm1t-Bxa1ght ... 
man first ot e.l.l8"'*to deny the tc:rce ot this pos1t1on. uwe 
3 have hezte a· crucial argument • u 
Xn attampbing to answaP th$ argument Brightman feels 
that the solut1ont one •'1 0%* the other, depends entirel1' 
on the validity of the p:ttemiset:J. If :mate:r1al1am is an ada ..... 
quate explanatofly p1'1no1ple to~ all the facts ot. expe:f'1ence, 
. ' 
l• see Br1gh1mlan1 POR, 387 ... 410• tr:l¥! b.1s most extensive 
treatment or immol'tal1t,-. 
a. Ib14.,. 395., 
3. Ib:t.d., 395. 
then there is no case £or continuation of t·onaoiousness 
b07cnd the death of the bod7.. But B:r1gh1nus.n holds that the. 
facts do not make an alte~ne.tiva v1ew impossible. ApB.l*t 
!?om the 'tfe'1!y 11empir1oal.. .te.ct that sensations s.:re nc.rb phya• 
1cal but mental 1n ohs.ra,otert • 1 it may be tbs.t consciousness 
1tael..f aftOl'da: a bettex- clue . to ths na:tnU'e of ~ee.l1ty, and 
avoids the necassit7 or $Xp1e.in1ng Upe:t*so:n.s:.l identity., unit71 
mem~yu2 1n te~ of a mate•1al1$t1c o~ pos1t1vist1o pPin• 
ciple. '!'he depende:nee of :mind on body is not to be denied •. 
The quest1on.~eall7 demands a consideration by the philoso~ 
phe~ of nthe natura and. the cosmic Pelatf.ona ct the Peal1ty 
3 that appeaz.s a.e his bod,-." What 1s the body! 
It the bo~ is viewed as mater~alistio postu~ 
l.atee require, death is final• &dt if the· 
boay is interpreted on the1at1o postulates, 
the destiny of pweonal conae1ousnesa in th~ 
wo~ld will not be determined b7 the laws of 
matter but xrather b7 the plU'P<J$$ ani wUl of 
the God whose activity la ver:y 1ncompletel.7 4 
:t'eveal.ed in the cbjeot we call the hwns.n botq., 
Hera axae eome gl"ounds fm.w oont1nuta1on of consciouanesa 1 
but the Ol'Uttial eJ!lgum.ent fo'l!" J.lmno:rtal1t7 involves mo:re con"'"' 
s1derat1on of the :tte:I.ation t>f pexasonalit~ to values. 
It has ~e~dy been shown5 that ~ishtman hol4is not 
only to the 1naepua.b1lity cr values and pe%'scns. but to 
uthe pxa1nc1ple of !'espect fox- p$l'aona.l1ty" as one of tha 
l. Bl'!ghtman$ POR• 319.-
a. Ibid., 399-. 
3. Ibid-• 400. 
4. I'bic:t., 400. 
a. Oha.pter II,. A. 
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basic criteria foP value judgment. With such an intimate 
association of values and pe~aons it is nat~al to expect 
that Br1ghtmants view of the eonae!'vat1on ot values would 
somehow entail the cont1nuat1on cf pwsont:h B1s ee.ss :to'£' 
the 1ntel"dependenee ot values and pevsons need not be re ... 
peated here, except to point out his insistence on the view 
that nwhe~e there is no enjoJ!ng pe~aon there 1s no valua,nl_ 
and his equa.ll,- emphatic doctrine that "1n pel'sonality 1s 
the only t~ul.y intttinsic value we know or can oonce1ve.'08 . 
Brightmants doctrine of 1mmo~ta11ty hinges on one big ques~ 
. 
tiona Can God be the consex-rver of values and not be the 
oonsexaver of personst It is Brightman's op1n1on that 11God, 
.. . 
the conaarvait of values, must be God, the conserver ot per .... 
sons.u3 ~1ghtman dcee not consider the pcss1b111t,r that 
maybe God 1s unable, due to same restriction within his own 
el':.pS:t'ienoe,4 to preserve paxa$ons aftett d1se.ssoc1at1on from 
the body, but 1n so f&:r as God is able, ~1gb.tman holds that 
his goodness makes it incumbent up~ him to prasevva pe~sons 
and their values. 
It there is a God• ... a supreme, creative, eosm1o 
person--then the~e is an infinitely good being 5 committed to the eternal oon&ervat1on of values. 
Thla 1a what Brightman refe:rs tQ as "the c~cial egument 
ll9 
tax- imnlo%'tal1t)'l the goodness of God.-:"1 
It does. not tollow, ot coUJ:ise, that eve17 human being 
wil.l automatically be· px-ese;rved by God* :en Brtightmants 
.v.tew everr person 1s e.. candidate foX' 1mnto-'"ality, but ttonly 
those pel'S<ma are immortal whom God judges to be oa.pable of 
developtng worth11.7 at 8.n'9' time 1n thea tu.tUXte axis tence. nS 
He x-etera t·o thie bfpothes:ts aa "conditional .ixrltnortalit7.,n3 
&t1ghtme.n'§f doot;r1ne of. 1Jnmo%tta.l1tY' appears to be co .... 
hevently ~ou.nded 1n his own system. The strictly empirical 
observation thQt ~ues do have their locllS in perEJons oon ... 
stitutas reason tor the ext:tJapolation of an analogous asso ... 
a1at1on b&yond p~sical death, While the 1ntera$t of God in 
the conservation of peJ~sons and values :ts an eypothes1a that 
g1ves added mean1Xlg to life as wall aa a. ooherent aoeount1ng 
tox- the 1no:t*ease and p~esel!"vs.tion of values 1n the un1ve:Nte * 
In what fW:tthe%1 sense God oonaat-ves all values a.nd the !Qf'Sr"" 
relation ot divine and human V$lues 1a ~the~ elaboratsd in 
the next section,. 
4- Metaphyaioal. Status of Values. 
G~ounded as 1t is in the ns.tw:-a.l1stio ordez.t. JIIf.tdingts 
value thscry .tails in refusing to find any need fo:r iJU11s .... 
. ,. 
not only .makes a tu.l.l anal7s1a of emp~1oal. values but 
gr:ounds them in the kind ot a. metaphys :teal o:ttdeXt whioh 
' pfU'a.ntees thebt p%'es:m:rvs.t1on and. incrEta~Hh No ax1closr 
1a· adequate until 1t does this J but hex-e 1s the inherent 
weakness, not only or H6tf'd1ng but o:t moPe modBlln philoao ... 
ph&l"S 11ke Exanest Nagel, Y • Bw ICr;tikQr1an, and John Dewey, . 
all of whom seek to find :plane ror values and mind within the 
na.tux-al ordexa or the universe. exoludingf of cou:rse, the pos .... 
s1b111t:y of ~ kind or data except . the data revealed by 
sene~ lilnd the sc1.entU1o metl'.l.od~ u:For na.t\U's.liam aa a phl8 
lo~ao~ the unive:rsal appl1oab1l.1t:y ct the expe~1ntenta.l. 
method is a basio belief ,.n1 Blt1ghtma.n 3X'ounda his values 
1n metapb#$1oa, but the ltadieal differenee between the per• 
sonalist and the ltat'Ul'a11at 1a 1n the kind of un1ve~se each 
. , r.:- i -.-·"r 
postulates,. Nat'Ul*al1sm !a the view~ aoeollriling to Kx»1kor1an_. 
"that nat'Ul'e 1a the whole ot :tteal.ity,ll and by natlWe he 
nmeans what emplxt1oa1 soisnoe find~t 1t to be and what a 
completed amph-ioal soienoa would .find it to be.,n8 Person ... 
al1sm, on the otb.w hand, saya "that the energy which phys1 ... 
' . 
oists desovibe 1a Godts will 1n action, and that thel:"a is no 
wholly unuonsciou~:~ Cl' impersonal. ba!ng,n3 On this view 
p}Waioe.l. nature 1s onl:y one part of the expe:tt1enoe ot a 
1. XXtikwian, ~t. (1944), 242. . 
a. Ib1d., 242-843. See also Randall on the nature Q·f 
natlU'alism, Attt • C 1944} • 
a. Blltiptma:n.,. mv, l.l4" 
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Supreme Person whose experience also 1nclu.daa umemox-1·es. 
its ~poses. its values, its powe%4s, 1ta activities., and 
ita expel'ienced interactions with its env~omnent.ul Here 
is adequate ~oun4 f~ declaring the metaphysical status 
. . 2 
of values. Nat\U's.l1sm suffers :t'rom too much :reductionism. 
In restzt1ct1ng data to se:r;tse. data, v$lues either have to be 
denied or l"&duoed to some phenomenal expression of spatial 
;pl*Operties ~ On the othe.t' hand, "personalism 1s m~e inclu.• 
siva than natutta11Sm.1 113 boldlJ avowing the reality- ot some 
values not dependent on the pb.Y.s1cal ordel'. 
What 1s, then, tba metaphrs1oal status of values 1n 
the univ ert:le'i It has a~eadf been shown that values EWe 
mes.n3.nsless apart ~om pe:J?sonal expw1enoe, human or c11v1ne. 
It ia not vn.-on~s, tharetwe, to se:a- that all value is aubjeo-
t1ve.4 Bu:tt the subJective ·expel'ienoe 4oes not tell. the 
whole sto:r7._ liver7 sxp~1enos is an. expex-1ence .of something. 
What is it, then,. that when expeXt1enced becomes a subjective 
value? In othe~ wo~ds, what is an objective value2 What-
ever it is, if it lay any clat. to being a p~t or the 
x-attona.l un1ve:r-se 1 it must fulfil at least twfl requ.~ement~tw 
l. B%'1gbtme.n, NV 1 56. 
2., See Bl:-1ghtman's whole IV tw his definitive t:r-ee.t:m.ent of 
nature and values, sapeo1al1~ 0 th& oha.ll,engs ot pe:rson'"" 
a.lism · to ne.tt.U-alism, n IV 1 115 ... 126. 3. Ibid. 116. . · 
4. This ls not, S.4 Brightman points out., to reduce values 
to ind1vidual1st1o subjectivism ox- a 11soc1al sol1pa1sm" 
with no obJective .l"eferenoe, !TP, 152. See r.t'P, 151-165 
tor the whole discussion of objeot1v1t'1 vs. aubjeetivit~. 
FJ.ltst, 1t must be aom.ething that all Peasonabla m!nde would 
acknowledge; and second• it must be valid not only for human 
minda but tor ultimate real1ty..,l This k1nd of value Bright• 
man calls a nwm. · A nottm is an objeot1ve value whose onto-
logioal. reality consists 1n the experionee of God in think ... 
!ng what; the value ought to be., 'lhe nOXtm is in God's mind, 
for all reality must be in a mind, but to keep the d1stine• 
t1on clef.U'I between norms and values Brightman says that n1t 
.. 
would perhaps be. more aoeul'ate to speak of the metaphysios.l 
obJect.tvity o:r nome, and the aubject1ve existence of values 
in tbs persons who experience them.n2 This represents a 
cla.r1tioat1on, 1t not a ~eel .. chMge1. 1n ~1gb.tman1s tl'ee.tmenv 
ot the objectivity of va.luea.. This sta.t:ement puts more e~ 
pbaa.ls on the objectivity ot norms rather than values, some.., 
what of a shift from his e!llpllases 1n pzaevious literature., 3 
. . 
W1bh this diet1netion in mindt 1-. e., the subjectivity of 
values and the objectivity of no~ms, one can synthesize by 
' 
s~ing tbat human persons may experienee subjectively the 
values wldch ha.va a meta.pb.ysieal status outside of human extl!f 
perience, but wh1oh are for God his O\n\ subjective app:t'ecis.• 
tiona ot unive:raal norms~ 
Values, it 'f:tJB:y tis concluded_, ~e ~ounded in the ult1-
n:rate oosm1o wder e.s p$.1't. of God t a axpa!"ienoe J and because 
that cosmic order is peraonal and rational the permanence ot 
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value tl*utbs is not only aastll'ed., but the comnnm1oat1on and 
app~ac1at1on of value-n~ms is made a posa1b1lit,v r~ all 
t'a.t!one.l minds 1n the un1vel'Se~ Al1 .other. s.rgumenta ooneid_.. 
a~ed, the most logical explaMtion tw th$ pl.'esence ot val• 
ues consists 1n the view that valueMno~ms are the "objective 
elaims that reality makes,. rather than eet oUX* nteNly subw 
jective demand tw pleasure OX" sat1staotion.'*1 
Brightman 1n deao:r1b1ng subjective appx-eo1at1on of ob-.. 
jeotive n~ spes.ks o~ the univerose as being Uf%a1endly"2 
to valuea, but he believes that onl.J' e. personalistic meta"'"' · 
pb;ys1cs makes it possible. The extra .. mantal world of the 
%'eal1st <>~ t.he wol'th·~·a& un1varse of tha naturalist makes 
values either inexplioable oP a miracle • Where all of 
reality, na~e, and values constitute a personal ~ler, 
then the plqsioal universe 1taalf • although 1n app&s.t"anoe 
1ntx-e.cta.ble and stubbOl*%11 1s 11on: th~· sidau of value g:rowth. 
The objeotion that 1:f the wwld ia 'friendly to value all 
reality 1s now perfect and 1nosnt1ve de~:ttl'oyed 1s based on 
the asswnption that the ua1vel'se is stflt!o. ~e object1CJn 
disappears when it is pointed cut that; the ·ttperfeotionu ot 
the un1varse does not consist ·1n fixed, changeless ultimacy 
but 1n its pevfect1b1l1ty.. nA living un1vel'SEhH• ~is more 
per.tsct than a pex-.teoted l.U:d.vevae thfat ~n gttow no mo:rli.n& 
l24 
With God and h1a experience. 1nolu41ng nature and values .. 
conceived ot as infinitely perfectible, there sUPely is no 
inh1b1t1on of htunan incentive. 
Some very helptul mate:r:tal cwrelat1ve to Bxt1ghtman•s 
views on the objectivity ot values .is fou.nd. in hia article, 
u!l!he Problem of e.n Objective Basis .to%' Value Judgmenta,.u1 
A b:rt1ef aummaey is given here for X:tefe!:'ence and comparison. 
He sets forth the following as his tunaamenta.l thesesa 
a 
a. Value expwience is an smp~1cal fact, 
b,. Value 1E~ an expa:t*1ence ot person. 8 Wh&JNt persona 
are absent~ ve.:S.ua 1s absent.u3 
<h Every value expexa1enoe bas ~e.tfa.ble qualities, but 
the ncm•:ttat1one..l elements ocn$t1tute au.l. btu" to rational s.n .... 
. . . 4 
veat1gation of the1tt relations, :meanings, and norms. 
d,.. 1'here is need. ot a. fuller. knowledge ot the meaning 
of value.. nnamowacy ae.n B'Ul'vive onl.y if 1t becomes mol'e 
5 
.oohexaent and objective about its vs.luea.• 
e. ~uth about values is not axw1ved at b7 experiment, 
or p~1oula~ facts, but 0, ~ational whole~ess and adequate 
1. Sl'ightman, A1'1h (1942). B%-ightman a1thex- pa.rt1oi.pated in 
d!rect~.ox- eontr1buted papers 'fio.,the.thil'd1 £ovth1 
st&th, and twelfth Symposia. on Scienaa, Ph1J.osopq1 and. 
Religion held 1n New York. H1.s contit1butiOl:l~ .are value. ... 
ble tor some ias1gbts 1nto his views on aoo1a1 values 
which he has not treated qst$lllat1cmll.J' in hia Wl"itbgs. 
s. Ibid~, 3. . 
a. tb1d., a'* 
4, Ibid., 4 .. 
Iii.' Ibid.,t 4• 
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coherence.,l. 
f. Science itself presupposes objective validity ot 
ideal values insofar as it eng~gea in an honest search fo~ 
truth.2 
S• Society and demoo:raoy depend on rational validity 
3 
·of val.ueth 
h. The ~elation of what n1sn to nwhat ought to be0 1s 
a problem of metapbJsica.4 
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Next he lists h1a ugwnents for the objeet1v1ty of nor• 
mat1ve ·value judgments. 'fhq are objective because they x.aefar: 
6 
a. To psychological and social facta. 
b• To the cohe~ent and cr1t1cal ~sanlzation of thaae 
facts. 
o. ~o bJpotheGes about· ideal norms. 
d.t ~o rt;tla.t1onships between value e:perienoe and the 
physical WOX'ld. 
e. ~o an objective souvce ot value .e~erienos. 
f• '.fhey presuppose and requlre e. !Tee, rational. in,-. 
quixay into the nattUte and conditicms o.f the bJ.ghest value 
expe r1ence .. 
The ad41t1on or othe~ axiological material ~om Bright~ 
man would be mostly xrepet1t1on. The one oonolus1cm posa1bl.e 
1. BP1ghttnan, AJ:tt. (194$}, 5., 
a. Ibid•• s. 
:h lb1dt.,. a. 
4• Ibidt., 6;, 
s. This and ~ema.1ning points e.:ra all tound on p .. e. 
from all the evidence presented above 1s tbat 1 tor Bright-
man, this is a ~alue universe. ~he eyes of common sense 
see only the physical wwld, a world wb.ioh no idealist de-
nies,, but sense data ax-e not the only data.. Expel"ience 
:reveals value facts which belong as much to the universe 
as ao-cs.llad physical taete, and the tw·o are not inc om .... 
patiblrrh Both are aspects of God ts activity wh1eh in turn 
becomes the source of data tor buman exparience. 
As this chapter section begins-, so it ends, that God 
is the ka7 to the axiol.ogica.l st:l'uctura ot any system which 
attempts to desc.wibe coherently the universe we live 1n. 
God as Person is source and prese~ve~ ot all ultimate val~ 
uas.., All xaealitr being a put of his pel*sonal expe:r1ence • 
the universe is fr1entily to value development, and because 
God's expe~1enoe 1s expanding• there is infinite ohallenga 
for effel't and. achievement. God himaelt 1s the guarantor · 
that values will be maintained. 
B., Whitehead. 
1. God as Principle ot 0QnO:tt$t1on. 
For Wh1tehead, perhaps even mOl'e than tw Bl'igb.tfllS.n1 
his whole cosmology and part1cula~l7 his axiology is a re• 
f.l.eotion ot the kind ot Gcd postulated., '!J!.an'y roade lead to 
the heart of Wh1 tehead' s do·ot3.'1ne ot God" One could begin 
w1th eithezt th& concept of the pr1mord1s.l and conaequent 
l.27 
ne.tUX'es ot God, or more empil?ically with the "dxtopa of 
experiance111 which soon lead t?a.ck to the only "non•tempora1 
. s 
actual entity", God. For purposes of this section, wbioh 
is to show how God relates to the value str,uoture of White@ 
head •a thought, the principle of concretion seems to be 
the most acoaasibl..e ent!'anoe to the ax1olog1ca.l schematm.. 
It might seem that Whitehead's account. whatever it 
is, uf eosm1o creation would be mQre bas1o tban.the ~1nc1• 
ple of oonwat1on. In one sense it is# in that nczaeat1vity 
ia the ult~ate behind all forms03 OF nthe ~versal of 
universals charaoteriling ult1ma.te matter. of fact"4 but_1t 
1s soon discovered that ~eativit,v is not an activity of 
God, but a foundational principle to which God himself if 
subject. God ia its "p~imo~dial aoc1dent0 , 5 he is 11 the ~~t~ 
oom$ of e~eativ1ty",e while b~th God and the world "are 1n 
the gvip ot the ultimate mc:ptap:tws1oal gx-ou.nd. the creative 
advauoe into novelt7·"' In tb~fl Whitehead. repudiates any 
notion of God ae ttan aboriginal, emtnently real. t:ransoen• 
dent being, and whose 1mposed will it obeys" and at the same 
time disavows the concept ot ttthe temporal WOl'ld ••• ae a 
1. Whitehead, PR, SSe This is Whiteheadta deSCl'ipt1ve 
pb'es.ae· tw an· actual entity. 
a,. Whitehead; RM, eo. Of. PR, '15, tw .fu.x-thet*- elaboration. 
of Gcd a.s · non•temporal¥ · 
a. Whitehead, P.R. 30... See aleo PR, lOwll. 
4. Ibid., 31-. . 
s. Ibid., ll. 
{h Ibid. • , 1311. 
7. Ibid.,. 529* 
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selt--autt1cient completion ot the CB'eative aot.,"1 Better 
think of God ae "not bQ;fore all ereation, but w~th all o:rea.• 
t1onJ"2 but creativity 1tael..f' app$ars to be aimless general .. 
it,' unt1l sse speoi;ticity is produ.eed tt-om the whole. Here 
1s where God appe~s in his primal l'ole, which is to wing 
d1ffef"ent1a.t1onand order' from the un41ffere:nt1ated on•gobg 
of the o~eat1ve advance., Whitehead t'efex-s to God 1n thia 
oapaoiicy' a.s •tha principle ot ooncreb1cm-tha principle where-
by the:re 1e 1n1t1ated a. definite outcome tl'Onl a. situation 
othel'wise riddled with amb1gu1ty.u3 
fb1s concept of cono~etion appears 1n embryo in Science 
and the Moeiex-n Wor'ld, where he sets 1t otf against AP5-stotleta 
.....•. ' . . . ' -
Pl"im.e Movw, which he :tt"epu.die.tas, but he :real.iaes the need 
in hi$ own system of an analogous agency and substitu'bes his 
"Pt*ineiple of Ooncret1on.114 It 1& Gotl's .function to bl'inS 
things togethex- in a pattexaneti conneot$dness. A synonym 
for! conovet1on 1& limitation, se that God 1s nthe ult11nate 
ltm1tat1on° ~ the nsupreme gpound £or l1mitAtion.05 Xn 
,rtel.J1£i1op .in t~~ .• ~i.p; Whitehead says that 0 apart f.vom him 
thEu .. ·e could b& no w~ld~ baoause there could ba no adjust• 
ment ct 1nd1v1due.Uty.n6 ln J:ropet;ta ,all!l1lea11~X God 1n this 
role appe!U*S to be mora actin to the extent that he ap""' 
pears to assume some of the '*eminently real." ohal'aote:t"ist1os 
which Whitehead deprived h1m ot., As p~ino1pl.e of conottetion 
God n !.s that actual entity fttom which each temporal concres.-
cenoe rece1vea that 1n1t1al aim fltom wb.ieb. its se1f•oe.usat1on 
sta.t'ts.n1 
Without taking up the 41ft1cult~ involved he~e.2 this 
dettn1t1on suggests that all oon~etiona o~ ooncrescence.s 
rece1ve something 41x'eotly tl'om Godo '.rhe next step toward 
God's major role in valu,e et:Maot'll.re !a tb:wf indicated. 
a.- ~e 11Boma" cf all Potentials. 
The pr1nc1plt~~ of ooncretion reveals how "diverse ele-
ments come togeth~ into a real un1ty.n3 Wb.a.t that par-
tieu.l.al" conoresMnoe w unity becomes dependu on the selec .... 
tion of potentiala which are there for it, "Actuality 1s 
the decision amid rpotential1t,-r._u4 All p.otentialit,- resides 
1n the F!m.ovdlal na.tve of Gcd, wh1oh Whitehead sees as the 
realm ot unlimited pos£t1b1li'by., This 1a Godts oonceptus.l. 
o~ mental pola~6 which consists itt the 8 41rect v1s1on ••• ot 
some posaibil1t7 as to how actualities ma~: be t3:efinite.-86 
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1. Whitehead, Pft1 374~ Of. also 104, a431 3731 522 •. 
a. The pz:-oblem 1a the reconc111at1on of Whitehead'~e inS1s• 
tence that actual entities t.Ute o~~~~ s~~ (see PB, 131, 1351 
339) and autonomous (see n, 311, 1fil with God rs in1t1a .. 
tion ·of t~ bas1o ·aim of eaoh ooneresc.eno$. 
3.; Whitehead. u_. 93-. 
4• Whitehead, fD1 aa. 5. Whitehead saya: tt Any ins~oe ot experience is dipolar_, 
· whether that ~tanoe be God or an aotual occasion ot tne 
worl4f :ra, 54. 
e. Ibid., so. 
Possibilities, potentialities, oonoeptu.s.l prehensions. are 
all srnot1J111S tor Whitehead.' s more genwal term, "eternal 
objects.u1 He dea01"'1bea an eternal object as ~~~ entit7 
whose conceptual recognition does not involve a. naceS$Bey 
reference to any definite actual entities or the temporal 
WO%*l.d.-. ~a More s1lnpl7, ete%-nal. objects BX'e 11PllX*G potentials 
for! the spec1f1c tetel'Dlination of' .fe.ot.u.3 All eternal ob• 
jeota exist in the pr1mol'd1al natve ot God, wh1oh 1s eitb.e~ 
speotfically equivalent to o~ has a . tu.nct;1on analagoue to 
Plato's realm ot ideaa.4 An actualit7, e. g., an actual 
ent1t,-, becomes real and determinate.'by selecting .fl'om these 
potentials or ideas the possib111t1es wh:toh al!'e compatible 
with its own sub3ect1ve a.1m. Eternal.. objticta :are then said 
to "1ngxaessn into actual esiatenoe. a Pfhe things which ax-e 
tempOl'al av1se by thai!- PQ.l'tic1pat1on in the things which 
QXJS eterna.l.uS Goti is thus seen to be the 11hom:eU of s.U 
potentials Zov actuality. H1a own pitnoxsdial natue, while 
devoid of actuality, consists in the "complete envisagement 
l, Whitehead said that 1t the t·erm 11$terna.l cbjects0 wePe 
not liked; he·would settle fo't* 0 potent1a.lstt (PR, 296). 
2* Whitehead, ra. 70. ·ot. alao smw. 159. 
S._ Il:)1d.,, 38o 
4. He seems to identity them when he sa.rs: 0 Etemal ob .. jects, as in Godts prtmo~d1al nat~e. oon$t1tute the 
Platonic world of idealS•" Pit, 73# Of., one function ~ 
BX*ightman's •oontrolle~ ot ~e G1ven"t 11God's will is 
etettnally seeking new .terms of embodiment of the good.1 11 
POR, 338. . 
s. "!he .tunetlonins cf an atEWna.l object in the self•creation 
of an actual entity is the tingression' of the eternal · 
object 1n the aetuel e~tity~n PR, as. 
&. Ibid"' 63o. 
ot ~tex-nal objactanl which he '~~deeU.$s" 1 by an a.ppeti tion 
1n his own ntatu:tie to become coneiJete faot in the life of 
actual entities. This suggests the next point, which sees 
God 1n his role as a trl.uz.e tox- feeling. n 
b., The L'Ul*'e tot' Feeling. 
l'aoh actual ent!t7 mar be t'$E>nee.1vetl ot as having its 
own mental pole ox-1ented to~d God. What it becomes is 
subject to its own decision, but 8 1t derives .from God ita 
baa1o ocnnep'bual tdllhul God and aotus.1 ent1t1es nfe.oeu 
·each othe1*1 thea-efoX'e1 the one whose f\m.ot1on is tc be 
•the lln'a fol* teeltng,. the etexanal. urge of dea!xte,n3 and 
the ot~ to be the agent of s.etual.:l.sation. Neither ce.n 
&x1st without the other. e.Jteept to'l! ptUlpcses ot thought. 
D'Bternal objeota ea.rm.ot dam.,nstrate what they ere except 1n 
some given tact,n4 and actual entities are all e~essiona 
o~ potentials in God.. Because he 1s the 8 unlim1ted conoEJp ... 
tu.al. ~ealisa.tion of the absolute wealth of pctent1al.ity00 
he "1ongs0 6 to inject into the order ct a,otu.al1t7 the sraat 
poss1b111t1es there are tor 111."~ 
1 .. Wbitehaa41 Pll, 70., 
a. Ibid.,. aa. 
3,. Ibtd.,, ass. 
4a Ibid., 395*' 
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s., Ibid., 621. 
a. A term. not out o:t place in a tePminology which includes 
such d.escw1p't1ve al(p~eas1ons as ltfeeling" and stappetition-• 
7 *' Bixler says it this wa7: 11Go4 t~ies to persuade the 
wopld at eaCh ocoaaion to such pePfe~t!on aa 1s possible 
fo~ 1tfl« Al'1h(l941), 499. · 
that he constantly stXtivea for the realisation of new 
potential~! in tl).e o:rder of actuality. The 11grow~ edge0 
exists, of co~s.e, onl7 in the b~th and beoaming of actual 
ent1t1EUJ., "fhe actual ent1t~ 1$ the t-eal oonoxaeso$nce ot 
lDS.l0.7 potentials • uS Whs11 an actual ent1t:r,. wh1oh is ce1usa" 
,su,:f;, S prahends othe:r.- data. so a a to bring into its own con.., 
ereseenue unilu.e elements, t.he ult!tnat<ii sa.t1ste.ot1on 1s 41• 
vevss f~om all other.sntitle$ and hence is a new ~eat~e-4 
Bach oon.Ol'esoen~ce is novel., simply b$Cause the data fxaom 
which 1t draws oan navel' be the same for! a:r:ry othel' ent:t.t,-. 
J!N&'t'J' actual entitJ', thettetoXte,. rep:resents .0 passage into 
novelty", 5 but, aa shall be se:en 1n a later section, 01~s 
passage 1a not its dea.th.,n6 
In bx-1ef s~ or the above, God is aeen as the 
~inoiple of conw.et~on 1n that he infuses into genex--al 
e~eat1v1'b7 the lbd.tations of pax-t1ou.la.r1'by. A.U poss!bil ... 
:tt1.as of wha.t p~tieu.l$1' "th1llgett can be are 1n. God as po-
tent1als which, by in#eSaion. ,become e.ot"UA1 1n the eatis..,. 
faction ot actual enti'bies. God 1a Uthe ltU-s for feeling• 
W the ~Ol'gan .of J'lOVSltlfU 1n that he 1S the U etemaJ. ~ge 
of deair.ett towE.WCl Upasss.ge into nove1ty" 11 
a. God aa Principle of OPdering., 
a.~~' TeleolOG'• 
~t the total actual world is the ubeooming of actual. 
ent1t1esn1 1s an s.x!om of Whitehead r a cosmology., '.fhe whole 
becoming of the aetut:tl wo:ttld Whitehead :ttefers to as ths 
"extensive continuum" which is none x-els.t1one.l complex. 1n 
wh1eh all potential object1f1oat1ons t!lnd their niche.n2 
one migb:b illustxaate the situation by a vast organic st~o-­
ture in which wer7 pwt brought to the new ·conorEu~cence of 
elements will ftnd a place not cut of accord with the purpose 
of the total ati'Ucture o~ its own individual na.tura.3 The 
question whether the pattt was made fO'JI the whole or the whole 
tor the ;part is as 1rve1evant4 aa. the pxtoblem of wb.athe:tt God 
cw the wo%*14 1s pr1or.5 , Sutfiee it tbs.t when a.n aatual. en ... 
6 
t1ty' is nbwnn it t!nde itaelf at home 1n the untve~ae. 
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fhat there are no stl!*angers 1n this gl'ea'b kingdom of veal1t7 
1S du.e to the teleological st~ctve of the·extens1ve con ... 
tinuum itself. Hovelt,- !a oont1nuou.sly belng introduced, but 
it would be eampletel7 umeanimgleas and 1nconce1vableu7 unless 
l~r Whitehead, Pit, 33. 
s. lb1d., 103. . 
3. The il.lu.strs.tion does not do ju.at1os to the :p:Poce~a na, ... 
tve Gf Wh1t-eheadts eosmolos,-1 ·but it is ve1.*y difficult 
to think prooess.. Oft Bergson~ Whitehead himSelf speaks 
of·"t'.b.e universe as a solldal*ity ·Of m.a.rJ.7 actual Gnt1t1es,v 
· PH, 6th · 
4:., Whitehead; PR:; l.03t 
a. Ibid., sse. 
e. Of. Le1bn:tz. · 
7 • Whitehead,·- ra, 64~ 
it already had the stamp on it ot the unive:t"SS 1nto which 
1t e.ppeued-. But this stamp is inevitable because an actual 
entity not only .~erses into its environment a it srowe. qut 
ot 1ts environment 'li It can brlng into 1ts woPld only what 
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it received from its past, plus an appetition for realtza• 
tio.n tn its mental pole* Oomp1ete1 disjunction 1s therefore 
1mposs1blejjl ~t there, sb.al.l be ord$r 1s the sternest aspects 
ot the univez.se and mere Whi tehea.d comes the nearest to baV• 
ing an ••eminently real" God Whose will sball be obeyed. God 
ia the ordering principle. :tt is the "divine element" in 
the world. 2 0 'l'b1s tunct1on of God 1s 81'1$logoua to the re-
mwaeless working of things 111 Gz?eek and in Buddhist thought . 
• • • What is inexwa'ble 1n God~ is valuation as an a1m towax'4s 
tordwt.u3. 
It will help to make oleal' how this ardell" is effected 
in the universe by l"ev1ew1ng Wb1teheati•s analysis of the 
views oonG!ernins the laws of natuJ:te. 4 He suggests fov main 
types of laws: 
. (l) Law e.s !mrao.nent. This 1s bu:t to ee.y that nature 
1s exp:tess1ve of its own essence. 5 It tollows from this 
view that: tit-st, true scientist seeks fw explanations 
rathe~ than d.escxaiptiona; second, uexact conformation o~ 
1.- Room has to be lett for the elements of ~eteleolog-
: which do appear. 
2. Whitehead, PB• 64a 
3• Ibid., ~73. · 
4. For the whole disow.ts1on, AI, 142•151• 178-1'17-. 
5. Of. Spinoma. 
1 
nature to eny l.e.w is not to be expectedJu third, laws 
Change as the unive~se changesJ fourth. 1nduct1ons become 
m.we trustwoxatb.7'r fifth, the universe has some coherent 
system ot interconnectionJ and sixth, the doct~1ne is 
rat1onal1stio in that it p~ovidea a basis to~ the posa1b1l• 
ity of understanding natu:tte. 
(B} Law E1S .1fnl?oa~d. from wS.thout on. th~s. This is 
the transcendent view of 4e1sm. It is the assumption be• 
bind the notion of substance 1n Descartes and the physics 
of Galileo and Newton. 
(3) ;t:e.:w,as ciescription. This is the doctrine of posi ... 
t1v1am which says that the laws ot nat\We are only persisting 
patterns ot phenomena- •All science bases itself on this 
prooed't.tv.e.n2 'fh1s view r•l.ly explains nothing; for it is 
only tautology .. 
(4} L~w .as. conventional inta~l?.retation. Modern specu• 
lat1on, dialectics, and mathemat1oa ·illustrate this type, 
whoae method is to "elaborate a. s,-stam of 1dee.s, in detach-. 
ment from &.fV/ diraot 1 4e~1led matt ex- of tact • n& FOl' exam• 
ple • d.istanee is measut'ad in terms of some conventional 
standard, e. I•, 1nohes • $.lthough there a:tte no "particular 
ent1t1esn4 eorresponding to inches. 
1. Whitehead, AI, 145. 
a. Ibid., 149. Whitehaa.dta negative attitude to the v1g1d 
. empiricism of.solent1f1.o analysis is an interesting and 
. well.,..lalown aspect of his thought* . 
3. Ibid., 175. 
4 •. Ibid.~ 174 •. 
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Of these foUP interpretations of law Whitehead rejects 
the last three. It is his view that the immanence of God 
1n nature affox-ds the only- ground tozt "belief that pure chaos 
is intrinsically impossiblflh.ul God 'a immanence 1a the 
11meta.phys1oal ats.b111tyn8 ot the unive~se and 1s the gu.e.r""' 
antee that there will be harmony throughout the ext ens 1ve 
a 
continuum, npast, present and tutul"e-n In what sense God 
1s immanent 1n the wo~ld ts worthy of note if Whitehead's 
system itself be not reduced to chao$. The common philo~ 
sophice.l use of the tem 1a not flU" remo~ed from its etyma.-. 
logical sense, in, in, and manso~ remain. As applied to 
- ..... . 
the God-world ~elationship it ~ana that God is jn the 
world, the conformation of physical matter being an expres-
sion of God's presence w1th1n it. Extrema views of God as 
lmme.nent amount to pantheism, fh S•, Spinoza. For othm."s, 
Ood is regarded as immanent in the sense that the universe 
is part of God's activit~, e. g~¥ BowneJ but here God is not 
ltm1ted to the universes he also transcends it. Whitehead, 
in ~ reapeots, 1s nearer to the latter view, although 
some of his statements seem to exclude that conclusion. He 
speaks, for . inata:nce, of the lJllltual · :!.mmanence of God and the 
woJtl4 1n one of his own summarizing ant~.nomtest 11It is as 
tl'ue to say that the world is immanent in God, as that God 
1~ Whitehead, PH, 169. 
e. Ibid., 64• · 
a. Whitehead,-PR, 103. 
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is in the wo~ld."1 Admittedly it 1e ve~y difficult to 
separate this view hom Sp1noz1st1c pantheism. but on the 
other hand, 1t must be remembered that Whitehead's cosmo• 
logicQl structure is a aystem in which all action, progress. 
change, I'elationship& are possible only through pxaehensions. 
The universe is a soe1ety of prehendins entities and !lathing 
else. When one actual entity prehends another, it ~ee~s it 
within ita own being; w~t the other ent1tf is becomes an 
element 1n the conoresoent process of the original entity. 
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It oan be said accurately# according to Whitehead's system~ 
that ttan actual entity ;t.s ~eaent 1n otb.er actual entities+ u3 
~is point is vary impo~tant for Whitehead in that "the 
philosophy or OX'g$.nism 1a mainly devoted to the task of making 
ale@ the notion of tbe1ng p~esent in another ent1t;rf *n4 
· From this evidence it can ba seen that Whitehead uses 
the term immanence not in its tPaditicnal philosophical sense. 
Rathexa • immanence .,. in 11 pxaehens1on. God and the world 6.1'9 
in Qna a.nother.- therefore, insofax- as that px'ah&hd one an-
other* God is truly immanent, but there seems to be no con ... 
clus1ve evidence for saying that God ~~ the world in the 
sense that the two are coextensive ,in all respect~.. If God 
1. Whitehead, FR, 103.-
a. Ibid.~ 27. · 
3. Ibid,, 79.- Whitehead ite.l1oued. "is" to place his view 
. 1n opposition to '1Ar1atotle's dictum, t {A substanee) 1s 
not present 1n a subjeott 1 ° PR, 79* By u1a0 , however; 
. he means no more tban n is :f'e-lt b7• u 
4. Ibid., '79 .. 80. 
and the wtntld ~~ coextensive 111 all respects, then Wh1te~ 
head's emphatic insistence ~n the private expe~1ence of 
self~dete~m1ntng actual entities is automatically nullified. 
1 There is both ttpublio faot ana. pl"1vate experience" through-
out Whiteb.es.Q.ta ooamolcg1oal exposition. Some elements, he 
explains, can be· understood only b~ refex-enoe to a world 
beyond a given tact, while there Sol' a other elements which 
r 
~eta%" onl7 to the "private~ personal individuality, or the 
tact in qu.ef.iltion.)u2 Whitehead aa,-s that n·the .t'OPme:t' ele-
llt.ents express. the publicity of the wc:trldJ the latter element$ 
&Xpl'eSS the p.rtivaey of the ind.iVidual,,.,ttZ There 1s :no doubt 
that this p;r1vaoy 1s genuine 1n the sense that God does not 
inte:tt.fwe in the tttntemal lifew of aotual entities. God 
feels what otha:r actual entities are, of aourse, but he 
dc&Al not decide what elements shall be admitted. into their 
connx-eaoent Jll'ooeaSEUh 'J!he decisions of actua.l entities 
do not balong to God. Therefore 1t. 1.$ not tl'ue that ttaoa. 
is all thette 1Eh n 
On the other lu\nt11 GQd himaelf is not an aaoept1o:n to 
the p~ino1p1e of ~1vaoy.4 He is an actual ent1t75 and 
th~efo~e ~ private experience. In so f4r as God baa 
f'uutltions peculiar to himself he has an 1dent1ty all his own. 
1 .. Whitehead,: PI, 498~ 
a. Ibid., Ms. 
3., Ibid.~ 443. Cf. also 444 1 27,;h 
4. See Whitehead; PR, 521. · 
5. Ibid." 2B~t 
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Oe~tainly the initiative towArd novelt7 and the ordering 
of nature impl.J' a certain tvanaoendent :pp1or1t:r. It 1s a 
transcendence not of apax-tness t'.Pom the world, but of an 
all-inclusive feeling for the univa~ae while still retatn• 
ing certain prerogatives wb1Ch belong to God a1one.1 
One fultther p:ttoblem a:vises 1n conneetion w1th God•s 
teleological function. ~ere appe~s to be no ~eason wD¥ 
••g1venness0 ,. 1f that is equivalent. to totality, should be 
in the nat\U'e of a teleclogieal etl'Uottll'e rather than qs .. 
·teleological. Whitebee.d sees this problem and allows for 
1t9 ne sa:y·sa 
'Ol'dertmeans· mo:re than tgivennesa* • though 
it Pl'esupposes tgtvenne:!is' 'disordel"• ie also 
'given. t Each m.etual entity reQuix-es a total• 
1t,- of tg1venneaat, and ea.eh· tote.l!ty o& •stv• 
enness' attaiJ:ls its meAS'tr$ of •ordet'. t 
' 
'fhe pJ"1or1ty of the p~1no1ple of ordering is seen, howev•, 
in his ela1*1fy1ng reltltWk: that 1Ho11dert 1n the actual world 
is diffel'entie:bed ~om taeJ:te 'g1vermesa' _by 1ntt-oduct1on or 
. 8 
~dpJ!tat~on t,or ~1~ ~t~aimne.nt, of; e.n e~." &wtahorne ob• 
serves that the proesenoe .of order 11 is perhaps Whitahend's 
4 ta.vw~te Ql'gument" fol!* God's :vol~ in th$ Wlive:Pse. 
b. Persuasive Agency of God., 
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Altho~h the approa.oh ~om oxacler to God may sound au.sp1• 
ciously like the traditional. oosmological argwne~, Vfh1teheadd 
1. For example, God as a "persuasive asencr' discussed 1n 
the next 8eet1on. · 
2. Whitehead, PR, 127. . a.: Xb1d., 12'1 •. ,ltal.1cs added. 
4. liariJ$hOX'b.G, Art,. (1941) 1 638. 
tU.t.fers fl*om this tracU.tional view b:y :ttejeot1ng the notion of 
t;t. t&OmR~ls_iVft ottde»ins ft'om w1thcuth The doet!'ir:t$ o~ tmposed 
tawl but ~esurvaots, amons othw f'alle.c1es, the view that 
things fU'e theb* ovm. :reasons for existing, aa, e. g., in 
Deaoavtes, Newton, and all fOl*ms ot :Pe1sm.. Among Whitehead t s 
famous :rapudiations no doctz-1ne is mozte tho:t.tou,ghl.y rejected 
than the notion of selt~exist~ substance. Further~e. 
the idea of J.mJ>oaed law oom:.pttomiaes the chal'acter ()t God, 
whose will becomes ~tbl.aas and arbit!'$17• 0 !fhe Laws of 
Nature will be euttl.7 obeysd.u2 In th1s view, God becomes 
to(t much like ea.estw Zo't! Whit ahead.$ Be J)l'*efs:rs 'be find 
1n God a little more ot the Galilean b..u.rdJ.1t,-~ 4 which bas 
little in CJOill'laOn with s. God aftel' the :manner of Boman rm .... 
per1el1tun6 Rebx-ew MoXtalism, or ~1atotle 's unmoved. Mover • 
God ~ws how to crdeX" the un1vel'Se, but he does it net by 
divine decltee but b7 wisdom and love. '!'hat 11 the divine 
element in the wo»ld is to be eoneeived a.a a persuasive 
agency and not ae a. ooezacive aseno;ru Whitehead calls "one 
of the sreateat 1ntelleotual disoovwiee: 1n the hiat017 og 
:rel1g1on.uS fhat 1s flfb_e New Ref0l'mat1onu 1n4ee4f0 Oo4 
is etex-nalq relevant "to eaoh tnt&at1ve aot, as it ar1ses,u'1 
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presiding over it with "tender patience, leading it by 
h1s vision of t~th, beauty* and goodneaa.ul 
In keeping with the discussion or the p~evious see~ 
tion, 1t mtght be pointed out that God as a persuasive 
l42 
agency gives furthe:r support to the view that, in Whiteheaa.ts 
thought, God has some eharaeteristios which make 1t :reasonii;l 
able to attXJibu.te to him some transeendent functions. In a 
thorougb. ... golng pe.nthe1am the" is no room either tor per ... 
suasion ... -al:L things must follow~~or for genuine recalcitrancy. 
o. God the 9 Poet0 of Reality. 
Whitehead ts philosop~ comes the na~est to exhibiting 
e.asthetio quality REf~ s~ whezee he 1s expounding his cosmologr 
in te~ms ot aesthetic proces$. Where h1s writing escapes 
the somewhat pondevous style is pl'eo1saly in conjunction with 
the ela.bwat1on of the great concepts whieh seem to appear 
regu.laza~ out or his twm1nol.og1cal obhscat~ as 1f the 
ve~ ~1t1ng ot the ideas put beauty and wa~h into his 
pen. The. closing ohaptal' 1n Pro~Qs,s !lnd, Rea.~1tz, "God and 
the World,n and. the last section in fl.el1sion and the ~1n£b 
tt!b.e Ne.turte of God1 ° are p~obably the most 0 1nspilted" por-
tions of his WX"itinga. The concept of God as nthe poet of 
the wo:rldnS 1s a philosophical and liitW6.%7 su.mmlt of rax-e 
~auty. In th1$ capacity 
God'a role ~ not the oamhat of pPoduct1ve 
force with productive foree,. of destructive 
l• Whitehead, PR, 526" 
a. Ibid., sse" 
force with destt-Uot1ve fweea it lies 1n the 
patient operation ot the ove~powe~1ng1rat1on• ality of his concaptua1 ~mcniea,1on. · 
God 1s seen as pPeaiding over a woPld of a multiplicity ot 
entities all in a process of becoming. Because of the un""' 
limited conceptu.al1aat1on or potas1b111t1es, 1. a., knowing 
what 1s best feZ* each entity in aceoxadance with the harmonr 
of the whole, he dil'$cta that entity. not by force but by 
tande.:r persuaa1venass to the kind of Cl!Jnoraseenoa which 
will produce the maximum l'.la.l'mol').lt• 
God 1a a poet. Be knows h&w,the disjunctive elements 
ot. the wo:rld should be brought together !nto one oon3un•t1 ve 
unity with balance, crdex- • and beauty... "fhe teleology ot 
the 'O'niversa is directed to the produ~tion ot Beauty.n9 
W1 thout God. there 1s no relevaney et ptn'ta to whole. He 
~ep:t.-esents the standard of relevancy before tha·aatualiza. ... 
tton oocu:r.-s. 11There cannot 'be valu without antecedent 
standards of value,. to discriminate the acceptance o~ re....-
jeotion ot wbat 1s befoPe the env1Sflg1ng mode of aotiv1ty.,ul 
In aooorQ.ancJ with God's own eternal perapeotive ha gives to 
each occasion ita initial aim, 4 »an endowment whitsb. the sub.,. 
,jeet inherits t'l!om thE) 1nav1te.'bl$ Ol'del'*lng of things, eon• 
ceptually realiaed in the ne.tutte of God., u5 Although the a1m 
1. Whitehead, Pi, 526. 
a. Whitehead, AI, 341. 
s. Whitehead,. SMW, 1'78. 
46 Whitehead, PR, 374. 
5. Ibid., 373. 
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wbioh God giV$S 1a the beat for that situation, tha au.bjeot, 
being autonomous, does not ~ve to eoopet~ta.t$•1 but if its 
ovtn d.eo1a1ons ax-e in s.cowdJa.n~e with God's conceptual $Val .... 
uation, theJ;t b.ax*motdc aiJ.d stable values_ ~l'rlerge in the wox-ld 
of s.ctua.li~:y" Wb:ttehaa.d summaxrisea the, pl"ocess by' aa.7ing 
that "wbateve~ ~1ses in actuAl entitiEUl !'~om Godta 4&e1a1on, 
tw:isea fiPat conceptua,ll:y,. and 1a -t:r-.nsmuted into th& pb7s ... , 
iOal WOX'l.d • nS 
I . 
fo ~s.rl*y out Whitehea-d'$ t~a, God ~a.d.aa the :rele• 
vance~ _of each word to his ptJem and atbn!tst 1t to partioipa~ 
tion in the Whole aacording to his own $ta.:ndard of judgment., 
~- . 
God t_s en4 ia an a:aathetic proclu.otion-~> Since SV$~ element 
:!.noluded in the poem is a. :t-e$ult ot p1Wpos$tul. seJleet1v1 ty ~ 
G~'s ehoice 1a thus e. Judgment on it. God seleeta only- the 
bflau.t1fu1, and the wcztld is gQod be-e>$-U,Se .1t ,.is b~aut!ful~ 
l:l$eauae at tb.1a au.bolr!d1nation of' th$ ~xaal to- the a,eathetic, 
Ely 1a quite svong in his. ,eont~n:tfiotl that Whttebea.d•a God 
hilnSelt is not good~~4 Qod will.s the.s.a~thetio but not the 
good. Whitehead does as:y, "The :tteal wox-ld 1$ good when 1t 
1s beautiful~ u5 but aa usual Ely l'IU,:lkes the oas& stronga-
than necessuy. AJ.rno.st El.:tl1' atut.le~t of Whitehead will s.dmit 
l-.. Be:re u thG souvea or evil. · 
24' Whitehead, J.R, 248.;, 
a. Ibid~ 1 461 94S. fb.e pos:s1b111ty- of evil :ts diseussed 1n the next chap tel:!'., 
4jil El:v- RAWG• sa~ , . _ . 
&... Whita~a.d,. .A.IJ' 345. 
144 
the t~oant pls.oa given to tn.&ll'al.ity ;eer ~s'.t in his thought,l 
but 1a not Whitehead only trying to SSiy that true :m0l'al1ty 
ce.nnot be ugly, and that tX'll.a beauty l'D.U.St be good.? Ell" 
p~cba.bly has not ~owd.det-$d suoh passages as this 1 .t!:l 
"actual entity, in a state ot proceae .dur!ns which it 1s 
not tully 4efin1te, dete::t'm1n&s its oW'l'.l ultimate definite .... 
ness~ This is the whole point of mo~al l'eapcna1b1l1ty.,n2 
In keeping with the l'es:t of Whitehead's thought it seems 
that the good choice 1$ an ll.s.rmonious ehcioe.. To choose 
to be out of nonfsrm1t1' ia ett1l. In Gth&1"' wo::tttds 1 the good 
is a ssleotion of eompatible fJlemen'bSJ hence, eve17 choice 
is a 11mitationit The ~ame is t:rro:.e ~ot God htrnself.. Whit&w 
head bas a ve~y c~if7ing passage on the ~elation ·Of good" 
ness and God's 11mitat1ont 
~e limitation of God is his soodnesth He 
gains his depth f;)r aotuality- ·b7 hts ~n7 
of valuation. It 1s not tPUB that· God is 1n 
all lllespeota 1nt1n!.te., If .He were, Bs WQuld 
be ev11 as well as good.. Also this u.nl.1m1ted 
fu.$10n of evil with good would mean mere 
nothingnesEt •. Be:sis sometldng dac1de4 and is 
thereby 1tmited.-
:tn s_c1EmC$· in the. Modern _Wolfld Wh1 tehead bad alreaq pointed 
·- -. 
out the fallacy of mak1ng G-od the 0 foundat1on ot the meta.-
phys1aal tt1tuat1on with its ttl.timate aet1v1t:y.,•4 fhere 1a 
no es.eapa hare f~om the :ria~e~Jsity of ascribing to God the 
1• For one of the' most r-·eeant t!"aatmenta 
sas Millard, PVW'f. 42a .... 45l-. 
a. Whitehead, PB# 39Qlf 
3., Whitehead# u, ·153+ 
4., Whitehead, SMW, 1'79., 
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origin of evil as well as good. On the contx-a.rr. "if He 
be eonoe1ved as the supreme gztow:t4 fox- 11m1tat1on, it stands 
1n His Ve'/:7 natve to 41vi4e the Good from the EV1lt and to 
establish Reason •within her dom1n1cns su.!)X'emat.ul 
At this potnt if one ask ~e.~lum o~ if it be pointed 
out that Godta poem is not ent~ely ~ee t.Pam evil elements, 
Whitehead replies that the good does not actually dwell 1n 
isolation &om the evil, but that the good is a.ont1nually 
overcoming the evil b7 meebins eve'l!i/ element of d.iave.l.ue ey 
what is of worth. 
God has· 1n his ne.'lml'·e the knowledge of ev111 
of pa1ne and of degvadat1on. but 1t 1a the~e­
as ove~eome with what is good. Eve~ tact 
is whe.:b 1t 1s, a fact of p!leasve, ot Joy • 
of pain, w ot suf.fel*ing,. In its· union with 
God. that fao'b is not a total loss, but on 
its fineP side 1s an element to be woven !f""' 
morte.ll7 1nt o the l.'hythm of mortal tb.1nge, · 
With this quotation the p(Jle or God baa passed almost; 1m ... 
pe:t'G$ptibly from. his tunot!on as the SOUl"'ce of all poten• 
t1al1ty and appetition and the poet of the becoming process 
to h1s ful'ther function as the :~:~"ecip1ent of all aetuality 
tbl'ough his all-inol.us1ve pl'ehena.ive experience. fhis ia 
God 1n his consequent natu:re or u Sa.viw of the World, 
.3. God as Savior and 1te:11nal. :Pr&cess • 
God does not destroy the wo:ttldJ he saves :tt. White-
head hilr.leelf is the juat1f1oat1on f0'1! this somewhat 
l• Whitehead, SMW, 1'79•180. 
2. Wh1tehead,. RM, 155. 
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· aotw1o1og1oal t•l'minology,. we bave alrae..q seen tbat neaeh 
actuality has 1t$ present life and ita immedhte passage into 
noveltyJ b'Ut. i~s pe$s~ee .is .. no~d _it~ . da,ath;.,ul I'h 1a one of 
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the great etr$nsths ot Wh1teb.Gu.td 'ta 4octr1ne that h$ adequ.a.tel-7 
' . 
provides for the eont1:nua1;io:o. of value& be,-ond theiJ! p~~ 
axpJ?EUUtion1 1. Eh 1 va.l.uea 4o not perish with the o»1g1ael. ex-. 
per1enoe or them.. As pr1morcU.e..l God is the 0 homeu ot u.nl.im• 
!ted potentiality, but he 1a n4et1c1entll" ~otualn,2 which. 
means 'bbAt his feelings fU'e cml:y cenceptu.al with no ·phySical 
:raeal1aat1orh In this state (Jed 1s 1nf1n1te, complete, etex-.,. 
nal, and un.consa1ous.3 . In t~JUa of value he is the 'Ul'SG ~ 
appetition to\11$:l!ds value, but. bis pl:i'imerdUl natut:ae ia a::d.o ... 
logic~l.y tletio1~t. As oons~quent, howevw,. God 1s na.etw-
m1z:us4, 1neomplets, eonsequant1. tevex*•la.st1ng', full7 actual, 
and COJUU!S:l.O\\S#04 Go4''-'<f-L.pt-1m01"41al na.'h'ulte becomes consequent 
as a result of the ttr$acfi.1on of the w~ldu5~~pon him. But 
th1s 2"eao\1cn is a oon1U.nuous Pl*Oeeas:t by whtoh eveey occa-
sion bsoomea ntav$l'last1nst b:y 1~s cb3ect1ve immortal1q in 
Go4~86 Gocfi Dshal'es w1'bh eve'I.'Y new et-eat.ion ita a.e'bual WOl'ld•"' 
In othe:o wo:r4s, Ged•S.J preb.ens:Lve espax-1enoG includes, by its at;... 
f'eot on him,. ev·&lr'/ otbe~ ac'hu.s.l. entity which becomes a. novel. 
ele•nt in his na.tuzte, but J-etnainS theN as pal't of GoAts 
continuous existence.. ~X~e is no less. "The consequent 
natux-& of God is his judgment on the world.. He saves the 
world as it passes into the immed.iaoy ot his own l.1te,.t~l 
In him all expePienae, all gains, all values are p~ese~ved. 
God 1s indeed Savio~+ Be is 8th~ storehouse of achieved 
value, 11 saya lily .a 
In this possibility of ~eserved value tn God lies 
the 3uat1f1oat1on for optimism. ~re !a l1ttls enthusiasm 
for the. a:s:iolog1oa1 task U at the end the ~ieved gains 
are rende:-ed nU by theil* relapse into vaau.ity-J but if the 
unive:rae provides the kind of mol'al or rudol.ogioal arena 
whel"e values CQ!l not onl,J' be produced but p:resdved. then 
there 1a challenge fo~ activity and w~k. ~t values ax-e . 
not loat _gives st1mulus to ett01-t -~ eaeoUFagament 1n 
struggle# One might even say religious oomfcrt •3 Ely' a 
objection that the laying up of value •tn heaven for God's 
eternal contemplation and enjoyment •••. does net help m.en4 
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ta1ls to take into cona1derat1on not only the tnl7 creative 
~ge of all entities, especially those with "personal order", 0 
but the possibilitcy', though very faint 1n Whitehead's thought. 
ot the cont1n~t1en of that personal orde~ at anothev laval 
of existence. one might a~ that immortality is the one 
l• Whitehead, PR, 595,. 
S• 11~. BAWG,·4o. 
3# fhe xael1g1Mls aspects of Whitehead's rudolo§ will re ... 
ee1ve · fuller trea.tm.&nt later ... 
441- Bl.y · KAWG, 'S. · 
5• Wh1,ehead, · PR, 244. 
thing needful to give final Just1ficat1on fo~ an other~ 
Wi$e tr~ational striving* Both personal 1dant1ty and value 
find ult1m.ate meaning only in the 11WoPld. Which emphaaiaes 
Pers1stene$ ••• the Wwld cf Value.n1 
~e affective realuat!on of value 1n the 
WOX*ld or Change ,should 1'1nd 1ts eountel'part 
:tn the World of Val.ue:~th1s means thtlt tam• 
p~al personalit7 1n one woPld 1ftvolves tm~ 
mox-ts.l pex-sonal1ty in tho$ othal' _., 
fheve is S·ome evidence 1n Whitehead. fnr the view thab 
by 0 tem.pore.l. personalityn ha means a. "oonsoious salfn, but 
whether or not 111mmorota.l pwsonal1t'fn 1n another epoch ia 
analogous is a desideratu.ll4 Harbehol>ne and Raaae sa,- that 
the possibility of a nJWolongation of our present pexasonal ... 
1ty, is appr;wently ignored b7 Wh1tehea,~3 Nevel'theless, 
. . -~::.':·.· -~~; ·-
the ~a!nt 2o,ssib1litz of the continuation of personal idan~ 
t1tr lies in the evidence eduoad !)l'&V1ously to't! the stab111'Q' 
of value~. 4 ~ere it wa.s shown that values find the~ gl't;~ai; ... 
est ste.'b111ty in personal identi'b7• It may be mwe tbeJl 
R.Gtit;() iS1~~1n1!; t() auggesii-.... still on the basi$ of White" 
head r s thoughtJ ...... two things in suppo!'t of the immo!*tal:ttfJ' 
ot personal 1dent1trt 
lfix"att, if valu.fl £sGme at leaet) 1n the "WOX'ld of Oha.nsen 
is ~Chieved through personal 1dent1t7 then it 1s attenuating 
. . 
the concept, if not the oontent, of value to disassociate 
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personal 1d.ent1t1' &om the value. 
Second,. the exper1enee of pe~aonal identity 1n the 
present epoch is a high value., Could tha.t value be con• 
served in anothe:r epooh o~ leV'el ·of existence without per'"" 
sonal identit7Y In the light of the ~1vacy of experience 
and God's 0 tendel* Ofl.X*e that nothtns be loat, nl. there seems 
to be no wa:r to answer the question !n the aft11"'mat1ve._ 
Whether or not continued pe~aonal identity ts a feature 
ot Wh1teb.ea.4fa doctrine of immoX~ta.11ty, God's fUnction as 
the immortal conserver of achieved valuea 1s still a rich 
and meaningful 4oct,.-1ne. Because ot his unlim1ted pex-spee-
tive he $eea and un.ttes all. values 1nto a hal'monio togethe:r;a.;. 
ness. H$ ga.theX*s up 1n himself aU value achievements in 
the world and o%-'dera them in such a fashion as to produce 
.· the ma:s:1mum aeathet1t result• .. ~o this ul.time.te p1ot1U*e aU 
actual entities contribute thai:r values. "Your labo:tt is not 
in veJ.n 1n the Lo:rd.111 
As seen above, it is not doing violence to Whitehead's 
thought to think ot God 1n sot$r1ological terms~ But tb1s 
concept must not be nonstned to mean that the pexame.nency 
of values impl1ea a static condition in God., The heading 
ot this section calla fae p~ass as wall. aa pe:rmarienoy. 
fhe kind. of cosmology Whi'beh.ead proolain'Ja :n.eeda both,. 
fermM.$ll07 is needed fOil stability. Something must abidth 
1. Whitehead, PR, 52fl. 
2. I Oo~. l5t· 58. 
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But perma.nency is not enough. !hare must be process ol' 
there is no ~ogress. 
Ideals raah1on th~elvee ~ound these two 
notions, pemanenee a.nd .flu. In the 111 .... 
escapable tlu:a, there 1s something that 
abides! in the ov~wne~ p~manenoet 1 
there . a . an. ~lament that escapes into rlux* 
If theaa u1daal oppositestt ~e separated, then thex-e 1s no 
undwstancU.ng of the actual world• neithel' 1s there po~es. 
Both God as p:a!Jrto:td1a1 (permaneno,-) and the wox-ld as oono;zaete 
(tlwt) ~e agents frit!' the f~t111zat1on or tul.filment of the 
othe~. God 1s infinite mentali~ seeking d1vers1ty o~ mul• 
t1plic1ty Which 1t tillds in the wwld, whex-eas the wol'ld 1a 
Q multipl1o1t7 of a~tua.l1ty seeking. unity which it finds 1n 
Ged. . 'fhls means that ev$1.'7 p~tential in the mind ot Gc4 
becomes a lurE:~ for- feeling ol' a poss1b111t7 for actual~ 
tion, whUe every feeling adds novelty to the 11mass1v~r in• 
hev1tance &om b'ygtm.s system .. tt2 !his . d1e.leot1o between God 
and the woPl.d 1e etezanal. and dyna.miCJ lt 1s the gVOwins edge 
ot ~ea11u,-.• 
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First, it 1s e. potent1al1fi7 1n the mind of God, then an · 
actua.liaa.ti9n 1n the pbys1oal. world; next 1t passes back into 
God to beoome objects~1s4 1n God1a coDsequent natnwe, and 
tinalll' God passes it baok as pex-feottni actuality to become 
itselt a taet of experience foxs eaoh temporal actuality. 
Whitehead calls this fourth phase nthe love of God", the 
. action of which he d,escribes in· this beautiful, and it 
might be said, religious langua.ga:1 
.. 
What is done in the world ia ~a.nsformed 
into a realit7 1n h·eaven, e.nd the r'aal1t7 
in heaven passes back into the wwl.d* By 
reason of this reeipl*oos..l relation, the 
love 1n the wo~ld passes into tha love tn 
heaven, and floods back again into the 
wovld. In th1a sense, God ia the· great 
compani§n""' ... the fellow sut.ferer who unde~~ 
stands.· 
He:re ie exciting possibility; and p:-ogrees unlimited. 
In that process lies the perpetuation and eternal increase 
of values in the universe. "No statio maintenance of per'"' 
faction is possible-. '!his axiom ia X*ooted in the natu:re 
of things.n3 
o. Oomps.ra.t1ve S~* 
Bxtigb.tma.nrs view of the !'Unction of God 1n value 
structuPe is summarised tn th~ following words& 
'lhe idea of God. symbolizes a unit7 or b!ut ... 
mon, between existence and ·value; cOheFence 
between structure and tunction ot p&rsons 
and the strtaotur:e and function ot things f 
an end for human and fot- ot>amie encieavolt, 
individual and socialJ a synthesta of meeh• 
anism and p~ose. 
A oomp~able a~ of Whitaheadta position is also found 
in his own wo~dst 
1. Just previously Whitehead had referred to the theme ot 
cosmology as "the baais of all religions," Pit, 529-530. 
2., Ibid., 53S., 
3. Whitehead, AI, 364. 
4. :Blt'igbtman, A%'1h (1937), 149. 
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The power by which God sustains the wo~1d 
is the powe:tt of himSelf as the ideal .... 
Apart from God, there would be no actual 
worlds and apvt from. the actual wol'ld with 
its o~eativity1 there would be no ~ational 
explana:tion ot the 1d.ea.l vision wh1ob. con ... 
st1tutes God • .,,,He is the binding element in 
the wol'ld *".Be 1s not the world, but the 
valuation of the wox-ld ••• Apart from 1t1 there could be no definite detePminat1on 
of l~itation raqutred £or a'tainment.~ 
. -
· Fw both men what God 1s, is the olua to tbah- inter..,. 
pl'&tat!on of values. Btt1gb.tma.n~'s theo%7 ot values rests 
on the a.x1om that God 1s personal. and that ultimate values 
a:r,te his n~tive appreciations • !eoause "mind can xaeoog"" 
nize mind, u other persons. 1n the u.niversa are e.ble to e.p• 
prao!ate in theilt own exp&r1enoe the val:ues wh1eh are dis• 
ooverable, 1n the un1ve:t-&Uh In this manner the unive:rse is 
seen as e. fellowship of personEh It is not en instance of 
men against the worrld, but a ~Joo1ety- of perceiving minds 
able to entex- into communion with one anothe:r. Persons 
atte neither stl"ange!"s in the universe not- is there an 
ttintinita qualitative d1:f'fs%-"enoe0 between finite human 
minds and the Supreme Mind. Personalistic idealism aa 
represented b;r B:Pightman eontronta experience with the faith. 
nthat the small segment ot the universe which we call ~~ 
s,elves 1s truly a sample of what the whole universe 1a.n8 
Here is gt"ound tor effort and achievement., An impwsonal 
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WOl'ld. "unintEWested" in the attainment and consel*Vat1on 
of values 1s not a"veey conducive environ.t!'lent in whicb. to 
make the effort nor is 1 t an adequate framework :tn which 
to build value theory. 
Whitehead's ·view of God and the world also affords 
to individuals the highest incentive to~ value striving. 
He eternally oon.fl*onta the wo:ttld with the ideal vision of 
what it can become~ 9 He 1s the mb-~w which d1soloses to 
eve~ creature its own greatnees~ol Eve~ feeble effo~t 
towSX'd value 1e mat with God's aol1e1tude that each achieve .... 
ment might not only be maintained but that p~ogvesa shall 
continue. As the principle ot concretion God 0 longs0 to 
' ' . 
wing d1fte:rent1ation and orde~# 1. e., value, out of the 
othe~w1se homogeneous on•gotng ~t the o~eativa advance. 
'lhe oompax»able notion 1n Brightman t s thought 1a God aa 
noontroll~xr ot The Given'* which signifies his .. etfort 11to 
impose eva:tt new combinations of given :t'B.tional form on the 
given nonrational oontent.n9 
In ucontt.toln and ttoonoretionu God'EJ teleological tunc .... 
tion is :reveal~d. lie is the xweaaon 1n the universe Wh\r 
there is order. For Brightman, nowhe.r-e 1a the failure ot. 
impel"sons.lism any llto:re app&l'ent than 1n the attempt to. ae• 
count fer purpose. For Whitehead ~ teeli~~less, material• 
istic world with certain conf1~at1ons of matter in apaoe 
1. Whitehead, RM, 155~ 
2. Brightman. POll- .,. 
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and time ts equally a failure in accounting for meaning@<~ 
tul organic rela.t 1onsh1pEJ.. For one the aim of God is the 
ttembodim.ent of the gooa.u1 wb.il.e .fer uha othev the aim is 
"aesthetic har1110~ ,.-s .. 
In neither man are ord~ and value .~~xorably imposed 
from without. It is the immanence of God which preserves 
the world from chaos • Btt1ghtxnan' s personalistic plural1Slf1 a . 
1s ~ tx-om pantheiSm,. yet it is beoa\Ule the universe .is 
part of God's. rational expe:r1ence that it reveals a pattern 
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of law and ordex-. Whitehead's aosmolog, although difficult 
to disassociate. from pantheiEJ.m, 1a saved from that traditional 
classic :position by the mild transcendence implied by God's 
persuasive function~ In both• the-private experience of 
human persons and actual en1;1tl.es make .1t impossible te sa.-, 
tha.t God is all there 1s. 
A high point of s 1m1lar1ty between the two men is sean 
in the~ orientation towa).l'd the futUX*e. It is a g:reat 
strength of both that thebt doctrine adequately p:rov14es 
for the continuation of values be7ond their pl'asent expres~ 
s1on. God is the gu~anto~t that values shall be maintained .. 
Both use soter1olog1oa1 langu.ags 1n :--e.terring to the con-
sexavation uf values. Bt*igb.tJman coins the expression 
·. 
l. Brightman, POR, 35th 
2. Whitehead, SMW ~ 20-. 
3. It 1s not fo:re1gn fo:r some commentators to plant the 
opposite suggestion. See Clark, o~. sas~ 
11axiosoteria." while Whitehead retelte to God as "saviox-.,11 
Whether or not the oont1nus.t-1on ot.values involves the con-
tinuation of pePsons is a p::roblelll not easily' settled. 
Brightman's position is lass subJect to the Cl'1tio1sm or 
indaterminatenf.H!Uh Whether he is right o~ wrong he does 
suggest the high pl'obab1lity tb.at Gcd will eont1nue to 
preserve the existence ot .fin&Ue human pettsons att~ the 
death of the phrs 1oa1 ~rgan1am.. His at'gument reste on the 
failure of p~s1.o1og1eal psy-chology tc demonstrate the a.b ... 
solute depen4anoe of consciousness on th$ brain and the 
even motte potent BFgwnent fvom .. th$ goodness of God who. 
Brightman feels, is under a oe~ta1n divine obligation to 
preserve all persons Whom ha ocns1ders capable ot oont1n~ 
udd development. 
One of the moat significant eomparat1ve va.luea to emerge 
.tx-om the juxtaposition ot Brightman's and Whitehead's v1ews 
of God tn relation to the~ ax1olo,gy is the ove~·all feeling 
that &a1gb.tman.'s personalism and Whiteheadts "panpsyob.1st1e 
personal1sm«1 p~ov14e a solid metaphysical foundation f~ 
thew value structure. The impo,tanee of metaphysiea.l de .... 
quae,- is seen not only as an internal. necessity of their' 
systems but as a constant source ot stpen;th for the would ..... 
be expos1tol" cf their va.lu.e theox-:tea~ In oth:S%1' wt:Wds, value 
no'b:tons do not have to be brought to their sys'bems and .foJ.lleed 
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into a fram.awo):tk not meant for them., ·Thera 1~ no doubt 
that Bl'ightman has an uiology and that it ~s integral 
to his syetem. Moat reviewers would not question the 
vi#lW that Whitehead's Miology is an essential part ot 
his system, el though Laue does bagin his atudy 1 ,Metap!;!ls_.-. 
~~al ;Foundations for' a T_h.~o:rt ~~ ;value 1n t_he Phifi.o~opP.y; 
ot A. N. Wb.iteh~e,a.. with a pa.Fs.dox~ "!!'he paradox 1a that 
Whitehead. does not bava a theoey cf valua.~1 '.rhel'e n1a7 
/ 
be soma truth in Leuets statement if the emphasis is put 
on tJ:lao:r;tz,. but values axte still there rooted deep in his 
organic system and the natu.zte of G9d* J!:r.rt' consistent ef8 
tort to expound either Whitebaad•a view of Ged ol" value 
without oonsidex-.ation of both concepts is due .. to tail. 
Grounded as they are in a. strong theJ.atic metaphys"" 
ic$, 1t might not bE:J too ha.zardoU:~ to prophesy that a 
oaretul, studied synthes1s8 e.f Brightman's and Whitehead's 
major axiological insights would result tn an axiology 
toxat1f1e4 by' the s tXtong points of both and minus the 
waakness of each~ suoh a synthesis might begin by a ~a~ 
evaluation of thel%' 1dea.a of God-'ll' IW1ghtman's concept 
or 1nd1v1dual. p&.Paonal1t,- as applied to God would be 
1- Leue. MF~V, 1. 
S • This present dissertat1on ts not 1n e.tllJ' sanae such 
an attempt, but it. might pFovide the basis for some 
further consideration ot the possibility cf a syn~ 
thesis. 
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enriched by Whitehead's v1ew of God •:s organio related-
ness to· the world. On the other hand, Whitehead's con ... 
cept of God, attended as it 1a with certain metapnysioal 
vagtl.l'.'ies, would be olBP1f$ed by B.'r!ghtmants oleal'-cut 
theism. 
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A. PrlShtman. 
ClB.AP'rlm FOUR 
DIS VALUE 
Xt ia Brightman's bel1et that d1svalue or evill is 
- 2 the majo!." pttoblem. 1n &tt'f a,-stema.t1o theoll"J' of values., 
lfhe pl"oblem is not. sut)h. that it oan be arb1trat'1ly sa""" 
leoted ():t" axoluded as a ma:rre mattex- cf ed1to:tt1al r:tl! 
thematio poliO'Y~c a.ooording to the expected reader 1n<H 
te~est., Rath~, it !a one that forces 1taelf on e:rrr 
person who would wish to be eoha~ant about his phil~sop~ 
of liflh U tb.el'e ia re.tiona.l pa!"ticipaticn in life,. 
then ev1l is &riproblem,. 
l'~~' l!Jtperienoe as a Revealar of DisvaltUh 
' . 3 
All knowledge comes in the form of self ... expax-isn.ee* 
th$ good as well as the bad. .Ar.ry attempt to blink this 
tact is th$ extreme(ft ld.ud of optimism, :tf n&t outl"ight 
moral b11n~t:ul. Wh&thex- or not there is an:, sa.tiatacto17 
1. Bl'igb.tm.a.n uses, the terms d1svalue and evil 1nterchs.nge .... 
abl7• :tn ltV, Bl, he sa.ySJ that «the term used to denote 
the contr~JU7 of valuE~ is d:tsva.lu.a or evil. u In POR, 99 • 
he says* "11:l.e oppo~i ts of value 1~ d1avs.luo or evil ~ 
w&~thlesnnaas.w see also poa. 241 n. - · 
2., ':6r1gh'tlnliu11 :POB1. 240. 
a. See one of the mo$t recent critiques of the view that 
1n sel.f•expe:ttien:oe knowledge has tt1ts seem-est footio8 
holdn 1 1n PftJ.'J"$", RV 1 448 ii 
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1fol.ut1on to the :pl'Obl-em of ·evil, or sven before thex-a is 
any attempt to solve 1 t • one e>r the most poignant and 
$V1dent .facta of expel"ien«'e is tba'b evil. comes miltad with 
. gooi.. "All sxpe:t'1·ence 1s 1n the fol'm. of opposition. -and 
at:rugsle ,nl Bl:'ishtman sqa 11'1 The P:r.-Qhlem of Go_d,. Il1 
. -· -· - l· . -
A. Pl'.liloao»!?.Y. _of Rel1G1on he se.76 that 0 expevianee contains 
both teleological and qateleologioa.l tactox-a.112 Eve17 
creative axpsrienoe seams to be subject to the d1sores. ... 
t1ve,3 8VS'1!'9' ba:t'mony With disha.t'mc:my-1 beauty with the U&l:a'• 
Brightman sa7s that "evil is a p:ttobl.e:m ·only beoaus·e th$:*e 
is aome good wh1oh we are ®t now atta1trtng and which the 
.. . 4 
evil pl."events our e.tta1n1ngJ n but 1t 1s also t:t'tte tha:b 
goodness 1s a Jll*oblem beeaut:fe thsl'e is evil. D1J:Jvalua is 
not mex-e negat.tvi tT• It is the most ~bly xa-eal aspects 
' 
ot 'expe~iencE~». u:s:e who lives tl'U.l.y seas that expe:rienoe 
' . 5 ' 
1s 1'1'1hl.gl$d ()omedy and t~aget~y,tt but for ma.~ people 1t 1a 
mostly t~agedy. To see only th$ good is ove~-opttmiatio 
and visiG~J to aee onl7 the evil is ~ pess1mia~ and 
morbid despai~* !he rational attitude involves not o~ 
the raoognition of both a~ inescapable facts of axpelf.\1enoe" 
but the sex-1oua attempt to t1nc:i SQllle oohe:rent explanation 
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I 
tt~:tJ the eo~x1atenca of both good and evil., 
It 1s a sign of the intensity w1th which Brightman 
seeks to expound a coherent philosoplq that he has given 
suoh.a large place to the qate1eologieal. te.cts. In fact, 
his theory ot veJ.ue is unintelligible without h1s treat"" 
me:nt of' avu. What the two aspects cannot ba separated 
1a seen 1n. a:-1gb.tmants statement the.t we noontttont, not 
the problem of good w the px*oblem ot $V1l.1 but the oom-
pou.nd problem .of good•.IU'-d ... evu.nl :tt is d1tricu.lt to 
understand how any propose4 axiological system could avoid 
the poblem,. if the WX'ite:r: had any intention at all of be~ 
ing empbtical tmd srstentat1o. One 1e l"el.uotant to ex-!ti• 
cise as geat a W$'k as tJ:rbanta talu.atieru ·I~s NJ;lt'Ul'e 
and .LEJ.WS, bu.t one c&uld read. 1ta moxaa than 425 pages anti 
bud.l)" be a:wa!lle tba.t the:r:-e ware any ethel- k1nds of uio• 
logical data but expeP1ences of poa1t1Ua WOPth and. good• 
ness.- The situation 1a all the mwe ~ins in the light 
of tlxabe.n 'a statement in the ~~~ta.CJ.U 
W1th$u.t lay-ing claim tt~~ ee:D1p'ehena1veness or 
aotfl.Pleteneas ~ it me.y be said1 I th1rlk, tha.t 
there 1S no e!gntt1eant .fOX'm ot worth expta%*1. .. 
enoe which is not adequately enough treated 
to show it§ relation to the sane:t"al ey-st• 
of values. 
The omission ot di.sva.lue lJlq" be part of the incomplatei'!IO 
neaa, bu.t in the light o:t the omtss1on1 the rest· ot hi$ 
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claim. 1a ve'¥:*"}1 difficult to undwat&.nd. 
Fo~ ~ightms.n disvaluta ie a p:Poblam because it is 
a tact of the universe. It is not me~aly a psychological 
expeXtience to be explained away by tx-e.na1ent t eelinga of' 
d1sowd and suf'twing, but 1t is in the vw-s warp an4 woof 
ot the unive~se, tSJuak and ominou~J., Experienoe reflects 
what 1a there. The va7 ot hop$ 1n the pictux-e is that 
evil is not the ul.til:ns.te unive:r;tsal. fact*' The pt-oblem ot 
evil 1s not enthtely solved, b~t it ~s tltem.endously ve ... 
11eve4 b7 the knowledg& that; uthe deepest reality 1s 
gooet.ttl 
2. lfa.t'Ul-e of D!svalue-. 
It ha$ been shown that experience reveals evU as 
well .a.s good facta. The pxtoblem. of th1$ bx-1ef section la 
to show how, aoeox-d1ng to ~ightman, evil is revealed.J ol"' 
to put it 1n 1nteN'ogat017 fol*m• what oan be illfe:t'Xted 
about the nat~e of evil f'Xtcm its pzaeaence 1n eX,e~ienoe? 
Fil:tst, !Wightman sees evil as a "dev1at1o:n tl-om the 
goocl,.u It 1s the good that 1s 0 bas1o and !lormat1va.,09 
A genuine diffioUlt7 p~esents itself here~ One could 
question the O«:'gnitive gPound.S for his somewhat .a. ,P:tt1o~1 
a.S$St*t1on that the gocd 1a the norm. That the good 1s 
the nwm is rea4ily gx-antedJ but it co11ld 'be a,xtped that 
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Bt-1gb.tmtm. is going be7ond. an7 exp$r1ence in mak!Jis this 
. 1 -
c-laim. 5?hat the good sho1.1l.4 be the normative rather than 
the evil appe~s to be. a non-...emp1rical judgment wholl-7 
separate« ~am sn7 criterion exeept the moral intuition 
that the good is prioP.-. Bxtigb.t:m.a.n'S: rapl7 to the dif.t!-.. 
cul.t7 1s that 8 moXJa11ty is rat1oMlJ112 hence# mal'alit~ 
mu.st be gttented :pl'iox-tty U we appeal. to reason. Other .... 
wise we would have as mu.ch 1-ee.son fw doing wrong as rw 
doing :t-ight 1 e.lld the~e would be no pound at all fw ethi .... 
cal judgment. But avant ins 1'at1onal1t7 # one gztuts the 
pr1o:r1~ of r1shtn.Elsa at the same t3JJMr. Furthe:r support 
fOX' the view of evil as d.eviatioa 1$ foUhd 1n Brightman t s 
belief that one om lmow his op$:r1enotJ as evil onl7 be .... 
cause hs.kn~ws the sood. 
'!he nature of good or value ma.7 be defined 
without tUl.J" refe:t'en"t;J to, av1;1 _ w without i'.tnpl.J'ing that a.uycns evw f'a.us to a iftain 
the highest good. on the other band, you 
.cannot detin.e what ,-~~an by av1l without 
x-eterence t,o the gooQ. . , 
!he position which Brightman takes on thifJ 1n later 
W'%.*1t1ngta r~veals ~omewhat r;g a shifting emphasis. In h1a 
u~1ele 1n,p~ntm.rmoX¥a!l:J:,Ama~1ce.n, Tb.e~lost'h$ el.a.boxaat$S 
the theme that_ ttone must ex.pv1ence tthe dark .night of the 
soul' in some tom6 bGfol¥e one .tully appreciates the day, u4 
although in still late~ works he ~evarts back to his 
w1g!nal emphasis, but with moi"e sympathy for the value 
ot the actual goo.d ..... evil aont:raat. Dfhe enjoyment ot a 
good apple does not require log1oall7 the experience of 
rotten apples," he says,1 but he does concede that "the 
theor~ ot eontrast•effeot is not wholly false, for the 
2 
oontl'asts .of experience often do stimulate the good. n 
What Brightman finds basically wrong with the necessity 
of positing evil as a diffe~ent1a1 tor goodness 1s the 
ove:rabundance of the evil. Muoh less WQuld be auff'io1ant 
to indicate the contrast~ 
3 
.Second, evil is "1noons1stency.11 Here B:tt1ghtman 
1a, · 1n aftect, atfil'm1ng the view already mentioned that 
the gocd. is the rations.+J e.nd while not ai".firm1ng that 
consistency is equivalent to rat1ons.11ty, he is denying 
that 1nconsilitenoy is good-. Evil. 1s irrational. Only 
the good can be ratior.ta.l.r It :follows the~etora that 
nthe only ultimate evil woUld be whateve~ oont~adicts 
o:r prevante the ~ealisation ot the rational whole or 
good.114 It is the natUl'e ot eV'il. that 1t does not con ... 
t%*.1bu.te to a. coherent wholeJ it is isolation~ 
1. Brightman, mv, 83!)' !t'ha aame ana.J.ogr appears in i'OR, 
266 •. 'fb.a expression was a stock Cl8.SS%100m illust~a­
tion~ 
2. Blt1ghtmani· POR1 266. 
3. Brightman, RV, 13&. 
4t~. Brightman• POR" 844. 
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!had, evil is ndisharmony~~'"l ':fhis 1a the ne~est 
that Br.-ightma.n comes to using the language of aesthetics 
to deaeribe the mo~al situation. 
Fourth, ha defines evil inhs.xielogioal terminology 
3 Fifth, he seefll in ffpllJtl'poseless experience" one of 
tlla a•theistio sl.Etmen'bs in the wovld. 
One might suxnm.e.%"1se these f1ve.aspeets of evil by 
pointing out that they ve violations cf mol:"al, rational, 
aesthetic, axiolosical, and teleological nc:rms; Bl*1ghtman 
would pl"obably like to add that these five types of norms 
could all be oohe:"ently' e;~ubsumed unde:r hia one principle 
of Pe.t1omtl.it~ 1 which, in his view. is the arbiter of all 
nol"lllS. In such an evant, e:tl:'f kind. of evil 1a seen as a 
depart~e t:tiom the rational norm,. 
fwo fUrther ditfe~entiat1ons should bi indicated be~ 
fore closing the d1acusa1on on the. nature of evil. First.,. 
as in his analysis ot values, Brightman mekes a lltrons 
distinction between intrinsic and. instrumental disvalues. 
Just as an 1ntrina1o value is inherent, apart t~om ~ 
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use o:r disuse of it, so an 1nt~1nsio diava.lue or evil is 
inheren~ly bad. Intrinsic evils "are disvalues in themselves 
l. Brightman, RV, 135. 
e. Ibid., a1. 
3. BX-1ghtm.an, POR, 199., 
and nothing can make them intQ 1nt~1n$1o valuee.ul He 
lists truth and worship as examples of intrinsic good, 
and erztol' and blasphemy as examples of intrinsic evU. 
Brightman rejects the view that 0 1ntr1ns1c evils &.!'e 
either essential parte of the complete intrinsic good 
or are necessar-y and per.rect means to t he pel"fect end 
. e 
ot intP1ns1o good," but he does allow for the possibil• 
~ty that 1ntr1ns1c evil !!t. be instrumental to good. 
This latte~ position represents a mcd1tioat1on of his 
thought. In the efll"lie~ printings of p. Ph1losop!>;y o~ 
~~l~sion he decl~ed that "if there be any truly surd 
evil• then it is not 1n e.ny sense an. 1nstl'Umanta1 good) 
good comes 1n spite of 1t, not because of 1t~03 In the 
last printing ot the book (1960} the woxad "instrumental" 
1s changed to nintr1ns1off and he zaevises the lattex- pal't 
of the quotation to say that •good comea in opposing it, 
not in enjo,-ing it.n4 BJ:tightman was led to make his modi~ 
5 f1ca.t1on aftexa or1t1c1am b7 L* a. DeWolf.- Xn admitting 
the axtXtemity of the Ol*1g1nal view,. Brightman says: 
Here I went altogether too ~. No matter 
how evil evil 1s, 1t·~ be instrumental to 
com-age, to patience, a.:nd .even to love. I 
should have sa1d thau 'sur4 evil 1a not !.n 
l. ~1ptm.an6 POlt, 248. 
a. Ibid., S4~h Sea also Poa, 269"' 
a. Ibid., 246, in tnlJ' edition up tl'lX'ough the sixth. 
4a Ibid •., 846 • · · 
5• DeWolf, RRAR, 171•172. 
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an::r sense an 1ntt-1ns1o go~ci, ' e.nd am in• . 
struot1ng "1:1!¥ publ1she~ to x•evise accolldingly-. 1 
Intrinsic evil, than1 ea.n neveP be tranatormed into 1n ... 
tr1ns1e gooti, but it may be 1natrumentsl for the production 
of other values~ Instrumental evils a.re "relat1 ve to o1x-• 
CUD'J.$tances, and. the same hls:trum.ent ma:y- seXive eithw good 
or ev11 ends~02 He fu:ttther :defines inatl''Wttental evil s.s 
u~ expa~1anos, ~oeess, ·or en~ity which contributes to 
producing e.n 1ntx-1nsio evil or to averting an 1ntx-1nsie 
good.n3 
Whe second d1t'ferent1at1on wox-thJ' <ilf note is the one 
he makes between voluntary s.nd tnvolun.t~ evils .if ttvolun-
tataf evils are these whiah r~eult from ohoiee, involunt8%*y 
evils are those 'Which al'ise w1thou.t~: o'r! in spite of, human 
cho1oe. n4 fha former evils a:f!e usually r·eferred to ~s 
. 5 
mGl'al evils , and the latta~ as natural evilS.· It is 1m• 
possible that mol*al evil could exist apart from human 
vol1$1on while all nat~a.l ev1la are 1n4ependent of ~ 
b:wnan w111.6 When men ohoose 'to ·a.o wrong deliberately, 
f!!Vil lies in their willingMas to destro,- or avoid value. 
"It 1s impossible to do mcral ~ong un1ntent1onall"F•n7 
1. Bx-1ghtman; JU:"t., (1949), 923. 
2. B.x-1ghtme.n, fOR, 842. S:ee e.lso his· discussion or the 
"theol'*y of' multiple .mean1ngs 1 8 It.P, 1778178., 
3. Ibid., 241h 
4. Brightman, NV" 84~ 
5. But BP1ghuman prefers 0 voluntQl7tt and 11 1nvolunta17n to 
umoraln an<l ttnatural.q See POK~ 243J NV, 94 ... 95 .• 
a. Brightman, POR, 943. 
"r, Bt'ightman. NV, 84- See also ML, 991 100., 
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Mal!¥ diavalues" howevexa, do not have the oonO'tlt*l'&nce at 
the will, such as err~,l ignorance. disease, and all those 
experiences which 11seem to arise from the natUPe ot th1nga.u8 
To s~i.Be the natu:'e of evil thus f8.'1!, it has been 
shown as deviation f'ltom the good, !neonsistenq, diahal'mo~., 
whatevett" 1a unwoz-thy, puroposelesra experienee. It is fur .... 
ther analrse4 into 1n~1ns1o and 1nstrum$ntal, and volun-
tary and 1nvo1unt8.%'7• Brightman also olass1tias evil il'ltc 
five·broad types, which ape indicated 1n the next section. 
3. Types of Disvalwh 
The types ot evil presented 1n this section are not 
strictly of a cU.f.ferent o:rde:r from. the oha:racter1st1ca of 
evil already presented* The p~ev1ous section :represented 
same ot the mo~e general aspects of the nature of evil as 
found in isolaQed discussion. while the .foll~ing is ~ight• 
ma.nts o\m analys1a. Whe:re· there is overlapping, only brief 
COD1l'll$nt will be sufficient.· 
a. Incoherence. 
The most ~at1onal pe~son at times will expe:r!enoa 
"a will that ia moPe o~ less 1ncoh~ent04 which consists · 
1n a certain hesitancy 1n choosing among values, in the 
b~eaking of oont:racta, ~ willing ends that ape at cross 
1. "Involuntary el"':raov is· an intellectual evil.J voluntB.X'y 
e:r:ror 1a a moral evil, n l?Olt, 842 n. 
s .. Brightman., NV • 84. . 
3. .Bl'igbtman~ POR1 244'~"'246. 
4. Ibid. 1 244• 
purposes., ~is 1ncohexaent will app&a.PS to 'be both vol_. 
untQX7 and 1nvoluntar7, . invol v!ns, possibl7, . del.ibezaete 
dis:rtegard of eohe1-ant aetionJ but also. due to the weeJt;,oo 
ness ot flesh and !mpaot ot the evils in the nature of 
things, an 1nvol:unta17 concession to incoherent actions 
ol* ideals.., 
b. Ignora.nea-. 
Bx'iahtrna.n rete:r~ to th1s as an 111ntallectual evu.nl 
Xt 1s a mwa1 evil when knowledge baa been available and • 
no attempt has been mada to, app;t'opr1e.te it ;2 it 1a a 
natUt-al. evil when the !.pox-anoe has no concurrence ot the 
will. It 1a 1nte%'esting tb.e.t he not only oonside~s 18""' 
norar1oe to be 1nt:tiWJ1e evil but that the most p:reval.ent, 
and Rperhaps the wwst" of all, 1s "ignorance of the h1gh-
e$t 1ntr1nsia valu.es.n3 Seen in the light o:r B1'1ghtnv:mr~ 
"mox-al l.awsn, wilful 1gnoPance 1s a violation of the Law 
. I 
of tb.G Best Possibie, whioh says· that •'all persons "ught 
to Will the best possible ValUeS in $VElX7 situation;. 
. . ~ 
hence, -if' possible • 'to improve eve):'J' situation.-" 
c. Maladjua tment ~ 
Brightman does not speaify what kind of maladjustment 
he means. exoept to say that "social maladjustment is one 
l. ~ightma.n,. POR, 249. . 
2 • O:t • tho distinction made in theological. W ethical d1S• 
cuss1on between sins of om1as1on and oomm1as1cm.. James 
sa1dt u'l'o him the.t knoweth to do good, and deeth it 
not# to him 1t 1$ s.J.;,._'! (lh 17) ~ . 
a. Brightman,_ .POll, 245. 
4,. Br'ightman, ML., 156~ 
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of the worst avila of this type,n1 It ma7 be assumed 
that he means tu1'y kind of persona.l., l'JlWal, tir! n&ttWa1 
(phys1cs.l) disarrangement ct the p~t in relation to the 
whola.9 
d;., Incompetenoth 
He d&scr1bes incompetence as uthe lack of ab111tr 1n 
tJ.fl'1l inaividu.a.l to· do what he undertakes to do.n3 It is 
s. definite d1svalue. although the sheez.t inability to 0hit 
the mark" 1s not a volunta:t'J' deviation trom some wwt'lly 
end, nor the sign of an incon~ent ideal. Nevertheless. 
Brightman consider$ it a. disvalu.e on the gl*ounds that an 
unsk1ll.tul person may actually axperienoe hia lack as an 
evil-. 
4 
e. Dysteleologioal Surd. 
The type of evll which B.l:"1ghtman refers to as udya .... 
teleog.toal SUX'dn is the most destructive ev1l which he 
f'inds in $XpeP1enoe" It is cU.at1nct and UDique 1n that 
all the othw types desc:ribed oe capable of a.l.levi.at1on 
or correction by the appl1cat;1on of 1aws ot 1ntpl'oV$1716nt, 
but it is chavaota~1st1c of the dysteleolog1cal s~d that 
1. Br1ghtman,·poa, &45. · 
2. Maladjustment may well be viewed a a a oorollavy of the 
disharmony mentioned earlier. 
&. Br'ightman, POft~ 245. 
4. This type of evil is aometimes 1mplied in Brightman's 
other ~itings, but his use or »surdn as des~ipt1ve 
is limited almost entirely' to his POR. In RV he says, 
0 The presence of a.·surd·do$a·not invalidate the objec-
tivity- of a system," RV1 134.-
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1t is "inherent~ and ~~educ1bly ev11 and contains w1thtn 
itself no pP1no1ple of development o~ ~ovement.n1 ~ight• 
man bo:rrows the term ":am:rd11 f'ro.m ma.thematics, where it means 
an il*rational quantity* In its u:1olog1ca1. application$ 1t 
rete:rs to "an evil that is not e~pPass1ble 1n terms of good1 
a~ 
no matter what o:pe1-ations arre pe:-1"oPmed on it .n At the 
beginning ot h1s argument • ~1ghtman acknowledges that th$ 
existence of such surds is debatable, and suggests tha.'b 
the most acute problem fol!' axiology is whether or not there 
3 . . 
is aurd evilJ but in all subsequent references he expresses 
no doubts and assumes the reality of the urational evils 
without &Jl1 attempt to establiSh that they ax-e •edue1bl7 
valueless.. Be illuatt:aates this type by ~1mbec111ty, which, 
1f 1nc'IU'able, has within it 9 the int:rins 1o wo:Pthlessness 
ot the 1mbaoile ts existence and the suffering which his 
. 6 
existence imposes on ot-he~s.n 
Not even God can oo!lve:rt; au.ch an evil into a good. 
It has no ~deeming qual1tJ"• The enly "solutiontt 1n the 
presence of evU SUl'dS lies 1n control and opposition. to 
the end that other values will not be deat~a,ved and the poe• 
sib1l1ty that some tnst~~ental value might be derived.6 
l. &:a1ghtma.tl, POR#~46 • 
2. Ibid*~' 245 n. C:t. a.leo the lexicon, POR, 539. It has 
al:rea.dy been shown s.bove that although nothin.g 1ntr1ns1-.. 
cally good oan . be brought from a. surd evil, 1 t ID.S:3 be 
an instrumental value*' 
3. ~1ghtman, POR, 146. 
4. Note 1 Eh S•:t POR• £76. 5. Ibid., 246~ 
e. Ibid., 246; ass, 
4. Souroen ot D1sva.lue. 
The crux of ~ d!seussion ~f diBvalue lies in the 
th&Ol"J' postulated .as to the a Ol.l.roea (or soux-oe) of evil. 
Experience ma~ indicate 1oea1 and immediate cause$• but 
an,- theory tjf ult!ma.te o1*1g1na l1ea beyond expe%*1ent1al 
evidence.. ~e bast that can be dona is: to postulate the 
kind of causes ol" so~ees that would account for evil 1n 
the WlfKT that 1t appe!WS in e;&pel'!ience., ~his seems like e. 
tl'U1sm, bu.t the neglect ot th:ts axis has permitted the 
development of ma.ny theol'1es of' disvalue and evil fax- .x-eOJ!;' 
moved hom the taots e. a l:*evealed. It is the strength of 
Bt*ightmsnts position that he begins with experience in the 
light of which he formulates an hypothesis whioh. as he 
sees it, coherently acoounta .f'or the dyateleologica1 fae .... 
tc:wa 1n the un1 vel'ae. If sucb an lqpothesis demands :r.-sw 
adjustment of the traditional views ot God, then ;sx.1ghtman 
bol4ly axpo'W'ld.a a theism that will fit the totality or 
data., As 1n. the case of Whitehead, he eonsid.e:rs that not 
even God should ube treated as Em exception to all meta.-
pbrsical pPtno.iplea ••• He ia the~ chief exemplif1oationtn1 
K:ts ''solution" to the problem of disvalue <ices involve God, 
and. in such a. way that 1t becOll1EJs the ,central issue in h1a 
I e:~tposition of d1svalue9 Nels Fe~e is cott21eet in sqing 
of' the view that nthe solution of ou:tt finite pt"oblem ot 
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is ra!sad into ultimate status b7 mak1ng it the solution 
ot the Pl'Oblem. of God,ul althou.sh he objects to elevating 
the problem ot evil to "ultimate status.n It is B1'1ghtman'a 
opinion tha,.no adequate explanation of disvalue can be 
given that omits God. 
This seet!ont therefore, will give spec1a1 attention 
to his theistic ;t1n1t1sm a.a the only s.1tet'nat1va in a 
:aational accounting of ev11. Because he allows to'll' finite 
human selves as possible subs1d1~ sou:ttCtUI of ev111 111 
will be neoasaary to oonsidw the part ot human w1Us, but 
only br1efl7• 
a.. Human Wills. 
Muoh of ilhe oldw theolosr ~inda in human sin the cause 
of the major evils ot the wo:t'l4• A. H. strons~ fol' 1nstanoe, 
sqs that 0 but fw th~ fact of man's aln, it ,Q.eat'!fl would 
not have ex1sttad.ttS But the theologians 81'& not alone !n 
attributing to hu.tnarl wills the ma.Jezr. oauses of dlsvalue • 
'!he philosopher Bowne aays 1 °'Rhe chief 1Us under which 
man auffws ax-e the :r-esults of his own do1ng.118 Bowne 
recognises tu.ll. well the ter%'1t1o evils of the natural w-
der, 4 and although a ome are beyond any poas1b1e hume.n 
1. Ferre, cua,. ae. 
&. Strong, Sf, 658. His QJlSW&l' to the objection the.t 
death must have existed before the DfeJ.l" of man 1a 
a.maz ingt "We may beUeve that God ~ed even the 
geological h1atory to correspond with the foreseen 
fact of hum.an·apostasy,n S'f, 659. 
:;., Bowne, 'alE; 277 .. 
4. Ibid., 2'141 27th 
1'13 
causal :relationship*, he does see 1n man himaelf the solu. ... 
tion to the eth1eal1 social, and even metapb¥sioal. p.l'Oblema 
entailed thereby • He says t 
All that stands in the we.,- ot this oorun:tm• 
mation is man himself. The~a ia no inhexsent 
1nt~aetlb111ty in the nature of things which 
forbids it. p.e d~fiou.lt,- lies solely in 
human natul'e., · 
With moat or this ~igntman disa~ees. He sees the 
b.l.un.an w1l1:t because of ita measure of freedom• as the 
source. or some evil 1 a pe.rtioular ly moral evil. And he 
could e.gx-ee with Bownets emphasis on the pedagogical value 
of evil, 8 bttt the evident lr.IS.Pks Qf c'qstelaoloQ 1n the 
un1vavse go deeper thAn~ possible human cause. 11~e 
ev1l.s~that 1s. hinilPanoea to value ... ""oannot without ab• 
s~dit:y all be aswibed to h'U.!Jlatl sin .,~ human .fin1te.naes .. 114 
Thera are ~ ~steleolog1oal aspects of the phyaioal 
universe which have no appax-ent no:nneot1on e.t aU with hu ... 
man agency, e. S•• tcx-nadoes. voloa.noee, cancer., 5 In the 
social and psyehological context there ~ te~~ific ~es• 
GUX'es and .rox-ees wh1eh oe.nuot be attx-ibutea. to e.n;:r v<Jlun• 
ta17 human will. 
Is it juat to ascribe all of the etns and 
vices ot povex-ty .... stt-icken refugees. o'l! unem ... 
ployed familiea to their own freedom, ot-
1. Bowne, THEt 280. 
2 ... ishtme.n, POR~ 247, sao. Also PG, 113.. . 
a. Sae Bowne 1 TD, 97Eh "The imperfection of the phyaiea.l 
world 1n itself 1e ita perfection, oonsidSPed as an ta~ 
strum.ant tox- the upb';flding of me.n,*u 
4. Brightman, Art. (1938) . " 76. 
a. !hese were ravor1te olassroam 1llust~at1ona. 
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even to all. humtm &eedom put tagetheP? ••• 
Free4om, we repea.t 11 explains mu.oh of moral 
evil, but it does not explatn eit~ the 
fOl"oe ot temptati()n or1 the debaeing cense• quenoea of moral evU * ·: 
b. Othev Attempted Solutions. 
Besides b.um.an freedom, whioh Blt'ightman f'ejeote as 
a complete solution to the "totality- of evil 1n the un1 .. 
Vel'llf:e, he SU»V$7S eight othe:r attempted. solutions, all of 
whi()h he rejects as being 1nadequte1 although some may 
have a germ of truth. It 1s D(!)t the pwpose to discuss 
them fully he~a. They ax-e l!ated below with a h1shl:r 4crm.• 
den•e4 s~ of Brightman's objections, as evidence of 
his thorough investigation of the problem. and f0:r theilt 
oamp~ative value 1n relation to Brightman's awn solut1~ 
and to Whitehead ts discussion latw. The other attempteci 
solutions EU.teta 
(1) Non~mora1 evils come as punishment for moral 
3 evus .. 
Objeotionc This view doaa not accord with the high• 
est ethical ideals ~ the lcve of God. 
(2) Non•mo%"al ev1l.a a:re d.1sc1p1ins.rr• 
.l. &-ightma.n. POR, l60w261.. ·· 
S. Ibid. 1 S6l•27! for all the tollowins po1nts in th1s 
section. 
3.. Sea" f'tJP examp. . 1~1 Gustava Oehler, who e.a.ys that 9moreJ. 
and plcy's1eal. evu were net w1g1na.lly 1n the wcrld. The 
latta~ was penally o:f'da1naci .(Gen. 111., 17ff.,) after· the 
tGI'mal' had entered the world b:r the tree act of man,~ anti 
fi'om th1a time to:rward both fo1'l'Jl an element ot the cu.~ 
vine o:rde~ o:t the world, n ~00!, as• 
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Objeet1ont If for d1se1pl1ne they fJIJ:fe etten out ot 
proportion to the 0 cr1m$11 , and it 1s doubtful U thq are 
the best means t~ produoing ,the values des bed .. 
(;;) Evil is 1necmpleta good •. 
Objeetiona This argument holds only it 1t is known 
what the whole is. and ffhat it is good.-
(4) Evil 1a needed as a contrast to good. 
Objection: More evil 1a present than is neeess~y 
fol' the oentltaat.1 
(5) lh'ils tw man ~ be 1nstl'Um.ental. goode for 
othav beings in the universe • 
Objection; ~era is absolutely no svidenoe for this, 
but 1f it ware possible it doe$ not answe~ w~ human1tr 
needs to sutter to serve another OFder ot be~w 
(6) All evils serve an lUlknown good.. 
Objectioxu ~a view makes the Pf!esent distinction. 
between gocd and av11 impossible., and· 1gnol'anoa of what 1s 
ultimately good is no ground tOP sartng that an experience 
o:t av1l 1s pe.rt1el.l-, good.. !hat is tb.s fallacy of 1potnlm; 
J!S~ ign9t 1.11£4. • 
(?) Bv11 1s ~eal. 
Objeot1ont If av11 is 11luaion then the good. also ma:y 
be Uluaion., but the exrr<:W of thinking it real is just as 
1. It has alJ:teady bean noted that Brightman varied some 1n 
his opinion on the necessity of ev11 as contxaast to good. 
ot c~a here he 1$ only ~ins that there is mo~$ evil 
than neeessax-y to :fu.ggeat the oontra.t:lt .-
J.'76 
bArmtul as if it were; f'u.r'bb.ermol:ie, thia theory does not 
aooount for the error 1n an othal'Wise perfect universe. 
. CB) Evil and good ax-e found onl,- in conscious ex .. 
pettienoe, which becomes, then• onl7 a matter of adjust• 
msnt to s.xiolog1ea1ly neutx-s.l pxaooesses. 
Objectiont Ultimate axiological ~ist1not1ons become 
1m.poas1bl.e, and values tute only- d1s1ll.,iontne:J?.ta .• l 
c. Godta Jonrational. Given~ 
It is not necessa.17 tor pul'poses ot this section to 
review w tmal31e the whole doctrine of theistic t1n1t1sm 
2 
as pl'opounded by Bltightmar.h . , It . wUl be auf.fioient. to 
consider .(1) in what sense he f'1wis the souce ot diavalu~ 
1n God, (2) hia a:t'gumants 1n support o:r this pos1 tion, and 
(3) ~ome objections to the doctrine. 
(l) Bl'1Shtmn says that 
it there are causal prooceasea 1n natw:te . 
wh1oh1 ~pal't !':rom h\unan intervention. lead to dystaleolog1cal ~esults 1 then 1t is ~~ possible to avoid the qusst1on ot Gud'R 
~e~pons1b1l1ty tor av11. 
As ~bown above, ~igb.tm.an.rejects the h'u.m.att possibility 
along with some other attempted solutions wh1oh cannot 
be accol'ded coherent de~enoe. !ale whole welte~ o£ poaa1• 
ble solutions to evil may be ~educed to two alterna:t1veec 
1. 'l'b!s "solution, n Bt*lghtman se.7s~ "is the least coherent 
of all interpretations of good~wevil,n POR, S7S. 
e. Fw a br1e.f and very recent exposition. see Stahl, 
Atai;. ( 1954) • 
a. Brightman. Poa,. 247. 
I 
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a Maniohae.e.n dualism ox- God himselr~l II$ boldly Clhooaes. 
the la.tte~ horn of the dilemma. feeling that 1n spite of 
e.ll its attendant difficulties, it is the only explanation. 
that can consistently k$ep ttone world" ud still acscount 
for! the dysteleolog1eal faots.2 Xn attxsibut1ng d1svalue 
to God• BP1ghtman faces the :t"eal isrmea how can evil be 
atWbuted to a good Godt ~1ghtman's answel:' is the 
heattt of his theistic finitiamt . God n1s limited by etw ... 
nal and unereated ~estrainta w1thtn his own nature.u3 
H1a natrte for this aspect of God is The Gtven. 4 He ala.o 
t'etet-a to it v~ioualy as a a cosmic drag1', 5 8:rat~d1ng 
1. B:t-1ghtman, AX't. (1939)1., 7fh 
2. Brightman 1a perfactl~ willing far the problem of evil 
to be raised t'o "ultimate status" and be ms.de the prob8 
lem or God, provided, of· eolU*se •. that the theo:ey wh1oh 
does ao 1-emains cche:ttent. 
3. Brightman, Art,. C193&}J.., 7Eh FO%' Btt1ghtman's own bx-1et 
summa~1es of the whole theo~, aeQ lG, ll3J FG, l74•17'J 
POR, 336-33?'. 
4-. It is possible to demonstx-ate some ob.F.mg1ng emphasis 1n 
B.1*1ghtman's use of the term. In his f1rst extensive 
account he sees it u1n add1t1onu to God's "x-eason and 
his active creative w1ll8 •. (PG. llZ) J but late:tt he 
des cr. 1bes. it as applying tc nthe total c. ~lex of ate:r ... 
nal tactox-e 1n the d1'9'1ne na:uve0 (FG, 174). In POB 
he, Ba.:ya that ttfh& Given oona1ats 1n the eternal, u.-
cree.'bed. laws of reason and also of equally etex-ne.l and 
unorea.tad. prooesaes ot nonratlonal aonsc1cusness11 (POR, 337}. It 1s $lways-neceas~y to distingUish the 
:r.-at1onal fX'om. the nom*atioru:d Givan, bu.t 1n 00Jll.11100 use 
B~ightman usuall7 meant the no:m"at tonal· n oosm1c &:tag11 
when he refenad, without qual1f!oat1on, tc The Given. 
Some ambigUity 1e caused by his failure to make cle~U" 
whether fhe Given· (as·no:nl*at1onall is passive o:t' ae ... 
t1ve. See~ e. S•• PG; llS, and FG, 174, 175. 
5. Brightman, .Ax-t. (1932), 76. 
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powertt, 1 w ·~ataxading faotor .• u2 Thia recal.c1trant3 
tacto~ in God's nature ente~a his conscious aet1v1V, 
0 as sensation, instinct, end impulse enter into ours:~ 
4 
and constitutes a. problem fw him.," Be does not wiU 
it,. and he controls it~ 6 bu.t it is this nonrationa.l., un* 
willed,.snd eternal Given 1n God whiob. makes evil possible 
1n the world. It should be emphasized that Bt-ightman es• 
tablishas very clearly th$ cs:u.sal :ttelationship between 
6 The Given and evil.- In :aucoinot swnma.ey1 the aouree of 
evil 1a God's no:r1rat1one.l G1ventr Surds ma:y be tlfaced to 
God as souroe, but be does not will them*· His goodness, 
therefore, is p:resernd at the expense ot h1s power. 
' ' 
Stt~ictly speald.ng, and Bxt!ghtman is oatt&f'u.l to point th!a 
out, it is more_cOJ*rect to "apeak of a God whose will 1s 
finite rather ths.n a finite. God.-117 
(a) Wb.a t does Brightman offel* bJ' way- of a.:rgu.ment fo'tf 
this pos1t1onY Negatively, h1a five ob3ect1ona to the1st1c 
abao1ut1sm8 rtJS.7 be transposed as at-gum.Etnts fo~ finitism. 
1'79 
Stated positively, they- ean stand on the1x- awn teet as 
evidence frtr! his position. :B'rietr.l7 S'Willl1Q:r.-1zed, his the ... 
l 
1st1c fini'b1am :*eats on the following oons1dera.tiontu 
FirEJt 1 the data of evolution. Evolution 1n its total 
aspect shows p:r.-cgress a.nd telecl.ogy, but there fU'e also 
signs of waste and st~uggle, whioh argue against both ab• 
solutism and atheism* 'fhe struggle shows both life e.nd 
tem.po:ttarT f'a1lV$J therefore, a finite God., In this view 
the facta are aoca»ted and interpreted to.r ;what . th!l,. are • 
instead ot being explained 1n ·wel'ms of igno~anca or th$ 
Second, it gives a ooba~ent •cnount of s~d evil. 
Wo attribute avila to Godts will. 1s altogether incoherent 
in the light of his gootln.et:u~ .. S ~o hold that God is 1n ~loll 
Itespacts infinite necetud.ta.tes the attxa1bu.t1ng (lf evil te 
3 htm* But "there is no evidence that power is intinitG.u 
If God is tinits in pow~, then $\Utd evils can be aooou.nted 
!l!h1l'td, it allows for the aupw1w1ty c:f goodness over 
power. Goodness,_ not powe1"1 1s wo:rthy of worship. 11God 
is the goodness in th$ un1versa.u4 Bothethe goodness and 
the pcwe~ cannot be ma!nbained. 
1. Bl'1ghtman1 POR1 314 fftt 2. Although Cal.vints God could predestine sin and still 
maintain his goodness. 
3. ~igh~, PO!, ~19. 
4. Ibid., 319 .. 
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F~th, expe~ienoe ~eveals activit~, rational form 
and brute tact. Every expexaianee involves ac.tivityo ot 
some kind, opex-ating in aucordanue with oe:rts.in laws whioh 
are uot themselves the resUlt ct an e.ot1v1ty-. Bu.t more 
than ,s,ct1v1ty- and fozttm thexae is also re'Vealad the content 
o:r bx-ute i'aot ....... 11the ultime.te qualities {ox- !lus.lia;) of a• 
pw1ence, the sel1$e qualities,. the pleasures and pa.ins, 
. 1 
the dea1tt'aa and impulses of experienae,.n Finitism is 
postulated as a. rational and eohsrent alternative to the 
necessity of attributing to God's rational creative will 
this bl*Ute tact content of exparienoEh To do the latter 
is to make h1m evil. Fin1t1sm both aooounta for the teta.l 
' 
structure of experience and p:t*eservea Godts good will. 
Fifth, theistic tinitism is empirioa.l.ly adequate. 
This has already bean implied throughout 1 but Brightman t s 
empha.a1s 1s not over-dena, and hia continued 1ns1etenoe on 
. . 
the emp1P1·oa1 adequacy torees debate to the level of ax ... 
pez-1ence where Br1ghtmants os.se iEf the strongest. No thao%7 
1a adequate which makes a p:Pio%"1 judgments 1n regard to what 
God ought to be. It might be asked at th1a point, "Is not 
Bl.'1ghtman.·ts trequent declarat1o~ that God ia good, pure 
e. p:r1cr1? Might not he aetualiy be evil as some taots se-am 
to 1nd.ieateY" ~1ghtman1 s J""epl~ to this or1t1o1sm l1ea 1n 
his eonviotion that ttthe deep~st :reality is gooa. 08 
l~ Bl'1ghtm.an1 POR1 520., a~ :st-1ght!l.1Wl, RV, l54. 
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H1s evidence lies 1n the exper1enee and ~eoogn.it!on of 
the love of God. h:Uf ox-eatwship•· his p:r.-ov1 .... 
denoe, his im.tnanenoe 1n a.ll things, his w1s ... 1 dom, . and the signs of hia purpose ln nattn'$. · 
All these a:t*e 1nd1oatovs that good is d.om1nant despite the 
ev1l. On the huru.a.n level val.u.ea oe.n be achieved 1n the 
face of the greatest obate.oles which e;g;pe:t-ienoe pt:tasentli. 
~he:re 1s .etwuggle but there is also value realisation. 
Wba.t is tne on the divine level. can oaly be postulated 
the basis ot taots on the b'~ level. lt is Br!gh~'s 
opinion that theistic fin1t1sm. is the onl.7 J:ln)othee1s that 
does Justice to all $xper1enee. 
If God 1s an ete~nal pe~on, Whose will is 
limited l:f( the ete:ttnal lawJ¥ · fit :reason· and the 
eternal bx-u.'be filets ot his exper1$nce t t~en 
the observed emp~1~1 natUXte of the wol'*ld we 
expel'ienoa oan ba understood. All of its 
fae:fnn•es are explained by refexaenoe to th$ 
eternal ground of all h'l.'U118.n e1pex-1en.ca<;ol'!j! 
namely the divine experience. 
(2) Although the last chapte:r.t of th!s dissex-tation 
is :ttee:En.*ve4 fof! oritique, aome Fe~es<intative obJections 
. . 
to his theistic t1n1t1sm: may 1 with p~o.f1t 1 be mentioned 
he~s. :tn genex'al, 1t may be said that most of the erit1e1s:ms 
o~ !rightme.n's view of a finite God fall undel.t two main cs.ta .... 
gories, ~el.1g1ous e.nd metap~a1ea1 •. a As examples ot the 
1. B%.'1gb.tman;~ FG, 169•170., 
a.., Bta1gh1iman1. POR1 3Sl.,. 3., A brief SUl'"V$1' of ten ot-t1t1c1sms under these two ma.joxa 
ea.tegor1e$ is contained 1n Mullen,. Art.-(1954). Some 
of the material p:t'esented here is adapt$d fl-,om this papw. 
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.former type, the following objections seem to be .faix-ly 
representative. 
Alfxaed. E._ G$l'V1e 1n his woXtk,. 1'he Oln-istian Belief 
1n God, does not enlarge upon his obJection, but he says: that 
it W$re indeed a st~ange, even st~tl1ng ~a-
do.x, if 1n His nat~s a.a Ged thwa were this 
Given, which bewilders, benumbs, and baffles 
His taelf .... 1 mowledge, aelf .... ~eve:rence, and self~ control .. ' ·· 
G~vie admits the ~it o~ plaoing the lim.1ta.tion--1f there 
is one ...... w1th1n God ratha.tt than :tn an ~xtemal power, but 
his conclusion is that "faith cannot acquiesce in a. finite 
God.112 Bl'ightma.n would reject .Garvie*s appeal as be!.ng 
based on emotional ~ather than expe:tt1ent1al. conside:tta.t1ons, 
and, as such, too nm.*x>ow,. Faith may not wish to aoknowledge 
less than an a'bae>lute God, but one. cannot esoape the tota.lit,-
of exper-ience wh1oh reveals the t~agic as well as the good. 
•rinitisnlu .• is based on the tl'uly ampb.-1oal. motive of giving 
a complete and a %*a.t1ona.l.. a.eeount ot all of the experiences 
of me.n.,n& 
Edwin Lewis, probabl7 one of th$ most outspoken of 
BriS):l.tman's ctt'1t1es. sayst 
The introduction of a conflict tnto the v~ 
bosom of God such as 81-ightman. p.ttoposes will 
bardl)r win ouxa ph11os.opb.1cal atb.e1sts.-.1t will 
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not help the difficulties of the Feat host 
of perple~ed and earnest# seekexas. ·· 
Lewis feels that Br1shtman'a v1ew takes s.wa7 the meta .... 
phfa1oal basis for ~6lig1cm.s adequacy. What it amounts 
ta, Lewis contends, is ffmodex-n Maniohae1sm" , 2 but it has 
"all the ~a.wbacks and none ot the a.d:vantagas of Zo:ttoas.-. 
tttis.n dualism.83 Oonflict in God not only rEJdu.ees the 
appeal of theism, says Lewis, but the concept of God as 
8 gt'owing in wisdom, power,, and goodness n4 cannot be mam'""". 
tained~ 
It is ver7 helpful to have Br-1ghtms.n t s ·Own reply to 
soma ~f hia c.t-1t1ca :tn his t:U'tiole~ u~ Given and ita 
Or1t1cs.05 Whe ~ge that his view 1a really dualism 
Brightman dentes. Be saysl 
Wb;v deso:ribe e. view as Manicha.ean mel1ely be ... 
oe.us& 1t asserts that God did not actually 
e:ree..~e . hie ewn being, but finds 6w1th1n himself elements whi,ch call for s.ct1onf · 
As for the charge at 1nisroduo1ng c®fl1ot and oha.nge 1n. 
God, Brightman answers Lewis by saying• "My' vtew is a 
pl.$ a. fO'¥! a ct,namie instead of a statio universe, a sutter• 
1ng and c:-eativ$1 instead of s.n 1mpat.:ts1v$ and 1mpa.ss1bl.e 
7 . . GQd.n ~thermora. it is of tha v~ nature of personalit~ 
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to obange. nxs n~t par$onalit7 always a eonorete syntne~ 
sis o:t oh.a.nge and ident!t7? How could God be a pexsson U 
·ohange were uttel*llT foreign to h:tm?1 
Ettgena w. Lyman also reje-cts Brightman's theist1c 
f1n1t1am. on the gt'ounds ot its rel1gioua inadequac7• That 
. . ~ 
God bas a dark• irrational a~pect cuts the nerve cf woro• 
ship which ean ~ be based, he contends, on a super• 
rat1onal aw~eness of God's superior wisdom imd goodne-ss. 
Bt-1ghtmants x-eply' to this or1tic1sm 1n his well•dafended 
belief ·that 8 1t is not at all. evident that the wo~sh1pfu.l 
attitude is contingent upon anr belief tn omnipotenoa what~ 
evw.u3 
On more meta.pby's1ee;l. grounds the following e.tte some 
typiee.l or1t1o1ams ot Brightman's the:istd.c f'initism. In 
(Jod. ~l .. Hi;s,tol'X:1 . Sherwood Eddy shows gx-eat sympathy' with 
Bxt:tshtmants view, declaring that he would "be quite wUl:tng 
to go the whole w~n4 if log1u or expa~ienea led in that 
dil.teot1on, but he does not tin.d it neoesaQ1'7 to assume that 
the limitations of Gad are due to ~ome internal impotence. 
o~ Whole struet'tlJ!e: of the unive:rse in eve%7 atom, au 
shown b7 the a.1WJ111-cs bomb• beru.-e evidence of 1naa1eula.ble and 
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1nonnoeivabla powe~.nl The evidence indicates that God 
may be infinite in power as well fJ.$ love, hence adequate 
fo~ any situation .. 
!d.dy has· a strong point in appealing to the hontdly 
real presence of power 1n the ;physical universe, and 1t 
matter is God's will in action, as Brightman says, then 
there 1s empirical evidence t~ divine· potency $UCh as has 
neve~ been imagined. But the weakness 1n Eddy's poa1t1on 
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is that he would find 1n physical power u.iologioal eff'ioiene7. 
There 1B little reason to a.asume that the kind of power rew 
leased 1n an a tom.io w ~ogen Qltp1os1on. 1s adequate tw 
'Winging moral beauty or love to fltu.1t1on. Value by force 
accords neither teith Bt'ightman•s nol' Whitehead's God. Even 
though God's ttpeya1oal poweru ma.y be the most potent twoe 
1n the universe, it dO:es not change the exper1enoed taot 
that values do omne only through gl*eat effort and pain, and 
without ooereion. Therefore, there must be something in-
twnal to God's natura which makeu atttugsle :neoeasfU4y tt.t 
~1ologieal aohievemsnt. 
, Nels Ferr$ has made s~& ve~y pe~sp1eaoious evitie1s~. 
He sa~ that Bx-1ghtman has raised the finite px-oblem of evil 
to •ult!m.a.te atatuan2 by msld.ng 1t the problem of God, and 
in so doing has actually :Peduoed the oonaept of God to terms 
ot: lJ.m1ted human, $Xperien~.e,. This is toe mu.oh like making 
man the measUFa. It makea the "present proGess» the measUXte 
of God, whereas nGod towex-s majestically over our finite 
difficulties with wh!oh we t:ey- to l1m.it Him. ul. A flwtha:tt: 
evit1o1sm is that if God actually 1s g:ttow1ng "fl'om de• 
f1o1an.oy :tnto pexo.teotion, He should have done ao long batore 
now witbin 1nt1n1te time.uS 
I fsX'~ets oritic1sma nt117 be awtwe:a:aed b:y referenoe to 
ms.ny pS.$Gages 1n B!'ightman's workth Few things ara mora 
clear 1n. Brightman t s wgwnent for a f1n1 te God than his in-
aistence on beginning with the taots. That 1t is net sound 
thinking to explain God in temns of human experience is met 
by ~igb.tman 1 s strong counterclaim that only as we inter-
pet God 1n te:rms of what we know ue we on adequate philO"" 
sophical gl'ound-. It may be that the mora neaxaly GoX"ract 
vititw ot God is a synthesis of Fe:t'r,'s desil"'e to pxweuJe:ttve the 
t~anscendant Xllfil.jesfcy" of God e.nd lh'1ghimlan'a insistence on a. 
concept ot God whieh does not out b.1m off f%-om f'ini te ex• 
. . . 
i~tence. Actually, such a. Ecyntheais, 1. e., a view which 
p"eseJ.'iVea both the d1 vine d1gn1 t7 a.n4 $lllpi1*1eal. adequaoy-, 
ia prec1sel7 the position wh1oh Bt'1gb.tman takes"" He sa:ya 
that 11at:~.y emp11'1oa.l philosop~ cf religion mu.st l'eoognize 
both tha d1v1ne dignity and hum$tl su.fteX'ins•••bo'bb. a M1gb.t'f 
God and a. Suffel'1ng Sel'Vant.n3 Brightman i~ w1ll1ng to 
18"1 
sr"arJ.t tha:t eome ot the .functions o~ the Supreme Being 
are nh1gh u.d lifted up" ptwovided. that 1 t does not make 
h1m to.ta11te:r.- al1te,r. 
As for the second ox-1tio1sm that in infinite time God 
should have gr-own °hom daf1o1encJ' into perfect1on., 0 1. e., 
eliminated the notJX¥at1onal Given from his ne.tm-e, it aoes 
not reflect any claim b,- ~ightms.n. tbs.t God will outgrow 
~e Given. Brightman e.lways thought of '!he Given as eter ... 
nal. Instead of elimtna.tion 
there _is mol'e gxtound to hope tbat it ltU\7 be 
ve.ise4 to higher and higher levels and that 
it may enter 1nto ino~eas1ngl.y beautiful and 
hol.J' Ol-ea tiona a.~ the $nd1.esa f'utU'f'e advances,. 1 
Be believes that the poss1b111t~ of Godfs ~~iving at some 
stage of develojjment whel"a ther-e 1s no ~ther development 
"1a so r.emota from the taots ot experience as to be inco ... 
herent ••• with· them,. uS Pex-feot1on 1a: not static completion 
but uinuhs.Wlt1b1e pe:rfect1b1l1ty.n3 
Another objeation, on mabapbJa 1ea1 · gz"ounds, to Bright-
man ts doctrine oom.ee from 1.\\lgene Lyman, who questions 
Brightman's oontention that ~ Given in no wa,- makes a 
ndue.11sm e1thett of stuff Ol" of ul. t1mate principle 1n the 
universe,.u4 Lyman feels that by asaxoibins to God nsutfw .. 
in; ete!t'nall.}r present,. •• beoe.use of an etaxanal element in 
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hia nature"1 is to make mo~s than a •dualism ot ~ooess.•2 
. . 
A batteP and mo~a emp1l'1ca.l alternative~ he hold a, is to 
ascribe to the whole universe elements of "spontaneity and 
eontingenq" Whioh $iUl adequatel,- aacount fer both evil 
and divine limitation 1n creative etfo~t, but which do not 
1n anr ~ 1nJeet ltmitation into the nature of God htmlelt. 
~1ghtman ~ejects both the c~gs et dual1s~ and Ly• 
man•s flclut!on to the problem of evU., That God would be 
ttel1&17ed of re£Jpona1bil1ty from the world by gt'a.nting tx-ee-
dom to otb.ett parts of the .untvax-se (a.s.sumins, of course •. · 
that Gcd 1$ ult!ma.te cause) BX4ightman disallows. In reply .... 
1ng to D. o. Macintosh, whose sol~tion to the pFoblem ot 
evil is very stmi~ to tyman•s,C ~1ghtman contends that 
:tn creating at.al1 God must be held respons~ble for the con-.. 
sequences • S hence to a ttx.-1bute to nat'Ul'e "a CaPtain measure 
ct tree datev.m1nat1onn6 ia not to absolve God of all ~spon~ 
s1b1lity. 
1. Lyman 1 M'fft, 430 • 
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2 • Br'ightman allows this mue~t~ of e. due.lism, PG 184\h 
3. This was one of the most common objections to Brightm.ants 
view of The .. Given. It bas been made· by Clark,· Ot.lle.t', 280; 
Lewis• GO, .131 14J ·Banning, Art. (1934); 154. Knudsen, DR, 804. Also by hie aaeociates:, students, and other profea• 
atonal phil.oaopb.e!'s. The frequenq and persistenoe of the 
o~ge, ~b,e taoe of Bxt1ghtman's repeated disavowal or 
it, must be due·to a oa~tain lack of ~eeiseness in his de-
l1neat1on of The Gt ven. His answer to it has aJJ:teady been 
given. 
4o Ot. also Garnett, RPR, 297, S98J Rall1 OHR, 321, for al• 
moat identical views. Whitehead's aoJ.u.tion m1gb.t be 1n8 
eluded in thia sam$ class1f1cation. 3 5. See Brightman's reply to Maointosh, Art.(l93S) • Note 
also "'fhe·Law ot Consequenaes,n ML# 142 ff. 
e. Macintosh, A.1-t.(l93B), aos~ 
'rwo othex-s, who have had tb.a advantage of close 
personal association with ~ightman, have p~ov1ded same 
cogent ox-it1oism of aevel'al aspects of &-1ghtmn's thought 
associated with his th.eist1<i f1:n.1tiam. 'J:Ihey are P. A. 
Betttoco1 and L~ B. DeWolf • 
. _ Bartocc1' s pr1n.ta.ry' obJection oonoel'ns the toxama.l 
~ect of The Given. Brign~ is stro~ insistent on 
the presence of the 0ete~al faotors in the divine nature 
which ha did not Cl*eate and with which he always baa to 
deal. ul. 'l!hese .taotws 1 including reason, moxaal law, end 
an eternal subject~~atter,2 ~e ete~nal necessities with 
which God must reckon when be acts. Bexatoco1 teals that 
in holcU.n.g the divine p.eces~1!£g o:t sttbm1tting to the un ... 
weated laws of reason ox- mo:ra11ty"' Bxtif!htman is going 
beyond the "empirical. evidence. 11~ That God is reasonable 
is a conce1vs.ble concept, ax-sues Be:rtoco1, but he ean 
'!sea no !t'easOl'l for holding that LJloU mm.st be reasonable 
whether he wsnts·to or not.n4 Bertoco.1 contends that God 
is free; as a:va othe:r persons, nto do good 01' evil. His 
moral goodness, like ours, cannot be automat1c.05 lt 1s 
possible that God cannot do. better than he is doing with 
1. Bi'1ghtman, FG, 1"14. o:. POK• 337. 
a. Ibid., 175. 
5. Bertocci, RAGt 2"79. 
'· 
Ibid., 279. 
5., Bel*tooo1, IPR1 4ii&· 
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the material he has at band, bu.t he !!tih'f;.. have adopted 
an alternate plan and created & universe without other 
persons. God was free to create w not to create. 
In regard to his goodness the question might be asked, 
"Why could not.God be only partly goodt 1. e., plal"tly evil?" 
~ answer 11es in the view that God is assuredly doing his 
. ' 
__ u.tinost to bring value out of· the chaotic aspects of ex• 
perienoe which ax's there as a Given both in his o~ nature 
and 1n h1rman persona tl To believe othexa than this 1 1n both 
Brightman's and Bertocci's views, is to reduce experience 
to pure chaos. Unless God ie wholl7 on the side of good,. 
whetha:v he is able to aohiave bis full p'f.trpose or not, 
moral expel'ienoe would seem to be without meaning. If., 
howeve1'1 God be seen as finite with 11m1ta.t1ons1 but al-
ways wilUng the good~ nthen the observed empirical nature 
ot the wox-l.d we expe:rianue can be undwatood..ul 
Be~tooci po1nus oat that, although God is not 
n~qeasap1lt, goed, 1t is stUl best for him, even a:;, God, 
to wo~k to~ the increase of value 1n the wo~ld~ In othe~ 
words, God will• and proba.bl-7 does, do his best for the 
in()xaes.se and preservation ot value. He 1a x-espons1ble 
for helping his own o:reation. If he does not, then the 
most satisfying thing that oan be said about God 1s that 
l9l 
he ~oufq but he ~~Qt.l Bertooo1 concludes his dis~ 
oussion of this ve'¥!3 delicate PJ'Oblem with this important 
insight: 
E1Ten God cannot destroy value and be the 
better for it. The religious conviction 
thab God is sood-·the conviction that love, 
bindins all persons and things together in 
weat1ve union, is central to the universe 
....... 1s thus reasonably justified. To suppose 
tba t the highest InteU1gence we know would 
find soma sort of delight ov selt~tulfill ... 
mant 1n allowing unneoeSsQ%7 hllD'lfl.n sutfex-• 
ing, or an1mal pain, if he · could do aome-
.th1Jm about it.' is to 'releofiH everyaimg 
vie ow a'6ou£ · 'the natve of wiedom.,B 
In the above statement Sertooci has made more 
explicit what is implicit in :Bx-:!.ghtman's thought. 
Where Bertocc1 differs more radically with ~ightman 
is 1n the use of the term The G1 van. Bertoooi w~uld 
prefer that the tel'tll be restricted aa an appellation tor 
the irrational rather than the rational element 1n the 
experience ot God., Su.eh a. mod1t1ca.tion would not only 
e.llow tor the self .. 1mpoa1t1on of· moPal a.nd l'at1onal 
norms bJ' God llilMJeU, but would be more in keeping with 
a temporal view.of God who is tn actual. proeese of de8 
velopment. 
1. Sse Be~tocoi, lAG, 275. 
a. Bertooei. IPR, 4Sa. 
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·sertooci'e suggestion that fhe Given should be limited 
9 to the chaotic, retavding taotor 1n God's experienca91 1a 
further evidence tor the opinion expressed earlier that 
Brightman ta delineation of The Given reveals somewba t of a 
changing emphasi:h In the ~ol.1l~m_o,f :God• where his theis""' 
tic f1nit1sm.receives its first extensive_ treatment, The 
Given is in. addition to God's raaaon and his w111,2· whe~&aa 
!n The,Pind!!'!G ot,Go~ and all late!* descriptions The Given 
seems to :.c-efer to »the total complex of eternal raetors in 
the d1v1na nature.03 Much contusion 1n the interpretation 
of Bl'ightman's thought would have been avoided 11: he had 
not made the term all-1nolus1ve and restricted it, as Ber• 
toGoi suggests. to the non .... re.tiona.l elements 1n God's natux-e. 
DeWolf, 1n crit1eiz 1ng 13:rightman t s d!ln1t1sm, admits an . 
uadvantage 1n 1ntell1g1bil1ty" over the views of Plato ami 
~1ll1oh, but like Ferre he 1s hesitant to declare a solution 
to the pl'oblem of e.vil by 9 moving the problematic situation 
tra.m man's oonsoiousness to God's where 1t is in pP1nc1ple 
insoluble einoe there 1s . no furtheit being t o whom we ~ 
look tor explanat1on.n4 
~e force ot DeWolf's objection is most evident in h1e 
comment that it is uppoes1blf:t to show_ any "meaningful roela. ... 
tion" of the no.nrational Given to the rational, s~oe all 
1~ Bartooc1, BAG, 279~ 
2., Br 1S};1trnan 1 _ PG, 113 • 3. ~ighnman, FG, 1?4• 
4- DeWolf, ~a, 134. 
l9~ 
m~~1nsfu1 relations can be attributed only to the ~ational 
element in God's nature. DeWolf concludes that 
not only is belief in such an ext~arat1ona1 
kind of ultimate being a b~e~ bfpotheais 
f:t*Om which nothing can be inter~d. but 1t 
postulates gttatuitously a new eelf•contra, ... 
. d1otozt relat1onsh~p at the ve'f!'3' sotWce of 
being.· 
Some other CPit1qu.as of Bt-ightman not tt'ea.ted speoif1+ 
eally he:re ~e Gordon Ht OlJutk,a 1">. c., Macintosh, 3 a. B. 
' . . . ·. 
Baker, Andrew BatmlnS, 5 Vergtliua :Fe:rno.,. 6 Georgia Harkness, 7 
and Al'thur ltmk. 8 
. ~~ section is ve7ty well s~u.ed b7 three obaerva.-
t1ons* First, one is impressed over again that there are 
no easy answers to the .problem ot disvalue. despite Lewis's 
opinion that 1n contl"ast to men like Bowne and Knudson, 
BPightma.n took the ea.ay way out of the problem. 9 The shee~ · 
quantitative aspect o£ the o~1tie1sm of Brightman's position 
l. DeWolf,. 'i'LO, 134. . . . 
a. Olarkb 0Vll.l.'1 23l..SB1. Ols.x>'krs wit1c1am is determine« la~galy by cel.'ta1n theological ~esuppos!tions wh1oh lJlakt;t 
an 1mp~t1a1 critique impossible·~* His language 1s harsh 
and h1a discussion supe:rt1oial .. 
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&. Macintosht PRK, 57'1. Also Arih (1932} • 
4. Baker, OLG• 139 .. 1?:9. Brightman· says ot th!a wwkt 11Re-
viewers generally ha~e pointed out its lack of object1v· 
ity ~~ POit1 324 n. The ~eviewers.' findings are sustained. For an example ot hew she missed an obvious point on t-he 
ana.loS7· ot lfhe Given to the eontent ot sensa experience 
see OLG, l5G. or. Bvightmanta reply to her to Art.(l934)S, 
a. Banning, Art.-{1934). 
6 • Fex-m, FCRP a 174. 
7. Hsrknesa, RI,. 162. 
8. Munk1 HG, 238 .... 1340. g., Lewis, Go, uo •. 
and his courage in meeting all objections rsf'Ute the 
notion that the way 'W9.$ easy. s~1 Bx-1gb.tman was con~"' 
v1noed beyond a Cioubt that his &>otx-1n.e or !he Given was 
the only s ol.ution that squax-es with. the facts ·• Whatever 
other defects his view might have 1 1t cannot be ol.aim.ed 
that ha refuSed tp acknowledge the Aata :x-evealed 1n exp$1'1• 
eri.ce. fhird,, many of the objeot1ona to ~.lghtman ts theistic 
f1n1t1sm seem to be bas~d on too auperfio1a.l aspects of the 
doctrine. His '*l"esul.tant idea of Godul compares favorably 
with other expositions of God which do not have the 0 d1aad .... 
vantage" of a .somewhat Ul'l.USu.a.l aapeot of God to e:plaith 
B~1gh~•a God 1s no less adequate t~ life and w~ship. 
. . 
While it 1a tx-ue that :m.uch,. 1f not most, ot cosmic 
disvalue is traceable to unwilled elements in God's !1at'Ul'e1 
this chapter has shown that God. is also the ultimata solU'oe 
. of value attd himself the guarantee tbAt values and pex-son.a 
she.l.l be conserved. 
J., The Nature of D1sve.lue" 
Whitehead'a view of d1svalue8 can be und9Pstood only 
1n the light of his concept of value which haS e.J.xteady bem:t 
defined 1n terms cf aesthetic ha.xtmony. tttvalue• is tbe wox-d 
l* See his obapte~ w1th this title, PG, 107~138~ 
2, Whitehead does not use the te!'lrl nd1svalue •" The wwd. 1s 
ua,ed here as a general synonym to Whitehead's ve.l"ied and 
colorful phrases descriptive of the diso~dant elements 
1n the world. 
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t use for the 1n~1ns1c ~ealit7 of an event. Value 1s an 
element wh1ob. parnuaates through end tl'U'ou.p the poetic vt-ew 
ot natura.ul- God's :eole in the un1verse ms.y be summarized 
in the statement that God is "the poet of the .wox-1d.u2 
D1svalue, then, 1s a.r.wthins which .intx-oduees a disl'Uptive 
o~ deterring element tnto the ~eal1sat1on of harmonic st~uc~ 
ture ·in the universe. 
Whitehead uses a wide v~iety of words and phrases to 
express the d:tsoor&l.nt elements 1n the WOJtld, ~\h g., mutual. 
1nhib1tton,a mutual destl'uct1veness,4 diversent tona11t1e~a,5 
dieeQ~ds.nt feeling• 6 inoompa:b1b111ty-~' 4estzauot1ft turbu• 
lenoe~8 !noompatible alterxw.t;1ves~9 d1scwdanoe.10 
!fhe tb'st question to be re.itJed here 1s whether w not 
metaph'ys1oal evil ia in any sense intrinsic w 1s, instead,_ 
only a certain way of lookins at the facts in the light of 
aesthetic purpose<lt The latte:r:- seems to be the mwe correct 
interpretation of Wh1taheadts ~pbaata. ln th1a v1ew evil, 
l.96 
or 41svel.ue, 1s better seen as partiality or temporal*y 1noo;m ... 
patibiliV., rather than as an intrinsically destvuot1ve faat~. 
Even in the views which follow, 1. a. 1 evil as '*p1J¥s1oa.l 
wasting11 and 0mutual. obatruet1on11 , what on the surface a.p-... 
peB.X'G to be d1S'V'al.ue ~~r. q! is e.ntua1ly not an evil when 
put 1%1 p%'0per con:tJextL., 
a. Phys1oal Wasting. 
Wh1teh$ad · v1awa the fmSO!bs ot the un1verae as .an a4• 
ventUPa •upwards and downwea.s.ttl Wha.'evex- does not rise 
at~e to decay by passing to subsequent oeoasions an atten• 
ue.ted feeling of the good. 
It decays by tl'anstrd.tttns ita ne.tll:t'a to 
slighter oceanions of actuality, by ~eaaon 
ot tha te.UlU*~ of the naw .to:t'JilS t c fexet1 .... 
lir&a the pelt"ceptive aehie1amenta wb.ieh ocn~ 
stituta :tts past h1st~. · 
~s fa11til!Pa reveals one aQpact ot the univa~e ·aa 0 pb.Js1 .... 
<sally wast1ngu, whUe the othw aspect is seen aa "sp11'1tuall.7 
a.soend1ng."3 Whatevex- 11 evil 1n. the wovld the%'efore tDS.'9' be 
viewed. as a physical wasting. :tt is negative 1n that it does 
not Xt&apond Ol'eat1ve1y to poss1b:tl1t,-1 but it is positive 1n. 
the sensa that it a ets as· a 4eterl.'ing element 1n the life of 
ethel* actual. ent1t1~Hh Bixle!l's opinion on this point that 
nevil is a bl'Uise motive t~roe en 1ts own aocountn4 1s too 
st:rong, in that it eeems to empbatt!.ae a oms inherent malignant 
qual.itr• !he context-ual f4'1nu;te of evil ~t .conti~l'Y be 
k6pt in mlnd. 
Ev11, t:t-1\UI'1Phant 1n its enjoyment, is sc te:» 
good in itsaltJ but berorut 1'bael.t it is evU 
tn its eh~a~teP at a destructive agent among 
tb.1=ss greater than 1tself.*,.EvU is positive 
and dest~!ot1VGJ What 1s good is positive and 
creative. ·· · 
this is to sa;y ths.t a tactal' is evil when it opeatea 1n 
relation to things more advancE»d tbe.n 1tse1t. Value as 
tha aobieved satisfaction of an, ~vidual concresoanoe 
is d1scov$X'e4 only in nens.. Any' not1Gn of intrinsic ev11 
seems to be repu.d.1atedt 
Evil it:~ a. wasting in that it does not add. to the har.,.' 
Illotl.7 of the universe. What dbaa not gow must needs die. 
It is tr;tn its own nat'Ulre 'tU1Stable08 and beGause unstable 
1t achieves 1ts own dest:rmot1on. It sinkS "towaJtd nothin.S-
nessnS by· 1ts evm. .failure to beoom.e a pavt of the creative 
e.dvance. What does not conti-1bu.te to progress falls back 
u.ndex- its own weight. 
It decays by 1irsnsm1,t1ng its ns.1mre 'ho 
slighter occas:l.ons of aotualit,-, by- ll'en.son. of 
the fa.Uure of th.e new f~ to · feJ."'b11.1ae the 
pereaptive ac~evementa wh1ch constitute its 
past b.ist0%'7• · 
'l'he effect of evil becomes morae tenuous as the "past tadEu.t•6 
until it achieves its "t!nal. degrad.s.tion.-06 What the status 
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of th1a .final ana selt•elim!nattns stage is, Whitehead 
does not explain too well, but the ev11 of it consists 
ttin the 6ompar1aon of wbat is with what might have been.ul 
~c make the point eleBP • Wh1 tehead g1 vee one of his too in• 
frequent 11lustxaations"' A hog 1s not evil, he says, and s. 
man who 1s actuall.l' reduced to hog level 1s still not av11.-
'l'he til'a.geey ites 1n what the man might h.a.va been. Posa1b11~ 
ity is thus seen to be a judsmant on actual1t7• Ev11 1s the 
' 
loss or wasting of elements wh1oh could have eont~ibuted to 
the Q:Peative advance. lJ.1ha.t the .tutve is not 11-remed1ab17.· 
harmed tlWx-ebJ' n11ee 1n the fact that the past fades, ttS Qtl.d 
:J ' • • J. 
the evil is el.1m1nated. Herein 11es at least pal"tt of White .... 
head t s solution to the pl*oblem of avU .. 
b., Aesthetic Deatl'uction. 
~ idea of lack or physical we.st1Dfh however, does not 
sa7 quite enoughw 
In the ta~al. woxal.d · 1 t is th$ empbt1oe.l. fact 
that prooesa entails !osst the past is ~esent 
under an abstrs.otion. Bu.t thel'S is no :t'eason, 
ot any ultimate meta.pbJ's1oe.l gene~al11fy, w}W 
this should be the whole st0%7• f!he nat~e ot 
ev11 1s that· the gb.araeter.s of tb.ins$ Bl'e mu:bu. .... 
ally obsuructive. 
~ngs 1n this case are uobstruot1ve1 which does not necea8 
atu'ily imply destJ:au.otiveneas 1n el:.lare.ctett- Good t'lll!ss "11JS.7 
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obstruct one another. In his d:1scusa1on or bea.ut71 Wh!.te• 
head describes this a ituation under the notion of 1nh1b1"'"' 
tiona. 'fhere he speaks of noomponent teel.1nga which mutually 
inhibit each othe, so that neitheX" rtaee to the a trength 
propel' to 1t.n9 Xnhib~tions ma7 be of two k:tnda, on.l.y one 
of whi~ 11 involves a de~o~at1on ~om pe~tection.n ~e othe~ 
kind ot inhibition pl'*oduoes .an '*a.naesthea1au which :r-esult$ 
fi'om the total exclusion ot the 1nh1b1tion as a positive 
component in subjective . :forllh '!he inh1'b1t1on 1n this oaae 
1a negatively preb.ended. On the othex- band11 where two or 
I . • 
mol!ie·teelings are positive components,. there.may- be a "elaah 
of vivid feelings0 .Ql' 11 tb.e violenoe of stJ;tength a.gawt 
a strength~'' !his cla.t!h u prehended involves the third feel ... 
ins ot· "mutual dest%'U<tt1veneas.,"' Here tbs evil lies 1n the 
taleologieal failllJ:te to a.eh1eve e. feeling of a.esthet1e hax-'• 
mony 1n the aubj$ot1ve fox-m of the tota.1Ul7 of components. 
Mutual obl!bruet1on tb.ua becom§s '~'e.eathei;:te destnotion" 1 6 . 
the opposite ot beaut7. 11Bea.uty 1s tb.$ 1nt$%*ne.l eontol'.maw 
tion et the Va1"10U.S items of expettianee with eaeh other ft1» 
the pxtoduot1on of ~mwn effaetivenea.s)f•8 Mutual obstwc-
tivenesa spoils the pict'\Ui*e that could have been, hence evil. 
·· !lr. .... P' t1 •. : _., .:·.· tt '* T"1 -~- . c ·.1 · __ ,_,. n 
soo 
a. Disvalue as tnst~umental Good. 
DieV'alua as pbJ$1oal wasting and a.s mutual obstl'Uction 
bas a.l%teady been cU.scussed. Greatex- insight into the na.t'IUI'e 
of diavs.lue can. be aehieved by oonsideping ft11fther wbs.t has 
all-ea.~ been a.nt1o1pate4, vu. 1 that evil is not only r ala ... 
tive to context but actua1l.7 ma,- become an institumen'ti for 
sood. 
Whitehead appeSJ:~s t<J be . tr6ltl$tJ..dou.sl:r impressed. by the· 
· "aaathet1o value of tU.soo~•ul His idea reoux-s 1n DlJU17 
eon texts il In the ongo!.q ot c1v1l1aat1on,. the att%'1va1 at . 
some paP.f'aoteA ideal is the death of advanee. 11Sta.lenesa 
seta 1n. And this fatigue !.a nothing otheF than the creep .... 
ing growth of anaeethesia., wha!"eby that eooial ~ou.p is 
g%'adual.l.7 sinld.ng towavd noth1qneSlh92 !rhe only hope tw 
propees lie& 1n surpJ"isa and spontaneity which may bring 
oonftu.tion., but they also add b'esbness to the bottedom of 
statio perfection~ 'l'b.e ideal. &$ ideal 1s the "ltwe tor 
teel:t.ngt3 fof! all a.otua1 en.t1t1es ~ but: wb.en achieved its 
repet1t1on meana onl.y d.ea.th. It 1s not enough to hunt fO'f! 
the beet that hs.a been sa1d and thought ·1n hlstoxay. uaaok 
to the Gl'eeks1 11 some might ~~ but :tt is Wh1tehead•a opin• 
:Lon that "the moat un•G:t*eek thing that we oc do, !I.e to cow 
. . . 
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the Greeks.nl fol* the tre-mendous power and creat1v!'b)" of 
.. 
the BelC~Jn1o c1viliaat1on la7 1l'l speeulativs dir!.usa.t1sfac'b1ona 
of the Greek mind.- Every phase of the G:Pe&k life :reflected 
the boundless ene:t'§ st1m1lla.ted by the l'Ul*e ot e.n ideal., but 
with the atta1rmtent of perfection the 1nsph'-e.t1on oeasetl. 
) . 
Bell.en1sm passed into nt;he HeUe:nistic epoch in which genius 
was stifled b7 ~epet:f:bion, u2 e. beaub1tul duplication of the 
' 
n1cet1et£ of G:t"eek o1v1llsat1on bu.t ODl.~ aa a fading echo• 
In tM moral4.:U.t$ the a.ttaimnent ot an ideal o~ be a.e;,t 
' 
d1aa.atrous to pro~ass as s.n·c1v111r&at1on. Th-ere. 1s alway~ 
the tandec1 to cease st:t"iv:blg when a goal 1s reached. Moral• 
it~ exists baeaus~ the~e ~e 411co~4s among the conoo~dant 
elements ot natu.ve.. ~ morality lies 1ft the esleot1vifJ7 ot. 
' . . 
the good, hence tt·sele-et1on 1s at onee the meas\U'e of evil, 
'. 
and th0 process of 1ta evasion. It r.n.eans the- discarding the 
elements of obstructiveness in .fact. lfo element in tact ie 
ineffectual.. u8 It is the funot1on. of moralitr to be a oontin ... 
' . 
uoua jutlgment on the P!'GS$ntl, though always oX~1ented toward 
the tu.tUPEh 0 Tbe effect of the present on the tutmaa ia the 4 . . . 
bus..1neaa ot mo:eala.u Pl:"ssent det1<l1encies, discords, un.-
tult1lle4 potent1als, ~e all di&valuee a$ expe~ienced 1n 
the present but are ~ll pxtopheoiea ot a batter tonlCl'l'ow.,. 
358 .• 
517~ 
346., 
Th"7 belong to the •essence ot ~eat1ve Mva.nca,"l aa 1n"" 
stvuments to higher levels ot achi&V$d value. ~age~ 1$ 
real ~t 1t muat be seen •a" a 11vtng agent pe~suading the 
w~l.d to aim at .fineness beyontl tbS faded level of ~ound­
ing faeis. Baoh tx-agedy 1s the d1solot5ure of an ideal.u2 · 
With suoh ev1de11Ae, it appears that 1n Whiteheatt.•e 
thousht no disvalue 1s evil R~X' s~.· Wbat are oalled ev1l.s1. 
. . - $ -
e. 8•• deeay, tJ~ana1t1on, loss,. 41splacemantt all sel.*Ve as 
teleolog1eal f'unct1on 1n the prcducuic.m. of a g:Ma.tel'* aeethet1e 
btU'•DY• 
9. The Source of Dtsvalue. 
Although the empirical tact of evU has been delineated. 
1n terms of' pbysieal wasting., at)sthetto def:1tl'Uet1on• and as 
an inStrument er pxt'Ogl*ees, the e1t'W':lt1on which makes diSCO%'• 
dant elements possible bas act 7et.been described. Th1a is 
the pt-obl.em of the sour-ee of disval.ue'* Even though aesthetie 
cU.sha!'mOf17 is but a temp~a.y tre.gad7 X*Gady to g1ve birth to 
an ideal, how aooount tM! the pxtesent discord? In 1'ead1ng 
Whitehead and especiall7 1n attempttng to 1nteX~pret his 
thought, one mllSt eont1nua1l,- %'emin4 h!mself that the reason 
tw anything muet be tx-e.oad baQk to oJW or more actual entd.• 
ties, fof! ncth!ng else exists but actual ent1t:r1,a$ and the!l» 
1. Whitehead, AI, 869. 
a. Ib1d.; 369. 
a. Ibid., see~ 
functions. "Bveeything 1n. the aetual world ia refel'a.ble 
to some actual entity.nl The source of ev1l.~st be, then, 
unequ1vooally, in actual entities. In a br1af preltm~ 
statement, evil arises as a result ot the measure of salt• 
determinacy among the mu.lt1pl1a1ty ot elements which ~on­
st1tute the universe. How this is possible is net so easily 
answered in view of Whitehead's somewhat ambiguous exposition 
o~ the relation between the a~onom, of entities and the 
dil"ective influence of God. The :t'econoUia.tion of these two 
antino~es. constitutes one of the major problems 1n his thought" 
On the one hand Whitehead makes a strong case fat.' the 
freedom ot actual entities • 'lb.ey ax-e ~ELUE!£\ sui, which 
means that th$ process ot conoreacenoe 1a its 
own reason for the decision ln respect to the 
qualitative clothing of feelings, It is t1w 
nallY responsible. tov the dec1s1on by whic.h 
any lura fw feeling is admitted to e:ffio1enoy. 
The flteedom inherent 1n the universe 1a. cona 
st1tuted by this element ot self•causatio.n. 
On the other han4,. each actual entity, although causa sui, 
emerges from a background which determines at least p~­
tially what that entit7 shall be. Seve~al key passages 
illustrate thiSo 8 f,ne initial stage of its atm 1s an enM 
dowment which the subject 1nhe:tt1ts from the inevitable or---
dex-1ng of things, coneeptu~ly realized in the nature of 
Ood., 113 In this sense God 1a uthe weator of each temporal 
1. Whitehead,. PR; S'1S.- See also 27, 57. 
2 .. Ibid ... 135. other passages are Pa~ 131, 339. 
3. Ibid., 375. 
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actual ··entity.nl EVen mo:tte speoitio ia the statement that 
God "is that aotual entity fxtomwh1ch each temporal ooncrea ... 
oenoe receives that initial aim ~om wh1oh its self~oausat1on 
atar>ta.u2 This seems to take awar at least some of the free~ 
dom which was g!'anted ·to actual entities in describing them· 
as c~usa ·.· su.i. Appar-ently they are self.-oaused only in the 
sense that they fult1l the potential which God gives them. 
as explained in Whitehead's denial of absolute freedom. 
11Eve17 actual entity possesses only suoh freedom as is in• 
herent 1n the primary phase 'given' by 1ts standpoint of 
velativi'b7 to its actual 1Udvexase.u3 l'et this does not ,-et 
quite do Justice to the pfU*ados that ea.eh entity x-eoe1ves 
its initial aim from Go4, yet 1s aelf.,.ea.used~ The solution. 
of the antinoDW p:r-obably ~eats 1n a oombimt1on of the two 
notions as expressed 1n the alar 1.ty1ng statement that each 
tempwa.l entity "derives from God its basic conceptual aimt 
~elevant to its actual world~ yet with indeterminations 
awaiting its own decis1ons."6 In another passage the syn• 
thesis is effected by sayitl.g that "the initial stage of the 
a!.m ~a vooted 1n the nature of God, and 1ts QODlRletion de .... 
. . ·-··-I-·· .. 
:e,eJJ4s ,on dthe, self-~,a.u~a.t1on Qf t.~e. sut?Jec:,t.,.s~:ee~Jeot."Q 
To slUlllJ1QX'1ze, each actual entity ,emwgea from the xa.t1ona.1 
' 
complex ov baok~ound whioh puts its inevitable stamp on the 
1,. Wh1tehead6 PR, 343. · 
2 .. Ibid., 374.._ See also Pft, 1041 S4S, 344, 592. 
3.- Ibid., S02. 
4a Ib!.d.lt 54~~ 
a• Ibid•• 5'13• Italics added.• 
neweborn creature, but having be$n bwn, the entity bas bhe 
fvaedom of choosing what feel.ings shall be admitted into its 
own £u:vthw development.. Bezae 1s b(.)th dete:rmi.nation and 
liberty. God in giving the ~t1aJ. atm. is inexorable 1n hia 
desix-e fo:r.- orde1",1 but his relation to the subsequent lift~ 
of $tl'b1t1es is persuasive rathta2:- tbS.n eoercive.9 
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It is God's tunot1on•8one might sa~ destra~"to brtng 
the diverse element a of the universe into a b.armonious whole,. 
each pa:r-t contJ:tibu.ting its sb.arts to the totality of existence 
but yet rrda.1nins w1th1n 1tselt its own 1nd1v1dual1ty. This 
of ooUX'S& is the ideal a:1tuation. :aut actual entities rtJS.7 
na.eroge.te t'I!CillJ,tt s.~ well as 11.oontr-1bu:b'e to .... the aommon val.u.e 
of' the total comm:unity.n3 It is precisely at this point 
that evil arit:H:)s.. EvU 1s possible because actual ent1tie£t 
~a tl.*ee to D.derogate b.*omu 'bhe patterned 'Whole. ~a essence 
of evil is 41nh9J.'lmony and 1ncompatib1l1ty. n~e teleolo§ 
or the trnivel'se is dbtacted to the pl*f)ductton of Bea.uty.,u4 
When. e,.ctual. entities de not ooopel"e.te w1tb. one anothel' and 
God~ the dJateleolog1oal tmpulses result in ugliness and 
vulgav1tN"w. !!'he aesthetie whole is :.rrJSJ.1l'e4 whenevezt "the con• 
oerns of the actual wol'ld are deflected tram h~ony of feel-
ing by the d1vel'gen.t tonalities int:voduced fXtom the mental. 
poles."0 
1. Whitehead; FR.t 373., 
s. Whitehead;, AI, 213. 
3·• Whitehead; RM~ SS, 
4 * Wh1'behea4* A:t, 340. 
a. Ibid., saa. 
one specific way 1n. which discord may be introduced 
1a by 111ne:t.atene.e on birth at the wrong season. nl.. In using 
the bi~th analosr Whitehead evidently does not ~efar to the 
exact beginning at an entit7's existence but to tte activity 
1n :relation to a new oommun1fi7 or society. Insistence, .pz-e .. 
matt.U*el-7, on becoming e. p~Uitt ot the nascent pattern does 
ma.ke plain how ns. new s.otua.l1ty m.e:y appear in the wrong 
society';. emid which its ola!.tn.S to eft1oa.~ act me.inl,- as in""'. 
h!b1ticns.119 Sunh ~eoipitant ant1on imposes on the crea~1ve 
funot:tcn the weat7 task ot :t:tem.eving the 1nh1b1 tory feelings 
x-eleased. ~1s is acccmpl1ahed bJ' other and higheJ.- creation~ 
which can ha.moniowtly 1nolUde the enoe olamOPous and 1mpeb• 
u.ous entit:y. tlnwelooma novelty does make fO'I! dele.,. and fx-Ua .... 
t:tta.tion, 3 but 8 the dvanea, when it does arrive, will be 
r1ohw 1n cen1Hlnt. more f'ull7 londiti~nad• and more st~b1e .nA 
It must bg ~emembered bhat the ~eaaon for·the f~uatration 
oons.ists 1n the p~ticul.ar- con.tent of the new entit7, which, 
although t emporal"ily out ot ple.ee, offer a an imm.&dia te chal· 
lange tor ~eate~ inolusiveneas. 
From·th$ latt~ view sevePal s1gn1f1cant facta eme~get · 
F1l"St 1 qstelE~ological facta a%'9 nevel' final. The categcrae.l 
' 
detaxaminat1ons of existence px-ovide the conditions which make 
ev!l poasibl$ 1 but at Whitehead shows* 11they tute also the 
341~ 
530. 
341. 
X*easons wb7, 1n the advance o:t the w~ld, pSJ:-tt1cultut evil 
1 taots a:tte tinal.ly tl'e.nscendad".u Second., the tJystel.eo&ss1• 
. cal elements injected by actttal entities not onl.y p:r~vent 
a bax-ren tautology 1 but llUlke oreat1v1t7 an evw"'"e'xpanding 
and etQtne.l. adventu:tee · 1n the pX"odu.ot1on of aaethet1c h.a.r• 
mony. Para.dold.eall:r, it is better to have so:m.e 1mperfeel .... 
tiona than totality of perfection. 
In Disoo:ra.d thel"e is always a frus~ation.-
But even D1seo~d ~ be prefe~abla to a feel• 
1ng of slow ~elapse into geneJtal e.naestb.e$1&1 
or into tameness which is its px-elu.de. Per .... 
. fsot1on. at a. low21evel ranks below Im,p~fect!on 
w:t'bh h1ghet- a1m. . 
~cth this and the pXt$'V'1ov.s point may be aummal*ised in Wh1 te• 
·~ 
head's beau~1f'ul statement 1n Jiel1s1_o~ .... in the ~ita;kM!g. 
Eve~y fact is what it isi a raot of pleaa~e, 
of joy-t of pain~. or of sutfe~.tns. In 1ts · 
union with God that fact is not a. 'betril loaa, 
bu.t on its fine~ slde is en element to be 
woven 1mrrl.ox-bally into the :ttbJ'thm ot mortal 
thinsah · Xts veey evil becomes a 4'bepptns3 stone 1n the all.•em'Ws.oing idaala ot God. · 
A thil-d faet has Vttl!'3' spe•1e.l s 1pif1canoe .for Wh1 t&~ 
htite.dta.' dootr1ne of Goci- He sha.t'EH1 the view tbe.t God is lint""· 
> 
!ted. and good, but 1t is the VEti!'Y :u.mitation that m.akes :rw 
his goodness. 0 It 1a n~t true that God 1s in all respect~ 
1. Whitehead, Plt, 34l.q . 
a .. Whitehead., A.I1 3-39. ·l1n one occasion BX*ightman reter:tted to this quote:uion aa 0 one of th$ meat 1llWI'l1nat1Dg pas-
sages 1n the book.11 ot. ltartshWneta discussion on the 
poaaibility ct the .supel'iorit7 of 11 the. parfeut~an.(i .... the• 
imper.feot;tt tottthe·perteot talone•,• DR, 19. 
ai!' Whitehead, . RM, 155~ 
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1ntin1te. If He were, He would be evil as wall as good.ul 
This suggests ve~ fovcibly w~t bas alread1 been 1mp;1ed 
above, viz., that not all the decisions 1n the world al'e 
God's decis1ons,S which means that God oan be spared the 
att~1but1on to htm of ev11. 
If the theory of complete detexam1n1sm, by 
·reason of the necessity of conformation with 
the nature of God, holdS true .. then the evil 
1n the wg~l4 1a 1il oontox-m1tj' with the natux-e 
· ot God," 
but there is not complete determinism. Actual entities 
make some decisionc:t according to the12:- own aim• which, 1n 
~elation to larger societies of ant1ties are incompatible 
and the~efora evil. ~teharne calls tbia solution to the 
px*obl.em of evil 
the oldest of all (of~ the Book Qf Genesis), 
except for the tact that· scarcely !UlJ'Ot.te be• 
fora Whitehead ever made an adequate and hon-
est place for it 1n e. comprehensive metaphysical 
system. (Varisco,. Wa.t'd• Md Fe~er are perhaps . 
exceptions to this e:ttatement). 
1. Whitehead• u, ·153. 
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s. c:e. Hel'tsho:me, Art. (194m), 528. 
3. Whitehead., D, 95.. ·" _ 
4a .Ha.rtshorne, Art. (1944\) 1 527 •. But 1s not this nsolut1on11 but a mataphfsical version of the ve~y familiar explanation 
offered b7 aome theologians s1nna the claya of st~ Paul? · Of 
·iSoursa. Whitehead's Rfrtee agents0 extend all the WS.J' 
tht'ough nature., 1noluding the tihloM>ttallad 1nan:tma.te objects, 
whe:reas the theological account; has been limited to 11i"rae 
. mwal. agents," 1 .. e., persons. But the :result is the samee 
. 1.n so fs.F as there ·1S evil in the 'WO.X'ld it 1s due to the 
~ee actions ot entities otbsr than God. Another recent 
philosopher whose view is similar to Whitehead's is D. c. 
Macintosh who, 1n mak1ng a realistic division of the uni .... 
verse~ 1. e. A into God and h1a 11bo~tt • finds. the source of 
evil in the 11cel'ta1n meaaure of tree determ1nat1onH 1n the 
~sioal world, o:e God's body-. See Macintosh, ~t.(1932), 
3061 and PRK, 377•878. 
l:iartshorne also points ou.t this solution :raises the problem 
of how reepontU.b1l.:1ty tor evil ·$Sll b-e ps.sseA to the decisions 
ot oreat~es 1t «all the wealth of actual1tyu be ascribed to 
God. 11!t'o do this we must hava general metaphJS !t:nl prino1""' 
ples whexaeb7 s.otual.1t1es·~ be oonta1n,ed in ether actual:t..-
,t~es, zet, rat,ain their own ,se1f:-dac~s,1ons. 111 Wh1tehe&.dts 
metapb;rs1cs pxaovidee fo:r that exactly, but not to the extent 
that s.etue.l entities lose the1l!7 selt-deta~mina.oy. Hartshel'ne 
is pttobably too extreme when he fUlJ'S that nthe unqualified 
blc1u.e1veness cf prehenston .... 1s requ1%-e4 bJ' f!/h1teheadtJ{i 
system as a wholau8 1n or4e:F to constitute the world ~ .. .ttea1 
whole. John Blrth g1ves a ve'IYI fol'c&ful al'lSwer to HIU'ta-
horne'a contention b7 showing how c ungwi.tieil, 1nolus1v,e ... 
ness not only :robs actual entities of theil- 1nd1vidua.1 par .... 
speot1ves but reduces the ~ pavts or the un1vel:'se to a 
single individual monad.3 Dr 1na1sting on •unqualified in• 
olusivsnessn ~bsh~ne baa poss1b17 revealed ~a of b1s 
own type ot panps7oh1sm. than the one he or1t1o!ees. White• 
head•s system adequately ~ov1des 'fo~ mutual immanence b.y 
. . 
px-ehens1ve expw1ence, but as the evidence has shown, not to 
the exclusion of individual selt~deo1s1on# 
In b:Pief s~ of the maa.n1ns of d1sve.lue 1n Vlh1te..-
head's thought, the .tl~st th11lg noticeable is the som.ewbe.t 
SlO 
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peripheral place he gives to the pttoblem. It 1a 1n no 
sense cent~al to an,r aspect of his metapbrsloal exposition, 
except • pc-haps, as a teleological dev~oe tOP the production 
of #Sater ael!thet1o he.l*monr. It. is obvious tba.t ev11 is 
not a matte!' ot mcwal1ty. It ntha real wo:Pld1 1s good when 
it is bee.uflitu.l,ul then good end ev:tl al'e aesthetic and not 
moral oatego~iea. It is the nature ot disvalue that it is 
a deterrent to aesthetic he.ltm•y • Its sowce lies 1n the 
aelt-detel'l111nacy of tampoPa1 actual entities • B1s tte.nsww0 , 
to the problem. is threefold: -F!.ltst, evil 1s unstable ~ 
in ~ocess of time ef.feets tts own eltm!nat1on b7 its lack 
of positive creativity. Second, elamenta which ere evil 
b7 vix'tue of their \Ult1mel1tlesa o~ d1acox-dant o~cte:ra net 
onl~ eerw as et3.mu.11 to propess but ma,- 11ve flo beecme 
incorporated 1n more inclusive relationships where the dia~ 
oorda e.re resolved into .~ny. ~d, the tzaeedom accOXJd.ed 
actual entities ms:t cause d1sh£mrl.ony, but in that bteedom 
1s the only basis for the ox-eat1v1tlr which will overeom.e the 
evil by what is good. 
a. oompa.ative s~. 
No a~1olog1eal. theory S.s adequate unless it allows 
room for the problem of d1sval.ue. It is the strength of 
both Sl'1ghtman and Whitehead tm.e.t the facts of evil are not 
. ~ Ne1tb.e:r man '15JS:f. have the complete answel" to the 
' 
problem, but such is their devotion to t)le Jtevelat1ons of 
eXperience that the,- aPe wa.vely wue to the .facts even a.t. 
the l"i~k of weaken.lrl.g l!ltGtlaphysics.l theories suppo%4ted b7 
appeals to the cohex-ent and ~esthetic natUl.'e of the universe. 
The a tt1 tude of both ~ be well qpx-essed 1n the oonoludlns 
wox-ds ot ona ot Whiteb.ee.dts ~r L.eoturesa 
Things are wh$.t they are;· and it .is useless 
to diagu1se the fact that 'What 'bb.ings 81"& t 
1s often ver-y d1tf1eult tor,our 1ntelleot:s 
to .follow. lt 1s a :mel'& evasion o.t the ul• 
tlma.te pri>blems to ah~k such obstacles ,_.•·~ 
That Wh1tehee.d a ees 1n evil leas of. a m.ene.ee to the gt:rowth 
of value than Er1ghtman does nob detract from th& opinion 
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that he was devoted to the tact a • In other words, the some• 
What SUbOl'd1na.te place that disvalue has in hiS thought 61S.,. 
tam ta net due tO: evasion but to his estimate of the impfil'tumce 
of the probler.rt. on the other hand, Brightman ha.s :ttaieed the 
pl:'oblam of evil into uultinle.te 3tatus119 by l!W.k1ng it the prob-!!'t 
lam ot God. Me.fbe the pt-ope.r emphas~a lias ao.mewhere in be.,. 
tween the two ex.trames. 
In describing t~e nature ot avU · Bl'1ghtman 'W!IEJS suoh . 
tel*ms as dev1at1on1 1noon.s1atenoy, d1ahvmony, 1noohex-enoe., 
ign~anee, melad.tuetmtnit, 1noompetenoe 1 wh1le Whitehead 
speaks of mutual 1nb1b1t1on, mutual destruo'b1venesa, diver• 
. . 
gent tonalities, 1neompat1b111ty, diseoraanee. Some of th$ae 
'b$%'ll1S could ba interchanged without darrt.flge to the impwt of 
1. Whitehead, ON. 119. 
e. Fal');*e. wa, sa. . 
the ~1ews of either man, but a ma3c~ 41vergsnee between tha 
two man appears 1n th&iJ:t final analysis ot what evil. 1a. 
•~ Brightman some EtV11s are "ev11" only 1n the sense that 
tha7 are in~trumental to deeper d1avalueaJ1 but these do not· 
constitute the real problem. •!l,'he problem cg evil in ita 
moat acute fwm is the quest ion whether there 1s surd ev11 
and, if so. what its relation to value is.02 'lhe existence 
or suoh surds ia deba:bable•3 ~ightman aamJ.ts, bu.t 1n his 
own opinion there ~e elements revealed in e~pe~1enoa wh1Uh 
are "1nherent1~ and ~eduoibl¥ ev11~"4 There is nothins 
comparable to th1a 1n Whitehead. In h1s view no tact 1n the 
un1vaX's& 11 whether pleaslU'e 1 pain,. or suf.tw1ng1 is a total. 
5 loss .• 
It bas been shown 1n the first part of the chapter that 
Brif!htman altered his view somewhat on the possibil1'b7 of 
Slll'd ev11& serving a a inst:Mmlental goods" Be dan1ed the 
poasi'b1lit:y at f.htst, but later held that "no ma'btext how evil 
evil 1s, it ma.y be 1nstrumen,al to c~ase; to patience, and 6 . . 
even to love.n G1"ant1ng the pos:d.bil1t;y, however, that 
lo Bl'1ghtma.n, POR• 242t nAn 1nst%*Ul'llenta1 evil is e.ny expert""' 
ence, p:rocaas, or entity wbieh oont:r1butes to pxtoduc1ns 
e.n 1ntr1ns1o evil or to averting an 1ntx-1ns1o good.n 
:a .. Bl'1mtman1 poa, 246. · 3. Ibid~, 84u* · 
4. Xb1d~_, 245..,.246 •. See also 318. 
5. Wb.!tsn.ae.d" u, 155. · 
e. Brightman, Art. (1949)! 983. This J.atteXt view 1s most dit-
Zieult to reconcile w th his e~plannt1on of s~d evil above_ 
and his continued use of surd 1ft the sense that he defined 
it via. a "A .Sl.U*d 1n the l*aalm ot value experience 1s an 
ev!1 that is not exp~es.s1ble tn te~ ot good6 nQ matter what p,Re~a~~ons are :e~!'forme~ on J.t,n POR, 246 n., !tia1lcs aliiea. ' 
1ntr1ns1o e'V'1l ~ be an inst.tsumenta.l good 1n Blt'igb.tman'a 
thought, he mn.kes little or notb.11'lg of. it, whereas Whitehead 
la7s more emphasis on th~ a1gn1f'1oanee of evil as a function 
in the origin and increase of lmiveraal value~ D1scm.:-d.s 
. ' 
prevent anaesthesia, staleness, box:'edom,. A present ditva!lue 
is a. pl'Opheey ot a hisher srnthes1s of s.ehieved hSI'moxq- .. 
fh& hope ot c1v1l!ea.t1on 11aa in the taet that "no epoch 1e 
homogeneous J 11 the:re will alwaye be me.n.. ttwho e»Ub:l. t them• 
selves aa ante.goniatie to the tone of tb.e1%" age,ul 1'he2:'e1n 
!s px-ogreas. Because the wo:r-14 is a.a it is there will be 
evU, but dyateleQ:logioal .taota 'l:U'e never f1nalt thq will . 
ba tl"anacended. lfa7be the diffexaenee between the two men 
on the funot:t.on of evU in ra1at;1on. to value m&.J' be 1nd:1oated 
. . 
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b7 saying that toP Wh1teb1Jad., although God is opposed to evil, 
all evil is instrum.ente.l, wh1l.a fo:r Brightman at least some 
aspects of surd evil ful.tU no a:aioloat.,_al tunotd.onJ if there 
1s anr value a~uJot\1at19d with surd. evu, the ngood comes in 
oposs1ng it-.82 
As tor the scw.-ee, OP sowees, of ti1avalua, Whitehead 
we.oes the u.l.t1ma'Ge reasons for evil back to the self...-
dete:rm!nina aation o,f the many ent1t1es. wh1oh make up the 
universe. Evil. EW:1ses when ent1t1ea x-~fuae to l'eSpond ore .. 
a.t1vely to the persuasive agency ot God. In so do1ng 'hhsy 
M _.., ··· .. ·r P P ·1 • l' ... ·; _ ·1 '_-____ - H"!!tit -··- T 11'. !II 
1 o Wh1 tehead, SMW • 67 • · 
s.. Brightman, lOR, 246. By def1111t1on this seems to be 1m .... 
possible. 
introduce a d1aoo:Pd.ant element into the total aesthetic 
patter.'n pltehended b7 Oodt btl~ God feels tbfit ev11 only tam .. 
pore.x-117t s1nee it is thefle e1the~ overcome by what is gocd, 
or it affects its -own el1minat1on b:y ita la.ok of creat1ve 
response. On tbs oth$r he.Jld. entities which continue to 
asse:rt themselvaa a.nd do not Ufaeenl ma7 1nhib1t or obstX'u.ot 
othe~ $ttt1tiea which ~ead7 have baen aeathet1oa1~ unitedJ 
. 
but ap.1n. th& d1shnrmotl.7 1s tempo~Q%7'-• ~e disjunctive ele• 
ment m:s.y be tbe "ta1nt d.iscoPdant light ot the da.wtil of an,..,. 
oth$v agenl .in wh1'Ch, ultillatel.7• the hs.X'mtmic 1noongru1t,. 
will be resolvt1d into a mo:r-e 1nGlu.a1ve patte:t*n. 
&-ifthtman" rutm1ts tbsi.t the std:t*ting plaae of some evil 
ma,y.:l.1e 1n tbe fl1'tite ~etua ,of h~ p~sons•·t~e nea:rest ana-
logue to Whitehead'S actual entitie~J but hume.n ;ftieedom 
d.oes not explAin all evil.- paPti~ly the elements e1the~ 
1n the e~terne.l wwld, ox- with~ the biological Ol*ganism. 
associated with the pe.-suna11ty.3 '.l!l:l.e.x-eason fox- evil, he 
th1nks, l1ea deeper 1n the metaphfa!oal titStuoture of the 
universe. oven tn Ube nat~$ ot God himaelf Whose willed 
expression tbs univex-se is. This is not to say 'hat God 
deliberately wills the evU elements. tot* his will !s unl.im• 
1tad in scedr:uaes and loveJ but Ged in acting cannot eaoape · 
th$ aoruaat1onal1 u.nwilled el&•nts whiok exist in hia nat'W:'e 
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as an eternal Given, the '~inevitable ingredient" 1D. evwy 
l 
act. and an eve~·p•esent obstacle to the divine w1ll1ng. 
The Given 1n God is the source of sux-d evil 1n the un1vexree~ 
It follows that God is· finite· in his power, although 1nt1n .... 
1te 1h love and e:d.atenoe. Whitehead shares the notion of 
God's l1m1tat1on, a necessity not only of 'flbitehaa.d's meta"* 
ph.'fsioal structure but of the function which he assigns to · 
GodJ but it is an J:nteresting point of. comparison that 
Whitehead ~~1•! from God's natl.lve tbs evil, whioh, 1t 
. . 
inoluded with all the other. elements, would make h1m in .. 
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fin1te,9 whereaa to~ Brightman 1t 1a pree1saly because God 
has not aoh1eve4 complete control of the ttz-estrietions.within 
h1s own nature" that God 1s finite. 
Bow do B:rlghtlman and Whitehead oompue in their 0 anewertt 
to the problem of evil? Are surds~ dieoorda, purposeless 
processes,. d,-steleoloa1e&l eletneni:ls continuously rec~1;51ng 
p9l»tS ot the me'ba.phfs1cal siwuotura ot the universe? It 
seems that the answer is 9 yea11 in both cases.. Brightman 
usually deso:r1bes !The Giventt as et$rnfll• Be says 1n The 
-
P~oblam ol: God. that "the~e see• l.1tt1e s;round~ ... to believe 
that 1t will be entirely e11m1nated,.n3 In Whitehead's 
1. See Bl'igb.tman'e a.b'bl"ev1ated statement ot the dootr1ne of 
~e Given, POR, 336-339. · 
2. Whitehead, RM, 1S8f. n!he 11mita.t!on of God is his good ... 
nees ••• It is not true that God is in all respeots in• 
finite. If He were, He would be evil as well as good." 
3o Brightman, FG, 176~ 0£. POR, 405. 
thought God nf:JVel- tteza1veen at ~ ult1nta.te pel'.feotion.J 1t 
he did, oPeat1ve advance would cease. Both God and the 
world continually "advance into noveltu."1 which means that 
diseo:t'ds wiU al.we.ya be prese:ab.., :tnel'eaae 1n goodness anti 
valu.ea 1n the u.nivEWse dependa on the oontinued freedom ot 
entities. but thare111 liea the t'Uitnstant poss1bU1t7 of 
evu*8 Ia there, then, no uanswexa?" Wh1tehea«'a anawalt 
21'7 
ia in tb.a telaolog1oal poas1b1l1t1es of every evil element .. 
~1ghtma.n 1 s answex- is 1n bhe inctte.s.slng oontt-ol o£ 2!he Given 
by God. ••Man7 problems ot The 01ven may be pel*m.anentl.J' 
solved.";; but there w11l al'Wa7S be fl-ustx-ations and blind 
alleys • fhel*e is hope • howe vex-~ 1n that God will always 
f1n.d ways to use CJ:Ihe Given "!.u the ooamto creation of new. 
values._n4 
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OHAPTER PIVB 
!HE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION OF VALUE 
A.. Bl'ightman. 
1. The Inseparability of Value and Religion. 
It is possible to discuss values without consideration 
ot God or religion~"' but to do so 1a to give an 1noomplete 
picture of both :r&l1g1on and values. Nothing is judged 
correctly untll 1t is seen in its proper context and 1n its 
best twm. Religious extwesaion without value eons1derat1ona 
l~its religion to pure and undifferentiated feeling, una~ 
&mined and meaningless; value without x-el1gion is un1nsplxt1ng. 
•.e. true value,« S8.7a Bt*1ghtms.n, Dll1$t be judg.ed u1n the light 
of oUl' whole experience and out' h1ghest.1dealst"2 
Pe~aonaliats, including ~1gntman~a have been aceuaed 
of being too rel1g1ous or theolog1~al to be thox-oughgoing 
philosophers, with the 1mplies:b1on that the :rigox- of theixa 
philosopbJ' has been thereby attenuated#> B%-ightma.n vigor*ously 
1. :FO%' example. Hall, WVJ Laird, IVJ Lepley, vv. ~ightman 
· says that the omiss 1on of .religious values .fitom such 
~1t1ng is "the spec1al1stts fallacy at w~k~" ITP, 164. 
S • Brightman, RV • lfh 
3. Fw 1nstanca, N'otttbl*op in commenting on Brightman's papexa, 
~t. (1944), thought tbat Bxtightmtm's emphasis on the perOOjl 
sonal gave 0 Gx.pression to provincial modexan P.r,o1HiUlta.nt 
values." See Bt'yson et aJ.. (ed.t:h), AWP, 565. 
repudiated an7 suggestion that he was a theolog1an•1 but 
he never minimiaed the 1mpl.1ca.t1ons of religion 1n his 
thought. He could not have espoused coherence as his cvi ... 
terion ot tX"Uth if he had.s 
Nowher-e does the 1mpoxatance of r e11g1on become so 
evident as tn his discussion ot values. It is Brightman's 
opinion that value and %1'el1g1on are 1nsep8Xlab1e.. Not all 
' . ,, 
values BX'e religious, of OO'U.'&.'se, but all relig1oua aape:t'1• 
enoe 1mpl1es a conscious or unconscious valua•clatm~ Re-
ligion, like eve'l!y other as.pect ot existence, needs exam ... 
ination, and not all valu,s Sl'e at the top of· the scale J 
but devotion to some· :r~lig1on implies a certain amount of 
selectivity ~r value ... Ol'1ente.t1on,. 11Ral1g1on is a eho1oe 
of value, a commitment to it. It is a basic orienting of 
oneself to what is considered to be the best, e.nd that 1n ... 
volves inescapable vaJ.u.e•jud.gments.4 
But xwt only is religion a choice of valuea it is 
11a faith 1n thG fviendliness of the un1vex-se to value.115 
~1s faith g!'ouw.is the source of both religion and value 
1. See a verr· spier di;aavowal of the suggestion 1n 
Al't. (1938 1' 53. 
S. "!he aupersensu.ous oannot be excluded by a coherent 
pb.Uosopb;y• 11 Sfli.7S Bl'1ptman, rl!P 1 170. 
a. Brightman, PORi 8514 
4. See McOZ.aoken, TV, 3, fw a forceful a.tatement of 
the cognitive aspect of valuat!ozh ·He feels that the 
"separation of thinking and vs:l.uing, whetbe:t- its motive. 
be :religious. or emp1rio1s.:t1 is fundamentally erroneous 
and fatal in ph1losopau-" 
5. Bxt1ghtman1 POR,. 86. 
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in the mete.pb.yeical struot~e ot :r;t eal1 ty,. a faot which makes 
religion all the mo~e amenable t~ axiological nonside~ations. 
When ane gives up faith in an obJective con• 
servation of value, one has given u.p religion;. 
and 1t 1a only verbalism to. tlen:y. this fact. . . 
I find 1t impossible to s.ocount fo11 the axis.,. 
tenee of ideals and values 1n hunuin experianoe 
unless the!'e is in the universe beyond man 
SClll$th1ng that ts~eate!. ideals and ·values a:nd 
is wo~thy of worship., 
There 1s no need to make the case stronge!" than Bl'tightme.n 
himself makes it. 
In the light of his thougbt up t& this point, a sap~ 
~ation of ~el1g1on and values would do at least t~ee 
things. It would& 
(1) ~ a dichotQ.11W (11bif'u.t*ce.t1enu 1 Whitehee.-4 would 
SaJ'} which experience does not wal'lts.nt., Some of the highest 
values·are 1nvar1abl:y oonneetecl with x-el1g1.ous expe!fience. 
(2) ~ly that the highest values are non-religious. 
(5) Rob value theal"yo of insight, e .•. g., sutfer'ing love; 
faith, wwsh~p, wh1cb. are baa!oally religious in ehal*aoteJ!. 
2. Def1n1t1ona ot S{$lig1a. 
Befo~e ~tber d1s.ousaion 1s·pqss1ble, 1t is necessarr 
to ss.tabl1sh e~otly what Brightm.an mea.na by rel1g1on. He 
it very earetul. in dif.fe;rtent1at1ng between what :t"el1g1on 1~ 
and wbe.t it ~uaat to b~h A definition of the fonte.r he 'lallG 
0 deSC1'iptiveU While th$ other he refera to as 11nwm.at1ve.11 
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a. Descriptive. 
A descriptive definition is the attempt to say what 
religion is in tax-ms of observable faot~h It is objective 
and contains no opinion as tn Whether it is "r~gb.tn or 
uWX*ong", "good" or ubad..n There ~e ~ types of t-el1g1ous 
expression with s. great ~1&'bJ" of bal1ets and ceremonies. 
A good defin1t1on, therefore, would have to include the 
basic common constituents of them allw This Brightman tries 
to de 1n his somewhat elaboxaate descriptive statement in 
~ Philcsos . ot. R,?li[li"n' as .toll owe.: 
Religion is concern about experiences wbioh ~e 
regarded as of supreme value; devotion toward a· 
pcwe:r or powe:tts believed tc originate~ ine:vea.se, 
and conserve these values; and B f)Jlle suitable 
expression ot this oonee:vn and d$vot1on1 whether 
thx-ougb. sy:mbol1e a-ites Ol* · tbxtough othe:r incU.• 
vidual and sooie.l oonduot .1 
fh1s definition ineludes conca~n, ievotiant and expression. 
the major elements whieh Brightman .feels are 1n all religions. 
b. Normative. 
But it is not enou.gb. to desc:r,:t1be religi·on. The fa.ets· 
sb.~w that :rael1g1on. m.ay be expxteased 1n manners as vavied as 
human saovitioe and the high sp~itual worship or a QuakerJ 
and unless religion 1s the one thing in the world that bali 
a ~!ght t.o remain unexamined, there tnte some characte:r1at1Ss 
tbat ous!t to be associated with religious experience and 
1. Brightman- POR. 174 See alao ITJ?., 169_. fOI' another 
descriptive definition.-
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.• 
exp~easion it it is to be wc~tbr of respect. In enun• 
Q1at1ng his normative definition Brightman emphasizes that 
it is not an al'b1tx-ary standard or a "subjective whim" that 
he is proposing, but one "tested bY expe~ienee coherently 
viewed'* and open for rational ox-1t1c:J.sm.,1 -His definition 
is as follows: 
Religion ou~t to be obaracteriae4 by the 
feeling of 4~pendenoe on a. pera.onal. Gcd and 
d.Oli'.J.inated by the will to cowopera.te w1th Gjd 
1n the oonswvat1on and increase of value. 
~e key elements he~e are ought, dependeno&• ~op~at1on1 
btl, emd values* 
Two obse:rvat1ons should be made about these def1n1t1ona :. 
First. the normative det1n:lt1on 11 taken f'xtom. tlle second 
edition of !Uf. Intrcftu~t_1pr~: .~o Phi,l~0$025£ (19&1), 1s exactly 
the same as appeared in the ~1gtnal edition of 19&5. T.hia 
i~t a1p1f1cant in that hia Xntr(!fl.u~:t.1e_n was subjeet to o. 
tho~ou!b revision and was h1s last published book. 
Second, both definitions S.nvolve values, but tha nott-
mative definition sees the dominant pw;-posa of %'el1g1on 1n 
terms of the pPoduot1on at values, thus leruling f'ullther 
suppwt to the op1n1on that re11g1on and value cannot be 
separated 1n Jht!.ghtma.n 1 s thought. 
1. Brightman, I'PP, 169.· ..... · . 
a. Ibid•• 169. In POR, 455, he say~ that «religion:, when 
conscious of its own dasti!ry', is best defined as oocp-o-
&rat1on with God and man f~ the realiSation of individual 
and she.J.ted values." 
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3. Religious Values and Reaaon. 
Setting up as he does the vl.ew that "the working test 
of truth is OUl' m.axim.um coherent system ot propositions as 
a wbole,u1 is religion subJect to the same test as ~ 
other truth clatm? Does one or the othe.r bave any p~1or1ty 
of cert1tude'l 
a. Religious V$rsus Logical Oe~titude* 
Brightman's treatment of the relat1onah1p of religion 
and reason does not follow the c·onvent1onal pattern. His 
1s no attempt to "prove" the sup~iorJ.ty of one ox- the othW * 
Religion 1a as mUOh p~t of experlence as an,r othaF aspect 
of lire. ·~task, therefo~e, 1& one of seetng the proper 
relationship between the two. The fix*et question. that may 
be asked 1s whether or not :rea.aon is a way to God. :£Wight ... 
man calla this not only a.n important qu.est1cn. but a "tragi ... 
cally 1mpox-tant0 question~ 2 fer the answer to 1i divides 
the religious world into the debllllka:t"a of res.son3 end those-
who. say religion 1a impossible· w:tthou.t it.4 Bl'ightman :teel.a 
that the position of the fWmall' g%*oup 1s 1tsalt irrational 
on the g:rou.nds, that God b.imself must b$ a God of x-es.son, 
hence approachabl& by reason.5 To denr the rational approach 
l. Brlghtms.n. I!P I 69. 
2 •. Jlr'1ghtman, FG, 454. _ 
3. Pw a treatment of the negative s.tt1tuAa toward reason 
among the neo~o~thbdax theologians aee DeWolf, RRAR. 
4. See oasaerleyi GR, to~ a ver7 recent and sensible state-
ment o:t the p aoe ot reason 1n religious life and thought..-
5., BrightmEm, FG, 55. 
on the gr-ounds that 
human reason 1s inferior to divine reaaon ••• 1s 
equally good ground fo~ ~ejecting eVerY human 
approaoh to God on the groun~ that every human 
expe:rienoe 1s 1nte:r1or to divine experiance,.J. 
BUt assuming that reason is a necessr:uey adjunct to 
x-el1g5.ous experience_ do either or both bring certainty? 
On this qu.estion Brightman 1s mildly agnostic. He has d~· 
ola.zaed h1mself e follower of both ~neades-t dictum that 
p%-l'oba.bility- is the guide of life ,s and the belief of Kt.w1 
Groos that onl:y ~els.t1ve certa.inb on any subject is eveP 
atta1nable.3 ~igntman•s ep1atem1e dualism makes cognitive 
certainty impossible. Ever7 case of nknowledge" involves 
only a J:mowledge-ola1m1 since it is obviously impossible 
to experience the whole of' an objeot whethel' pb7s1ca.l w 
conceptual. Eve~ ~ognitive expe~1ance in reter~ing beyond 
itself can only postulate what 1a m:ob~l,)l.x tne aboliu that 
pa.ptieuls.r s:1tuat1oth It 1a BPightms.nte nsitue.tion be .... 
:u.eved-in_.n4 The highest eogn1t1ve oertaint'1, the:Pefore. 
involves same element which ia not stP1otly logical, but it 
is accepted e.s knoWledge on 'the gx-ounds of the relevant date. 
which make that ~tam of knowledge highly probable. The only 
sense in whiah.ul.t~te certainty applies is a the actual 
1. B't'ightman, FG, 5fh 
a. Ibid-., 69, a.lso RV, 31, and m, eo. 
3. Ibid., 69, also POR, 130, 194., 
4. See his l?OR, 34'1-349, fol* the whole discussion ot 
"Situations l'ibtper1enue411 and ns1tuations Bel1eved-int:'* 
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experience of a given situation. This is Brightman's 
"situation exper1enced. 11 OnJ:sr the exp$r1ence 1t~elt is 
absolutely cwts1n. To doubt that is to doubt the conscious 
salt, the pnlz basis, in ~i~tman•s view, fo~ kriowledga. 
To d1sclatm absolute oerta1nt7 here 1S not a compr~1se with 
either skepticism or urampant urat1~1sm which is now 
eating away the very marrow of· o~ o1v111aat1onJ 111 it 1a, 
rather • a. rebuke to the dogmatism which thinks it has all 
the truth, and on the other hand, a corrective to the un-
reasonable claimS made fo:r reason itsel..t* ttDogma.t1sm is tb,e, 
cessation of ;tteasonn9 while ttfinal px-oof is accessible only· 
to h1m who knows Absolute ~th.03 Reason can never $~ust 
God, therefore rational finality is 1m»ose1bla. 
Wbat 1e said about logical certainty is also true of 
vel1g1ous certainty. Nothtng# 1noluding religion, is demonw 
strable beyond t1ll doubt. "Inoompleteness and uncertainty 
. . 
attache$ to all knowl.edge.n4 ~re a, however, a legitlma.te 
oerta1nty in religion wh1oh Bt.-1ghtman allows fw. He deolar~s 
in Religious .Values, that 
religious certainty does not mean that any ~e" 
l1gious dogmas a:re e.bf.lolutel7 pvoved by logical 
reasoning. It means, ~atb$~, that religion is 
a oomm.itting ct tb.e life to what .tg absolutely 
real, to a cause that cannot fail. 
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He reaff'~ms this position 1n A. Philosop~ ot Rel1g1ont 
The work or thought is never done and revision 
·and .ftl:tlther pewth aPe e.lway-s in prospect. Yet 
it is the faith or religio~ that in all the 
changes that may come, ·oer,e.1n eonstante of value 
will a.bidthl 
This is the steadfastness of faith.s tt is the conscious~ 
ness whioh comes to eve~y religious believer that the "mere~ 
than-human reality which his faith is seekingu3 is the re~l 
God, the ultimately real. This, again, 1a the 0 s1tu.ation 
experienoedn in a religious context-- It is similar to the 
epistemological immediacy of the m,st1o who claims that hie 
experience has a noetic quality. Only to this experience 
is any tina.l certainty attached-. It .~~()t~ be doubted. 
Uncertainty ar1sea in the claims made for this experience 
or in the description or the x-eality to which the experience 
is supposed to refer. U there is any arror it mu.su be in 
the situation bel1eved~1n. 
With propositions, logical or rel1g1ous 1 as only h1gn 
pl'obabilitiea, what 1liJ th~ value of knowledge? ·Brightman's 
reply 1a that even thougb nfinal proof. complete demonstra• 
tion ••• can never be reached by human skill on any matter 
whatever,u4 coherent hfpotheses at least serve to taka us in 
the direction of truth and God. H.1potheses and propositions 
l• BJ:41ghttna.n, POR, 194. 
a. James .A.-rm1n1us se.id the only kind or cel"tainty God re..,. 
qu~ed was a "certainty of faith, n W~ks, I, 122. 
3• Bright:me.n, RV, ll5. - - . 
4., Erightme.n., POR,. 194. 
about all axparienoe EU"e nnot oerta1n, but they are halU' ... 
1st1c.nl. 
b,. Reason as Guida to Religion. 
~hs only p~iOPit7 thAt reason has o~e~ religion is 
functional, i.;.· tih, 1n 1ttl role as guide and 1nte:Iipreter of 
religious data., 8 Reason al.wa}ts w~ks with me.tel"is.l. that it 
do.afl not e:tteaile by me:ve ~eason., ni Ral.1g1on is what one ex ... 
parienoas in the pl'eaence of certain values wh1oh Sl:'e held. 
to be su~eme and which el1o1t his reuponse in some man11"as-
tat1on ot devct1orb It is probable that no rational person 
is devoid of s oms exper$.ences whit!h may be rightly called 
religious, whether it !a the numinous. sxpexaience deaeribed 
by Otto O:t" tb.$ feeling ot dependeno.e of Sohleiel*:macher. 
Religion 1s a fact of expex-1enoe1 but like Any oth$l:' expex-1,.. 
en~~ it needs 1ntel'pl"St1ng. Without the guidanos of S·Olll$ 
l*&t1onal nox-m. religion 1$ as ebaot1o and u.nd.1tfettent1at·ed 
as senuat!ong it can go from &Xt:tteme to extrema and like 
Stephen Leacock's horseman. ¢~ ~id$ oft in all directions 
at onCEh Just because ·G.n experi.enoe is :ral1g10'l.t$ does not 
constitute grounds to~ aase~ttng tbat it is an untouchable 
and sel.f'-validati%18 e.u.tonom:r. uwo value has sovereignty in 
its national tel*1"1t.o17J· only the league ot values: is scva~­
e1p.n3 !erue.·rellgious feeltng is one response to life 
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which ia that and no other, but religion does not OV%.7 
with it its own built .... in exple.na.twy appi.U.'atua. 'Wl'J.at re-
ligion. means must be seen in totality 1 and foxa B1'1ghtman 
the only W$Y to synoptic vision is through systematic ~eason. 
This means. that reaaon itself contributes something to the 
total ~el1g1ous experience* It is the binding Eaetov, but 
it is motte, when the full sign1fioa.n~e of reason is al1oweci. 
Res.aono;j,~conoreta and 1nol.us1vely empix*ioal, 
not merely abstract and formal .... .,.is the aup:r*eme 
s cnu-oe of rel1g1oua insight, the supema way 
of knowing,.about God, whether ha 1S 1 w whethel!' he is not.'""' 
Reason and rel.i81en,. theret~e,. ~e co8rdinates. 
Bxtightman does not vary in this insistence, from his atU--
liest works to his latest, e,aQept perhaps in the dix-eotion 
of a virtual. ident1f1eat1o:n of the two. Itt Rel±s~ous VAA .... 
ues(l925) he says that uz-el1g1ous faith should be gl"oundad. 
-
1n a coherent whole of truth, not in the ha.pl:J.Mvd likes 
and dislikes of the momentitnta In Tb,e J?:t'obl~m of Geeil(l930} 
he declares that 0 the aause of reason and the causa cf re-
ligion ax-e 1next1'1nably' bound up together _u3 The same idea 
1s rea.ftirmed. in The F1nd.i;!YJ'}lf0qd.(l.93l.) whe:ve he sa,.s that 
ut~ oauae of ~eason and the cause of ~eligion stand o~ fall 
togethrax-. u4 Late~, 1n 1-. Philoso@l. (J~_ ~e.l1s1cn(1940) b.a 
asaettts thE.l.t '*it we are to know •• _.aod., · eoherent reason is 
thew~ of knowing most suited to the problem- 111 St:rongel* 
still is the statement 1n 1\Tat~~ a.nd _ Vt\lU.ea {1945) that 0 to, 
appeal to %feta.aon is to appsal tc Ood.ua This 1a squ1val.ent 
to t\fay!ng that to be religious is to be rational. 
By making auoh a stl*ong ·caJiU~ fC'l! the intel"d&pendene)e 
of. :t*el1g1on, l'eason,. and Gad, Bttightman p:t"obabl.y does not 
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mean to imply that a11 ~elig1on is neeasse:.wily dependent on 
~eaaon a:n.d/or: belief !n Go.d., Some :tt'eligion$ ~e ant1 .... ra'b101Ull 
in the extx-eme, and. it- 1s possible that a non-theist may have 
X'el1g1cua tea lings,. What. he px-,obabl.y maans to se:y 1s that 
n~x-mative rel1g:t.on 1s impoas_1ble without the rs:h1ona1, while 
reason, 1. e", as neono:tJete and inclusively empiri~al,u is 
the only objective means fox- the detel"mitJAtion of God's ex .... 
istenGilh Brtigb.tllui.n acknowle-dges other waya of knowing God, 
. . 
a~ 8•~: 111mmediate- exper-ienea1 :ttevs1a.t1on. a.nti ta1th,"3 but 
all of these must ba tested by the :ll!IAXimu:m. rele.t1onah1ps of 
expel*ienae. "fo a~u1e:ttt God 1s to assart cosmic p~ose. • • 
If we are tc know such a G0d1 cohe~ent ~eason is the wa'f ot 
knowing most suited to the p:t-oblem. n4 
~o make t'eaaon the guide to religion is to insist that 
1. &t1ghttfl8.n; POR,. 191. 
a. :sx-ightm~:W., w, -lS7. 
3. ~ightman, POR1 182. 
4. Ib1d. ,_ 191-. 
it be kept consistent and oohel'!ent. Religion is not an 
exoapt1on to th:e ruJ.e ........ at lea~t for ataiptme.n ....... that a.U 
experience must be testect. and seen 1n the light of a l.'at1ona1 
whole. Nothing is pxtoperl:r teste« until examined by the 
most 1nc1usiva ~ange of facts., All religion, the:refo~e, 
which cannot meaetWe up to Jfthe EN.Pl"'liml$ oo1.1rt of reason 
which alone bas j~1ad1ot1~ in cases ot t~thn2 is to b$ 
:*&:pu.cU.ated as ut 1ns1gn1f1aant vs.lu$ end u.nwolltb7 of :r.-espect. 
Rella reason 1s seen in ita ~th$X' rcle a,.a the arbiter among 
religious. el.a3JtUh All values b.ave to cmru:J to thia test. 
Without SQttte sueh guide all x-eligioua and valu.e•claims e.re 
reduced to an ax1tlog1Qa~ relat1v1ttm, and the poss1b1litr 
of no~ms is eao1ude4• for on no othe:r ground can norms be 
este.bl1sb.e4-.5 
4" OontP1but1ona ot Ral1g1on to Ru.man Value. 
It has been shawn that x-el1g1on 1JJ $. value that needs 
to be iH~$tad like all other dattit of exper!Jine&. R~J.igion 
,. • .!-
1. Both consistenoy Qnd ooharenoe are n$oess~ t~ ~eason. 
OonsiatenC)" demands tx-ead.om from internra.l eontrs.d1ot1on., 
while ·ocharence ~elates to the totality ot experience. 
Of., the 'Original 41SOUSS1on· O:f CChEU.*S:tlOS in Ohapte;r :ti• 
s. BX*1ghtma.n, :W, 69. Also NV, lOS, wh~re he says that 
· 49eason 1s tttha titUptteDle court; of the mind," BXt1gbtwul 
· e.lao .uses· the pb).'s:se in. RV '. 23! 251 where he oap1tal1raes 
the 1n1tte.l letter~;h: In FG, l> 1 he says tha.t God is 
ttthe Sup~ame Reason, and hostil.i tr to reason is one form 
of hostility to the divine.n 
3. See :!r!shtma.nts discussion on the inadequacy ot otha:r 
Pel1gious or1te:r1a, PORt. l.S5,...l29J also his t~at:ment of 
the cr1ter1a. of truth, J.TP., 46"""15. 
Wbl.tt :Y!el1g1ous values actuaUT do oontli*1bute to the <Joherent 
wdering of lite ia the p~oblem. 9t this section.l 
Human life is not a compartmenta.l!mation into mutually 
exclusive kinds of e:xpw1ence, €h g,., intellectual, aes .. 
thetie, ~ ~el1g1ous. Lite is exper1enoed as a complex 
unity of 1tttwpen.et:rat1ng values. The attempt to isolate 
~elision from life and values is due ait~r to a too~n~ow 
ru\tll!taltsm or a misguided belief that !-el1g1on is a ms:t;.ter 
of oreedfi and dogD1Ela intendet!l only fOf.!' use on ee:rtain days 
of the week. Both $ttempts are due to a false notion or ra~ 
ligion. Bxtigb.tl:rlatl sa,-a that "re11gion mq ba ehallengad only 
in so taxa a.s it can be shown that value experience is non,. 
existent or that it lacks • ccsmie suppo:rt •. ua or as was said 
ot !f1111eh1s 1dee. of the holy, "the holy* •• is a dimension 1n 
eve~htng ~aal, and not a seGtion w1tbin real1ty.u3 What 
does ~elig1on oontr1bute to the ~est of human expe~ience? 
lfbe tol.l.owins repx-esent the maJol'i' oontr1bu.t1otte as seen by 
Bxtightmant4 
Fh'st, :xrel1g1on helps meat the ills of life. lfo one 
&. It is not neoeBSG%7 to establish tha:b B:ta1ghtman Ji~ be- · 
lieve that religion had much tQ oontP1bute to l e. ~e 
o:ffaXting of his data 1s- ~u.fficS.ent pttoof ot th1a. · 
2. Brightman.. POR, as. · 
3. fhE~odo~ Siegtr1e4,. 1n Xxteg1e}" and Bretall7 TP'l', 691t 4. !he majo:r:- part ot the data for ·this section oomes from. 
B.t»ightma.n t s chapter on nlti:.unru:t Value au, '78-lOl, in RV, 
one ot the ea.rl1eat of Brightman)s books. Careful check .... 
ing J:aeveala no substantial "mod1f1oatl1ons 1n the latw 
v1t1ngs. Whe:rever there if.! a1gnit1oant obAnge the .fact 
will be noted. · 
ce.n escape involvement in the 41svalues which ax-e oownon to 
the human race. ~e problem is not the faot ot.involvamen' 
I' ~ . .. 
but ~~ the 111s of life are met. Religion helps positively 
1n ell the following ills: 
(l)- S~f$P1ns• .Suffex-1ng, wheth~ mental. or physical• 
is Wliversal. Many palliative and a.lm0$t aentlmental aolu"'" 
tiona are ofte~ed, and none actually provides an answer. 
In so fax- as religion does~ ~1ghtman says that this 1a the 
meaning a 
Sutter1ng is not the brute mJStery that 1t seems 
to beJ it serves soma pUX*poae, even thoup we 
know not wha.tJ :1t w1ll be overeoma, even though 
we know not how. Religion, than, meeta the suf .... 
twins of the individual with taith ••• What othezt 
x-eaouroe than this in the faoe of suffering is 
not presently exhausted and battledf~ 
(2) Death. Death seems to make all.values impossible. 
Two solutions ar.e possible here, one which says tbat somehow 
goodness will persist even though the bod7 di·ea • and the 
other whiebdeclares. the possibility ot continued existence 
beyond physical death. BP!ghtman inclines strongly to the 
latter opinion as the bast religious answeP to death. 
Faith in immwtal life is an all but u.ntveraal 
tJts.it ot religions. In tb.e h!gher forms it 1s 
an expression ot the belief that all peraona.l ... 
ity must SlU"vive because it is the moat valuable 
1. Rr-ightman, RV • 91. llhia ia one point that :BPightman hae 
modifiect. ~t suffering aepves soma pu:ttpose even though 
it !a not known aoun4s VeF$' mueh like the appeal to 1g ... 
nox-anoe which he soundly x-ejects la.tGxa as e. solution to 
the problem o£ evil. See POB, 509410; 269 ... 
fa.ot 1n the universe on which the l:*ee.l existence 
ot all other values depend.s.,l. 
(5} MF~ ,1iv1!• 1'bis is a problem,. ea.ys ~ightman, be.,. 
causa mo::'al evil. is against the V·St!'f values the.t rel.1gion 
would build up. !he role of :religion hers is to make a v1o ... 
lato:r of the mol*al laws ot)nsc1QlUJ ot the d1v1s1on which he 
has injected 1nto the .,\lttiv~se by bla ain'IJ "Religion views 
sin as a. oosmio ~e.gedy, 1!9 but 1t offers tha v1ole.tW' 11by 
saw1t1oe o.tt penanoe· or ppentanea, or by s·e:me combination 
o:t these or other m$ans,n3 the• oppo~nit7 to help 1n repa.h* .... 
:tns the dam:a.ge that has been done both to himself and to the 
universe. It ia passages like this 1 partioule.:rly 1n his 
earl.1el* .,itings. that stimulates op1n1ons s1milar to the 
one noticed above that Bl:¥1ghtman is too theological. for a 
philosoph~. 
(4) ,Ieoran.~a,. Although x-el1g1on may have at times 
b.elpe4 to foster or oondona ignorance, religion When f\u.lf1l<Ot 
ling its tl'Ue role .does :not ofte:r.- opposition to any b!tanch 
of knowledge* Ita answer to .tgnOXtanoe 1s t.wofo1d. Fil"st, 
rttt offers objecta of faithwhioh lie beyond demonstrable 
knowledge 1 n4 and seeond,· 1t p!-oclaims a faith .s.n the meaning 
l., Br1ghtwan. POR 9&. Brightman Q.oas not modify this point 
of view, except to strengthen 1t,. In fact-. his ma.jcr ar .... 
gument tor 1mmovte.lity is an appeal to the goodness of 
God on tbe gounds :bhat a good· God 1a 0 eomrnitted to the 
etex-nal conservation of values, 11 POR, 401. 
S. Ibid • • 94u, 
a. Ibid. i 94. 
4, Ibid., 95.., 
of all things,. even though that meaning is not known. 
Beightma.n calls this none of the ·most potent values wh1eh 
:religion impswts to human 11fe.,n1 In The Spi:r1tua1 Life 
he defines faith in Divine Spb'it as 0 fa.1th that no event 
of any- kind., pby'sioal. or personal, will ever dest:roy- Divine · 
Spirit oJ:t its pUl'pose of loyalty to the ideal ends and ail:rl$ 
ot existanoe .. 119 :tf :ta1th really does this~ e.s expeF!ence 
seems to testify, then Brightman could very well ~eatf~ 
with added emphuifl that .te.ith 2.n God 1a •one of the most 
potent values which religion 1mparta to human l1te.n3 
(5) Llmitta.tion. This point is more cw less a~ ot 
the previous fou»t ttYI! it includes all the weaknesses wh1oh 
man 1a heht to.. Man all by himself 1n the universe is a 
pit 1a.ble spectacle* Thera 1a nothing 1n Br.-1ghtman to suggest 
sympathy with a religion o~ philosophy or l1fe based only on 
human1st1u tenet$. Any religion oogniaant ot the facts will 
xaecogn1$$e the tin1teneas. of man, but it does not leave him 
alone to bJ.s ~ resolll'eettJ it seeks, Father, to teach him 
. that the universa 1a fl'.*1endly to him and puts its spiritual 
1. ~tgbtman, Pea, 96. Ae alreaay note4, ~igntman modified 
~views be once asserte4wh1ch appealed to the unknown 
aa solut1ons to pttob1ems1 but he does not 1n the least ltl1n1miee the place . of fa th 1n religious e:s:~Weasion and 
wwsh1p. · He does o:rient 1'b more. in the direction of ex• 
pariance, whioh justit1es his faith., Of. POll, 417. 
a. &-1f3htman, SL; l4o. 
3. Brightllla.n., RV, 96. 
4. ~ightman doubts it suoh a position ~uld be called a 
religion at all, RV, 219. 
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resources at his disposal. 0 'ihus 4oea religion meet this 
ill tooc'01 
Besidea supplying e.n answer to these common httms.n ills, 
religion also fills as nothing else cant three of the basic 
h'Ult'UiUl needs,; unity, pt.n-pose~ and pe~ms.nenoy. 
(l) tJ'niiiz• Whethel' be ~ealiaes it 0'1! not, each man 
will organise his lite and expel"ience around some ideal. 
It is basic to hwna.n pe~son.ality that some type of unity be 
found. Rel!.s1on OEU'l claim some pr1or1ty h.e:r$1 fox- -it "1s 
all-inclusivet it seta all our thoughts, feelings, and vo-
. 2 11t1ons in their relation to God,." Religion in oz.dexa to be 
~ue to experience will include all valid interest~. There• 
fox-e, 1t can serve as the unifying pxa1nc1ple o:r hume.n p~­
sonal1ty,.3 
{B) ft~Xtpose. But Just to have unity ia not enough. 
A t'\wther need is 'for some ideal end. Religion, if it is 
in terms of loyaltr and devotion to God, 1s at once a unify• 
1ng force and a. pUI*pose forr which to live. 0 0nly the pu:rpose 
to sene God is 1n the long run 1nolusive enough adequately 
to sustain the server or to benefit the served., n4 
1. Brigb:tll'Jrul,. av, 9&-97. 
s. Ibid. • 9'1. 
a. or. I..TP, 173. "Belief" in God, 1n a word,_ seems to b$ 
the one unity!ng prine1:Pl·e that oa.n make of our chaotic 
· human lite a ~mo~ious whole of thought and feeltng and 
actior.h" 
4.,· Brightman, :av. ss"' 
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(3) :Perl!U\.nencx:;.- Men also deail"e permanenc~, something 
that will remain constant 1n the midst of transient experienoe. 
So much of lite is etterveseent and aupe~f1o1al. Ohoe again 
"it is religion that points man to the eternal in the world 
ot change and g1vaa ~ a aolid anchorage_ul 
!hat l'el1g1on does contribute 1n some mea.s~e all these 
values to human expe~ience is a matte~ of observation. No 
a.ttexnpt has been made here, either by' Brightman or by the 
author of the d1ssertation1 to say that a owtain kind ot 
religious e:pe~ience is the onlT one that is valid. It 
ae$ll$ that ~ 1mpaf'tial student of the ph1loao~ OP histw,-
o£ t'eligion would a~ee that r aligion has contributed these 
and ~ other values, Whateve~ ~y be said about 'b.e dis-
values whtob. some :Peligiona have undoubtedly' bx-ought into the 
world. Religion does not sol-ve all problems, and 1t does net 
claim to .fultn1sh answers fo~ science or eoonom1cs, but as 
T11lieb. suggests, religion is a dimension ot all life.. •The 
religious spirit, when t~ue to itself, is the soul of ~VeF7 
undertaking ••• It weates the vision of a divine plan 1n 
:u.te. uS such is its purpose and aotuel. fulfilment. It does 
not set the task, but 1t provides the inspiration and mot1va~ 
tion w1thout which the task would be tbro.dgeey. 
1. ~ightman, RV, 99. 
2. Ibid., 97. 
5. Creative Value~ of WOPsh1p. 
Wox-ah1p is parat of :t-el1g1onJ indeed, it is the very 
1 
"he&l"t ot religious axpe:r1enoe •. 0 · It !s thsrafox-e given 
separate treatment here~ An1 just1f1oat1on necess~ ro~ 
the special. emphasis ts found 1n Bl.*ightlnan himself'. In 
Re,l;1a1ous Values he devotes t~ee full chapters out of ten 
to a oonside~at1on of the issues and values involved. Fur-
thermore, 1n his anunda.tion. o£ "the first px-1nc1ples of a 
personalistic philosopbr of 11fe"2 be gives a comparatively 
large plaoe to worship 1n the first . px-1no1ple which he la7a 
down, viz., respect fol' personal1t,.. .• a 
~igntman selects what he considers to be the four 
major aspects ot worship tor d1seuss1on.4 
(1) Cont~!!ela~,ion. This 1s the most element~ toxam 
ot wor.sh1p1 but 1t should become for every religious person 
a regular pt*aot1Jie. B7 it is meant "the fullest possible 
conoentl*ation of ~avo~ent attention" on Ood:~5 a pPe.ctioe 
whioh w1ll 11br1ng calm and unity to the divided soul. 06 
(2) Re"'felat1on. Contemplation often leads to a h1ghev 
expeztienoe wheve the soul raceivee a revelation of ·God'$ 
1. Br.-ightman, RV 1 . 'lS,. 
s. B.l'-1ghtman1 NV, 149 ft. 
a. The other two: Natura as a revelation of Divine Person• 
alit;y, and spiritual liberty. 
4. The same selection appee.!'s 1n both RV and NV. For 41a-
ouss1on here, greater consideratton is given to NV as the 
· mo.tte ·recent, but both at'e accorded full attention. 
5., Brightman, BV, 180" 
6. :at-1ghtma.n1 NV,. l6fh 
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presence and his love.. This is the Qu$ker "inner l1gbt 11 
and the lllJ'St1c nillumlnation". Bx-!ghtman feels that many 
wwshipers have sacrificed valuable insights by not cult!• 
vating more "the highest mystical revelat1on."1 But he 
gives two WEll'n1ngsJ first, that all revelation still needs 
to be tested both by the understanding and its consequencesJ 
and second, that in the high moments of 1llum1na.t1on there 
is the temptation to yield to ntha emotional pantheistic 
:a impulse." ~e solution to this possible pantheistic urge 
appears in the next aspect of worship. 
(S) Communion. Any tendenc~ to 1dentit)' the self with 
God in worship is overcOltl& by the realization that true wor .... 
ship is communion, not union_, "This is a co-operative ex'"" 
perience.88 It 1a a fellowship between persons.. If God 1u 
not responsive to prayer, then God '1J!a7 as well not exist so 
far as the worshiper is oonoemed, True worship must be 
predicated on the poasib1l1t.T of mutual response. "Oommunicn 
is the profound sense of membership tn God's universe and of 
p~t1cipat1on tn God's plan."4 !he .oss!bilit1es of progress 
here B.X"e tremendous • 
The limits of communion with God hi prayer and 
1n lite cannot be set by ~ fo~. A field 
of sp"ll'1tual experiment and adventure is open 
to those who are willing to pay the price o:r 
1. Brightman, NV, 155,. 
S.. Ibid. • 156-. 
3, Ibid., 155. 
4. Ibid. :t 15th 
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the intellectual~ moral, and ~eligious dis• 
oiplines which are ~equ~ea,l 
~his great sensa or adventure suggests the next aspect. 
(4) ~it~on. t.rbis :ts the stage of WOFSh1p where the 
mora intePnal aspeota of wo~ship emerge into lire. The end 
be~e is "not the ecstasy of myatio communion but the ~u1t 
a ot the sptr1t.0 Here 1& the g~eat ~ealm ot actual ~t1e1~ 
patton 1n cree.t1va ventl.tJ.I"e. Without px-oductivity w()ltship 
1s_ sterile. Bl-ight:manta whole ohapte;r;t on "Worship as OPe• 
ativ:t.ty"3 is not only an a.mpl1.f1aation ot worship in terms 
of fl:tu1t1on, but it ~e.f'leots Bt-1ghtmanta Ol"ientation toward 
po1!4sib1l1ty and pPoglteaa, oompat*able in ~ respects, as 
will be shown later, to Whiteheadts dynamic ap~oaoh to the 
future. 0Ves.t1V1ty is the mOSt impOl'tMt o.t WCX*Ship Values, 
sinoe it is in creativity that the ax1stenoe of t~ue worship 
itself 1s maintained. Worship must ~eflect the kind of God 
th&Xte u 1n the universe ........ a God who bimBelf ia capable of 
new e.xpe:r:-ienoe and .growth.. 11A God whQ oan change· nothing, 
b.tt:tllg nothing into baing, cxaaate n.o new life, is a pitiable 
th1ngw•aoar,ely a ~d at ali.u4 Re11gion aa ex1st1ng tn 
relation to a God Who ~tmself is capable of new experience 
:f\U'n1shes pvobe.bly the deep(!J$t insight 1nt.o the meaning ot 
1. Erightmant J5lV 1 156. 
2 • Bl!"1ghtman, RV, 183 • 
z. Ibid., 203·237. 
4.· Ibid.,, 205. 
a dynamic un1verae.1 The God ot deism means death not only 
to religion but to cosmic pros~ess. 
In what sense is worship creative? What values does 
1t create? Brightman lists tour fruita of warship for 
special consideration. 
First, p]\er~pe~ti'V~· Worship enables man to think be ... 
yond his own ~ediate needs and o~cumstances. In some 
measure, a~ least, it enables him to see life from. the stand• 
point ot God and the ultimate purposes of life. Such a per• 
speot1ve throws a new light on the ro:te ot man himt:Jelf in 
the ongoing of the universe. He sees ~elf as a pavt, not 
1n the sense ot 1dent1t1cation with Brahman, but as a eon• 
tr1but1ng factor to the fulfil,.fU.ng of purpose in the total 
cosmic aoheme. ~is sense ot 1dent1t1cat1on 1s lite•giving. 
"It gives man what he most needs, namel~, the combination of 
a sense of his pe~sonal wo~th with a sense of personal sub• 
ord1nat1on.u2 This is not the subordination of a fawning 
pol1t1o1an, noxa does 1t ~ob a man of his own proper d1gn1t,-. 
It is• instead, the trustfu.l: poise of a knowledge that God 
is gx-eatet.' than he and 1s somehow 1n control ot things .. 
l. Thus showing again the n,oessity of ~elating religion 
and metap~s 1os • Btt1gh.tman observes that 11ph1l~~op~ of 
religion ie a b~anch of metaphysics and that its pl'oblema 
are 1nt~tw1ned with most metap~sioal ones ••• A study 
of metaphys1os should b~J!'·eeede and follow a study of 
philosophy of ·religion," PGR• 398 n. . 
2-. Brightman; RV, 2l4. · 
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Personal wwth and pars onal su.b0%*d1nat1on thus 
fuse 1n the worshiper's tUtper1enoe. out of this 
tsnaion of opposites is bcxan religious person ... 
alit,- with its peculiar qual1t1es .... ~a poise that, 
while worship lives, oan never beoom.e apatJl.T, 
a peaoe that cannot become melle paas1vity. a 
Joy that cannot become frivolitJ-1 f conf1denoe 
that cannot became overecnt1denoe. 
Second, ,a sp;~1tua.l_1d_~al,• Worship stimulates ideals 
of the up1:r1t, the :process, of which pay@.ologr me.y t!tX.plain, 
but the source of the ideal is recognised by the worshiper 
as God working in hi& mind, 2 the torm of which is explain• 
able only b7 the axp6P1enoa of worship. ~t w~ah1p not only 
creates a via1onJ it also implants a deshae tor ita attain• 
ment. 8 In the Mtux-a ot th1a spht1tual 1deal.-n says Bv1ght ... 
man, "lies its peculiar orea.tivit714"3 The ideal is inex.-. 
hs.ustible and thel-efw.e it will need an, etwnity to explore 
what this value mea.nsb Bare 1s the heart of religion. It 
is liberation of the sp~it, unbound b~ creedal formulations, 
into the realm of ~sat a.dventu:tte with God. 4 
'J.'h1rd, poww~ Brightman used to uey that he was more 
1nteres~ed in soodneas than 1n power~ The kind of power 
suggested here, however, is not the kind ot power that he 
l. ~ightma.n, RV, 2l5v Of •. Hooking's 11p:t-ino1ple of e.lter• 
nat1on1 " MGHE, 406 .... 427. s., 'fbis ia very similar to Whitehea.dts conception of the 
function of God 1n initiating the subjective atm of 
actual entities. See PR, 164. 
5. ~ightman, RV, 217. 
4. One teals that Brightman's whole book" The Sfiix-1tua.l Lit~, 
is but an elabol'at1on of this basiG theme. · e £ii1Ces ·as 
his major premise nthat only apirit is eternal, only spirit 
is truly real, only spirit 1s the goal ot life,n sv, e. 
24l. 
would repudiate* He was not interested in coereive power 
of any- kind, whsthezt in individual men, gova:t.tmnents, or 
God. He was interested in the power of the sp~it, which 
is the ~ea.l meaning ot his term h~:We-, It is that des12-e 
tor means to implement what he reels: about the ideal. The 
vision e.nd even the desire to fulfil the divine ideals ax-e 
of little import unless a measUJ:te ct sp11'1tual energ is · 
present. Brightman feels that this pcwer eomes aa anoths.r 
eont:ttibution of wox-sh1pi* It makes possible the transfox-ma-
tion ot the future, biJ the control of the inner life J but 
m~be more x-emax-kable still is the possibility of changing 
the past, not by :t'emoving the facts tbs.t are the:re, un-
ohnngeable, but by seeing them w1th new meaning, a power 
which religion gives. 
OomtmUlion with Gad means fxreedom frQM bondage 
to the past, to the envir'oning wwld, to the 
f'utut*e J a flteedom that ~om.es from oommwce 
with reality 1tsalf •• .-Ral1g1ous powe:ro'l than" 
is fx'eedom; and its ~eedom is power,. ; 
Fourth, is a oommunit;v: of '-ove, eomptwa'bla to Royce's 
"beloved community. 0 Brightman considers this to be the 
''supreme consummation of wo:vsh1pn2 foreshadowing the very 
goal and purpose of· the unlverse. ln one sense w0l'ah1p ia 
personal and p~ivate., but even 1n worship an individual is 
still pai't tOf the :race, Worship :r:aeveals the value and worth 
1. Bl"ightman, RV, 221. 
s., Ibid.,, 921. 
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of other souls, but there are additional values which 
eme~ge only in the corporate situation. 
Experience shows that when 1nd1v1dua.la come 
togethel* e.nd become a worsh1p1ngcoDJm.Unity1 
new spiritual levels are reached, new values 
created, new powex-s relea.aetJ.,.l 
Worship makes the experience of God more vivid, and adds 
a new depth to the meaning ·or society. Fox- religion to 
do leas _than that is to l-ob religion of its greatest poasi ... 
ble and most potent con~r1but1on to the well ... being of so-
ciety, vis., the sense of mutual respona1b111t~ and respect.~ 
"Worship ••• is nsoeasa:t*il.y social at its highest po1nt.02 
Bvigntman further elaborates his chapter on creative 
worship by a oonaideration of the factors which contribute 
to creativity 1tselt~ Attar st~easing the need of inner 
p~ap~ation. ha points out the value of conflict, silent 
self-possession, the vision of God, and the will in the cre-
ative prooesa. 
"Bot all confliot leeA.s to Gcd,11 sa.J$ Bx-ightms.n, but 
there. 1a a a pec:Lal. kind of spix'itua.J. oonfl1ot which finds 
in the 1nner tensions ot the soul the &timulation to p:resex-ve 
the values or all and to reoonoi;e them at higher levels of 
meaning. Worship does not aeek to destl"oy the confl.iots, 
buu to usa tb.em.-
'lb.e worship of God is the only b'tl.man expatt1enee 
lr:u;tge enough in ~ts scope to be able to speak 
l. Bt-ightma.n, RV I 222-. 
2. Ibid., 223. 
the word of creative control to all the 1m-
pulS$S in man•a breast• wot-sh1p alone is the 
exp~ienoe 1n wfi.. ah eve~ conflict beoomes 
Cl'eative powe%'-. · 
Wc:t'*ah1p not only reconciles· other conflicts, but 1t ere ... 
ate~ conflicts ot its owrh In wcwsh1p tensions between 
knoT!ledge and. myste17, act1v1ty- and pa$aivity, .1nt1mao~ and 
awe, are set up, but these fU"e the oo~:Ltions out of which. 
ora$t1vity t~ives- Silent selt~posaess1on is ~1ghtman•s 
' 
we.y~ot emphasizing the need and power of concentration. 
11Th~ spix-1tual 11.t~ is the single mindl! unified by concan ... 
' trs.tion on. one mtpl'leme purpo~Uh •.• ccmeantra.t1on $.lways .leads 
to hew vision oz. new life._ue 
XI is 1n the experience of God himself that all worship 
valtles have the~· unity, for God is the ultimate so'l.lree o£ 
i 3 
cree.tiv1ty, 0 !'o see God ia to eonft-ont X*ea:u.t-,"n · and in 
thap vision ona 1s able to view the whole meaning of' things. 
Wo~~hip thus or~ates b~ea4th cf view Qnd the possibility of 
purpose in the total pict~e. Mo~e than that, wo~sh1p ~e­
vea;ts God himself,. who is· hidden to sense, feeling, and 
tho~ght, but who :eeveala himselt in the spiritual expex-1enos 
or •ot*ship. 
: ~he vision of God will not be eomplete. of oo~sa. but 
thei vision is most complete 1n the life o~ one who aot:t'll'elll" 
1. ~1ShtlllfU1, RV, fiU37., Nota the phrase "creative oontrol.u .. 
!rbia is before Brightman had attempted any formulation of 
his concept of' theistic f'1nitism. 
a, Ibid., sas. 
3,,. fib1d., 1 S30ro 
cooperates, with God. Worship must involve the will s.nd the 
whole peXtsonal1ty. It is the whole self that must find 
pro~e~ o~1entation to God and the universe, but it is the 
will which is the dil'ecting agency ot the personality in 
~ligning the self with the creative power of the Sup~eme 
Mind.- It n1s the key to the vision of God and to the in-
gre$s of the u:tteative Sp~it ot God into hl.'UllS.n life. nl 
~1gbtman ooneludea with "a few words about the God ~e~ 
vea~ed in W·orah1p.n2 In Rel1g1Qua Value§, which contains 
most ot the ~x1o·~slig1ous data for this discussion, ~1snt~ 
I 
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man.does not yet espouse his lateX* views of theistic f1n1t1sm., 
henoe the particular values ~ssociated with that doctrine 
have not yet been mentioned. God's basic role in ~ightmants 
value theo%7 has already been appX"aised• but a. brief statement 
' 
of ~ow :religious values are enhanced by the fin1et1c concept 
w1l1 serve as conolus1on and Summal7 fer this ~t ot the 
chapter·~< 
: Not all ax-e asreed. that f1n1t1sm 1a i'el1..giousl:r fertile, 
as attightman readily admits.3 and e.s indicated in a pl'evioua 
obapter. But in th$ face of many obJeot1ons B1'1ght:ma.n offers 
:r1va "specific religious values in the idea of a f1n1ta God 
who :1s potent, but not omn!potent.•4 
First, f1n1t1sm implies gFe@Jie:r assurance ot d!Yine 
spnpathy and love. It raqu!lr$S mwe ta1th" he holds, to 
believe in a. God who wants to help am1d the tl'agedies of 
life and oa.nnot, than 1n ·one who (lan and does not. 
~ ~ - ~~ ~· ~ ~-··· . 
Second, there is JlW"Stieal value 1n the concept of the 
divtae eb.uggle~ That God is looked 1n et~nal combat with 
farces wh1oh he d14 not create, but over which he oontin• 
u.oualy seeks oontl"ol., elicits nthe pz»ofcundest rel1g1oua 
emotions ot l"&V&:t'&nt:ur, gl'atitu.de and f'a1thtt 11 
Th1ltd, f1n1t1sn:t providaa mo~e incentive tf!l!' ooopera.;.. 
t!on with Goth Absolutism. 1mpl1es a uompletenes.s which does 
not ,evoke the same sense o£ n!J)ed f~ eoope:Pative end-eavor~ 
Fo'W.'th, a God who 1a :not absolute suggests room for 
aosmtc advance and p:rtogl'ess, tt:tnaxhauati'ble perreet1b111t,-11 
adds mee.n.tng to 1mmo~tality and makes possible a 1ltox-e J:ie .... 
11g:toua attitude to~d the tutu.re., 
~Fifth, a t1n1te God 1s probably.m.ox-"e moved. b1' prayers 
than an Absolute God wb.oaEJ. de-Cl'Jees a:re already- determined.. 
Xn bXJ1et1 Brightman feels that the traditional :notiot:a. 
of Goci who is timeless and already complete does not pl'ovide 
the be.s1s fol! ere.a.t1va religion~ Jiis thought points up th$ 
axiom, wol'tb.7 ct repeating, that ·the kJ.nCJ. of God pos1 teA 
determines the content of onets wo:ttehip and ;religious ex-
pxtession. Infinite po4s1b111ty ot pl'CgEuts gives to initia-
tive its bighEutt etimulantJ ul.t1tnate pel'feetion, on the othel' 
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hand, m.ean1ng r1e Rt\lS_ ultr~, :vesults in stagnation and a 
too easily aa.tis.t'i.ed attainment. "Yell~ ism," which is 
Br1ghtm.a.n's term. for the poss1b1l.1t,- of endless parfectS:-
b111ty,l enhances initiative, provides v~iety and makes 
x-eligion an iEJ:s:o1t1ng vent'Ul"e. To wwk with the Eternal 
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Spirit who is ttetev:nally oraat!ve0 2 1a a religious value of 
the highest order. This means that the possib111t1es of 
t~th1 beauty, an4 goodness are infinite 1n the!%- appl1ca• 
t1on to pe:Psonal and so~1a1 :relAtions. "It doth not yet 
a.ppes.:tt what we shall be," but every level of the Pel1g1ous 
life is both tulfUment and promise.. nEvel'y ~tage is precious 
and adds something that must neve~ be lcu;tt:J yet no stage ex ... 
hauats the pos$1bU1t1es of sp~1tual growthof •• tst1stence is 
never t1nishe4.n3 
B. Whitehead. 
1. The Meaning of Religion. 
!o include some of Whitehead's rel1g1ous views as part 
of' his general value theory is not a tou de . toroe. one of 
Whitehead's keenetst 1ntel'pretere, Oharle$ Ha.rt&ho:tJne, sa.yat 
Thee idea tbat the reli.gtous · -epntent of White ... 
b.ead'a system is ~agged u, a.:nd that what his 
system requ1X"$1iJ ill some 'impe:rsonal.* force ox-
l. Bl"1ghtma.n, POR, 340. 
s. Bl'1ghtman, SL, 155. · 
3. Ib1d., 169. The ohapteP, '*SpU'it as Develop1ng1° SL, 
142-175• is especially pertinent for the whole d1aouss1on. 
tunotion having no essential connection with 
love, is in 'I!J1 opinion a thorough misundw-
standing, 
By tr-aining and temperament Whitehead waa rel1gioua. He 
was the son or a cle:rgymana and was surrounded by a liberal 
. but devotional a.tmoaphere .a . 'lhe profoundly sp1r1tue.l mood 
permeating his metaphysical w~ks is ~obably one cf the 
attractive and almost subtle $lemsnts which cb"aw x-eaders t·o 
his 'm'1t1ngs. Felbt F:rtmk.furte:r observes that "tor all who 
came w1~1n the ~ange of h1s tatect1ous pe~sonality, arid 
protess1<mal:tam was quickened into eXb.Ue..rat1ng meaning 
. . 
and the universe eapanded.n4 
lt is not too much to say that his basic attitude to 
the u.n1verse was religious 1 an4 that even his metaphys 1os, 
aa w111 'be shown later, is a relig1cus en.terp:rise. Bixler. 
says that nso1enl1t1o as it 1a. and notable in its oont:ribu~ 
ties to log1c, h1s phUosop~ ean yet be sa1d to face 1n 
the- religious dil'eotion. ui !eo neglect the religious, there ... 
fo:re 1 1n even e. pal"t1al account of Whitehead t s the0%7 ot 
val~s is to give a dist~ted picture, to:r religion itself 
is 1n te:rms of value. not indeed. e..s .! value among othex-s, 
1. Razttsb.o:r-ne, MV'G, 50. JJmmet bas someth!ng s1m1l.axa when 
sb,e says that n1ihe last section of Pr..ooess and Reali~ 
!the most_ religious pal't of the b.otW la not an adgen um 
~levant· to the rest ot the book* - It is an 1ritag:tti.i1-· ·-
part or 1t,n WPO, 247~ 
2 • As was Brightman* . 
3. See hie. "Au.tob1og;raph1oal Notesn in Schil.pp, PANW, 38 14,. 
4. In a torwfUtd tOY! Mental" edition of Whitehead's AE. 
5. B!aler, Art.(l94l), 490~ 
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but as being of the verY' essence ot value. Religion begins 
in self•valuattonl and 1a founded on the value ot 1nd1vid..., 
ua.ls fw themselves, on individuals aa values tw one a.nothat.", 
and on tha values of the objeoti ve community 1 whioh is an e,x ..... 
tension of the ~elations among 1nd1v1duals.a n!he pecul~ 
ob.al'aetev ot religious tl'Uth 1a tb.at it expl!oitly deals with 
va.lues.03 
Wh1tehead,rs most frequentl,- quoted definition of :va ... 
lig1on 1$ t "Rel.1.g1on 1a what the 1nd1 vidual does with h1s 
sol1te.r1ness,.n4 Not eo often given is his own explanation 
ot the concept of solitariness~ Be. points out5 that the 
gx*eat l*ational religiona are the outcome of a universal con.,. 
soiotUtnaas as opposed to the looal ott tribal, Being univer ... 
sal, religion divorces itself t~om the immediate so that 1t 
might embtts.ce the wider a.speots and meanings of existencaJ 
net being tied to en.ytbins partioula:r it thus becomes, so to 
speak, so11taxay 1n the gxaaat un1ve:rse.. Without the aolita%."1• 
neas there :t.s no religion. 6 for it is only 1n the sepal'a.t1on 
tltom the partioul.Etf' that the unive:r-sa.:t 1s toundr but the 
sepa.re.t1on is net ultin!ats tw it is in the d1scoveey of 
the lar-ger aspeots that the details UG s sen 1n theix- propax-
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~elat1oneh1ps. naeligion is an ultimate craving to in" 
fuse into the insistent particularity ot emotion that non .. 
temporal generality Which p~imaPil7 belongs to conceptual 
thought alone._nl Whitehead's desor1pt1on throughout is 
vwy similar to the mystic nps.rado:t of pove:~?ty, u where the 
seeking soul tte.tu.ses to become tied to any particular thing 
in oztd~rr that he might po.saess all tbJ.ngs. 
. -
~he solite.rineas, than~ 1s: the ttea.ot1on of a worshipel' 
1n the search tali* ultimate PX"'inciplEUh It 1a n-ot merely a 
tteaotion to the aooial exptt-ession ot :l-$l1g1.on; 1t is the 
individual alone in the p:resenqe of Gcxl,e an experience 
px-erequ1s1te to the und~etand1ng ·Of lteligion as x-a.t1onal 
and acc1a.l. ~1ghbm.rmt in e:r;o:ttic1z1ng th1a pos 1tion, is 
abta1d 'bha.t Whitehead goes too fua 1n tnnpb.af!1e1ng the soli" 
tartness. He aaytU 
Spiritual l1bex-ty ne.nnot be a~hieve4 &.lone~ 
A1~e4 N~th Wb1teheadts f~us saying that 
'l'elig1on ia what a %IUU1 does with his sol1tar1-
ness t remains tt-ue as an ae!d tau:it ot s 1nceza ... 
1t'1 end as e.n emphatic statement that· ~eligion 
1s, first end fo:t>emo&t, tra.f.t'1~ between the 
soUl and God. Yet $olit~tn$SS is itself the 
achievement and the need of a socie.l baing. , • 
Spiritual liberty ean be won onl7 through oo~ 
ope:rat1vfl toil.a 
Ellt Whitehead himself guflr1b apintat 1ntel'pxteting this 
sol.1tEUT stage of r-el.1g1on s.a being the final fom of' 
1. Whitehead, PR, 2~.. . 
2. Note the striking E~imile.ri~ here to K1erka~ts 
ao:J.1 t.EU7 1.ndi vidu.al bef'we God. •. 
1. 13.1:'1ghtman, NV., 164.-
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~el1g1ous expression. Be saya thAt ureligion is still a 
tho~dUghly $Ocial phenomenen.u1 fhe individual must first 
discover that sol1ta~1neaa constitutes uthe heart ot ~el1gious 
importance, ne · but the moment he ax.preSJses his :religion 1n 
some fol'm it becomes social. 
·E:&p:ress1on, and 1n part1oul~ expression by 
dogma. is the return from aol1tal'1ness to -
soo1e"'. There ia no such th!ag as absolute 
solitariness. Each entity !'equ1rres tts en-
vlztonment, 1}US ·man cannot seclude himself 
from soc1et,-. 
The highly pet'aonal ~d expexa1ent1a.l cbaraete:r of 
l-eligion as seen by Whitehead emerges in h1s further dafin• 
1 t ion of religion aa "the art and the th&OJr!17 ot the 1nte:rna1 
life of man1 eo fa'l! as 1t dependa on the me.n himself and on 
. 4 
what ia permanent in the natUPe at tbings.n This is WhiteM 
head's WQ7 of elqmessing the e:Ustential. nat'\U'e of religion. 
Ra1ig1on is a c~actar or qualit~ of personal existence. 
It is more than a form of action ~ aasen~ ~o a belief. 
Biltler says again tbl't "Whitehead is mot-e sympathet io tlla:n 
·' 
many to the view that our rel181ous1y significant expar1ences 
include mol-a tb.a.n can be conveyed b,- ou.t:t twmal- statements. u5 
The difference is bJ&ought out 1n Whitehead t s statement that 
nyou use eitbmet1o, but you e.l'a religious.- 0 6 
Religion ia the. affective tone of the individual in 
the p~esence of universal values. Out of this situation 
gi-OWS chEU*a.ote~ which develops in accordance with one ts 
taith. "'l'h1s is the primaey religious t:ruth from which no 
one oan escape," says· Whitehead. 0 llelig1on is fox-ce of 
belief cleansing the inwal'*d pa%Jts. nl Here belief and ex.,.. 
per1enoe ara united, but it is only as beliefs are ttvtv1dl7 
apprehendedu2 that they are meaninsful.-. !his 1s as strong 
an emphasis on the sign1tioanoe of the tntexanal e.nd eubj ac-
tive aspect of r e11g1on as anythins in K1e~kega.ewd.3 White .... 
head makes this constant emphasis to avoid the fatal re'flll 
lapse or religion into mere dogma. Religion is nothing if 
1t 1a not a personal "settt of the soul. 'l'o make it equiva .... 
lent to a oreed o;r a pattel'n of aotion is to destroy it* 
Religion is tte,n adventure of the spirit;04 1t is a "com• 
mandtng v1s1onJu5 but ttths insistence upon rules of oonduot 
marks the ebb ot rel1gioua :t:e:rvol.U'.,u& l'Jogme.t1c finalit,- ia 
the enemr or ~e11g1on7 as well as science and metaphysics. 
Whitehead illustrates this point beautifully: 
A system of dogmas may be the ax-k within which 
the Ohureh floats safely down the fl.ood .... tide ot 
25! 
h1stoJ.'7• Bllt the Church will perish unless 
it opens its window and lets out the dove to 
search tor an olive branch. Sometimes even it 
will do well to disembark on Mount Al'ax*at and 
build a new altar to the divine Sp1~1tH•an 
altar neither in Mount Gar1timnor yet at 
Jerusalem. I. 
In delineating religion in this fashion, Wbitehead 
wants to present it as a movement of the spirit, not as 
patterned formula. Religion 1a the free expression of the 
soulJ hence it must begin 1n solitariness. But it 1s the 
nature of all meaningful expt-ee$1on that it use the media 
that are there tor it. Religion thus becomes inescapably 
$oc1al, ~epresenttng the deepest and profowndast outreach 
of t1n1te ~nt1t1es for se.t1staot1on and ultimate immmortal• 
1 t,. 1n Go.d., 
2. Religion and Metap~s1cs. 
Whitehead p1etuves Obv1sttan1t1 as "a ~aligion aeektng 
a. m.ete.pcysio, 1n contrast to Bu.ddh1sm, wb1oh is e. metaphysic 
2 generating a rel1gian.n Fo~ Whitehead relig1cn will be 
auoceasful only as it finds its metaphyslc_.3 ~e main rea-
son to~ this 1s found in the t~emendous !nneP destre·f~ 
1. Whitehead, RM, l45-wrl46. 
s. Ib1d .. , 50. 
~. Conu:ea.at Whitehead with men like nerkegaa:r:-d and Barth, 
who would discuss these two oonoepta together onl~ to show 
that they are m,utually esolus1va* ·On the othe:r hand, 
ph1losophe~s like Bowne, ~igh~, Bertocci, and philoM. 
sophioal theologians liKe Fewe, Lewis~ Tilllch, have all 
seen the need ot a eon$1stent metapbJsic as a p~erequ1~ 
s1ta to a consistent ~el1g1on. 
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togatberness ·in the universe. It !a the natura ot mind 
to want to find some aort of unity,. It may be theologi-
cally stimulating to dogmatize on "the infinite qualitative 
d1fferenoeU between God and man~ but it will not satiety 
·\:\. 
the xaeligious spirit. naal1g1on is the longirlg of the 
ap:Lx-it that the l$Cta ot existence should find their jus• 
t1f1cation in the·nat~e of exiatenoe.~1 In P~ooass and 
Refi:l1.tt religion is motte than a "lcng1ngn; it is nan ulti .. 
mate crav1ng11 to discover some ganeralitl wh1eh may be 1n.-
tused "into the ina1stent l)S.l"ticulal"1ty of emotion. ttS Until 
that discovery is ntQde and effected thezte is no religious 
value, fol' values EU'e the px-oduct ot the metaphysical ppo ... 
cess., 3 "Religious consciousness st.Qlt'ts f:t:tom self•val.ua t !on, n4 
but lt expands to include the universe through a process of 
ad3ustment to all other values until the ultimate aesthetic 
. . 
aatistaotion. A meaningful x-el!gion• theretoll'e1 is px-ed1· 
ca. ted on a satiafJ'!ng metapeysic. 
Besides the need for togetherMss. religion must be 
8%*0\Ulded 1n something objective. due to the veey natuzte ot 
the religious conaciounneGa-. Religion 1s ~otive, and al• 
though ttemot1ons are av1denoe of some vivid e.aperienoe •• ~ 
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the7 ~e a ve'lf3' poor gu.al"S.ntee for its oorreot 1ntePpr*ets..tion.u5 
1 .. Whitehead; 
e~ Whiteheadi 
3o Whitehead,_ 
4. Ib!l.d. 1 5~h 
a. Ibid.,. aa. 
Bel1g1cn can be ~%amined and o~it!c!zed only as its 4os~ 
lDJi.Ul are based in the rational at:Mloture of the unive~se. 
Relat1v1um. and confusion e.:tte the only alternatives. Cl.aimG 
of direct an(l 1ndiv1dual1st1o intuition of some religious 
truth make agreement ott the meaning ef X'elig1on impossible. 
Xt is at les.st part of the role of reason in religion to 
sa.fegu.ard 1ts object1v1ty1 and only 5.n so far as it is o~ 
jeot1ve is it capable of public examination and eval\U:l.t1on,., 
Again• a matap~s1o 1a needed ba.fwe an hist .. 1ca1 
app~eoiat1on of religion is poss1ble.2 All inte~~etation 
is :U.m1ted to the praeant 1 therefore any historical extXta"" 
polat1on must be based on pr1ne1ple deduced from. a fomer 
immediacy-, At 'best, the :reconsun.ction of the past depends 
on memory which exists. only 1n the preaent1 but in any case 
a. ccna1stent meta.p~sic 1s the sine nqua. noXJ, tcm tUl"f inter..,. 
-- .•. . -, . .$ 
pratat1on a.t all. 
Some furthel' 1mpl1os.t1ons of the 1ttte~""'l"ela.tion between 
x-al.1g1on and metapb.yawa ax-e 'bXtought cut also in the ne:&t 
aeotiorh 
3. Religion and Reason. 
Religion e.n4 ~eaaon come togethe:tt,. 1n Whitehead's m.eta• 
peya1Qs.5 It 1a 1nte:resting1. 1f not s1gn1fioant, that this 
combination 1a set torth with delibel'a.te oa.r,e in P:rocess ana 
1. Whitehead, RM, 64. 
a. Ibid., a4. 
&., Whitehead, :PR~ 67. 
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Real1tz, the book usually oonsida~ed the mo$t met~phys1cal 
ot all Wh1tehea.d 1s work£h The task ot :reason, he says ~here, 
is to .f:tn4 general princ 1ple s in the u.n1ver se which will 11 ... 
l.um.tnEl.te the pal't1eu.l.e.r facts of SJ(ietenee.. That such a 
venture will always be attended b7. suooess11a tbb »hope of 
rat1ona1iamn1 ~athe~ than a~ demonstrable certainty.- T.ne 
hope, howeve:t-, bGcomes a ~eal 0 fa1th which .f'o~ms the motive 
tot!. the pursuit of all sc1en.nes alike,. 1ncludinSmets.pb.ys1~" .. na 
Paradold.callJ this seems almost tC) .eque.:t;e ~eason and ft11th, 
, tw reason always points bGTond fte worl.d of i'e.ct to the 
wo~ld ot gene~al1t1es, ~aws, first principles. Whitehead 
implies that ~ quest fc'l! the rs.t1onalitf b-f things might 
waver, bu~ it is at. this point that metaphysics assumes a 
dlmenaion which oan only ba called. rel1g1ous. It .faith 1n 
the ultimate reality of things 'be preservad1• it must be 
goUl'lded on 
an ult1mate ~al intuition into the natUl'e of 
1ntelleotual a.atio;n ........ tb.at it should embody' the 
adventure ot hope. Such an intuition marks 
the point whe:t"e metaph7sica-and. indeed ·eve:t7 
sc~enoe""' ... Sain s.sa~noe i'l'om religion a.nd ~alise~ 
,over- _~~to . :reliGion.... · 
~ sudden passtng ot metaphfs1cs into religion is a 
staxatling and ciaring proclama.t1®1 but 1t does not represent 
1. Whitehead, PR, 67. , 
2,. Ibid. 1 67 • Whitehead defines meta.pb;rs1•s as "notll1ns bu.t; 
the desc%'1pt1on of the generalities whieh apply to a:U 
the deta.Us or pract1cse1 " PB, 19. ct. u, 84 n. 
3* Ibid., 67 • italics added .. 
the abandonment ot the phil·osopb.ical. quest. It opens 
up instead a. use of reason and religion which expands· the 
meanings of' both and makes the· study ot metapb.y'sics a 
wa.rm and movins enterprise~~ Instead of be1ng a depaz.ture 
from reason, howave:tt, Whitehead says that 1n so ts:1;1 as we 
a.·ocept the doctrine of .taith ...... not, 1ndeea._ as a matap'nysiceJ. 
tsten but as an ideal wanting $S.t1s.tact1on ........ that Rwe are 
rationaliatalul ~ere ie no conflict there between faith 
and reaaon.. "'!he ages of faith are the ages ot rational• 
2 1sm,tt he says in another place, 
Religion. then, 1s an attempt to find the wholes 
which give meaning to the pax-ts J it is an attitude toward 
· tb.e univ~rse~ Rel:tg1on is the a·eaing or the wo!!!*ld as 
tta mutually adjasted disposition of things 1asuittg in value 
fo:t- its own sake.u3 The same situation gives ta1se to the 
notion of morality., Whitel::uaaA oal.ls it mo~a.J. because it 
relates the individual to the unive~aal 0 to the end o~ 
stretching individual·inte~sst be~ond its self•dateating 
4 part1cular1ty.u !he clash ct general and p~t1cular can 
be lt*aaol.ved cnl7 a$ the individual sees that nits interest 
is the general good•6 and that 1ts own concessions to gen~ 
eral.ity will yield only- "e. wider sweep of 1nte1'est.a6 'lb.e 
1. Whiteheaa., Pa, 67. 
a. Whitehea.d, IW, 84a 
3. I'b1d.' 145., 
4. Whitehead, :tnt, 93-
5. Ibid., 23. 
a. ns.a.., a3. 
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tull notion of morality ts revealed 1n the respons1bil1ty 
of the f~ae individual in 4etermtn1ng What its QWn real18 
zat1on shall be 1n acccrda.nea with its poea1b1l1t1es and 
env~onment. Be says: 
'fhe actual entity • 1n a state of p:l*oceaa during 
wh1oh it 1s not i'ully definite, determines its 
own ultimate d$f1n1teness. !h:ts 1s the whole 
point of mor$l ~espona1b111ty. Such rrespons1 .... · 
b1l1ty is oon41t1oned bf the limits of the data, 
and by1the ea.tegox-eal. :oond.1t1ons of aonores-aence. ·. 
Religion is xaational.J the rational is :t'e1ig1ous. 
Both are ways of looking at reality- Oonjo1ned into "ra-
tional t'e11g1onu, they become the kq to mete.ph.Ts1oa.l und$:t-"" 
ate.n.ding, o,.. to change the t1gure, the eye for aeetng into 
:fleal.ity. naa.t1onal. religion appeals to the dhteot 1ntu1t1on 
of special ~ccasiona, and to tb& elucidate~ power ot 1ts 
ot>neepts for all- oc<:uM:s1ons.u2 Such a religion opens up the 
world, x-eveal1ng e. -Qtap~s1os othww1se unknown. fffb,e 
do.etl'1nes t)f rational religion aim at being that meta.phys1cs 
which ·can be de:t-ived from the supwnol'mal. experience of 
l.. Whiteh~ad; PR, · 390:t !hough Whitehead does not empha-
siZe the mor&li and SOlD.$ see in the omission e. weakness • 
t::t. S•t M1lwd, fVWlf, 426-431, thel'e seems to be SQ.m8 
gttounc. hare tox- the wol'kint6 eu.t of a. fairly adequate 
basis for m.ora:U.ty. See Soh11pp- Art~ (1941),. 6081 
for- another op1n1on on the plAoe ot morality tn· Whita-
haadts thought. 
a. Whitehead,. RM, 3S., 
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mankind 1n ita momenta of finest insisht.ul This is no 
attempt t,, remOV$ ve·11g.ton fxaom life, nor to t-eduee such 
high oonompts to dogmatic credos. No one more than White• 
head . has pox-t:rayed so. fottoetully the withal" inS effects ot 
formul~ised religion~ B1s objection t~ "eoldu religion 
1s zievealed in his somewhat ironic rel'JUilrk that 1n the 
eighteenth oentu.t7 uGod made his first appeaztanoe in- :t:t$-
l1g1on 'IUld&t." the ~igid title of the First Cause, $Jld was 
appx-opr1ately wwsh1pped in white-washed ohut"ohea.u2 White-
head would make val.1g1on tree. Religion is a. moving of the 
sp1%*1t. Its total relation to matap~sioe oan well be aum-
marize4 in thitehead•a statement that "religion ie world 
loyal.ty.n3 
At this point 1n the .diaoussion it has already' become 
apparent that the ol.ose a.f.t1liat1on ot reason and l-el1g1cm. 
has modit•ted both. Religion is more than the $tnO.t1onal 
response to a ritual oxa worship a1tua.t1on. and l'eason 1s 
mo:re than a process of X'a.tioetnatio:tt. On the one band, 
Jrel1g1on is a metaphysical d1tipos1t1on. n~ final px-1nw 
o1ple of religion,• says Whitehead, "1s that the~e ia a 
w1saom 1n th$ na.tu:r.ae of" things., fxtom which flow O'U.Xt 
1. Wh1teb.ead, R'M., 32. !!lis statement -could. almost come 
fttom the ~sties who, in the illumination etage of "the 
mystic W$'7 proclaim an enhanced mental awareness of 
the true. nature of real1t7• See Underhill, MYS, 854...,.266,. 
s. Whitehead~ AI, 157. 
3. Whitehead,. D; so. 
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di!teotion ot practice, and ow:- pcssib1l1ti' ct the thecJ:tet-
1ca1 analy-sis ot taot.nl On the othe~ band, :reason beoomea 
a principle of orde~1ng. !bat means that Whitehead bas 
abandoned the notion that :reason 1s only a matter ot Pl'U ... 
ises and conclusions. One might eay that Th~ Function pt 
Reason is his deol.ara.tion ot independence 1'1-om the bondage 
of formal logic~ a There Whitehead 88.18 that 8 the funot1on 
-of Reason is t c promot a the art of l1i'e. n3 Rsas·on 1s an in'"' 
strument of adjustment to e$1.Vironment,4 the evexa•present 
r • • ~ 
' . 6 6 
urge to novelt,- and 1mp~ovement,, the answe:r to Fatip.e, 
Reason is pragrna.tio. ttneason ia the pztactical .embodiment 
• c • 
of the Ul'$& to transtol"m mere existence .into the good axis .... 
tence, and to trsnsfarm the good ex1$tence into the better 
·,17 . 
existence. Mo~e br!etly, the threefold UPge of ~eaaon 1st 
11!fo litre, to live w~ll, to live bettw."8 Hex-e z;u.e values 
1. Whitehead• u, 143. One seems to teel that Whitehead. bas 
almost a uacx-amental view of the uni vexasa ...... tln*ough meta .... 
p})tsics to eth1ca and the inner v~tu.es of the soul. fb.e 
same concept is even atronger in BP1ghtman$ who «:~eea in 
natw~e a urevelation ot Divine lextsone.lity," a view which 
"leads to a sao~Jamenta.l view ot nat'Ul'e,n NV, 160 .... 161. 
2. Ha.t-tsho:vne X*efere to 11Whiteheatlfs neglected. llttl& book, 
The F~ot1on of Reason~~a WOPk of p~e genius 1f the~e 
'br one, 11 ' 'iiVG$ · io~. · 
s. Whitehead, FR, s • ~e influence Qf Dewey and Bex-gaon 
1a ~:e.tent. Note above that Whitehead defines :religion 
as 1the art and the theo:t7 of the 1ntel"nal. l1f'e. 11 Re• 
11g1on and re~son thus become the intevnal and external 
'means· foJ.t the ~num1ous adjustment to the universe. 
4. Ibid.; a. 
a. IbM .•• 15. 
6,. Ibid,., lB. 
'7 •. Ib1d ... as~ 
a. Ib1d .. , 14. 
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again, the production ot wh1eh, 1n Whitehead's thought, 
is the end of all metaphysics and rational :rel1g1orh Reason, 
religion, and values are the geat "emwgents" frQ1n White-
head 'a metaphysics., 'fhe:y all oom.G beautifully together 1n 
the following quotation, which will serve as summe.%7 rw this 
section: 
Religion starts f~om the generalisation of final 
t:ttuths .first pe:t'O&ived u exemplified in p~• 
tioular 1nstanceao ~eae truths I!U*a smplifted 
into a cohe~ent aystem·and ~pplied to the inter~ 
pretation of lite. ~87 stand or fallM•11ke 
othe:v tl'U.thsw-by their sucoese 1n. this: intere-
pretat1on. ~e peculiar oharaotev of religious 
truth 1a that it explicitly deala with valuea. 
It brings ·into ()U!l' conso iouane~U!I that pel'nt.anent 
side of the universe whioh·we can c~ tor. It 
thereb7 provides a meaning, in teFms of value, 
for our own_ ex1stence_ f_ ·~ ':"a. meaning whioh flows 
from the nattll'e ot th;t.nga~• 
4 .. Is Whiteh$adta God "Ava1la'ble"t 
~bat Srigntmants theism involves w~sh1p the~e can be 
no doubt.8 H1s God is pe~sonal, and 1t bas been shown tna' 
one .of the chief so1ll"oes of oXteat1v1ty iu found in fellow-.. 
ship and communion with this personal God. !be matter 1s 
not eo easiiQ' settled 1n the case of Whitehead:~~~ WhetheX' ol* 
n¢t' hia God 1u "ava.1lable0 5 fo'l' worship and 1nte~a.ct1on with 
finite persons as Reraons, depends ent!Pely on the nature of 
God. A pxtev1ous aeotion4 bAs shown the f'unoticn of God 1n 
l:a Whitehead, HM, 124 ~ 
a~ As shown above. 
3., Making use of Ely's te~m in his RAWG. 
4. Oha.pte:r IV• B. 
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the universe, particularl~ as related to value structure, 
but very little was said w implied about the nature of 
God. If this pa:t't of the discussion is to be meaningful, 
certa1nl7 before BDJ concept of the1stio wovahip can be 
established, some attempt must be made to say whether or 
not Whitehead's God is the kind that is available tor in• 
te~persoQal re1at1onsh1p. 
Is Whitehead's God avs.Ua.blef The answer to this 
question depends. to some extent, on the answer to anothe:r! 
. 1 question: Is Whitehead's God peraonal7 · This 1a not to 
deny the religious values of othe:r views of God, even the 
opposite extreme of personalism. viz •• pantheism. Some of 
the great pantheists have been very devout, e. g., Spinosa~ 
while s~e of the mo~t fervent ral1gious mwstios. e. g., 
M$1ster Wokhart, have espoused a cosmolosr not f~ removed 
from the h1stOit1o pantheistic view of the unive:rse. Mallf 
of the mystics, while not thorough• going pantheists, ha.ve 
used the language of 1mmanent1am to eX}U'ess theh- mystical 
expe~1ences. The problem tor discussion here is not whe1sher 
pan'bhe1am 1s religiously available,. bu.t whether a God who is 
in SOll'le sense pex-sonal is ·not the only kind of God that 1s 
. . 
capable t so to speak, o.f entering 1nto the kind ot :vela.t1oneh1ps 
l• ~e position adopted hex-e :t.s that ~igb.tman, Bowne, e.nd 
otheza personalists,b.ave ganex-ally established tha1;r case. 
Bowne t s ohapte:t? on "!l'he Fa1lu:t"e of Impersona11em11 (PER, 
217ua67) is very effective in revealing the inadequacy-
of all a.'tempts to construc'b an impersonal metaphysics. 
which Wh1teh$ad describes 1n his religious sections. If 
God 1s 0 a principle ot orderingD and no mora tban that, 1t 
w1ll be moat difficult to establish ~om Whitehead's thought 
the notion of worship in anr ord1~ sensea but 1t God 14 
a Person~ albeit divine as opposed to human, then creative 
and meaningful warship is a rational possibilitJ• 
At best, a clear-out conoapt of the character ot White-
head's God 1s very much a deaidex-atum.., OnGJ can agree easily' 
with HartBhcrne'a comment that Whitehead's "idea of God ia .... 
, an intentional departure ~om most ot the philosophical 
past.n1 H1a is certainly not the God of Aristotle, Plotinus, 
Augustine, Aqu1nas 1 Calvin, or what 1s loosely known as the 
Olw1stian God, No h1sto2'1Ca.l or convent1onal.label will de. 
Whitehead's own testimony on one occasion put htm in the camp 
ot the panthe!sts,9 but the~e bas been little o~ no s&Pious 
attempt to make that class1f'1oat1on stick. ar;.1ghtman ea.ys 
categ~ioally that uWhitehead is clearly not a pantheist."& 
Whitehead ts emphasis on the immanence of Gcd does not leas en 
the value of Brightman's opinion when it is recalled that to 
be 111n" another actua1 entity mee.n.s to preh.snd or .feel what 
that other ent1'J' GdtDbeifh !fbls is the only sens~ in which 
1 ... Hal"tshwne 1 Al-t. (1941), 5lilfi 
a. In a written comment to the wriber, Brightman saidt 
uprivataly Whitehead has said (to Fe:r:tti) that he was 
really a pantheist." ~tgntman added, very interest• 
ingly, ni cs.ntt reoonoile this w1th a:t;om1o1ty o:r· o~ea- · 
sions." 
s. Bt-1ghtman, POR, lao. 
"God 1s immanent in the World11 w 11the World is immanent 
in God. 111 Furthermore. the »superjective nature of God112 
seems to make it p:ractioally impossible to label Whitehead's 
doctrine cf God as pantheistic. 
To deny pantheism is not to assert personalism, of 
course, 3 and the following is not an attempt to terce e. po1nt 
ot view that 1e unwa.:wanted. F.r.-e.nkly, the assel*tion that 
God 1s personal for Whitehead must be supported m~e by in• 
ferential evidence than stated tact J nevertheless~ it is the. 
plU'pose of tb1s section to show that the 1mplicat1ons of 
Wh1tehes.d's scheme of ideas favor the view that God is not 
oompletel,y void of those charaoter1at1os which make personal 
relationships poeaible. That ~1ghtm$11 himself classifies 
Whitehead among the personalists adds a certain impulse to 
the effort of substant1at1ng the v1ew with soma evidential 
data. In his chaptett 1n fel"m (ed .. ). A,1Jistou of'.PhUosCJ!h .. ;-
,oa.l Szs.t~ms, Btt1ghtma.n say-a: 
The glJeatest Anglo .... Ame.r 1oa.n philosophe:r · of re .... 
eent times, A. N. Whitehead (lS6l•l947), oame 
t:rom a. Hal1st1o tradition, but , his doctPines o£ 
creativit~,·aotual oaoas1ona, prE~hensione. sub~ 
Ject1ve aim,4and God all point to panpsych1st1o pe:veon&Llsm. 
Latex- in the same chapter Bltightman includes Whitehead in 
1. Whitehead- PRt 528" 
a. Ibid.* 131;. 
3. See the ~eat variety cr op1niana about God in Harts-
hwne and. Reese • PSG. · · 
4., Brightman_. .Avt. (1960·) 1 344. 
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e. liat ot "personalists who ••• aftim the finiteness of God. 11 l 
Whitehead uses the tel'lll$ "pel*son" Q.nd npersonaln t but 
with extrema caution, the fol:*lllEW term under conside:ra.ble 
que.li1"1cations, and the latter aa the distinctive DUU'k of a 
ce:r:-tui1n type of seria.l o:rtdw. fJ!he Ol:'d!naey- meaning of person 
unf~tunately suggests, aaya Whitehead, nthe notion of con• 
so1cusness 1 so that its use would lead to m1sundex-stand1ng.11S 
ooea.aionallyt hOWQVe:tt, in moments of less intense attention 
tu his highly reat%"1oted tel'm1nology 1 Whitehead lapses back 
. . 
into th& mo:tte ordi.na.:£7 ,. and one might add, moXIe emp!.xa1oal 
mode of exp:rsasion1 as when he wishes to distingu.ish between 
vegetative and personal life. 
:In the ca.se of single oellst of vesetation., and 
of th$ lowev tOX'ma of s.nim.a.l lite,. we have no 
ground for QonjsQtUJ:ting living parsanalit,-. 
Bu.t 1n the ca.se ot the higher anim.als- there 1s ()entral d1re.ct1on, which suggests that in thebt 
cane each antmal body ~bours a living pe~son, 
OX' living pa%'sons. ·Our own self ... oonseiousness 
is direct awareness of ouseivas as· such pare ... ' 
'sons.$. n. • •• •. • ••. • .... • . • • •• . . . . ' 
The last sentence ot this passage is at:J emph*ics.l.lr SX'Ounded 
as any proposition about pa~s.ona 1n &*1ghtman 's thought, and 
lends some support tr> the view here set f'ol"'th that there are 
suft1c1ant pa~sonalistio elements 1n Whiteheadts thought to 
w~rant the comparative analysis. 
1. Bl*ightma.n~ Art.(l950), 349. In Art.(l950), seo,. Bx-1jfbtman 
said: "Even Whitehead is essentially peraone.list1c'll' · 
S. Whitehead, PR, 58. See F.!, 945, 37!, fo·I' his uniqu.a 
view of the meaning of consciousness.., 
s. Ibid., l.eS-164. Italics addedo 
As tor the application ~r the tem person to God, 
there muat also be great care, :foP his px-imordial nattll"e 
is not eonao1oua.1 But here 1G the first majw inference 
1n support ·ot a personal God. If consciousness • even 1n 
Whitehead's exclusive sensa, .implies a person, then God is 
a per~:Jon8 toll' his consequent nature 1s aonscious. 2 J.iiUtthal' .... 
mare, God fultlls tb$ l'equtv~ts neoeaa~ for personal 
order., Be "sustains a Character" th!tough change, 5 he is his 
own reason tw existing, 4 .and something constant is supported 
along an 11h1sto~1cal routa.85 Raving these q,ualUica.tioM 
Whitehead says that "such an enduring entit7 is a 'living 
6 . 
pel:'son r •. • God being an s.ctl.!-e.l. $ntity ~ therefc:tte1 thalte ia 
no reason to t:tteat h1:tr.t "as an ajoe,ption to all metapeysical 
principles, invoked. to save their oollapae~ He . 1a theil' 
ehia.t uempl1t1cat1on,.n7 What cons'b1tutes "endU1'1ng pet-son• 
al.ity 1n the t,empol"a.l wwld." f'1nds 1ts. coXJ:relate 1n Godts 
nature to ,an enhanced dep,e~h *rb.ePe it ·ttta a.n even mora com.,. 
plete unitr of life 1n a oha.1n ot elements for which sucoes.., 
sien does not mean loss or immediate uniuon.98 
Lena spaeifio but equ.slty strong evidence is Whitehead t s 
constant use ·ot personal1st1o t,emnlnolog to describe tha 
866 
divine aet1v1t7• God feela,l he is tende~ towards actual 
occas1one.2 he grades the rele~anoe of eternal objects held 
out to actual entit1es,3 be shares experiences with the 
wo~ld14 he judgea,5 he saves the world,6 and he is patient.~ 
All these activities are personal. 
Whitehead comes the nearest to a deliberate 1dent1f1ca-
t1on of God with personal!~ in his discussion of tmmortal1V, 
in his Ingersoll. Lecture at Hal'vard. There he shows the need 
of end~tng personalitr to account for the persistence o~ 
value. How pe:ttsonal1ty makes this possible is seen in his 
.. ' . 
description of the nature. of fersonal Ident1tra 
A whole sequence of actual ocos.s1ona, eaoh with 
it~ own present immediacy, is such that each 
occasion embodies 1n its own being the antecedent 
mambers of that sequence with an emphatic ex~ 
perience or the self•1dent1ty of the past in the. 
~ediaa,r of the pre~ent.a 
The application here is to human personalities, but even more 
is there need for some pe~sisttng order on the cosmic level. 
Here is where God is needed to give ooherence to the multi ... 
pl1o1ty of values. 
The World of Value exhibits the essential un1• 
t1cat1on ot the Universe. Thus while it ·exhibits 
the immortal aide of the many persons 1~·1t also involves the unification of personal1u,v~ This 
is the concept ot God.9 
1. Whitehead, Pft, 134. 
a. Ibid., 161~ 
3. Ibid., 249. 
4. Ibid., 523. 
a. Ibid. , sss .• 
6. Ibid., 526. 
7. Ibid., sa&. 9 e. ~tebead, Art~(l94l) I 689. 
9. Ibid., 694. 
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Whitehead is quite supex-lativa 1n the expression of his 
views as to the axto~peraonal relationship, 1n the follow• 
ing statementst 
Personality is the extreme exampl·e of the 
sustatned realization of a type or value ••• 
We cannot d1sm1ss hrsona.l Identit7 without 
d1sm1sa 1ng the whole of huma.n thought as 
expressed ill every languagel.~ • .-ApfU''b fttom 
some mode of personality there is tr1v1al1w 
sation ot va.lue.2 
In the face of such evidence, it seems :t'easonable to 
oonolude that ,S1.Q!:1fiOe.%1~& value is possible only on . the 
personal level, the highest pel.'lllona.l level being God, 
who in himself gathers up the diverse values of the WOFld.~~ 
God is the unifying personality- of the wwld of val-
ues, but Whitehead woul4 modify the concept somewhat b7 
saying that 
it is not the God of the l.euned tradition 
of· Ol:U:-1st1an !J!heology, noP is it the d.:l..f• 
fused God of Hindu Buddh1st1e tradition. · 
The concept lies somewhere between the two.4 
It is noticeable throughout th1s whole discussion of God's 
relation· to the wot'ld that Wh1.telwad l'IJBkas this same ce.retul 
modification of the concept of God. In this Whitehead seeks 
to avoid on the one band an Heminently ~eal90 God, and on 
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the other a. God who ie so much everywbe:re that he is no-
where.- His God 1s ne1the~ "wholly othertt no~ und1ffe1"en .... 
t1ated ~ahman. What Whitehead teel$ is necessBXty ie a 
God Who is uno~1g1nata4 and sufficiently transcendent tc 
inititate and direct other entities; but not $0 11high and 
lifted up" that he is 1nd1ttex-ent to. or separate from, the 
woxtld which he eternally tntaatel. Personality as applied 
to God means that he 111s not n.eutx-~1 to relat1onsh1fls, 0 as 
~ts~ne expvesses it.l 
With soma care tand qual1ficat1cn, then, it 1$ not going 
bEt7ond the facts to infer tha.t WbJ.tehes.a.ts God ie in.:. some 
sense personal. !bls not · only opens the way for gpeatet-
a.va1lab1l1ty, but it suggests a whole new area ot pose!bil""' 
1ty. There can be no doubt of int~aotion between.entit1ea, 
whether on the lowest level or on tha highest with pe:ttaonal . 
order. The question is whether or not the prehend1ng rels. .... 
t1ontn1p between the temporal actual entities with pe~sonal 
o~der, 1. e._ himt.an beings• and the "non-tem.pOPal actual en-
S t1~, n Gc;~~d.~ 1s a sitl.Ul t1on that can be retertwea to e.e wo:tt~ 
Ship. Does Whit ahead's God inspire woX"~hip? 
1. Hartshorne, DR, 143., See ~teb.cwnEf's whole d!sauasion 
ot divine pel'sonality, which, although ha ia a close 
follower of Wh1 tehead, he 1e ·not ave•ae to ascribing to 
God, DB, l4S..,.l47. Of-. Eartshwne, M.VG, 249 ... 250. 
a. Whitehead# BM,.9o. 
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5. WOl'Ship¥ 
'l'fitle wwship involves rec1pXtoo1ty between God and man. 
A one way :velationsh1p1 whethev an al"b1t:r£1.X7 bestowal oi' 
g:tace :fltom ~bove or a meohan1oal chanting of religious tw""' 
mulae from below, 1s not wolt*ship. Re11g1on without inter"* 
action, o:r 1n moJte religious language, communion, is nothing 
but blind devotion on the pf:Utt ot mn and ,a_.ta1nly cannot 
result in an enhanced appreo1at1on of values, or a transfig• 
urad ps.sp of life and its pXtcblems,. Wfll9sh1p provides s. 
cb.ann$1 between God and l!Wl by which God' a l.ove and under ... 
standing fl.ow out in response to the outreach of man r a 
sp~1t and davot1on.1 Does God as delineated by Whitehead 
. . 
1naph-a devotion in a q.uestsfu.l spi:r1t? In othe:tt w.ords1 
wou~d the l'eligious impulse which sp%"ings tz.om the heat''b of 
mankind t1n4 r.epose 1n the God ot, sa7, ~ro~e!l's ~ ReE\11tz~ 
·Now it cannot be claimed at all that Whitehead's ab .... 
atnse terminology is the lansue-se of devoticnJ but neithw 
oan 1t be said that thEf bee.ut1ful language· of th$ P:.raye:r 
., ' • • J ··~· • 
Boolt_ or the_ Psal.tezt gives us an adequate unde!'tttanding of 
Godta nat't.U'e or hia :t'e·lat1ol1 to the wwld. To hellr of God 
as pr!mordial, consequent, w superjeotiva, does not par-. 
t1ottl~ly stimulate one to worsh1p1 but 1f theae taxams, when 
undwatccd • ccnve:y a more mermingtu.l ins 1ght inte God t s na'"" 
tve, is not the wq th$n opened for a mox-e 1ntell1gen.t 
WOP Ship? 
When I see thee as thou art · 
I'll p~a1s~a thee aa I ought"' 
Worship is neve~ helped by 1gnoPanoa, as Paul remind&d his 
hepxaers on ~a r li1ll. 
Ma.ta7' aspects of Whitehead's thought o:t God ax-e x-a• 
lig1ou.aly .fltu!ttu.l, but the following three l;'U'e the most 1m, ... 
press1vEu 
a. ':hat God is in constant 1nteXtaot1on w1th the unive:rse 
is an 1nsp1%41ng and reass~1ng 1t.mn of knowledge. P_$~~. 
a.t>stun.tditua, or God who is totalit~ alit~r may stimulate a. 
cwta1n ms.jestia awe. but not the %*eassuxaanoe of meaningful 
w~an1p. Go4 neve~ was apa~t from o~eat~on, no~ will he b&J 
he ia "with all c~eat1cm81 1n his eternal ce.pao1ty as the 
nlve for f'eelins11 ta exerc1s1ng a. 8 tender ps.t1encan3 1n or .. · 
faX" inS possibilities of rttru:bh, beauty • and goodness"-' to 
all actual entit1en * 
b. W·o:ttsh1p reaches its highest peak 1n the :tteal~at1on 
that communion not cnlr increases values, but God himself 
is the guarantor that ifb..ose values shall be oonse:rvei. H8f.f~ 
ding ma:r talk more about the "axiom et the oonseFVS.t!on of 
. . 
val.ue,n5 but he,. w1th his 1mpel'sonal ox-der ot natu:r-e,. tails 
2'11 
to give adequate metaphysical ~ound for such an elevated 
view. No philosopher surpasses Whitehead 1n the conviction 
that these values shall persist. · God's whole consequent 
nat'l.lre is the "home" of all va.luea origina t1ng in the world;. 
but which, upon thaht pe~.tsh1ng. find "objective irnnloX:'tality 
1n God.al That God needs these values is at once a.n in• 
sp1!*1ns and astounding revelation.: "We Qlte wO.llkexas together 
with God.u Here is the secret of an expanding and constantly 
enriched God. God 1s evez- giving QU.t•-h1s love flows into 
the wox-1.4-... but he receives ba.ok into h1s own experience the 
enhanced, 1ntens1f~ed feelings of tbs multitude of autono• 
mous entities which he o:rigin.ated. His 0 pound hath gained. 
ten pounds. 0 God 1s vitally concerned that value shall be 
conserved. "'!he image under which this operative growth of 
God~s nat'I.U'e 1a best eonoe1ved,1Ei that of a tende:r ca.t'e that 
nothing be lost.09 Hera, tndeed, is ~ound fo~ ~el1g1ous 
te.ith ot the nighest orde~-... the assurance that all worth• 
while e.tfozat,. eveey acqu1sit1on of value,. shall find bmnor"" 
ta.11ty in the pwmanenee of God. "Ea.oh actuality 1n the tem .... 
papal WaPld bas ita ~eoept1on into God's na~e.n3 
c. Perhaps the, most 1nsp1%*1ng element of worship 1n 
Whitehead's v1ew ot God is the nt)tion Qf God's 1dent1f1oa• 
t1on of htm.sel.f with the S'l.lffet-!ng of the world. '!'his opens 
l.io WhitGhead, Pft, 527 • 
a. Ibid., saa. 
a. Ibid., 531-. 
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again the whole problem of' evil, wbioh has alx»eac:Qr been 
treated. It ~emains onl~ to iruU.os.te $01ne of the :religious 
1mpl1ca.t1one of the pxwoblem. 
Fl*om the e!U*liel' disouesion, it might appeQ.l't that evil 
is net too deeply involve« 1n the metaphysical stXtuotUX*e of 
real1t,-., On ocoaaion it even appears as an instrument of 
good,. for 1t serves to shnw the diffex-ence between what an 
actual entity is 1 and what it might be., Whitehead calls 
that situation °f~rtunatettl for without the dispal'ity 
"aotu.ality would oonsis'b in a cycle of repetitiont :t*aa.lia1ng 
only a fine sxaoup of possib1lities.n2 On the Slll*faoe, thia 
view of evil appe~s non too s'er1ous, and tor some thinkers 
it might not go deep eno~J but it does take on mo~e sombe~ 
pox-tent when it is re:membwed that God ua~a: with eva%7' 
creation 1ts actual world.u3 But even m~e than a fellowship 
with the world* Godrs consequent nat~e 1tselt is the ttreao-
tion of the temporal wol*ld on the ~trm:tt!d1a}7 natux-e or 
God,114 ox- uthe weaving of God's ph,-s1cal teel~s upon his 
px-imordial concepts.80 ~1a 16J to say that God's nature is 
tnextvicably and eternally bound up with the phfsioal w~ld. 
une 1s not b~t;ol'.e all creation, but with .all oreat1on.n6 It 
. 
fellows then that the suffering of the world is God r a 
sutfe:r1ngJ its pain his pain; the world's truat:tta.tion his: 
:f.'l*ustra:b1on. OUt of this fe.ot emerges the religious value 
that God !s "the fellow"*sutterel'· who understands. nl God 
1s not one who so transcends his world, a la K'arit Ballth, 
that he· oan look on ind1ffel."entl:r while his creatves sutfe:r!. 
God ·shares with the world in that he 8 g1ves to suf'fet-ins 
ita uw1ft insight into values which can issue from it. Re 
is the ideal companion who t:ransnmtea what has been lost 
2 into a living fact within his OVlll natu:t"e ~ 11 
Ely, who has given a rigorous·, but at times unwar .... 
.rtanted, o%'1t1c1sm of the religious values in Whitehaa.ctrs 
metaphysics 1 admits that there 1s considerable value in 
the awe.t-eness ot a Being who understands and "to whose conw 
so1ousness all valuable happenings are 1mme41ately p~esent~"3 
But he argues that the knowledge means 11 ttle o:r nothing to 
the individual worshiper. "We ean tin41 at best; only a 
v1ce.xa1cus joy in o1llt sufferings a.n.d cur t:va.ged1ea.04 God 
does raoeive in his own natut'e the :expel'liences, good or 
evil, of all valuing beings; but Bly thinks that Gad 
1s interested only 1n oona~ving and produeing 
values that he alone ee.n enjoy. No matter how 
ev11-... that 1s,. how ugl.7 ........ th& wo:t-ld 1s, God. 
somehow manages to utilise 1t as an aspect o:t 
1·. Whitehead:, Pit, 532. 
e. Whitehead;· u, 154 ... 155. 
3·. Ely-, MWG·6 40. 4. Ibid., so. 
the beautiful picture he is eternally paint ... 
1ng for himself~ This p~oves him a d1v1naly 
skilful painter, but it does not1exn1b1t either human o~ superhuman benevolence~ 
!l'o this objection it might be replied that 1t still 
remains. a higher value tc knew that Gad is working with 
the world striving to ove;r.teome ita sorrows and evil than 
to feel that expe~iences of disvalue are total losses in 
the universe. Furthe:t"mmre, Ely tails to conaidex- that the 
valuaa wh1ch are tztansmuted, enhanced, or harmon1:aed in 
God are iS.~s.ad btlok into the wo~ld, 1n acao:ttdance with God•s 
own conceptual aim, so that they ue enjoyed e.~_tXte,nsmuted. 
In this ws:y Whitehead p!*ovid.ea foY.- the mutual enrichment of 
God and. the world. Ely might well be :tteminded that God and 
the WOX'ld a:re mutually immanent, so that the situation which 
he deplores doe# not exist. 
In addition to the three major Pelis1ous aspects ot 
. . 
Whiteb.aad'fs thought, that is• Godta interaction with the 
wwld, his co~operation 1n the increase and presa::t*vat1on of 
values, his u:rellowah1p o:f suf.fer1ng8 , thePe might be added 
ltlS.nY' random expressions and isolated thoughts which ~efleot 
profound religious feeling. B1s constant use of the word 
tttend.wn as descriptive ot Goctts e.et1v1tJ- is more than oold 
metap~s1cs.9 H1s last of the tolll:' creative phases of 
l. Bly, RAWG8 50~51. 2., One is :Peminded again of Whitehead's allusion to the 
worship ot the First Causa in white~washe4 ohurches9 
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aotualityl might well have been taken from a b~ok of re ... 
l1gioua devotion: 
The action of the !'oUX'th phase is the love of 
God f0'1! the world. It is the pEWt1oulaP pt'OVi• 
denoe folt' pal'tieul.a:r oooa.s:Lons. What is done 
in the wo~ld is transformed into a reality in 
heaven, and the realit~ in heaven paaaes back 
into the· world.. By reason of this reoipxtooa.l 
relation, the love in the wwld passes into the 
love 1n heaven, and tloods back flga.1n into the 
wwld.. In thia sensa, God 1$ the gX*ea.t oom•a 
pan1on~the fellowwsutfer~ whb understands. 
Again, 1n seeking to axpres.s the a.otue.lity of Go¢1 in rela. ... 
tion to the mu.lt1pl1c1ty of elements in the W(USld, Whitehead 
adopts the New Testament pbrase nthe kingdom of heaven. 03 
Many other irultanoes o.f religious te.tnn1nol.ogy eould be 
m.ent1onad. 
In aumm.ary, 1t 1s sufficient to point out that evidence 
itl abMdant 1n Whitehead, even 1n the most metaphysioal of 
his works, ,P~oceas and R~a.lii#y;, fo11 a pexesonal, loving, in .... 
tereated God, one who shax'ea the world's sorztow and stzwives 
to 1norease its joys. 
c. Oomp~ative summary .. 
The data presented in th1s chapter $'how that r~l1gion 
is integrally l'elated to the ph1loaoph1oal systems of both 
~1ghtman and Wb.itehed, f.U1d 1n particular to theil' axiology. 
For the one, nx-sl1g1on is a choice or value,n1 while for the 
other# 8 the peculi~ eharaeter of religious truth is that it 
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. . l . 
explicitly deals with values... . It is a. teet that both 
men ms.y have had a p:red.1leot1on toward. religion tU.l a re ... 
sult of e~ly t~ain1ng, but the admission of the tact does 
not neeesa8.11'1ly entaU ··the asswnpti()n tbat thai%* systems 
1'*$tleot, automatically- and uncrit1bally, a XMal1g1ous bias. 
The1:r avowal of religion as a dominant expxtesalon of value 
axper1enoa.must stand ol' tall b~ the contilistenoy of its 1n-.. 
elusion 1n their systems a$ a whol·e. !he previous material 
shows that in the oaae of neither is the inclusion a forced 
ente~priss. ~e ~eat plaoe given to ~elig1on 1s.but a 
demonstration 1n both of the bel1et that a cohe:r.-ent philosoo;.o 
Pb7 mu.st include ~ll the data of experience. 
Fe~ Br1ghtm6nt religion 1s a value~~ientation. One 
not onlf worships wha.t he consider-s tc be of supreme value, 
but he oxadera his life 1n aocovdanaa with the va.l.uee implied 
bf the object of his devotion. !fo be religious, the:refore, 
1s to be vitally conoerned about the highest values. Bright~ 
man's 11eonoex-n a.bou.t exper1aneas which axae :Pagal"de4 as of 
s~pxaema vsJ.u.e"2 is matched by 1thiteheadts "ultimata c:rav1:ng 
to 1ntuse ·into the insistent pa:rt1cular1ty of emot1ctn that 
non~temp~al gen~alit7 wh1oh pr~ily belongs to oonoeptual 
thoupt al·oneM"3 Religion in e1the.;r.t case begins with an 
evaluation by the individual wo:Pshipe~ 1n the presence ot his 
l. Whitehead, mt, l$4. 
a. See Bt'igblima.nts def1n1t1on, .POR, 171 or above. 
a. Whitehead, PR, 23 .•. 
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supreme val.ue. All values, aa indeed all types of ex• 
pe%'1anee, must begin in the conscioua self of the indivi-
4ua1,. Bl-1ghtman's da.tum ... aelrl f1nds its a.na.logtla in White-
headta pX'ehend1ng entity, but in the ease of each the pxtivate 
expeX'ienoe of the individual always Jl'efers to something be ... 
yond the self. Religion is an outreaching dim.ension. 
Just as sense 1mpl'ess1ons 1n us siva us olews 
to the objeetive order ot natur,e, ao do re• 
l1g1ous exper1encas 1n us give us olews to 
the cb~ective orier2ot value in a reality deep~ than :nat'lU:Ie,. · 
For Brightman he~e is the poi~t where taith is vital to 
rel1g1<!l'Wl value, .faith :ta an exp:ress1cn of .oontid.ance that 
the ul.tima.tel:r rea:t.·is God, the pe:rsonal originatol* and 
su.ata1ne:v of all values. Fw Whitehead, x-eligion is soli-
tariness, but it 1s e. solitude of discovery; it is the 
te:mpoX'a.:.t.7 but essential pl"e:requ.1s1te to an awareness of the 
largexa meanings and. values in the bottal st:ruot"t.We of the 
universe-. 
Both sys.tems reveal an existential strain. '!'his is 
pazttioularly true in the oase of Wb1tebsad, who emphasizes 
sol1taxa1neas, aelf .... valuat1on. and the atzaongly internal 
oharaoter of vel1g1ou.s expe~iencth Bu.t whwe religious 
existentialism cannot esoape its own highly subjent1v1st1o;~. 
1f not sol1ps1etio, pre41nrunent, Sl*ightman and Whitehead 
1 .. See APt.(l929), 560.,.561. 
s. ~1gntman, RV, 109. 
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~ound the~ religious ax1olo81 in a th~oughly objective 
metaphya1o. Religion is what it_. is because the un1vers• 
is what it is~ Such a. statement is mot-e than a tx-u1sm 
when seen in the light ot the htpeless attempts of non• 
metap~e1oal religions ~o ~Qv1de some rat~onale fo~ theiv 
bel1efs.-
Rel1g1on without a rational, matapbya1cal basis becames 
the constant v1cttm of subjeotive wh1m and psGPdo·~evelatio~ 
olatma. 1'he only' hope for rationality, oons1stancy. and 
oommu.n1cab1l1ty lies 1n the objective tcm.ndation or the sub .... 
jeet1ve S"lJerienoa~ It iS wo:rtb.y Of speo:tal note that 
&-ightma.n and Whitehead, although approaching the problel'Jl 
t'J:tom dit.fe:rent perspectives, S.gt'~Ha in their lnsistenoa on 
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tb!s necessity of a metaphysical bas1a for religion. ~t 
religion 11'1 leading man to nthe eternal in the world of change 
gives ~ a solid ·anohovage,"1 is ~ightman*a way of express~ 
1ng the relationship. Ra.t1cnal religion leads to meta.phJ'aica 
and tinde pemanen~.- li"tt.rthermore, the world 1s "fxtie:ndlytt 
to the vslue qu.aat.- Whitehead f'inds religion growing out of 
9 ' . 
0 tbe na.tve of thin{&thn Fol' ~~ m.etapt(ysios gives to re-
ligion :a. sense of b.EJi1mony w1th the rest of t-Eu1l1t7 • the 
parallel of Br:ightnilU1ta friendly- universe. It also pxrovides. 
a constant corrective to the inescapably emotive eruwacter 
1. Bltightiman, RV 1 99 + 
2• Whiteb.ea<l, RM,. 143,. 
of rel1g1onJ and f1nell7, the me1Japhys1oal is neeeaEJS!'Y 
for historical interpretation and ccmmun1cat1on* 
Xt is pFeo1sely becau.ee of ita meta.peysioal founda."" 
t1on, that :religion, foX' both of the mer.f in this stlldJ, 1e 
not incompatible with reas~n. Religion and reason ccma 
together 1n theil'* meta!'h7aics. It is reason which discovers 
in the universe e. cohex'ent Ol'derringJ hence, 1'el1g1on itself, 
if mata.pb}ra1oally gl'ou.nded, will ret'leot the kind o'E u.n1 .... 
verse with which it interacts,. :ataightman can so so f'u aa 
to aay that uthe oa.usa of reason ud the cause of religion 
stand w tall togetihet- .• 111 Rational religion 1n Whitehead.*s 
thought 1a the diecove%7 of principles which g:lva maan1ng to 
part1cu1aztity. The notion of mol'Ql1t7 artsea hette in ·the 
~elation of the individual to totality. It is nthe.funOtion 
or reason° to help the individual make harmonious adjustments 
to the universe. ~he higne&t values came only as p~oper ad• 
justment is mad~h This tunouion of tteason ia oompBl'able to 
Brightman's view that ttel1g1on must always be subject to 
the guiding hand of ~ea.son, although Bx-!gb.tme.n dcaa not 
asox-tbe to the ole.ims , of reason anything app~oaoh1ng to 111.• 
tall1bla o~tainty., Reason is a heJU'istic principle fol* 
sata~gu8Pd1n& ~e11g1cn from 1neons1atency,and incoherence. 
If there 1a !!l 8 suprema C()'UXtt" ot Judgment, then it must 
be reason. but in the case ot beth l!lr'ightman and. Wh1tehes.d 
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it has for its &ta the whole ~a.nge of experience wb1oh 
~events any nar~ow, one~s!ded t~p.raisal. 
Although Whitehead is quite p!*agmat1o in his dese1'1P""' 
tion of the function of :t"el1g1on, he does not enumerate 
ita values with the same speo1t1c1ty as does Brightman. 
Tha latter shows how rel1g1on.eontr1butes to human values 
1n P:t"OV1ding strength and 1lluminat1on 1n the pPesence ot 
su.ffex-ing, death, m.o:ral avtl. 1gnora.nce, and limitation,. 
Religion also fulfils the hunu;tn desire ~of' unity, purpose, 
and permanen~. That ~el1g1on dQes contribute these values 
to human expwienca is a matter of objective obse:ttvation, 
and 1n pov1d1ng such halp in eveey dimension of life, re<O;t 
lig1on fulfils ita proper f'tulotion. It does not solve ma.tha-
mat1os.l or economic problems. but 1t fortifies humanity- to 
meet with strength and courage the ills that are a~on to 
experienceii 
But while Whitehead may not oftw his own list of the 
cont~1butions of ~el1g1on to lite# the~e is no less reason 
to~ asc~ib1ng to h1s God the c~aote~1st1os which make the 
worship ot him meaningful and oreative. Whitehead's God 
is nava1lable" or his system tails to exempl1fy at this 
point the mutuality ot prehand!ng entities wh1oh constitute 
the total f:J:tamework of real1 ty-* some evidence bas been 
educed above to show that 1t is not extreme to refw to 
Whitehead's God as personal. A strictly tmp~sonal universe 
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could not produce the kind of experiences which he sets 
forth as possible. !hare r.ns:s be raoiprooat1on among ale-
manta 1n a non•personal universe, but it is veey d1tf1oult 
to contend fw ~ean1nstul, x-eciproca.tion. Despite the taro ... 
m1nolog1cal barrier to the worship ot Whitehead's God, the 
divine-human l'el.a.t1onsh1p set fol'th can only be deso:r1bed 
as religious. i'hezte is gl'eat value 1n the knowledge that 
God is wi}~ all c~eation, exe~o1s1ng in that relat1onsh~p 
e. care and tenderness that nollr'ishea eve;tty feeble flicker 
ot life and hope~~ 
The bruised Jteed he.w1U not b:reak 
:eu.t st:t"'angthan·and auatain,l 
God. conserves and 1nox-eases all values,. but despite the 
oontant3.on of lily, he does not de it 1n isolated 1ndiffell .... 
enoe, or tor eg(;)istic selt-adva.nt~tge. 
What GoCl .stutives for is the max1mu.m conox-etenesa and 
heJ:'tmony in the universe 1n which all actual entities find 
the~ p~oper place according to 8Godts all~emh~aoins oon• 
csptual valuat1ons.82 This is Whitehead's doutrina of 
teleology.a In atming at order as the end of all oaopera-
tive attwt between God and. the wwld, God is alway-s per ... 
suasive re.thw than coercive. He de1lerminas what a.re the 
noptt.mal linlits"4 of .fl'ee actions which he weights 1n the 
1. Well•known lines frOlll lh1tt1erts ~e Eternal GQodnesf;l. 
s., Whitehead, PB, 374., ·~ - ~ 
3. See 1btda~·l27• 
4. Bazttahorne, Dllr l.4S. 
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dtrect1on of the max~ good. BUt whatever the response 
1n the world of action, good or evil, God shares it. Where 
tha~e is opposition he 1s still the~e to meet it with good~ 
ness. Hartshorne richly illuminates this aspect or White• 
headts thought in the following: 
God conflicts ••• only with what he also par• 
ticipates ln tbx*ough his sena1t1v1t,- e:tt 
'tender:ness.. r If Whitehead aa1d less tban 
this, it 1s the logic of his system tha' would 
collaps§, and not me~ely its ~lig1ous applica• 
b111ty.J. 
To know that God shares e.l.l e:Jtpet-ienoe w1 th suoh unde:tt" 
standing is pl*oduot!.ve of the highest inspiration,. Here is 
cooperation, fellowship• orea.t1v1ty, a$1 va.tion. Oo4 is trul,-
0ava1lable.n 
Bt'igb.tman t·s dia,ousaion of religious values comes to a 
moving ol.tnJ.u 1n his discussion of the creat1va valu·es of 
wo~sh1p. Worship es contemplation brings ealmneas and 
poise; as an illuminative axpe:r1enca 1t opens up spil'1tua1 
insights otherw1ae unattainable J S.$ oom.m.union the wo:rahiper 
feala through mu:t'Wl.l reaponsa that he is pal't of' the wee. .. 
tive process of the universe, and as ~ition the life is 
enl:'1che4 41'ld. made pl:"oduct1V~h Fuxtthe:t'm.Ora, wo:rahip throws 
a new perspective ·tm the purposes ·of lite,~ :revealing at 
once the limitless poss1b1l1t1es of progxaess in the spiritual 
realm ooupled with the power, 1n cooperative ·effort with God, 
283 
to aohieve the tx-ans.to:t"ma t1 on. or the 1nd1 vidual lite and 
the oomnnmity of which he 1s a pe:rt. 
In BP1ghtman• as well as Whitehead, 1t is 1n the 
l1m1ts.t1en of God that his goodnese is revealed.. Finite ... 
nasa, suffering, 1noompleteneas, st.vussla, assUXJe sympa-
thetic understanding'a.nd el1eit ooope:t'*ativa effort as ne 
theistic absolutism will do. Q;tnipotent powe:tt, besides 
x-aising e.n insoluble problem of apparent divine lnaetivit,. 
in the i'ace of av11. is not necessary for religious worship~ 
What is nel)easaxa}r 1s e. Power who will not eease 1n the con., 
tlict of oreativit7 with non~oreativ1t7• There is mrst1eal 
value 1n the knowledge that God 1a contending with but al~ 
ways. able to contxeol the reeale1trant. elements wh1eh make 
the or1g1nation6 increase, an4 oons~vation of values in 
the uni'!erse an eternal stl'Uggle. 'J!he constant etfort:t 
instead of suggesting fail:u.re. opens the possibility cf 
eterne.l progtreaa • of wh1oh this:· life 1a probs.bl7 only the 
beginning o~ a continuously eau-iohed e.nd creative existence 
beyond physical death. 
Brightman $-lld Wh1tehead.are both opt1m1at1oally orien ... 
tated towa.:rd the .tutve. Re11g1cn is an experience ot hope, 
a dtmension ot sp~it reaching tow~d aver new creative 
poss1b111t1as. It 1a an adventure itt the o~eat1on of val~ 
uas • Without the px-ogress and the adventu:r.-e thwe is 
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nothing newa there is only deadening repetition. Re• 
l1g:t.ous faith is the a3sura.noe that tomo~ow can be 
better than today. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EVALUATION 
~e purpose Qf tbis chapter 1s prima~ily evaluative. 
Several po1nts fi"mn th& thought of' eaeh W:Ul will be ae-
lecte4 as the bases f~ er1t1oal appraisal of their strengthS 
a.nd w·eskneasea. · Some cona1de~s.t1on will be given to the 
question of the :relevancy of their' '\ta.lue theo:r:t1es tor the 
contempwa%7 sasne. !rbe ohaptea- will conclude with a final 
compa:r.-ativa est1l'.liate o£ the two men. 
A. B1" ightman. 
1~ Majo%' JU*eas of Cr1t1c1sm. 
Both the atvength and the weakness of Bl'ightman' s 
axiological theoX7 center a:t-ound tbltee fundamental oonoepts 
1n his thought, vu., God1 d1svalue, and pel.*sonality. Al ... 
though these concepts have already been discussed in previous 
chapters, it 1a the pux-pose now to evaluate them 1n a wider 
perspective* 
a. God .. 
aaa 
The que.ntit:r of Qrit1oism aimed at a. man ts general 
thought ma:r o:tt l'IJS."$' not be greatly e1gnit1cant, but some sig .... 
n1!'1canoa 1s r~vealid when the bulk at oomment• by £tUt, ew1 ..... 
te~a ~ound one particular aspeet. The ove:ttwhelming ettent1on 
accoroda4 to :att1ghtmants doow:tne o.f God suggests that it is 
unique enough to attract noti,ee and suffioientl;y meritw-. 
ioua to wax-rant both philosophical e.~,clalm and diaapp:toval. 
one might also deduoe that Bri!h'blnan's d.o~trine of God 1s 
his ma3o:tt- contribution to philosopb;r. L,. R. DeWolf 1n a 
very X*eoent az-t1cle declares that ttthe principal innovation 
ot BX*ightman t a metaphysics and phUosopb:y of r-eligion was 
l. his theistic fin1tisnt~n · 1'b.e fixist senten~e of another' 
article says 1 . uAmong the m~ cont:tJibut1ona to religious 
thought made by' Edge.r Sheffield Bl*ightman, the most famous 
and moat cont);'ovea-~1s.l was h1s attempt to solve the problem 
. . 
of ev11.u2 Br1ghw.manfs solution, of course# rests in his 
tl:;teiatio finl.t13m • 
. 'l'he oha.:ttge or dualism is .the majel' me'hapbysieal ob'"* 
jeotion made to Bl-igb.tman:ts view of God, a a~1t!e1sm which 
he by no mea.ns accepts tw being valid. F:vom the religious 
and axiologioal pwspecti"U'e, the majozt objaot1on oonsista 
1n the el.aim that theistic f1n1t1sm is an inadequate ptt1n""' 
oiple en which to build a 1'ounds.t1on of faith and. values. 
It p%!obably is a faat that the .faith of ma:r:w P'eople 
. 3 
neannot acquiesce in a t1n1te God,n as Garvie says. ~e 
questions asked at BJ:Jightmanfa public leetll!.'es, the lettel's 
o'£ pztotest, the crit1o1sms in religious books ~evea.l a great 
sensitivity 1n ragal*d to the eharactel." and powex- of God. 
SS7 
Whethe~ or not thinke~s. both ~ot1ve1y ~el1g1ous1 and 
~igerousl7 ph1losoph1oal,2 ~J!Sh~ to hold to one particul~. 
view of God, finite or absolute, ia not the question. A 
God li'hosa nat\U'e or will reveals some aspects ot finitude 
ma,- veli.''T well be tha kin4 of God that ·ax1sta; on the otheP 
b.and:~t e. GotJ. who is absolute in sel.f..-suftic!.enq but who may 
enter into meaningfUl relationships ms, be the real God. 
In making evaluation oZ the er:1t1c1sm the question 1e 
whethe~ or not the cb3ect1on oan. be sustained. An anawer 
eithel' wt!J.'9' invcl vea d1ft1oult1es # In some minds an abso .. 
lute God is ne~eaa~y to aas~e the permanence of values 
and. x-el1g1ous hope~ tb.ere.fwe the answeP must be yes.. A 
f1n1te God would and do&s damage faith* But the af'ti»mativs 
reply 1s mru:te at the expense o:t a aat1staltQX7 aeeountins 
of disvalu.fh lf the anew~ 1s no6 then 1t is naeesstu7 for 
e.dvooatea of the view to show that the1st1o finitism pro .... 
vides the grotU'1Cl tor re11g1oua .faith and S'Ul"'Vival ot values., 
Bx-igb.tman u.nde%ttakss that task with great vigor a.nd succeeds 
in presenting a view which, for ~ thinkers, gives more 
ground for fa.lth than the t~aditional absolutism •. 
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Hew 41amet3:-ioally opposea man ean be on .the answer to 
the question of the adequaey of the1£ttio fin1t1sm is :taevealed 
1n the views ot two men selected almost at random, The :first 
is tbat ot Go o. Cell, who sees 1n the .doctPine a menace to 
1. For example, Gordon Ha Clflztk1 eve. 2. For example, B. P. Bowne, 0'!1 or -nm. 
pxaaet1ca.l religion tand ta1th. In e.n&.l.ys!ng some ot the 
views antagoniatio to tre.d1t1onal. Cbl;t1st1an1ty- he sarst 
The net res~t for! :pl*aet1eal religion and the n 
seneX'Bl efteou on the l1t~~ino1ple of the 
Ohristian faith 1s all one whether God 1$ b~ 
!shed. t:l:'om the un1vax-se aa 1n deiam o~ is lost 
1n the tUilverse as 1n Xtecent pantheism and 1n 
the confusion 1a :tJepresented as stricken with 
·finitude, 1mpotent.17t hopel!.esl7 sb.a!'hlg ·1n its 
p:ttocessas of good and evil.,. 
On the other side is the opinion of Joshua Liebman,. who ss.7st 
. . 
At first it seems Awing, it not heretical., 
fw ua to say that God 1a not omn1p4)1sent•.., 
that :S:a1 too1 is limited. We ask in amazsment1 
tlfow can God be limttedt It H$ is not all• 
powerhJ....; .... e;ble to. do anytth!ng that Re wUls .... .-
then surely Be ea.naot be GotU' I de:n:y this 
OQnelusion, It I d1d not believe that God ia 
.11lu1ted by the vef!1 natve of the world He 
oraatSf~ then X would have t() slWX"endw tr13' 
faith. · 
Sueh opinions show th$ 1mposs1b11itcy- ot decla:r1:ns 
with assurance that either side of the (Labate is ••right., 11 
If theistic f1n1tism is ~el1g1ously inadequate to~ same, 
11 is also the ohl:r adeq,uate view for others"' 'l.'herein is 
both weakness and st~ngth.- ~1nJJrul realized that he 
eoul.d not enunciate a dcetr1ne of God equaUy satisfactw;v 
to all. loP did he t~. nMore 1s lost than is ga1ned1° 
he saya, 0by 1ns1sting on an idea of God wh1oh shall please 
3 
eveJ7tmEh 11 But whatever Bl'1e;htDUUl ms:r have 1ntended, hie 
doot~ine of God has been evaluated mora by theolog!oal 
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c:r1tex-1a and l)1*act1.cal religious experience than by' st~1etl:.y 
philosophical oategor1es. But that is not necessarily a 
disa.dva.ntageous consequence tor-ana who del1bet-s.tely at-
tempted to supply a ooherent pbJ.losoph14al framework fo:rt 
~el1g1ous faith and values. He holds that it is useless 
to discuss the ~eat valuea of :tteligion with 1mposa1ble 
axiotm!t.~ It is BX-1ghtman 'a position that onl7 a satisfaot&X? 
view of God w 111 allow for a. aatia.ta.otoey view ot religion. 
The gl"eat strength of Brightman's the1a't#1c f1n1t1~tm tor 
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value thaoey 11es in its empix'ica.l adequacy. bpeZ'ience 
show& that values are achieved in· struggle and patn. Close 
obsexavat1cn ot soc!et7 and the ver7 physical universe :re-
veals the same struggle thfil:re to'¥! the aohievement of lasting 
values.· In Bt-1ghtmants view the notion that God is sharing 
in that struggle is a :rel1g1ous value ot the highest order. 
Not f1n1t1am but absolutism leaves religion cold and tenacus~ 
By starting with all tha facts of experience", good and. 
evil, Brightman baa given to religion a. firm halifis in "the 
natux-e of thinga11 thereby doing tnllGh not only toward the 
restoMtion ot religion -as a topio wall wox-t~ of philo,.. 
soph1cal Qcnsideratton, bat he has shown to ~eligion1sts 
themselves that phUosopby may well be an ally ra.thelt than 
an enelll\9'• JeJll.ll)s. may speak of the "shallowing effect" of the 
intellEtot 1n his somewhat h'on1e appeal to ttaee how the an.,. 
alent spirit of Method1~m ·evaporates under those wonderfully 
able rat1onalist1o booklets (which evexay onG should read} 
of a ph!losopheF like Prafeasor BownaJnl but whatever truth 
the~e may nave been in Jameeta opinion, ~ightman has helpe4 
allay- many of the sufiJplo1ons that somaew :mstap~s1ca and 
religion are mutually exclusive. 
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Bt-igb.tman and Whitehead both ab.Qw that only by )l'efer• 
anoe te the un1t7, permanency, and stability of the univwae 
ce.n religion 1tsalt hope to achieve stability and rationality. 
The very 0 emot1ve» nature of religion 1s ite ow.n worst en~, 
especially 1n the effort to establish a no~t1ve definition. 
This 1s not meant to imply tbat B'.t'ightman _or Whitehead 
sought to eliminate feeling f.tlom. religion. V917 much to the 
rsontxaS%7. But as Whitehead s~,. "1ts authority 1s e~ 
2 
gered b~ the 1ntens1 ty or the emotions which 1t gEtneFates. u 
~eistio t1n1t1~ ~ not be the ult~te answeF to 
the "problem or God", but it has the advantage of ~igo~oua 
agreement with the facts of experience, Paul ! .. Johnson 
S8.7SI 
Rowevel" one mt!l.Y agres Gt* disagree with B1'1ght• 
mants view ·of God,. t)l'lG must admit tbs.'b he is 
xaeal.istic enou.gh to face tha problems and ex~ 
1sano:tes or life honestly and rigorouEJly, 
without glossing trve~ fihe evil in eve.s1v1J cp• 
ttmiam o~ yieldtng3to deapa~ 1n supine o~ defiant peaetmism. 
b. Distralue. 
There are two basic app~o·a~a to the Pl'Dblem of dis• 
value:· first, one might deal with it st~iotly as one ot the 
m.oli'e or less classic pl'Oblem$ ot metaphysics, ox- he might be 
motivated uowa:rd it by the insistent demands of expe~ience. 
With the .th*st motive Bx-ightmsn baa very little in common. 
Rartsbnr-ne and Reese say that ~1ghtman 1e 1nol1ne4 to tl*ea.t 
th~ p~oblam of God 0pragmat1cally.ul B1s theory of evil, 
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which entails his view ot theiatio tinitism {or vice ve:t".sa), 1s 
not the mere juggling of' ideas • bub an intellectual and emo .... 
ti$1 conviction growing out of the raw taets of expe:rienc~, .. 
There is no question but that Bl*lghtman has ex~essed. 
tho teeliags ot a ~ltitude of peeple who have found tn his 
frank treatment. of evil e. x-elease ~ the teJ1r1t1c tensionEt 
nrouaed by the tll'l.resolved ant1nom, haunting their mind& of a. 
tho~oughly good God e.nd the tl"ag1c :revelations of llfe .. 2 In 
an ~ge when the "vain speculations" of. philosophy are viewed. 
with disdain by ~d·b:1tten ul'eal1sta", the practical 1rnp11-. 
cations of B:r-ightman's disvalue theoey should help alleviate 
the o%*1t1,c1sm of othar .... woxald11ness. 
Praot:toal aa &»1ghtsman r s theo%7' ot evil is_ it 1s 
eomewhat pa,.-adOJdeal. that it should be :tt$1Sed to "ultimate 
status", a~t Fe:rre says~ by mak:l.ng 1t tM problem or God.3 
1. ~tahcrne and Reeae, PSG, 364. 
a. See some tavox-able comment;s by- .ro:rme:r students of Brightman 
in an article by P. A. ~toec1 and M. A" Oo.rea• 11Edgar 
Shet't'1eld .Bl:-ightma.n Thr'o~ lUs students I Eyes, • Phil~~: Eo~, 
lS ( 1954) , 53-67 • 
a. Pew$, CtJG, 26. 
This may- not amount to laying l'ough hands Of). the ~eatesu 
concept of all thought, but it may 'Qe an unnecess~y r~duc .... 
tton of that concept to tez-ms of limited experience and 
posa1b1l1ty.1 Fe:t't-e is quite tteluotant to accept a tb.eo1ey' 
which makes God pa.y for the lack itt man'$ own intellectual 
purse. Bette~ allow to~ 1gn~anee on the human side than 
til'litude en the d1v1nEh 
unpleasant tant which cannot be ~ead1ly fitted into th~ 
cosmic patte~n does have some value whioh cannot now be 
a.ppreo1ate4 but will be appe.l'49nt later.a 
" FerPe t s attitude is one of caution. He evidently 
thinks 1t is better to be without .a theory- which nsolvesn 
the problem than to proclaim a view of God which 1s "too 
olosel.lr tied dawn to a finite cu)smic epoch and 1s not sutf!!ll 
tio1ently e.ncb.ored in the metapby'sical ana.lys1a of ultimate 
being as suoh~n3 
" The orit1o1am offered by Fe~re iG toreefUl.. It 1$ h1s 
opinion that despite the need tor solution to the problem 
of evil th& concept of a .t1n1ta God does not do juet1de to 
the notion ot "u.lt!ms.te eelt--bahlg .. u4 Bl.-1ghtllUUl'a obvious 
who want to avoid ascribing evil to God. &ightman is 
not averse to the view that God is 1n some sense trans~ 
l. 
eendent. but care must betaken not to posit a God who is 
out of touehwith reason and experience. ~e only basis 
we bava for knowledge of anything, b:wne.tJ. or divine# is 1n 
experience. To go beyond the .facts, even in a theoey of 
God, !s unampiv1cal. 
It is to Bxt1ghtman's o:redit that his willingness to 
meet facts head on doeaonot rob btm of his positive o~ien~ 
tation toward the tutuve. .Para.doxioa.lly, it is because 
God is finite and the struggle l'ea.l that he sees hope to%' 
tomox-row. To B:r1gntmanrs mind 'bhe effo:t:tt, the pain, evan 
the failUl"e# a:tte $.11 evidence that the good 1s not van-
quished and quiescent. ~e fa.ets suggest that not all is 
well with the wo:rld1 bun experience also reveals a wealth 
of goodness and faith11. Wbatleve:r else might be $aid about 
God, Brightman never doubts his goodness ox- his constant 
devotion to the etaatnal task of hl"1ng1ng order and meaning 
out of ~e Given. 
In view of 81-ightme.n' s care neve:r to oomp:romise the 
ohtU'aote:r of God. 1t is diftioul.t to see how c1'1t1os oan 
oha:vge him with making God evil~ B:r.t1ghtman takea gt"'&at 
pains to distinguish between the elements in God's natutte 
which limit his will,. and God's good w1ll itself. The .fo~me:r 
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elements fU'a the ooea.aion ot evil iil the world, but God's 
will is nev~ evil,. Xis will is limited in powel' but never 
l 1n goodness ~ love. 
It is not impossible that a aritie like Gordon H. Clark 
could miss the point 1 for his a1m seems always to be · refu-
tation rather than unde~stand1ng,. He acknowledges that the 
will of BX'ightma.n•s .ngod112 1s good- but he goes on to sayt 
Let God 1s will be goodJ God's natuve or char ... 
aote:r is evil, and the totality ot these two 
parts of God, h!s will plua·hia essenoe, forms 
a sohisophranio personalit7.3 -
An analrs1s of this so~t is v~ tar ~om the taota and 
spirtit of Bxtightman's own interpretation. 
Not so easily excuss.bl$ is the comment offered by 
w. B. Sheldon in a disou$s1on of the concept of divine lim• 
itation; 
If' the limitation of' His power comes ~om a 
~etracto17 element in His own tr:IELke .. up, as 
Brightman ux-ges, then oel'tainl,- Be is not even 
perfect 1n intention, ainoe pa.r'li ot Hi! veey 
self tends to thwart His will"to~good. 
Not ineorrect 1s Sheldonts inte~pretation that Godts w~ll 
:ts thwartedt but how thi$ can be conlJtX'Ued to :reflect on 
the 1nte~1ty of Godta intention is difficult to see. ~ere 
5.s not the slightest ev1denoe in Br'1ghtma.n 'a thought to 
1. Brightman, POR, 337. . 
2. When discussing what &-1ghtman means by God, Ola.rk is 
rudely u.noompliment9.17 by- his ~etuaal to oapitaliae "god." 
.See examples in OVMT, 27'1 t 2'18. 
3. Ibid., sso. Note also ,RB.Ssim. 
4. Sheldon. GP, 1954. 
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suggest that God's highest and fnllest intention 1s any• 
thing but pe~fectly good. 
Also confused is the Ve'lrY able team of critics, Barts100 
hox-na and Reese. The avowed puvpose of theil' excellent an-
thology and oomment~, ,Pb.J.loso@.ers Sieak .o:r God, is "to 
aid x-eaders 1n estimating the vs.lldityrt of the views ot God 
contained. therein, 1 but whethev they achieve their aim 1n 
all respects, in vegard to Brightman ie open to question. 
At least one comment does not seem to agree with the facts~ 
They say of his doctrine of ~e Givent uit is God's ab ... 
atract ~pose which is Wholly good, and it is elements of 
his conovete e.xperience wh1ch a:ra avu~n2 :rn the l1ght of 
Blt1ghtma.n t s insistence that God is "a conscious Person or 
, Jezt.fect good will, u:S it is doubtful if he would allow the 
cr1t1c1sxn to go unchallenged that it is only God's abat:ract 
purpose that is good. Godts goodness sounds ve~y cono~ete 
as the expel*ienoe of a Ooslllic Person~ "Goodness and a.ll 
otha~ values are meaningless except as eonscious expeviences 
••• Good.nesff that is nobod7'& goodness 1s no goodness at a11.n4 
Maybe if Hartsho~e and Reese had not ltm1ted themselves so 
exolusively to ~a Problem of ~o~ they would have seen that 
tor Brightman goodness is the veey heart of God's concrete 
activity. Only with a oonsiste:n'bly seod God could Bl'ight~ · 
-- ~' ~ 
man, o:r al'lYbody, build a· tb~o:vy of values whiah has its 
gou.nd and strength in the meta.Pb¥sica.l s'bruotlU'e of the 
I 
universe. It God, although findtng in his own nature ale~ 
ments wbioh make effort necessary, is caprioioua and ;t;ra ... 
resolute 1n enlisting his will on the side of values, then 
a theory of d!avalue is the only empirioally sound position. 
But Bx-1ghtman is S'IU'ely right in his conviction that the· 
evidence of expeitienoe reveals mor-e goodness than evil in the 
wwld, and God is etwnally on the side of good. 0 Wbatevw 
the origin of evU may be, and howevev awful it ma.y be, God 
is the one who is never baffled by ~-ev1l.ul Here is 
Brightman' a "solution" to the problem of disvalue" 
th Pex-sona.i1tJ" * 
'l'he concept of person~1ty • as applied to both hl.Ull.aD 
beings ana God, 1s the thix'd ms.3or center a.l'*ound which 
BJ:t:tghtman' E~ theo~ of VQlue turrut., There 1s no need. to 
duplicate all the evidence hare whioh Brightman sets fo"ll'th 
as the basis fov his view that pe~sonal1ty is the only ade·· 
quate axiological px-inciple., Thl'ee smmnB.X'1~1ng quotations 
· will serve to x-eview Brightman's position and ox-ient the 
follo~ng evaluative discussion. 
From his article, "Freedom, Purpose, and Valueu t 
~he p!'imaey fact 1 fiaom which all facts are 
derived., which all theories interpret,. and 
:r~om which e.ll free action emanates,. is 
the ts.ot ot the total conscious situation 
which is a pe:t'sonts present expevienes.-
In that expex-1enee:r vision, insight, and 
synopsi~ ~1tunct1ons of the will ~o pUP• pose values. 
From Nature and Values: 
Peraonalism will ba taken to mean the be-
lief tbat the universe ie a soci$ty or 
conscious beings, that the ene:x- gy which · 
physicists describe 1& God's will 1n action, 
and that the!*e 1s2no wholl,- uneonso1cue o:r impersonal baing. 
Also from Na1nn-e and Values 1 
Xn the broadest sense, pel'aonalism 1a the 
belief that conscious personality is both 
the supx'eme vatus and the St1pl*ema !'eal.ity 
1n the un1vexase. · 
The substance of these tl'J.taee passages !a that the meta-
~s1cal universe and valuea are both f~ms ot pe~sonal 
experience. The main question fol:" evaluation is Whether or 
not Brightman r s pexrsone.l1am is an adequate axiological p:rin ... 
oiple. 
~ee types of e~1t1c1sms are offered against the oon~ 
oept of pel"sonality as the "ultimata category ot 1dent1tyn4 
and the locus o:t' value fe..ets: 
on the human level, the ti:rst obJection is that it 
ele~ates pe~sons berond the~ ~e impo:rtanoe. A modern 
nat'UZ'aliet, J, H. Randall, Jt.w., fo:ts example, sees a collapse 
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or pb.1l.osoph1e idealism with the passing away or "the 
problem to which philosophic idealism was a solution,nl 
1,. e., manta plana in 'bhe univazat:Uh 0 .How can :man's 1ntel'-
ests and values be given a cosmic signifieanoe,n he asks,. 
u 1n the f'aoe of a science stes.dil-7 underm1n1ng the t1-a ... 
d1t1onal Hebrew .... Obristian gu.~a.ntee of man's central place 
1n the eosmos?09 Beyond doubt the~e is a cer-tain danger 
ot pride oxa na~rowness in an exagge:ttated. a.nt:t:u;.opocent~t1sm, 
but it 1s possible that Rt.Uldall is gu1ltr of the quantita ... 
t1ve .fallacy whioh tends to measUX"e values in te:r-ms of size 
w data d.e:r1ved &om the expe1-imental. method.*5 ~al:'entl:r 
ll'1lUl. t s pla.ee 1n th$ un~ve:t"s·e is cf little account it the 
vast l'eaohas o.f space be the stand.at'd. bu.'b what fU'e' the 
:t*ee.lms of space and time 1t there are. no sentient beings. 
Bapable of value and thought? Brightman sa)Ts 1 
!rhe place ot parson~:tt7 1n the l'ealm of ends 
1s not to be determined by the ~pace that 
man's body oeeup1es or by the time that elapsed 
befo:r:-e he was b~, but Pather bi the values 
tbat he 1'* cs.pa.bla of :r-eala1:ng. · 
The tendency en th$ pat't of naturalism to reduce the statue 
ot human pe~sonality in the taca of science omits the verz 
.taotor which has elevated soienoe to the nobl:e position 
which 1t bas achieved, vts., zealous, pwposeful l:.1.uman per-.. 
sonalit7~ 
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on the divine level, a second type of cr1t1o1sm is 
the Vel!'~' common chaPga of e.ntm.opomol"phiam. "God 1 n the 
objection goes, UJ.s made too much attar the nua.nner ot human 
pe:rsons.lity.ul One ot the most xseoent of such app:-aisals 
is given by HBPtsh~ne and Reese, who say that in making 
personality e.ppl1oa'ble to God B.t-1gb.1iman's "pxaocedura leads 
to e.. conception s 1m1lu in :many :tteap$cts to a veJ.7 great 
h\Ul'!EUl be1ngt-nS Both philosophioal and :t-el.1g1ous theism 
have had to contend with this ~1tio1sm, wh1oh has mM1.7 
forms~ J;n an uiolog1oal context the objection 1s Xta1aed 
against the argumant that because uonly pa:Nums appx-eeiate 
values~; the~etore there lmlSt be a 'b!t*ansoendent pe%i'son who 
o:re•s and iJgut!.l'anteest them., 113 A. ox-1t1e like McOX"aeken 
contends f'Urthex- ths.t 
there is no logical ~eason w~ values should 
not emerge f:tt.om an 1mp&t*sonal Baingt and 
even 1£ the a.~gttment tw paX'Stlnal1t7 1n the 
Orea.to:l' 1s granted..,_ 1t dies not gu.arantee 
his value 01' 'soodnass. f 
MoOX'aGken is not objeoting to the goodness of God, as hia 
subsequent discussion shows, but he is opposed to the in,.. 
tex-enoe that God 1s personal and good on the pounds that 
human persons have eape~ienoes of value. 
Bl'ightmants. x-eply to thi£J type of objection is that 
1. One person in oonvera*ticn with the ~1te~ aa1d that to 
:make God personal is to set up an idol. 
S.: l:tal"tshex'ne and .Reeae1 PSG, 363. S• MOOPaoken~ fV, 14~15. 
4.: Ib1d., 15• 
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there 1s obtt1oua need of some sol't of oo:smio ~gan1zat1onal 
pr'1nc1ple, and divine personality 1s the onl,- adequate ey .... 
pothes1s wh1ah can give meaning tn the totality of the 
un1vel'sa, ~eluding the metaphysioal stl'Uot'W!Je of the world 
e.nd human experience. The aim or philosophy 1$ to make 
expal'iettee 1ntell1g1ble. fb.e pax-t oannot be S$pa.xi,tsd from 
the whole,. 'fhexsetox-e 1t !a not inoobe:r$nb to say that '1113' 
experiences_ of value 1nd1oai& the type of system in wh!oh_ 
values are p:rasent, net by :reason of to).etts.tion• but because 
ot t~ genuine 8 hosp1 tality" aoowded to them by the uni ve:t-ae. 
Without s. s:ynopt:tc log1o of coherence, and 
the ~otb.es!s that the Ullivarse is f1:!1andly 
to our ideals* the ideal of t:rubh, as well 
as the ideals ot goodness and beauty- and 
holiness, become subjeot$,.ve .tict1ons;1e.tld thought is impotent to pa.sp :l*eal1~"@ 
For B:r1gb.tman1 a notb.lng less tht.ul a $U.JWeme, cons c1ous Person 
can adequauely sat1sf7 the demand to~ a ttnif.ring prino!ple 
in whiCh both na~e and values are at home and adequately 
accounted .for. fhe axiological relationship of the supreme 
and hwnan minds 1s succinctly rendex-ed 1n the Shol't S"utnniU''"" 
:taing $ta.tement ot Brightman that ttun1versals M'e the 
thought-stuff of a supx-ema mind; values the no1'mat1ve ap"" 
preo1at1ons of a aupXJeme mind that ought tt> be known and. 
$ 
appzrec.f.e.ter.i by hums.n minda •11 
The 'bhil'd majw type of oritieism is that personality 
1s too na.ttrow a concept. eithel' on the human or div11'ls 
levels • JPer%7 expressea this point of v1ew when he Bays 
that 
there is more to a pe~son tbAn hia person~ 
alit,". 'lhet'$ are neoess~ oond1t1ons of 
pe:rsonalit~ • such as habit and temperament 
-but which do not ~ h1lrt a pex-son.J... 
Pe:c-ryts objection is lwgely aenua.nt1oal, involving what .... 
ever d1ffe:aenoe there is between "pe;rson" end "persona.l.ity.,u 
Certa:tnly by ttpe~sonal1t711 Bt'1ghtman does not mean a.'ll'l light 
and ai%7 thine; apart from the total expettienae of what a 
hu.man baing in~~ upersonal1\y 1a not a t'ixed and complete 
entity that can be labeled and J»,*eserved 1n a museum,.tt 
say-s Bx'1gb.tman .. 2 BUt a pel*~um. doea 1nolude ttall it$ ex-
• -- 0- ' 
p~1enoea-... 1ts memoriesJ 1ts ~poses, 1ts values, its 
. . 
powe~s, its act1v1t1es. and its axperienoed interaot1on 
with its envil'onment.n3 
H8ftdin8 in h1a .~hilos();shx;_of.RelJ.ston sets fwth 
some ~easons wey he thinks pe:refonal.1 tT is inacceptable as 
applied to God• Personality- a.a we understand it, he a.x--
gues, 11atx-ivas and stl'Uggles,. asserting 1taelf 1n the face 
of opposition;"' but without that st~ggla the concept of 
personality 1s but an abst~aotJ.on, o~ at best an analogy. 
Brightman's own theistic f1n1tism is the best answe~ to 
this objectien. Xt 1s ~ecd.sely because of th$ struggle 
an4 s :hn1l.ra~ traits that B!.i1ghtman Qalls God pa:rsonal •. · 
H8ffd1ng'~· seoond o:t'1t:toiam of the concept of divine 
personal1t]f 1a that pel'aonality becomes l.esa applicable 
to God the more he ia oonceivecl as absolutEh•l On this 
po1nt.B8ffding ia probabl7 nearer to t~utb than 1n his 
:f'il'st cr:l.t1o1am. It is difficult to th1nk of the God of 
-
.A.x-iatotle or 'fholn.aa Aquinas as baing pex-aons.l, although 
. . 
th!.nkers like iQy-cua1 OaJJd.ns• and ~be Basel have a~ 
thing ap~oaebJ.ng a pe~S(txtal. absoluteh But B8ffd1ng's 
cr1t1oum is at111 somewhat abstraot1 foX' not too 11W.n7 
hold to Aristotle' a e.cttUJ ~~.· Whe:re God 1e seen aa 
limited,. it is neithex- presu.mpt1ve nor injud1o!ous to ap• 
pq the concept o£ pe%"sons.li ty to. God. 
H8f.tdingts thwd majol."' !"a-aeon fo%1' a :vajeotion ot divine 
p&l*sonal1't7 is not beeau.ae v1t ia too high but baca:u.sa 1t 
.t.a. too low a daterminat:lcn o~ the deity~"& R8ftd1n,g teels 
t.bat pe:r.-sonal1ty just tteann.ot Etxplt*aaa. the 1nexbe.ust1ble 
~1neiple which -comes to light ln the Veif7 fact of the ·ex• 
1stence of this wo~la..•3 H&ffding oalla h1a own cono.eptio:n 
of God critical Mon1snt.,4 in rea.l1t:y' a modifiad. pliUltheism 
with clo$e affinities to nat-t.walism. Ka ~ejects, b.owave:r;-1, 
the type of' pant:twism which makes God immanent in the world 
1 process, whethe.~ God is conceived e.s person or not. 
The objection that personality is too low a concept 
to apply to God is met by Brightman's comment that 
instead of taking personality to be too human 
a. oatego17 to apply to God, it would really 
be more logical to take it as too d1vine a 
category to apply to m.an.s 
~od1 instead of hwnan beings, is the .stand~Wd of parson .... 
al1t7. But what man is is the best clue to what God is., 
On the baaia ct h.uman expe:t>ienoe o:r God, what is known of 
htm is personal in o~aote~~ lmpersonalism cannot axplatn 
the wealth of l'el.1g1ous, ethical, and a:&1olos1cal insights 
which OOllt$ as the ~a$Ult of tx-ee.ting God as a person cse.pabla 
of entering into reeipl*oca.1 relations. with othw persons. 
The importance of the concept of an underatand1ng, feeling 
God, cs.pa.ble ot shaxaing the values and eu.ffel'ings ot the 
WOX*ld, cannot be overestimated.. !l?he p~1oe paid to'l! such 
a view is the che.l'ge o.f h\UDJUl1S1ng God, a.nd wh1l.e an antlwo""" 
pomo'l!ph1o view is not intended, it 1S wo'l!th the price 1f 
God 1s ms.de available to man in terms which give meaning 
to his religious wo:ush1p and value effort. 
The only God wo~Uh believing in.~.in the 
light of the evidenea, !a a God 1ft living 
relat1gn to ths facts of o~s.mio and human 
hU!tOJl'y. Ha 1a a God into whcse ve'/!'9 being 
til'n.e entet's; we need a tempora11st1o l"'ather 
than a purely et~nal1atle view of God# 
God is one who wOl'ks J one to whmn. the passage 
1. 'lhis v1ew1 says·H!ff'd!ng, makes totse e.s much a pantheist 
as Spinoaa, POR, 96. / · 
2 * BF1ghtman1 XGP, 53,. Of • Ferre# OUG 1 40 • 
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ot time means somethingJ to whom the events 
of a. progressive creative evolution are s1g ... 
nificant J fot! whom ch.ange 1e pl'ofoundl.y 1m• 
portant~·auoh ohanges as oecur in ~unan 
c~acte~, as well as those mo~ sublime 
cluulges in his revelat1on1ot himt;telf to man 1n th-e OO'tU'SB Of h1st~.-
HVt$bwnG and..Rees$ suggest possible nequ1vocat1on" 
in :BP1gb.tman's attempt to .find ~ noatasorical mean" be• 
tween the ebernal ... tempoxaal., 1ntin1te .... fin1te poles of God's 
being., but they admit the ve.J.ue of the method which esta~ 
l1shes nan identity between the ultimata poles of all mean~ 
1ng and the being o:t :religioUs woxttlb nl BP1ghtmm would 
eonside:r this last statement a high compliment on his ef• 
. . 
torts to del:tneats the kind of God who, e.a personal, is a 
loving God capable ot aottng •eternally and c~eatively 
towards the highest ends, n3 a.n4 always available to huma.n 
pe:rsons in the!J.* stvuggle for- the ·achievement of values. 
S" Oontemp0l"al7 Relevance~ 
In the preceding gena:ttal evaluation, what Br-ightman t s 
value theotty ooul.d mean for the pt*eaent time bas already 
been anticipated. It remains onlv to make mOl's axpl1o1t 
the major sense wherein hia thought is ol:U.Wen'bly :relevant* 
A philosophy is X'elevant when it intelligently and co .... 
ha~ently ~elates pe~sons to one anotheP• to the pbJsioal 
1. Bftightm.an, PG, 129. sea a.lao the section on nThe Meaning 
ot a PersOnal. God11 1n IGP! 55~67. Also the . .f'o~oatul a:r,-... 
t1cle on "A Tempora11st. Vew of Godtu Al:'t.,(l93S). 
s. Bar'bahovne and· Reese, ~SG, 364. /~ 
3• Brightman, IGP, 62. 
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un1 Vel's a, and to God~ Only a. philosophy with no particular 
ax to grind is capable of enunciating ftrat principles 
broad enough to include all the facts. A strictly ant~o­
pocantr1c, metaphysical~ or theistic Weltanschauun~ may be 
actually abstract because of its failure to relate man to 
the totality or his experience. 
To say that personalism, as represented by Brightman, 
. . 
has brought God, man~ and the world into the most ooherent 
focus is a high ola1m, yet it may not be a begging or ths 
question to suggest the view that unde~ Brightman's rigor-
ous scholarship and his constant attention to the findings 
of science and other fields that ~s personalistic axiology 
1s a philosophy capable of meeting the demands of p!'ofes• 
s1onal aoholars and laymen alike. 
I Oornel1ua Kruse, esttmattng Brightman's contribution 
to philosophy, sayss 
Edg~ Sheffield Brightman's position in the 
histovy of American ph11osopb1 is assured. 
Whe~eveJ.t a complete account ·of American 
philosophy 1n the first half of the ~ ... 
t1eth century will be g!ven, l'eferance will 
without question be made to Professo~ ~ight• 
man as a continuator, vigorous ani creative, 
of the philosop~ ot personalism#· 
Besides BP1ghtmants emphasis on reason, expe~ienee, pe~son~ 
/ 
alism, and theistic f1n1t1sm, KPuse points out that 1n both 
Americas Professor Bl'1ghtme.n has become recognised as a lead-
1ng scholar in the field of axiology~ In a period when value 
1. Kruse, Art~Cl953)~ 4rt.(l953), 594. 
SOB 
theory is eomblg more to the fl'ont • Bl*ightma.n is rtamong 
those who gr-eatly stimulated d1soussicn and furthered the 
study of values 1n gen~al thao~ and in their application 
in the moral and r-eligious field.s.-"1 
It is on this la tte:t"' point that the relevancy of 
~ightman's axiology far the aontemp~~ scene is most 
meaningfully evident~ Consciously oP unconsciously men 
ope:tta.te a.ecol"ding to some "philosophy' of l1fe11 , but often .... 
times an inadequate principle of action is accepted far 
the sole reason that no better philosoph¥ is available to 
.fill the ethical Ol" religious vacuum. Moral -and axiological 
. -
relativism$ nihilism, religious akeptio1em1 ~a leas the ex~ 
p!'ess1on of reasoned ooncl.usions than the irrational and 
negative reactions to the unaat1sty1ng attempts of the pro~ 
tessional thew1s:ts to give an ordered pictt:l.re ot life in 
its total environment~ Halt~tl'uths may be pleasant for the 
moment but Ul'lde:r the impact of total living they are soon 
:revealed £ott what they arEh nNo philosophy whioh does not 
satisfy his whole mind will permanently satisfy man"tt2 
'Phe· g:-eat strangtb. ot Br!ghtma.n1s philosopey lies in 
its adequacy fo~ both theory and practise- It ia logically 
:rigo:ttous and at the s~ time it 1'1nds rna.n where he is, 
giving h1m. something to live by and tot'. In the delineation 
~ 
l. Jtl-use, A:rt.(l953), 59S" See also Johnson,. Art*{l954) fel"-
a survey of ~1ghtman's contributions to personalism. 
2. Bl"ightman. NV. 141 .. 
:~> 
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of his "resultant philosophy' or liten1 Brightman 'has set 
fo~th three "first principles" which may vary well fo~ the 
ple.tfol:"m. fol' a vigorous and healthy way o'f l1fe:8 
The f!Pst principle is respect fw paztsonalit~. This 
principle shows the meaning of respect not only for the 
self but for others and God. Entailed here are implications 
fov society and worship. 
The seoond.pr1nc1ple, wbioh sees na.t'Ul'e as a :revelation 
of Divine Personal1t~, gives a coherent basis tor relating 
man and nature. An impersonal wo:rld is abolished. Such a 
view not only suggests a way to unite thla ~1ths ot science 
and religion, but nature itself becomes a source of ~stical 
insight and spiritual values~ 
The third principle 1s ap~1tua1 libert7~ This is 
p:robs.bly the highest value that oan be achievedJ but it is 
also difficult due to the many debilitating influences which 
. -
seek to rob men ot both spirit and liberty. There e.a-e foutt 
lev·els of ap!J:titual liberty 11 the mater1al1st1c, the mbta·ou ... 
lous- the level of the !nne~ life, and the l$Vel of ooopera~ 
tion, It is only on this t1nal level, ears B:rightman1 that 
the other levels come to their fullest develp;pment; and1 we 
might add, the previous two p~1no1ples likewise. It 1a·on1y 
when men see the values 1n each othe:r through common devotion 
to God that txrue spiritual liberty 1s attained., "Rexee 1a 
1. Brightman, Chapter VIX, NV. 
s. Ibid •• 149~166. 
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the kingdom of God in which all races and creeds can meet, 
learn, and respect each other 1n :.religious liberty.nl 
In Brightman's personalistic ax1olo87 a.ll the gx-eat 
exist.ance and intellectual. values f:l.nd theixt proper pl.s.oe 
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- ... :ttel1g1on,. ethics,. reason, metaphysics,. theism. Brightman 
would be the last pe:E'aon to suggest that his views ~e the 
.final answer. But he 1s second to none 1n advocating loyalty 
to the widest possible range of truth and the highest values. 
He htmself says that ncne ot the acutest p~oblems of mode~n 
civilisa.ticn is ht:2w to combine emotiOM.l powe:r with critical 
1ntelligenoe.,02 His cwn critical method provides just suob. 
a synthesis 1n a value theo~y which sacrifices neither warmth 
nor intellectual. vig~. 
B. Whitehead. 
1. Major Areas of ~1t1c1sm. 
~e l!tera~e reveals a rweat VQ1'1ety of c:ritioism of 
Whitehead's philosophy'~ Hot all of it has close application 
to his axiology except as it mey show up the weaknesses or 
the metaphysical stPUcture which pttov1des the foundation foX' 
his axiological theo17. In the following discussion the 
c:ritio1sms which have both general and spee1al ~elevano~ f~ 
axiology e.Jte oonside:red. 
1. Bttigb.tmant NV, l6fh 
2. Ibid., 145. 
a. Terminology. 
'rhe oooasion f01!.the moat ~equ.ently of.f'exeed ():bJect1on 
to Whitehead's philosophy 1s his original and highly abstx*use 
nomenclature. The objection 1s probabl-7 the most senw•l one 
that ce.n be made since it applies about equallt.as well to 
any aspect of his thought. ~ ~1ters have passed the~ 
opinion on his taAD1nology. E. A. Blwtt calls Process and 
.R~.al.-11?z 8 one of the ~st ditf1oult phUoaophioal books eve%' 
wr1tten.ul D* s .. Robinson points out the d!f.ficulty of the 
concept of 11event0 and: concludes that "1t is even·doubtful 
Whether he /J!h1 tehea.Q himself knows fully what he intends 
e it to oonvey .. u · William Swabey 1n a review of Se1ence an4 
the Mode~nWorld says uhat "the theo~ of Abst~aotion is 
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no doubt important ...... could one undez-stand it. n5 Susan Stab .... 
bing xaafars to ,P!:tocef3!fJ .. ~nd .. ~eal1t:t. as the "p:rooduot of thinking 
that is essentially u.ncleGl-.04 She finds «whole aect1one un-
1ntell1gible.115 
w~ M. Urban seems to ba pewtieularly diat:ressed by 
Wbiteheadts terminology., In his article,. "Elements of tTn1n-
tell1gib111tp- in Whitehead's Metapb.Jsioac The PX"ob1em of 
Language in Procass.a,n.d Raalitz." he oalls the latta~ book 
ualmost the most unintelligible essay in philosophy ever 
witten,nl In another avt1c1e he sqs of Wh1teheach na1s 
metaphysics, as ·a whole, turns at cruo1al points on his 
ph1losop~ ot language. I for one have felt this d1ft1~ 
' 
oult,r most aoutely.n2 A. B~ JOhnson, always the defendeF 
ot Whitehead• thinks that Urban he.a over-stated his case.a 
If there is ~ ~eply to the criticism of "untntell1• 
g!b111ty"••an objection partly valid•-it lies in the sus• 
gest1on that understanding comes on~ with the persistent 
re-reading of Wh1'hehead•s mateza1al aided by frequent COIJ!t-
parieons w1th.h1s other ~itings. V~7 often an exposition 
in one book w1U illuminate his thought in another • For 
instance, Lowe points out that although Whitehead's basic 
metapbysioal concepts appear 1n Science. and the Modern WoFld, 
the beat int~oduction to thei~ ~etapbJs1cal relationships 
ocCUJ:t 1n ~ol_i~_i_on ipJ;h?j ~.1ns.•4 Whitehead's value ex• 
position• which is certa1nly no leas tree tx-om certain 
verbal obtu.soatione 1 must be understood in the light of 
many passages. ManY of the te~ms, e. g •• subjective t~, 
intensit,-, haFmony, reveal their full meaning only by eon• 
tinu.ed oroas~ztaference to parallel d1seuss1oJ'h Whitehead's 
. . 
moat trequentl7 ~uoted definition of valua1° for instance, 
1. Urban, Art.(l93S), 617. e• ~ban, Art.(1941), 303. 
3. Jobnson, ~t.(l943). · 
4.- Lowei A!'t • (1941) 1 998. 5~ 11 'Va ue' · is the wox-d I use for the intrinsic reaJ.it7 of 
an event •., SM.W, 95 •. 
is itself quite meaningless until seen in its total con• 
text.l 
'lhe peat pzaoblem of understanding Wh1 tehead might 
well raise the question in eome minc1s of the worth ot the 
enterprise. As a small p~ of t~e total evaluative pic-
ture, the counter•opinion is ottere~ that no one who has. 
really nc11scovered.0 Whitehead is skeptical as to the value 
of the effort tt. Still true for Whit eh.ead as for Spino~ a. 
are the concluding wordS o.t" .Sp1nosa•e Ethics: "All things 
excellent EU"e as d1ffieult as they are r/U*e .,n 
b. Autono:rl\1 or Divir'te Oause.iiion11 
~ctly where the "balance of power" lies 1n the 
Sx-owth and sat1efaetion ot aotua.l entities is another one 
ot the most perplexing JU!Oblems in Wh1 tehead 's thought • 
If valua consists in tbe intrinsic reality of an event, 
it 1s important to establi~h the source of the aim or 
telos which makes possible the gathering of the data into 
harmonic togetherness. Ia patterned. :ttealaat1on the 
"l"espons1bU1u,-n of individual entities, or is that God's 
sole ~eregat1vef To answer either wau does injustice 
to the facts, which seem ~o suggest the othe~ horn of 
the dilemma.. U aetual ent1t1ea are iftd&ed genuinely 
I ?' . - - J 
1. As Chapter II above has already shown. Also with due 
allowance for Whitehead' 8 latel'l' shift 1n emphasis fltom 
value as 1ntx-1ns1c xaaalime.tion to a mo:-e Platonic Worla. 
of Value • · although he does not el:lminS.te the .former 
view. 
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causa sui then an ordered universe seems tmpossible; on 
the other hand• an unrelieved theonomr leaves unexplained 
the obstructive elements which appe~ 1n the actual w~ld. 
D. J. Mo:d.ey is not quite satisfied with any solution 
which equally divides the initiative between God and othel' 
actual entitles. It is his opinion that the preponderance 
of initiative and eff1caa,v lie in God. In s~ or the 
problem he sayss 
Although Whitehead repeatedly insists that an 
actual occasion is eelf~c~eative and oa~sa sui 
and tha.t·its·oontx-ibution to the future, 1n 
virtue of ita *objective immortality,.'. is there ... 
tore an w1g!nal6 and 1nd1V1due.l oonti%i1but1on. 
those elements in the· pvoo&ss of conwescen<se 
which ax-e attx-ibuted to the '1'1nal1 causation 
of the actual ocoasi~n itself reduce in fact, 
so ta.x- as l can see, to the 'eftiC1$nt causa-
tion of God. tJ. 
Hal'tshorne also weltthts the balances in the favOl' of 
God. He SG.7S t 
!he ~adical diffe~ence between God and us 
implies that our influence upon him is slight• 
wh1l$ his influence upon us is predominant,. 
We fll'le an absolutely inessential (but not in-
consequential) object for hltnJ he is the as .... 
sential objeot for uso Hence God can sat 
narrow limits to OlU' freedom; to"l.' tha motte 
!iipoi"\iant the object to the subject~ the mol'e 
~partant is its etteot upon the range ot 
possible responses.& 
Both Moxley and lie.rtsho:rne ape impt*essed. maybe too 
much so, with Whiteheadts assertion ot uthe overpowering 
l. Moxley, Art.(l934). 177. 
2. Bartshorne 1 DR, 141 .... 141. 
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~ati~nality of his ~cd'if conceptual h~onisat1o.n."1 
Eql:tally emphatic 1n Whitehead rs exposition 1s the axiom 
that an actual entity "1s t'i:ns.lly rettpons1ble fw the de• 
e1s1on 'b7 which al'q' l1tt'a fov feeling is admitted to ef• 
f1cienOT•n2 God :tn his .role of ()J:'aatol' does not :to;taoe h1s 
will on the world. Instead, '0 a.U actual entities share with 
God this eharaotex-1st:to of seU-oa.usat1on. n5 In this sensa 
eaoh aotual entit,- tr.ansnends all othet" actual entities .. 
Onl7 beeau.$e of the autonomous, EUJtl.f-weativ.ity of actual 
entities oe.n the 4ystel.eolog1oal taota 1n the un1vel:'se be 
accounted fw~ ~ view which assigns to God a prepond.e%'""' 
antly d.omlns.nt tuttction is put und~:r 1ncreas1ngl:r tl1"'gent 
obligation t(J aocount for disvalue ~ li"tll*th:el*ltt()lte :t.t comas 
too near to violating th& ~inoiple ttthat the divine element 
1n the wol."ld ia to be col'loe1ved a.a a pa:t"suas:i ve agency and 
:nou as a oee.ttoive agenc~.,n4 All ~r1tio1sms o))' appXt-aisals 
of Whitehead's view of the divine $t1'1oacy must be aee:n in 
the light ot that prino!.ple,. boba.bly the bast l'esolu.tion 
ot the antino:m:y' is the one suggested e~lier in Whitehead's 
own woxadc::u n~e initial stage of the aim /ftt an actual 
,ent.ttz1is :r:tooted in the ne.t\U.'& ,of God, and its completion 
depends on the self.-.Qs.usat:ton of the au.bjeet-supel*jeot.,D5 
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~h Pe:t'sonal1ty. 
Another o1"1tio1sm arise$ from the ambiguity of the terms 
0 person• and "pe:ttsonal.n fhie paper hs.e shown the impo:tt'tanoe 
of the concept of pe~son in Wh1tehae.d.'s thought, pax*t1culs.x-lJ' 
as related to the stability and per$1stance of values. an4 
aa applied to God• One o:t the majol' d1tt1oult1ea of such tm. 
1nterp!"etat1on is the everwp%'esent un<u~!"taini'cy" as to how 
muc.1h Whitehead 1ntanded. th~ t e:rms to convey-. Not that he 
we.s going be7ond his pr1vllege ·in adapting common texaminol;,.. 
ogy to his own ~poses J that wa.s. h1a right. But he was 
under soma obligation to be oona.tstsnt in hie use. 
!fb.e position taken 1n previous discussion 1s that 
Whitehead. mee,nt to use "pe:rsonu and npersona.l11 1n a sense 
not flU* ~amoved, 1f anyl ~om Brightants de.f1n1t.ton of 
pex-son as "a self C o0111plax 'W.'lity of selt .... expel*ienoe) that 
is able to d·evelop :tt~ason and val.uet~.ul Where BJ:t1ghtman 
allowed :fol" the fttagmentEU7 charaote:tt of the self whoae 
1dent1t7 is maintained b7 the time-~anacending o~aoter 
ot sel.t•ex~1enee,2 Whitehead has "an h1eto~ic :ttoute of 
a.otua1 ocoaaions wh1nh 1n a DJS.l'ked degree •• * 1nhert1t froxn. each 
~hn3 ~l'l.ia is ~is d.asCAl*iption of ~the life of mt:Ullu4 In 
the ~s.met connection Whitehead illustx-ates o:ttder b7 "tha'b oom-
pl.ex oharaote:r.- in 'lri.l'tue of wh1eb. a man is . considered to be 
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the .. Sf!U!lE) endurig .J?&rson .fltom bil*th to d.eatb..nl By pex-sona 
both Br.t1gbtma.n and Whitehead mean hu.tr~Sn persons, and neither 
excludes the conoept f~am. oex-ta1n appl1oabil1t,- to God. But 
the point of the Cl'1t1cium h$1'"6 ~a that Wb.1 tehead weakens 
his. othewise good case folt! the impt>~banee of pex-sons. by his 
shifting app·licatt,on of the . term •. 
He does agree that »EW.y phi~osophy must provide some 
doctrine of perso® 1dent:tt:y • n2 and his ~ philosop~ sup• 
plies the dootltine in s. muoh mc):t'e rigox-ous manner than some 
would allo\¥-. · Percy Hughes, tor :tnatanoe;, S'+YS that tox-
Whitehead 11to l'&duce a pereo~ to a series ot aots ,makes non• 
sense not only of b1o~apbr but_ or o1v1l law, of ethics, of 
art, of religion, of fr'1endsh1p• and of love"113 Although 
the concept ot ~e!J.'Ison as a "s$r1es of t:ll)tsn is oexate.1nly 
no'b Whitehead1Wl terminology 1 Whitehead would be the fh!os'b 
to agee with the rest of Bughests. af}atem~ntt Whitehead 
aami ta t:tltttditt1eul'b7 involved in the n(.)tion of pexasone.l 
identity, but he hims~lf say$ that. "1t is d()l'l'J.!nant in hu.ms.n 
experieneet the nqtions of e1vU law are based upon 1t.•' 
He.xttshorne and R$esa say that they 
(ioubt 1.t anyone can really • or ot]?.el* than ve:tt• 
bally, mean by a tperson.t wwe than what White ... 
head means by a tpersonal.ly ordered' sequence 
or exper1enoes with certain defining oh~aate~~ 
istioa OJ.'f peraonal.1t:r tra1ta"'5 
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In spite of Wbitehaadts ocoas1onal explicit and em• 
ptrioal use of peraonal1ty1 howeve~, h1$ failure to enun• 
ciate the pl"inoiple of personality conaist$lltly throughout 
~eaults in the loss of the very eenoept which would have 
unified many of the diverse elements of his thought. More 
dependence on the empirical starting point suggested in his 
~eference te "our indubitable e~lf, the foundation of our 
pl'asent e.xistenoan1 would have pvevented the too•trequent 
olass1t1cation ot his system as pantheism. Pantheism does 
not tb.V1ve where there is steady insistence on the "incura-
ble atamicitr" ot occasions,& espe•1ally occasions with 
personal oxadel', "eaeh with its own present 1mtned1aoy.03 
• 
In Br1ghtxnan1s thought it is t~e meta.phyaicai :reality ot 
persons with theil' erl'or and ignorance wh1eh makes it 1m~ 
. . 
poas1ble to oontuae his thought with pantheism. 4 FOX" aim .. 
1lar :r-easons "God is not in all ttespects 1nfin1ta••5 1n White .... 
head t s thought. 1'he exclusion tJ.tom Ood. ot ev11, due to the 
maladjustment and divergent tonalities rJt actual ent1t:Les 11 
makes 1t equally difficult . ~o maintain that Whitehead t s ·sya• 
tem is actually pantheistic.. M~e explicit expos1t1~n of 
the latent pe~sonaliat1c e~ain in his thinking would have 
saved h1m fz-om. any su.oh class1f1oation.. 
317 
d. Stress on Humanities. 
Viator Lowe 1s of the opinion. that Whitehead put so 
muoh emphasis on the hum.an1t1ea, Eh g., theoloSY, political 
history, that he missed the rare oppo:t'tu.nity- of Pl'OVid1ng 
some muCh needed un1f'1eat1on among the sciences. 
This man had the ability to ~oduoe a new 
syn\hesis ot the soieneas 11 a new concept of 
the world, and to work it out enough to en""' 
S'l.U!'e aom.e ac'bual shaping .affect on the pros ... 
reas ot the sciences and the o~eat!on of new 
sc1ences.l.-
Lowe also joins with those ~itiea who call Whitehead's 
piety t()WS.ltd the #$at philosophers nexcessive.,n There 1s, 
fo~ irlstanae. 11 tha raising of John Locke to d1vin1t7n and. 
2 too much space devoted to bofih Locke and Descartes. 
In anothGt~ plaoe3 Lowe r-epeats the obJection alluded 
to above the.t Whit ahead t a emphasis 1s too theological. 
"As :r: see :tt," sa7s Lowe, "Whitehead's pl"econosptions were 
l.axtgel:y Platonic a:nd x-el1g1o'tl.S.., !he weakest pax-t of his 
thaota:y ot induction is his add1t1ont in Pr~o.~s a, and Real1!?z, 
. 4 
or an appeal to a theological g:Pound." 
There are some who d1Se.EWee 1 and rightly so, with 
Lowets or1t1oism. In re.fat-ring to tbe most religious part 
of ,Prooess and. Ret;Llitz, .Emmet obse:rve~ that it "is not an 
', 
addendum irrelevant to the rest of the book. It 1s an 
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integral part of it. nl Hartshorne shares Emmett s view in 
sa:ylng that "the idea. that the religious content of White• 
head's s~stem 1s dl'agged 1n" is "a thorough misunderstand .. 
1ng.us Again, in answer:tns some specific OX'itioisms or 
Whitehead's use of tl1a religious term 0 God11 , Hartshorne 
replies with his usual oandcv that Whitehead's being 
accused of using the religious t~with ~ 
propriet71 ta, I sq, somewhat' a.musina. Fw 
consider. Pu'tting God, the atel'rlfill, in time 
gives baok the ancient conoeption·of a tlivblg 
God', one who can pu.xaswa purposes, 1. e.~ .!! 
zat UllrGal.ie~fi ValUeS_.+:) . 
Lowers o~it1o1em maybe reveals a touch ot what Bright• 
man :refers to as 0 theophob1a.114 It is doubtfu.l if Process 
8fjd u'lea,l1!!Z; woUld have been aesthetioa.lly w :Logical~ com• 
plate without the conclusion that it does have. Whitehead's 
movlng discussion of the relation between God and the wwld 
exemplifies ,e. f9£t1:~1. what ha bas been. tr,-!.ng to show all 
along, that there is no :~•vacuous actual1t,-11 • 5 1. ~h, no non-
feeling real1ty1 and that all entities involve one another., 
~t the relation between the one non~tempcral actual en-
tity, God• and all other entities should be expressed in 
religious and sote:r1olog1ce.1 term$ but illustrates the tail ... 
ure of ordina:t7 language to convey the prehens1ve intensit7 
of that relationship. 
1, Emmet, WPO• 24'7. 
e .• Hartsbtrnejt MVGt 50., .. 
3. Hartshorne, Art.(l935), .340. 
4. Brightman., PG, 41 •. 
5. Whitehead• PR, 43. 
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e. Ete~nal Objects. 
The superfluity of eternal objects 1n Whitehead's 
philosophy 1s raised by Hall,l He discusses the the pur~ 
post:l of eternal objects whose function Whitehead defines 
as "pure potentials for the apee1f1c determination of 
fact, n2 but Hall goes on to show that ffaJ.l the ch$racter• 
1at1cs supposedly peculiar to eternal objects are shared 
3 . 
by actual occasions~" Fo~ instance, the notions of iden-
tity, permanence, universality, abs~ra~tness, and poasibil• 
4 . . ity which are usually associated with eternal objects are 
found equally well among the aotual entities themselves. 
On suoh grotm.da he feels that tfbernal objects might wall be 
eliminated trom Wh1tehee.dts thought atruottll:'a. Such is 
Rall 1s contention. 
There is little merit 1n the ~1c1sm except that it 
does point up the danger of l_ooking tor actuality anywhere 
but in the feelings of actual entities~ To eliminate eter• 
nal objects, howava~, is to do m~e than out off a 8 super• 
ficie.l" aspect of an othe:t'wise meta.pbJsically sound system. 
Apart ~om tpotent1al1tyt and tg1venneset, 
the~e can be no nexus · or aotual tb.inga 1n a 
pl:'oee$S of supe:f'session by novel actual 
things. The alternative is a static mon1s~ 
.tio ~verse, without unrealized potential~ 
1t1es. · · . 
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The e.xoluaion ot eternal objects 1s the death of value, 
for onl,- in the potentials held out to the world of aotua.l .... 
ity is there ~;my appetition_ toward realisation. They are 
the eternal lures for every becoming. Value potential and 
1 
value realisation without eaoh othe%* are only abst~aotions. 
t. Value Emphasis. 
In assessing the sttJength ot Wb.iteheafl's thought,. the 
type of c:r1tioisma as given thus far do not se:tt1ously cU.min" 
ish the wo:ttth and vitality of hie value theo:f7• Despite 
Urban t s contention that Wh1tehea4 has nso redGs1gned the 
2 
notion of value a. a praotioally to redeeign it away_ n the 
material set fo:ttth 1n the pr-eceding oha.pte:rs w~ants the · 
opinion tb.B.t it is precisely his emphasis on value that 
gives strength and ooherenee to his metapbJ-s1oal thought. 
. . 
Millard, tor example 1 ~eters to "the function of valu$ as 
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an. 1nteFat1ng .faotov for his general metaphysioa.l poa1t1on.u 
Morgan reveals a s 1m1l.ax- opinion when he sa:y-s: 
It ia a feature of Whitehead ts theory of value 
tb.&.t it is part of a gene:t'al recons-truction ot 
categories. not an isolated ~gnment thriving 
on supp~assed met.aphyeioal premises.t •• His 
phUoeop~ 1noludea values fl*om. the stal't and 
does not have to biting t~em 1n later as an 
apologetic atte~thought~ 
'lhe a.couracy of these obse:Pvations is seen by the attempt to 
und~et~d Wblteheadts thought without due consid~ration 
given to his value ewpha~es. 
~~s or:it1oism pow1:1 out of his opinion that there 
is an unresolved d~ohotumr in Wb!te~ad's thougnt between 
an 1deal1st1c and naturalistic 1nter~etation of reality 
with a.deo1ded ~erere~ce for the latta~. Urban thinks 
that although "the spbit of his entire philosophf is in e. 
sense 1dea.lis:t1o1111 
his ttrst love is reallJ the impersonal i~eal 
of 1ntellig1b1lity that baa been develope4 
1n science 6.l1d mathematics and that hie ac .... 
ceptance·of the traditio;;! ideal of 1ntsll1" 
g1bil1'b}r, with his ~>ef'wenoe to value, has 
never been moxae than balf' .... hearted.2 
Such an appraisal of Wh1tshead 1s view of value 4ees 
not do justice tc the stated. facts nor to the 1mpl.ioat1ons 
ot h1s organic philosophf* A ~eat number of spee1f1o 
statements could be :repeated he:re to show that Whitehead 
himself considered value to be the key to his organic view 
of na.tlll'e, ell! g., suqh statements as the following• 
The values of nature are perhap~ t~ ke,- to the 
metaphysical s;rnth$a1s of exiatenc& .. u&ll ttl,.. 
t1ma.te reasons are in terms of· aim e..t . 'Value4~- •• 
Beal~at1on ••• 1a in 1tself the attainment ct 
value ••• An ors~ism ts6the r$alizattpn or a definite shape of value .••• Value is ~rent 
l-. 't.Jl'tban, A.ttt.(194l), 396. 
a. Ibid.,~ 3S4a 
5.-, Whitehead, CN, 5. . . · 
4. Whitehead, .m.~ 9; also .Mf, 184,. 
5~ Whitehead, SMW, 95~ 
a. Ibid., 19S., 
1n actualityl.~.are~ticn aims at Value2 ••• 
The purpose of God is the attainm.ent of value 
1n the tempol'al world*i-
Xnstae.d of. attenuat!ng the meaning ot value as Urban 
suggests, Whitehead gives it a depth and s1gn1fica.nce proba.-
bl}r unpa:Pallaled in s.n:v other philosophy. Jh l!" Johnson 
deni&s Urban's claims 1n stx-ong term.e. He thinks ths.t-
Urban is inaccurate 1n his interpretation and bas oritic1zed 
only an °1me.g1Mey Whitehead.114 !o minimiaa value 1n favol1' 
of natllZ'sl.ism, as Urban does, is to miss the verr emphasis 
that brings lu41d1tJ' and life to Whitehead's. thought. The 
racta do not show that Whiteheatl'e Eut1ology is subservient 
- 5 
to, nox' less 1ntell1g1ble than the 11non-value categor1es11 · 
of his mtate.p~s1oe.l. scheme. Sc1$l1Ce B.Jld the Modern World 
is Whitehead's repudiation ot a senseless, valueless, Plll'""' 
poseless" and 0 1rreduc1ble brute mattetw, or material,. spread 
thttoughout space 1!i e. flux of cont:tgurations * tt6 It 1s his 
pereistent and consistent a.1m. to x-estare to nat'IU'e the char-
acteristics ot m1nd 41 feeling, a.nd value which a thwougb.goinl 
sc1ent1f1c naturalism omits.'7 :tn a ohapt~ on "Seience and 
1. Whitehead, HM, 100. 2 · . a. Whitehead, Art.(l.94l) ' 688. 
811 Whitehead• u, 100. · . 
S23 
4. Johnson, Ar1t.(l94S), 53, 55.- ats whole ru.-ticle censb1 .... 
·· tutes an answer to the· cl."1tieiama 1n Urban, Axat. (1941). 
See also Johnson, .Art. (1945}, where he gives an· extended 
treatlli.Snt -of actual entities and consideFs some objeet1cns. 
s• Urban, AJ.'t.(l941), 397. 
e. Whitehea.dt S.MW, lSo . 
7. In assess1ng the values of Wh1tehea.d.1s religious philosop~ 
Bixler says that "1t furnishes religion with a. much needed 
defense aga.iruat the attacks ot a scientific pos1t1v1sm.,11 
Al't lr {1941) ,. 606. 
Ph11oso~'' Whitehead conoludas b7 saying that it should 
be the task of the philosophical schools of this oentU17 
to bxting together the ox-ganie and s o1ent1f1o v1ewa of nature 
••anc1 ·therejr end the divoree of science from the e.ffirma"'" 
t!ons of OUX' aesthetic., and ethical experiences ~"1 It is the 
~eat strength of Whitaheadts whole metapb.7sical schema that 
it restores some unity to the world, thu.B ending the b!fln'too 
cation which bas· always haunted cosmclo§~t In Wh1teheadts 
system p~sics and a~e.ioloQ" ~efer to the same wovld. '!'here 
are neither b~e facts, no~ values divorced from ~otual1ty. 
Facts ~a values and valuea facts. His philosop~ bas given 
us .»one woPld. 0 
In restoring mind and value to nat~. Wbitehead•s 
philosop~ makes it possible to aooox-d. to ·human beings their 
:rightful place 1n the comolog1cal scheme. In philosopblr 
e.s well as x-el1gion 1t 1s often the :ra.sb1on to assign pe~· 
sons a ve~ seoondar1 position with respect to the inexar~ 
able, relentless, and impextsonal process of the unive!*se. 
Whitehead does not fall into the quantitative ta.Ua.cy nor 
does he • as ltierkag&.al"d ~aid cf Hegel, construct a beautiful. 
mataphy'sical mansion and then l:tve, himself, 1n a shack by 
the r'oe.d.- In Whitehead's $S10•centx-1c oosmclbgy 1nd1v1d:u.a.l 
persons are at home. !hey are aen'h1ent subjects, prehending 
and baing prehended~ . bipolar in their wients.t !on to the 
world of permanence and flux, mental and pb1sical, pev1ah~ 
1ng and becoming immortal. They are not "p11Sl*ims and. 
strangersn but cttiaens ~· 
It is a take d1ehotom, to t~ of Nature 
and Man. Mankind is that factor 1n Nature 
WHI~h ~bits in its mosi intense r~m 
the plasticity of nature. 
It was a significant point 1n his_ tory, Wh1 tahead says, 
when the dignity of man became recognized., No longe:r waa 
he to be l'egarded as a tool subject to the tmposed wishes 
395 
ot tyrannoua wlex-a. 'lbe~e slowl.,- wept into society the 
dawning consciousness of the worth or men as men and the 
preciousness of human lite. Whitehead calls this 0 the human .... 
1tax-1e.n apixtit, graduall7 em.ers1ng 1n the slow suru:-1~ of a 
thousand 'fSElrf.i. 119 It is at once the triumPh of the human 
spir1 t ovev the heax*tless end bJ~Ute.l f'oFcea ot unenlightened 
society and the meobanistlc philosophy which sees man as 
product of a m1ndl.eas and valueless nat'U1'e. It 1s "the vic• 
tory of persuasion over toree. The worth of men consists 
in their liability to pe:ttsuas1on.113 A society 1n which ttten 
Ell'e moved by value ideals is the highest society., Motive. .... 
tion B.l'ises by the recognition of constant poss1b1l1t1es of 
gl'owth and social improvement. Where there :ts reoo~se to 
.force the faUure of that civ111aa.t1on is disclosed. 4 
1. Whitehead, AI, 99. 
2, Ibid., 105. 
5-. Ibid., 105. 
4~~> Ibid., 105<~ 
Whitehead's keen sensitivity tQ the hume.n1tQI\'1an 
ideals invalidates whatever tend.ency the~e 1s among w1t1cs 
to brand h1s philcsopb;r. as out of touch w1 th life • It would 
be patte.dox indeed if Wbiteheadfa philosophy t~ned out to be 
abstz.act. Organism. is ~!.mum conctteteneis-. Wh!tehead's 
emphasis on the meaning of life Emd so(l1ety pxtovides the 
open dow . to aome :t'*t.n-tb.er 41souea1on of' h1s relevancy- tor 
oont~ov~ o1vil1satton. 
2. Contemporary R~lavancr. 
Whitehead's conoern f'or human dignity and the •oc1a1 
ideal might ve%''1 well .tol'm." the basis tox- contemporary social 
FeCOn$t:t'Uot1on* Whitehead 1a not otten O&.St in the role 'Of 
social philosopher .. p!fobs.bly to the detriment of beth society 
and. pbiloso!>h7• /h H. Johnson in one article tries to make 
up the lack by saying that 
it 1a at least interesting to discover that 
an outstanding phUosopher ·seems to se:y that 
certain d&moo:Pa.t1c ideals ( 'l1be:rty, t tequa.l ... 
1'liY, ' self....(l$v.elopm.en'b t) Gl*& ine!oapably 1n.-.. 
vol.. ved 1n the natu.rte ot · :ttea.J-1 ty. · 
'J!he strength of a aoo1ologioe.l theOl'y based. on Wh1te-
head1an concepts would lie 1n the great wealth of gene:ttal 
principles which his thought S}"Stem explicates. Society 
is su:vel.y ready fO%" a. glimpse of his ideal of uthe bond of 
sympatlq.11 
. . . . a 1~ Johnson, Art.(l943) , 269. 
~is bo:rui is the gx-owth of revel*snee toll tbs. t 
powex- in -vivtue· of which nat'tllle ·harbours ideal 
ends, end pl*oducea 1ndiv1dual beJ.ngs capable 
oi' conscious diaor.iaination of such ends. Th1a 
veva~enoa is the foundation of the respect for 
me.n as man-.1 
!he hope ot society lies in ~ts ability to glimpse unive~~ 
sal idaa1t:h Sometimes the vision is only .a. "dim apprehension 
of notions too geneJ-al tor its e:dsting J.angu.age,n2 and 
PI'osrese is slow. Whitehead says tblat ••ttw powth of sen• 
eral.ity of appx-ehension is the slowest o£ · aU evolut1onaey 
ohangea,u3 but the awal"eness when it does Qtr1ve 1s unbe~ 
lievs.bly potent., 
A gene:ral idea is always a dange:tf to the 
existing t>!'deX*• The whole bundle ot ·its con-
ceivable specie.l embodiments 1nvr:wioua usages 
of society oonatitutea a.· po~ or reform .. 
At any moment the smouldeP!ng ur.ihappinesa of 
mank1rld. may seize on soma . suCh p%JOSXI'atn end 
initiate a pe~iod of rap1d.obanga guided by 
the l~t of 1ta doct~1nes.4 
Whitehead 1s no 4oot~inatve soo1ologist. but in his efforts 
to make known the etex-nal peatnesa of the humanitarian 
ideals 0 incavnate in the passage of tempwal fact"0 he has , 
established a sound basta fov soo1e.1 pxtogress and peaoe., 
Otis Lee '11J1J.'1 say that the gttea.test gap 1n the ph11os opJlr 
of Whitehead is his lack of a. 11real. ph11osopl:J7 of aot1on,n6 
but such an ~valuation must ~ooeed from Leets own ta!luva 
to oo:ns1deX. the potenttal. EU:te.rgy of' Advan1;lut:es. of Ideas. 
Whitehead otte:rs, n.o .fox-mal. progttam for social action, but 
he suggests the ideals txrom Which healthy action must spr1zlS. 
Whitehaad's ten,4e);'l l'Etg!Ufd toY! the wo:t-tb. aru.1 dign1tt, of man, 
his empba~is on ~eedom, h..1JJ at:~st fw adventu&, at's ideas 
pXtegnant with int.ellee'bual powe~ and social. ~sa. 
~h:e theol'fetical possibilities of Wh1teheadts thought 
and ita .eur:rent !*elevanoy ru;re illru.ttl."'ated in an excellent· 
:monopaph by Elisabeth x .. Nottingl:uun .. Religion and SQcieV• 
She daao:t'1bes f'·O'Ull' •prevalent trpeu of adjustment to the 
p:ttoblem of pelt*sonality inte~at!on 111 modexan 1nduat:t:J1e.l 
1 
soo1et1e$•u . !ale fil-at type :ta the int~~e.tion achieved 
on the basis of the exolus.1vs values o~ a p~ti~ ~el.igious 
ol*gs.nieat1on to which the pe:t'son belongs. ~ seoond is a 
oomptU.'tmentaliJtted type ot 1ntegxtat1 on with a dual s erb o£ val ... 
ua$ 1 one l:'el.igiQUU and the other aeculax-. The th1ri kind of 
ad.3ustment is exol.us!vi!!Jly aeoular. Of the fowth 1:i7Pe sb.a 
SS.)'SI 
Finally • some people, Pl"Obe.bly a minox-ity, out ... 
stamling among whom atte Albert Schweitsel' and 
Al.tPed. Nol'th Whi tehead1 achieve 1ntepation 1n 
te.rms ot ultimate x-el1g1ou$ valueS: wh1Qh the7 
:reinte~pl"at and t-e$valus.te in the light o:f mod.-. 
am philosophy and sc:d.en4e. By means of this 
tte1nt~r.tetat1on they bring l*el1g1oua values 
into Ylbe.t rw them (and the autb.w) is a mefU'11.n.g... . 
.ful. relationship with modem incb:tstl"iallied sooieties.2 
- . 
1 •. Iifottinglul.m, as, 25, 
e. Ibid • ., s5. 
fh!a apPJ.'a1sa.l ia a t'EHltt1mo~ to the fru.1ttullleas of White ... 
head's axiology as applied to our technological etta and, 
suggests the view that there 1$ not the slightest tendency 
in Whitehead to $epaPate values from any aspect of life. 
Oompartmenta.l1zat1on is due not to G%17 inherent inapplica .... 
bilit7 of valuea to the. whole ot.' existence but .to laok of 
insight and a too .... ~ow appreciation of genel'a.l thecn-y., 
Doubtless it all members of aoe1ety could be endowed with 
sut1'1o1ent vision of genere.lit7 the pxteval.ent ills or O'lU'-
h1g~ meehan.ized and :m.G~tel'iel1st1o sooiety could be alle..., 
vi!!:bed 1t not abol1shed.~ 
Bu.t prcphets e.t'e usuall;r impatient. !he tempo of 
xwopess ·towal'dst social sensitivity 1s slow, and the ~asp• 
ing cZ tlhe pe:rma.nent values which would elueidate both the 
ills and the remedies for! suffering hu.m.anit:y 1s l:l.mited to 
those with insight an4 t~esignt.1 It ts at this point 
that Whitehead se-es the fulfilment of the basic tunation 
of ph1l.oaop~., 11Ph!1osophy is not a meXJe oolleetion ot 
. . 
noble sentimenta,u he Ss.7fl 1, and nit is not!ioi-o:r, at l.ea.st 1 
should not be-a fer·ocious debate between il'ritable pro• 
a teaso:t-s.1J He assigns to it instead the ve'1!'y noblest f)f 
tunctitlns• 
It 1s a S'tU",Yey of poss1b1l1t1es and their oom""' 
pe.rison with aetual1'b1e:Eh In ph1l.oaop~, the 
l. See the speo1t1e application. of this oonoept to ccll11'llex-oe, 
AI, llQ ... l,2Eh 
a. J:b1d., lS6. 
329 
fact! the th$Q.l'iy1 th·e altSl'*natijJea, and the 1des.J., are weiped together., Its gift a: are 
. :1ns1ght and to:t-esight, and a sense o:r tha -
wo~th of lite, 1n shwt, that $ense o:t inmOl'"'" 
ta.naa which ne~vea all. c1vil.isad ·ef.fort~"'" 
Wheth$1" or not philosophy always rises to the higb. idea; 
whioh Whitehead sets f'or 1t is a question that ahould be 
pondaPad by all philosophers 1 especially- e.t this c~it1cal. 
Junet~e in oiv111zation. ~t it 1s the task of all me~, 
pb.1los.oph~~Wa and l$~en alike• to help implement 1n Booiety 
the 1dea1s not now :realised 1n actuality • 
. lt is our business-ph1losoph$z-s, students, 
and practical men ....... to·:re...,c:reata Sl'J.d zr.elnacu 
a. vision ct the wol.'ld, inoluding those ela• 
menttt of rraverentJe"and orda:tt without which 
society lapses into ~iot. and penetrated 
throug.· .· . h and tbltough with u.nt:U.neh1l:lg ratio:n-
a.l1ty.,2 
Whitehead *til own phUoaopey oomes V~'9' ne~ demon.-. 
' . ' 
~tl'a.t1ng the pb.Uosophical ideals Wh1oll he enunoiatea. 
Gt*$at thoughts d., have szteat ocn~equan·ceih It me.7 be that 
Whitehead's uiolog1oal insights will hava an in~easing 
e.f.tia~cy 1n the auo1fllog1ca11 b1o1og1cal, aesthetic, and 
rel1g1oua re~on&t:t'Untion at; om" time$.. ~tshorne thinka 
that Whitehead. :tn his ph11osopb.J' bas given to the d1Bo1pl1ne$ 
Just en~ated 
an ~talleot'Wtl :l.n1:i$~ation suoh as Ollllt a 
thousan-d oX' ten thou.sana yaua of :t"tlrthe!' 
reflection rutd 1nq.u.~;r · aeem Ukely to ~ust 
ox- adequately- evaluate, but whose wide 
1. Whitehead. Al; 12:5• 
a. Ibid.., 196 ... 
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relevance and.1n·many respects at least com• 
parat1ve a.o~ae7 some of us think ea.n a:trea.d~ 
be discerned. · · 
Hartshorne in his somewhat exagge~ated p~edilection tow~d 
Whitehead is evidently prepa%*1ng the ph1J.osophioal world 
for another Plato~: but one need not go the whole way with 
th$ ,statement 1n order to agvee with another and somewhat 
mo~e restrained prophecy·of Bartsbornet 
If upon the wreckage of Newtonian materialism 
a new wo,.-l.dv1aw is to EU'1se, then Whitehead's 
system is thg most tmportant silgle:indioation 
ot what the wwldv1ew is to be" 
~e tru1tfulnesa of Whitehead ts W&.lt~so~Utn;lS em.bi'aoad 
!n his ph11osopbr of organism is fUPther exemplified b7 the 
orea.t1va impulse given to the ph1loaoph1ce.l entex-prise. 
Soon atte:v the publ.ioation. ·Of P~oeessand Realitz, A. D. Hit• 
chie ventured uta prophesy that the publ1eat ion of this book 
will muk one ot the ttn'ninS points of the history of philos .... 
opey.113 His prophesy 1s already being fulfilled as the great 
wealth of Whitahead1an lite:t'ature testifies. In the light· 
of Ol"ganism, it is very d1.ff$oult, to sa:r the least, to 1n .... 
aist with s.ssUPanoe that na.tlll'a 1s rent· with an unheala.ble 
bi.f'uroation. Be has shown with gt:teat st:r:tength "the gen• 
uinsly organic parts of our expar1enoe.ft4 an insight now 
baing tested in O'Ul':rent mete.pbys1os e.nd religion. 
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Charles Hartshorne is p~obably the outstanding con• 
tempo~ary philosopher whoee thought represents a cont1n• 
uation of Whitehead's organic philosophy. His dependance 
on Whitehead is revealed not only in specific acknowledge• 
mentl but 1n the very close similarity of terminology and 
emphases. 
Fex-re has done much to explore what Whitehead r s phi ... 
~osophy' means fw rel1g1orh "wa have worked fo'l" years ... 
Fe~re aays, 111n an attempt to understand how the ~istian 
and the Wh1tehead1an points of view coincide or contrast.n2 
H. N. Wieman, another con~emporary theolc;gian~ had 
done muCh to explore what Whitehead's philosophy means tor-
religion and axiology. Wieman is 11so profoundly 1ndebtedtt 
to Whitehead, according to his own statement 1 that he of ..... 
fars a warning to his readers not to confuse the thoughts 
of the two men.3 D. D.. Williams, in assessing the relation 
ot Ha%'tshorne and Wieman to Whitehead, says: 
The development in the theological taoultr 
at the University of Oh!oago .led by HerJ17 N. 
Wieman and de~eloped on the philosophical 
side by Obarles Havtsh~e 1s an atte~t to 
work out a. O~istis.n theology through a. 
positive use of Whitehead's doctrine that 
process rathe~ than t~eless4be1ng is the ultimate metaphysical truth. · 
1. see HaXttshorna, DR, x. 
2. F~et auG, 5. ct. Williams, WP~~~ ao. 
3- Wieman, SHG, 193 n. 
4o Williams, WPT~1 59. 
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In concluding this evaluation, 1t is .fitting that the 
opinions of B:tt.ightme.n should be used to Gl1Jllll1aXIize the man 
with whom he ia co•pared 1n th1a dissert~tion.1 ~igh~ 
has no sustained appraisal ot Whitehead t s philosop~, but 
the following isolated comments reveal his ·op1n1on ot White .... 
bead's philoaophical statura1 
Whitehead is a nprofound and 1mpart1al thtnker.n2 
Brightman l:*etars to "his dm!'k and 41ff1eult, but pro-
found Giffo;pd Lect1U*es.115 
He has "$nabled us to see the new spf.:ttit in. sc1enoe,n4 
"A• N. Whitehead's G1ff~d LectUJ'ea, ,Ppoc.oss_ and Ree.liti 
(~929) 6 offer a prof~ 1nt~pretat1on ot God 1n tha light 
of modern developments .. of eo1ance and philosophy., n5 
~ightman list$ him among 0 five distinguished modern 
theists.n6 
0 Tbe greateSt Anglo~Ame~10an philosopher Of the present 
. 7 
time, Alfred North Whitehea4 ••• 1s 1h a sense a mode~n Plato." 
C. Final Comparative Summary and Oonclua1o:ns .. 
~ ma.1n points of OQm.p$ir1aon 1n the value theorise of 
Brightman and Whitehead ma7 be summarized in the following 
sbatamentfil~~ 
1. It is reg~attable thau we do not have ~ statements ~om 
Whitehead on his opinion of Bx-1ghtman. 
2. Brightman. PI. 34. 
3. Bx-ightm.s.D., PO, l5S. 
4. a;.J.gb.tmam, :WJ? .- &1. 
5. Bl:'1ghtme.n, fOR, 28. 
6. Ib1d., 159. 
7. Ibid*, 299,. Of~ Artt ... (l950), for a very s1m1lal' :;~tatement, 
1. Brightman.ts personalism and Whitehead's pe.npaychism 
each provides a. f1"t41tful metaphysical gxtound ror the devel.,.. 
opment of a tt1ch and commendable theory of 1ralues ._ 
2 .. Value .Qons1dettat1ons constitute an integrally sig-
nificant p~t of tha~ total thought stwcture. 
3"' :Br-1ghtma.n.' s uiolog1cs.l p~1od. covers the span o:t 
7aSl."a from 1919 to 1952. Whitehead's works w1th majott 
ax1olog1o.a1 import come between the yeat-s l9S5 and 1~41. 
4. ~e be.aio ol'iteria ~f value in B.l-ightman'a thought 
are cohe:t"enoe and. the pr1no1pl.e ot Xtespeot for personality. 
For Whitehead the supreme tests ax'G intensity, harmony, 
stab1l1tyil ,;the highest vaa.uas a.re those which exemplif7 
the maxtmwa conoreteness. 
5. Theil:' greatest concSXtn with value 1a revealed 1n 
the~ common emphasis on the axiological funotion of God, 
WhO Ol'igJ.nateS 1 OOnS,erVeS, and inCXteaSf)S '1ta.lues 1n t:b.e 
uniV{:):t-Se_. 
a. i'b.e ttpr1nc1ple of ooncret1ou'* in Whitehead's thought 
haa its analogue in ;ex.1ghtman' s view of God a.s "Oontz-ollex-
of ftla G!van,.tt 
7. Bxtightmants theo17 ot value rests on the axiom that, 
God is pel'sonal and that although he enjoys values in his 
own eltl.)er1enoe, values e.zse ob3eot1ve in the metaphysical 
stl'uoture _of the universe aa his normative app:t'eeiatiens •. ::en 
Wh1tahead.'s thought God et.ernally e~onts the woxald with 
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the ideal v1a1on ot what it can beeome. As principle of 
concret.1on, God infuses.1nto gene:r:-al Ol"eativity the 11m1ta-
, ~r·, .. 
tiona of part1euler1ty. Only in meta~s1es.l limitation 
is there pattern and value. 
a. For both men values are only possibilities or poten.., 
tiale until realized either in personal lite or in the con• 
cresoence of actual entities. 
9. In the possibility of the continuation of values 
·lies the chief clue to thei.J! doctrines of immortality,. 
10. In the ~ealm of religion both men ftnd its highest 
exp.l'esa ion 1n terms of value experience • Brightman speaks 
of religion as an expression of faith in the ~iendlineas 
of the universe,wbile Whitehead describes ~eligion as a 
relationship to the universe revels.tozw of value meanings 
which flow txaom the very natw;ta of things • 
11. Although there is an u.nderlyillg existential strain 
1n both men, a strong emphasis on the rational and metapbys ... 
ical aspects of religion p~ovide adequate corrective to the 
inescapably eubjeet1ve and emotive nature of religious ex~ 
pex-ience., 
1a. Both m$U subordinate ethics to axiology, Whitehead 
probably more viso~oua~ than ~ightman. 
13.. While Bx-1gbtman t:ttaces the prime s ouxace of dis value 
to a retarding factor in God's experience, Whitehead is 
logically able to exclude the source of disvalue fl-cm Gsd 
335 
b7 attributing to the fl*eedom cf actual entities the causes 
of aesthetic destvuction and incompatibility 1n the uni-
verse.. Wh1teh.ead. puts mo:re empbasia than Bt*ightman on the 
axiological function of all dy'ateleologioal factors. 
lt.h God s.a described by Bxtigb:tman is de.f1n1tely 
"available» tox- WQJ!Ship, while the God ot Whitehead is 
possibly more available than is usuall~ allowed. 
15. A fruitful. synthes1a or the thought ot the two 
men might begin b7 more emphasis on organic relatedness 1n 
~ightman's personalistic pluralism, while Whitehsad'a eon• 
' 
capt of God Qould move profitably in the d~ection of 
~1ghtm.s.n's olea.v-..aut theism, Pe:tthaps e.J.so molt'e equal1t7 
ot emphasis on the aesthetic would e~ich Brigntmants axi-
ologr and lessen What 1s acnsidel'ed to be an excess! ve con• 
cern 1n Wh1 tehead t s thought. 
lEh The relevanoy- of the~ thought is evidenced both 
by the tmpulse which the~ baaie philosophical principles 
have given to the speculative oause of personalism on the 
one hAnd, and the philosoph¥ of organism on the ethel*, 
and in the pttactical application o:r theix' thought to re• 
ligious and social aitus.t1ons. 
336 
BIBLIOGRA.Pmt 
Aaron, a. I.M~Art.(l930) 
Rev. of Whitehead, FR(l929). 
Mind• 89(1930), 488 ... 492" 
Anehen, Ruth Nanda ( ed. ) .--FIM 
F!*eedom Its Meaning. 
New Yol'lk: ~court., Brace and Comptilll1 1 1940. 
Avey, Albert B* ....... .&rt.(194l), 
Rev. of Brightman, POR(l940). 
Phil.. Rev., 50(1941)., 461~452. 
Baker, Hannie Belle.-~cLG 
.~ conceet of a; Li!nited ,God. . 
we.aliliigton: Shenandoah Publishing Bouse, Inc., 1954. 
Banning, An<Wew,-.... Art. (1934) 
n:Pl'_ofessor ~1ghtmants Theoey of a Ltmited God. 
A crltioism.u · 
Hal"vud _Tb.eol. Rev. • 27 ( 1934), 146•168. 
Be1swangex-. George·w., ... .-~t.(l951) 
Rev., of Bltightman . PG( 1930) ·•· 
Jr_n. Phil .. , 28(1631), 443•44., • 
Bender, R .. w ..... -At*t-.{1952) _ 
D:whitehead's Implied Socii& Ethics." 
Ph1l.._Fol'\rin, 10(1958),·22-31. 
Bergson, Henr1.•-CE 
Creative Evolution (tr. Axathux- Mitohell). 
uew Yorks ·· ~Qnry Holt and Company, 1911. 
BePtocc1, Pete~ A.••EAG ita ~il'~cal. ArSHmen.t ,fqr. God in ,Lata _Briti_sh 
ous· • 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938. 
Introduction to the Philosolhl of Reli3!on-. 
· New York: J?rent'ice~lia'l!,' nc~, 1951. ·- ' 
--~------~-~~--~"~-·Art.(l94l} 
Rev. of Brightman POR(l940). 
Rev. of Re].., 5(!941), 223 ... 230 •. 
_ ...... - ............. _.,.. __ ..,....,. __ .,. ...... -Ar-t .. ( 1950) . 
nBl-ightman's View of the Self, the Person and the Bodr. 11 
Phil~ ForlJJil, 8(1950), 21 ... 28. 
337 
Bixler• J. s.~ ... Art.(l941) 
"Whitehead'S Philosophy ot Religion," 
In Sohilpp (ed.,),. l?ANW, 489-611. 
Bl3"tb, John· w ., ....... At*t. • ( 1937) 
0 on·· 1'ttr. Hazttshoxana 's Undel"'Standing of' Whitehead' a 
Philos ophJ' .•• · · · 
Phil •. Rev •• 46(193?')• 523 .. 528. 
St-igb.tma.n, E• S .... -FG. 
:&e Findin~,of' God. 
Hew Yor'ih ~He Ao~gden Press, l9Sl. 
-~~~••M•~~-·~-~--~IGP 
Is God a Person? 
' llew YoX.ita Association Press, l931h 
···---·~"·~--·••~IPKI 
Immortalitz in Poat•Kantian Idealism. · 
· cambridge: ~ ·&arv~a U'niversi't~ Frees, l92fh 
---.__~M~---···--ITP 
An ,Int:rod~ction, to Phi;J.~so~ (rev• ed .. ). New !ori: Henry Ho1t ana ampany, {1925)1951. 
~--~-~-~--~-~~"•~ML ~ort6 Law~. · 
'lew«!o:rlt: Abingdon Press, 1988~ 
..... .;. .. .., ....................... ~w 
Nature and Values. · 
" uo'rJ Ywiii: Ab!ngdon•Cokesbury Press. 1945. 
·-~~~---~~---~~-PG 
~he Problem ot God~ · 
· 'new forlu ·- ·The· AS1ngdon Pres a, 1930. 
--~~--·~~e•w·~·--PI 
A Ph;J.lqf!ogb.z. ot ~ea,ls,. · 
i~ew YOJ."lffi Henry iio!~ and Oompany, 19&8. 
~~M·~-~~~~·~·~·POR 
A Ph1lO,SOJ2ht ot Relif51on .. · 
new York: Prentico..:.Ha.J.lt Inct!" (1940)1950. 
·~~~"-----~~~~--.PR 
Personality nnd Rali~on.. . · 
'New York: - iT.Ee A5!n~on Press, 1934. 
--~~-~.~w··--~~~PV 
!l~sons and Values • · . · 
Boston: · Bos\Son University Pf'!eas, 1952. 
~~~M~w•·~-~~--~--~R~ 
Reli~ious Valu~s. 
·New Yorkt . ··~he' Abingdon Press~ 1926. 
""~-~~~-M~••·•~w~SL 
Tho S~~1tual Lifa. 
· ·r~e\7· wit'( · Ab1ngaon•Coke~bt1X':y Pxteas, 1942,. 
............ "" ....................... _ .............. _Art.{19l9) 
n!t'he Lisbon ··ltarthquak$# A Study 1n Religious 
Valuation-. n · · 
~er •. Jrn. Theol., 23(1919), 50Q.o.t51a,. 
.,. ... _ ............ --.............. ""-...... J\l't.(l9SO)l 
•Philosop~ 1n AmeP1can Education." 
Personalist, l(July-1920) 1 15 ... sa • 
.................................. - ............ Aztt.(l92Q)2 
"The Personalistic Method in. Ph1losophy., 0 
Meth. R~v., 103(1920}, 369•380. 
- ......................................... .,;,t .... _ ... Al't.(l920')5 
"Modem Idealism. u · 
Jrn• Phil., 17(1920) 1 5338550 • 
..,. __ ..,. __ ... ..;..., ........................ -Art.(l9Sl)l 
0Taska Confronting a Pe~sonal1stic Fh11osopby.0 
,Pe~aonal.iat, B(July 1921), l62...,171J 2(0ot. 1921), 
251..;.a'etl~ · · · .... · 
- ............ - ..................................... ""ut.(l9Slls 
"The M~e .. ~ ... Human Values of R6 lig1on." 
Jl'lh Rel. 1 1 (1981) • 3SS-3T7 # · 
.......................... - ....... -.-II!!Mi!I!AJ-t.(l92l)& 
nRel1g1ous V$lt.t~s and Recent Pbilt>sopl;ly.u 
Boston Un1~~ Bull•• lO(Aug. l, 1921) 
....... _._.,.. ...... ..,:... .... - ............. Art.(l922)l 
· · 
11~uth and Value·· in Religion." 
Meth. Rev •• 105(1922),. 42--47. 
-~-~-·---~--~--~Art.(leaa)a 
"Neo•Real1at1o Theories of Valu••" 
In Wilm {etl.), SPT.t 22..-..64it 
........................ --............. - ......... -..Art .. Cl924)1 
ufhe Oont:tt1but1on of Pbi.loa oph7 to the 'rheo:ey of 
Religious Education... , 
Boston Univ. Bu11., 13 (July lt)) • l924a 
~-·-·----~---.... ~ ... -Art.(l9S4)2 
**!he Meaning of Obl1gat1on.,n 
Rooh.estel'" 'fheol,.sam. Bull., '15(1924). 46-'10. 
539 
........ _ .......... - ................. - ........ Al't.{l926) 
n'What Constitutes a Sc1ent1f1o Interp:retat1on ot 
Relig:ton.11 · 
~n. Phi.l•., 6(1926) 1 25().258 • 
..,.,...,.. ... w•--•-....... -..., ... Axtt il< (1929}: . 
11!he Dialectic .of Religious Exper1ence.n 
Ph,:t.l., _Rev., 39 (1999), 557·573~ 
__ ............................... ...,_ ...... Art.(1931l1 
0 Rel1g1on as T:rrutlh" · 
In Ferm .{ed.), OAT, as .. al • 
.... .., ................... ____ ................ ,Apt.{l93.2)2 
11!he Given and· its Qr1t1os~" 
RE&l• -~t1- _J:,ife 1 l(l9SS) t 134•145 .• 
---~~-8-~-~~~"~~~...,Art-(1932}4 
uA fempora11at View ot Ged." 
;r~~~. H!l•• 19(1932) 1 544"556 • 
................. _ ... .,.._...,_ ... ..,. ... A%&t<l(l95"7l . 
"An Emp!x-1·es.l Approach· to God. 1' 
Phil.· Rev.,, 46 (1937), 147 ... 169"' 
...... _ ............. -.,..""'"""~ ................. A,rt,(l.940} 
~eedom, Ptnt-pose; and·Value.n 
In Anshen C ed- ) , FIM, 48& .... 506., 
.,,.._.,...,...,..., __ ..,._ ................. OM~t. ,(194!. )9. 
"!rb.a Pxtoblem of an Objective Basis for Va.lue 
Judgments'*" 
In Bryson and Finkelstein (eds .• ) 1 SPR• 1-s • 
......................................... .., ....... -AJlt-,.{l.943) 
'*Values, Ideals 1 Nox-ma ;· and . Existence .. n . P~;. '~en. Reseuch*' 4{1943}, 9~9-224o• 
~---~~~-"••~w•~~~"~t*{l944) 
npn.s.lcsophical Ideas and Enduring Peace." 
In B:ryst.)n snd others (&dEh), AWP, 642..,.556"' 
340 
...................................... M ... w-.... AJ:'t. (1945 )· 
0 A Personal1st1c V1ew of Bu.n.um Natur-a.• 
Rel. 1n.L1te, l4(1945)~t 216•187., 
. . . 
................................ -008 .... ~ .. -Artt. '(1946) 
nDet1n1t1ons t~ Personalists*" 
P@~aont!1l1st. 27(1946) 1 385•3'13. t 2 .. - . . . i. ·- . .--· 
"" ...... f;!O ......... ""' ..... - .... AJ:tt.{l960) 
"Peraonal1at1o llletaphysioe ot the Sel.ta :tts 
D1e'h1net1ve Obaltaeter1st1oa.,11 
In Inge (ed.) 1 ROSP, 287 ... 303 • 
...... ___ ... _____ ,.._Art.(l95a) 
n Autonom:; and !heonomy. tt . . 
In Bryson and others (eds<\t), FA'!, ,473-47fh 
Bew.ne, Borden P.~-MET· 
pata~hyqios (rev.). . · · 
nos~ona · Boston Un1vers1t7 P~ess~ (1892)1943~ 
~"~~~-~-~------~·PBR· 
Pel"sonal1sm. · · 
Besiorit· · 'louptc>-n Mifflin Comp9Jll', l90S. 
-----@·---~-"·-~-~. fheism •. · · · 
' Nevi "foxaka .Ame:tJican Book Company, 1909. 
B:ryaon, ~~ and othwa ( eds.) ........ AWP 
AR;eroaches tc Wwl.d Peace. · 
' lJew Yorfti &per' & BX-o£'hax-s 1 1944., 
341 
Casse~le~, I• v. L.~~GR 
Graceful Reas·on. 
"CJreenwlcnf- The SeabUX7 :Presa, 1954. 
~'XS>. ' : 
Oesee:un. Fel!Jt_._...,..pow 
~Jl;!~P~~~'=e~x-ll!~~=If:d-~! t~!e;:~ee, 1950 
Clarki ·Gordon B.-OVM! . 
A.o~S~fi'-aitr''1~wwo:r. ~en:w$!1dcrmmpts;,l1 hi c · l.l'\ma ztan ap _ s t . m. ,. eX" - . u a ng o., · uv.-;u 
DeWolt, L• Harold ..... •RRAR 
The-neli~io'US Revolt Age.1n~t_ft~ason. 
' liew Yor ' ~par &nBrothera ·PU'biiahex-s, 1949., 
_ ... _ ... _ ................... -~_.......,TLC 
·A·The-ology;·ot·the Liv1!!G ChUl"ch. 
''New ·Yorkt- 'Harpe~·& BtGifiiers --tubl.1shers 1 1951. 
-~M~~MW~-~~~*~---~·8Art~(lt54) 
"P-ersonalism 1n the Histo17 ot· Western Philosophy.'* 
fhU. ,~~ .. 19{1964}, 89-51,. 
Du~, Albe~t M.~Art.(l93S) 
'• Anlmiam and· J4a'he:r1al.1sm in Whitehead t s O%tgan.1o 
Philosopby.u · · 
J.n• Phil,., 89(19&~0, 41~7. 
}Sddy, · Sherwood .. -GH 
God_inH1storl• 
' 'New !o»-i: · Aesoc1e.t1on Pres a, 1947 w 
B~, Stephen L."~RAWG . . · 
, e!~a;tsioS AUe.ilr.ab,i~@~~---~~V ri~e:h-:ad;s ~9,4•l.g"'n MS. . son: a n veJOs _ y o 'I seona n .ttess,. ·· ~-
~mmet,. Dwotb¥ M~· ... WJ'O · · · -· · · 
VJhiteheaO; t a P)lilosoR~ct p~e;anis~. · 
LQ!idon• . &olll11lan _ · co., =.tliiilieA, 1932. 
Evwett, w,. G.-MV 
Moral Val't.l.Ss• 
' lew Yorih • He~y Bolt and OompanT 1 l9lf.h 
Fex-m, Ve~g1l1u.s (ed..)'!.ir""' ... oA~ . Qcntempox-ar.t Amw1oan ~eoloQ• 
f1ew YOrk: ··.Round Table :r:r'esa, :tno., 1932. 
·--·~ .... _,.-.~w~~M~ .. ·Iil!lf'-:~.-.~·BPS 
A H1st,o~ of Philoso:Ph1qal Szstems .• r~ew Yo:ro The Ph1I0soph1oal Libraey, 1950. 
~ . Ferre. Nels F. s.-os 
.~:tat1anit:v and s~c!etz. 
New Yol"ktlarpeP & Bliothere Publishe%'s, 1960. 
••w·-~~---~--~-~~~aua 
The Ohr1at1an Understand~ ot God. 
i~e\1 ·toi_.ln · -mi!iper & fJiio*hiira -· fu]tt1~;~hex-s, 1951. 
Ferayth, f., M.~ .... Az't.,(l932) 
"The New Oosmology in ita H1stor1ca.l. A$pacta Plat$, 
Newton, Whitehead.- tt · 
Phil.gS_f>!&, 7(1932) 1 54~1. 
Ga.nJ.ett,. A., c., ...... ua . 
A ftea.:u.st1~ _ fhiloaop~ ,of R~lig1on.• .-
't,"'h1cago: ' v111iett, twli & company, 1942. 
Garvie• Alfred u .... ...,om 
The Christie.n.Belie.f 1n God. 
:r~ew !orii": - Harpe%' ·"iii'id .BX*o£hers Publishers, 1932. 
--~""~"~-~~~~-w~~~t.(l9Jl) 
Rev. of Br1e;htman, PG{l9&0) • 
. E'}U.loaoJi!~l• 6(1931). l24...J.26. 
Gentry1 Ge~gs ........ JUtt. ,(1944) 
"Tile Subject in Wh1tehead's Philosophy." 
f!!1l~_ Sqi~nc~, 11(1944) 1 222•226-ll' 
-.,;r ................. - ....... - ........ - ........ Ar·iJ. {1946) 
"EtaPnal Objects and 'be Philosophy of organ1sm.u 
!>h2J.· soiel'.UJe, 15(1946), aas-.sao, 
Goheen, Jolm .... •Al*t.(l94l) 
"Whit ahead t s 'Rheory of Value." 
In Sch1lpp ( ed.,) • PANW, 437..,.469.-
G~een, T. n.~~PB 
fro!esomens. . to ... Ethics. 
ax Ol'd.t .At bHe c:!.U:endon Press, 1899. 
Gross, Mason w.-Al*t.(l943) 
Rev. of Sohilpp {ell .. ) t PANW(l94l) • 
Jrn. . Phil., 40 { 1943) , 271 ... 2'78. 
Gutman, James ....... Al*iJ,. (194'1-48) 
Rev-. of &t1gb.tma.n, W{l946),. 
~v~ Rf1~.,, 12(1947~8), Mo. 
Ball, Bve~ett w~~wv 
Whe.u is Val.uet 
' New Yorit ~e 11Uma.n1t1es hess Inc- • 1959,. 
........................................... ~ ....... -~t.(l930) 
nor What Use ~We Wbitehee.dta Eternal ObJeotsttt 
bn_ • .Pb,J.l.., S7(1930), 29-44. 
Harkness, Geo:t*gia.,-RI 
The Recov~ of Ideals. 
New Yorlh oi.iii'rXes Scribner'' s sons, 1937. 
HartshoJ-ne If Chal*lea ...... Dft 
Th~ Divine Relat1vitl. 
llew· &van• i"aie U'n varsity hess. 1948. 
~w"••~~•~•~•~•"~~~~-~•MVG 
Man's Vision ot God. 
' Ifew !oris·· Harper,.& Bttathe~s PUblishers, 1941 .. 
.................. - .................................................. Al-t.(1935) 
non Some CV1t1oisms of·Wh!teheadts Ph1losopbr.n 
Phil• Rev., 44(1935}, 328-344 • 
................................. --... ---.. ............ A..rt .. ll941) 
"Whitehead's Idea ef God• 
In SchUpp (sd.), PANW, 1941., 
-~-~~"~~~w•-~"-•--w•~t-/1950) 
"Whitehead's Metap~sica.d 
In Lewe, and othe~s, WMW, 25-41 • 
........................ - ...... .., ................ """ ... _...,.,. ... and w. L• Reaaa.-PSG 
Ph1losophal4S Speak of God. 
Oh!cago; · 'l'b.elinivers!tY: of Ob1cago Preas, 1953. 
Booking, w. E.--MGRE . . 
Th~ Meaning_ of God in Human Expev1ence .. 
· Uew i!iivent - !a& tfnlverslty Prese .. {%912)1939. 
a8.f'.fd1ng, Hal' old ..... poa 
The P~ilopomv ot, ~al1S1C?l'l: (tr. B• B. Meyer). 
tonaon; maemiiian and co., Ltd., (1902)1931¢ 
Holtzclaw, B. c., 3tt ..... ._Art.{l930) 
Rev. of' Brightman. Pl(l9DB). 
Ph.1l,. ReV.•• 39(1930),. 525 ... 527,. 
Hooper, Sydney.-•.Art,.(1943) 
0Wh1tehead•s·Ph11osopbyt Space, Time and Thinga.n 
!JhilO;JQ.£!8!1 18(AprU 1943),. 204•230. 2 . - . 
Howaon, ;r. Howard.-.Al't.,(l946) 
Rev. of Br1ghtmant NV(l945). · 
Cro~er. Q~~t., 23(1946)• 391. 
Hughes, Pe:t:tCY••-Art .. (l.94l) 
uie Wh1tehead's Psychology Adequate?0 
In Soh1lpp (ed.), PANW, 1941 .. 
Inge, w. R* and others-.-•RCSP 
Radhataa1abnans Com,RUI'ntiva Studies _in Ph1lcsopm• 
uaw YorliJ'- ..... iliiWpor & Ero'Eliers ·. Publlaiiers, . 1eSo. · ' 
Jolmson, A a H .• -WTR · 
\'l'hiteheaclf s t.rbePt'Y' of. Real it~ i!ostont ' · iiiacoiiPresa, · ZIS6~'. 
~~~~-Ma~••••~~~Art.(194i)l 
0 The Intel11g1b1l1ty of Whitehead•s Ph1losopby.0 
Phil.Sc1ence, 10(1943), 47•55. 
-~-~~-~----~~--Art.(l943)9 
0 fhe s_ oo1a_ 1 Pb1losoph7 · of Alfred North Whitehead." 
3.rn• Phil~, 40{1943) 1 S61~S71q · 
W~W8HW·M~--~-P"MArt.(1944) 
"'i':t'Uth, Beaut1 and Goocinesst in the Philosophy' ot 
lu N. Whitehead. 0 · · , 
Pllil• Science., 11(1944}, 9•29.-
·--.. ------Art.(l945) 
0 Wh1teheadta fbsory ot Actual Ent1tiesa Defence and 
Criticism." · · 
Phil~: S(J1ence, 12(1945),. 237-295~~" 
345 
Johnson, Paul.J: ........ AXtt.(1954) 
"Brightman's Contl*1but1on to Pex-sonal!am.u 
Pel'sonal~st, 55(1954) 1 59•78~ 
M------~-*MM~~----Art.(l943) 
Rev. of Brightman, SL(l942}. 
Phi~~ F~~. 1(1943)• 32•34. 
K'r1kor1an• Yervant a .... •l944 · 
~a~lU'al1Sf?_ an(i the Human, Seil'it * ~J'e\7 York: Coiiiiib!:a trn1vaXtsity Pxtess, 1944 .. 
~-~w•~~----••••••~~••APt.{1944) 
"A Naturalistic View ot Mind•" 
In XP1k91'1an1 NBS, B42 ... 2&9,. 
, . 
Kruse, CoP.nel1us.-~Art.(l953) 
0 Jii!ga2.' s. BX'1ghtman t s Oontztibut ion to Ame:tJican 
Ph1loaoph7•" · · · · 
Rel, .. _in. ~u~. 2e (1953), 594•603 .. 
Laird, John ....... .xv . 
The Idea .of Value .. · Cambridsei !£ tho University Press, 1929. 
La.wrenoe, Na.the.niela"'+' ... A.Pt • ( 1950) 
"Locke and Whitehead on Individual Entities." 
Rev. M$tw 1 4(1950). 1 215-23Eh 
Lee• Ot1s .... wArt.(l943)· . · 
Rev. of Schil.pp (ad. )1 PANW(l941). Phil._Phe~ • .Rea., 4(J.943) 1 455...,463. 
Lepley. Ray.--vv 
~erifiabil~tz o~ V,alu~. 
New Yorka Columbia University Press, 1944. 
346 
~~~M·--~~-~-~-ao 
God and Ourselves. 
Hew Yo:rkt- Abingdon•Ookesbuey Press, l9Sl. 
Lie'bl:nan, Joshua L ......... pJa 
Peace of Mind. 
• New- fori: · !im.on and Sohuste:r; 1946. 
Lowe, Vietor and othera.~~WMW 
Whi'tehead end the Modem Vlorld. 
' Boston& 'rhe Saeon- P!'ess ,f :t§so. 
~-M~-~-~·-~~-~Art.{l94l} 
"~e Development or Whitehead's Philosop~.n 
In Sohilpp ( ed.) 1 :PAEW t 1941. 
Lyman, Eu.gene w ......... M'J.'R 
in 
The Mean~ and Txtuth of Religion. · 
!Jew YorT Charies Scribner's 'sons, (1933)1941. 
Mac1ntosh1 D. c ....... PRX Tb.e_P:robJ.em,or.Rel~gious Knowled~e. 
New !o~k& i:lii:rper & §i:otiie~s i>u .Iishers, 1940.-
.,.._ ....... _ ......... -~ ................ - .. Ar"t.,{l.938) 
"What has Pt-otessw Bltigb:tman Done to Personal1s:rn'l" 
Rel.. -~ Life, l (1952), 304""'307. 
MeOraoken, D. J ..... -fi 
'rb,1nk1ng and ValuinG• 
Iion:donc Maoiiillliin ·and co., Limited~ l950. 
McEwen, William P ......... § 
End~ing Sat!staction. 
llew Yorlia Phii'osopliical Library, 1949. 
347 
............... _ ... __ ............................ - ........... Art.(l950) 
Rev •. of McEWen, ES ) • 
.f!!!l_ ... ro~, 8 ( . ' 4o-41 •. ' . 
___ ................. --... ---Al-t. (1951). 
"The Ghost of Eta:tlna.l1sm 1n Wh1teheat!'s Tb.eorr ot 
Value .. 11 , 
P¥1• JJ'OfJJS• 9 ( 0951) 1 160!1'22 * 
Morse.n,.. George_. ...... AJtt. (1937) 
"Whitehead.' s !b.e017 ct Value. u 
~t. J•~• Eth•t 4'(195'1) 1 309-$16. 
Moxlay.·D. J.••Art.(l934} . 
»The Oonoeption ef·God 1n the fhilosoPhf of Whitehead." 
In PAS, 34{1934), l5'•l86. . 
Mu.eldstt 1 Wa.ltEW G#<l ..... A,rt;, (1946) 
Rev. of Br-ightman, DV{1945)., · · 
Phil, FcX'um, 4(19.,6), 32-43. 
W~MMW~--~-~~~t-(1950) 
n'l'ha Social Pb1loaapb:y · ot Edg&XJ Sheffield Bxaightman. u 
Phil. Fo~, 8(1950:} 1 g.-14~ , . 
Mullen, w. B•••A.r-t. (1954) · 
"A survey and Evaluation ot some C~1t1o1sms of 
Bt?1ghtman 's View of a Finite God" (un.publ1shef$. 
x-esearch paper submitted in Dept. of Ph1losopb.)r). 
Bostonl Boston University. 1954. 
Munk, AX-thur w ........ m 
H1sto~z and God. 
• ·Neti Ywrta·· · . ..r:tie Ronald :P~aas, 1952. 
Murphy 1 Aztth~ E.,.,.•A:rt. (l.94l) . . 
"Whitehead and tha·Metbod ot Speculative PhilosopbJ.n 
In Soh1lpp (ed. }:1 PAEW, 363•;~-390, 
Nottingham, Elizabeth K ... ~ns 
Rel1.g1onand Soc1atz. 
New'!'orih DOubleday & Oompauy, Inc. 1 1954. 
Oehler, Gust&ve Fr1edr1oh. -J.rOi! 
Theolofil of t)l.e Old Testament. 
dre.ridRapids: zoi:idervan Publishing House, (1888)1950., 
348 
, otto, M. o ........ Al't•(~ese) 
Rev. ot Bl:-1ghtman! P%(19!9). ifrn:• i,hi~., 26 (1.929),.. 499 ... 501-. 
Per17, Ralph lh·.,.G~V 
Ganral Theou ot .. Value • . 
w new York#· Longm.ahs* Gl'&en and Cth • 1926 ,., 
............... ~ ... - ... ~.:..~av 
-Realms ofValu~. 
oam.w!dgei iiarva~d Universit,- Presa, 1954.-
Pols, Edwa:ttti J., J ......... mMW r& I~it :r a.Faes_tom ~aihe~ _M~tfi~J 1os of VJhiteheadlf 
1961. 
Robinsen, D.; s.-ILP 
An Intl"oduction. tQ Living PhilOS:ORl;V • · 
iJew York: · · ~oma·s Y.: cX:Oweil oompa!llT, l93S -o: 
Kunes. DapbeJ't (e4.) ...... J)p · · 
D1ot1onm of Philosop!;l:· 
''New Yo.rJ:- !Hie ''ftil1osbi)hj·eal Library. 1942. 
Seh1lpp1 p,. A-. (u.).~PANW · 
fhe. Ph1losop~ of Alftted Nortb.. VJhitehead (2nd ea..);, 
New Yorkt ... - dor · P.ubi!sn!ng ·company, (L94l)l95l. 
-.. .............. --.--lu't.{1941) .. 
uWbitehead's Mwe.l:Ph1l.osopb.7•n 
In SCh1lpp (ed.), PANWt 563•61$¥ 
Se~lea, He~be~t L.w•Art#(l954) 
Rev. of Bt-1ghtman, ML{l93&}. . 
Pe:r~Qru\l1~t, l&(;;r.934}, 566•369. 
349 
Shahan, Ewiq. P.-wu 
Wh1t,ehea.d,~s_. ~~o!!Z ~or §epe~ian~e. 
New Y'ork: u:s,ngrs Crown Frees, 1950. 
Sheldo:n, w. B,..""-GP 
God and Polaritf• . 
· New Ha.venl · fa>e University Press,. 1954. 
S1egt':r1ed, Thecdor .... -..A..xat.(1952) 
"1'he S1gn:1f1cance ot Paul T1ll.ioh.'s TheoloSl" for the 
German S1tuation. 0 . 
In Kegley and Ere tall (eds:.), TP,, 68•83. 
Sorley,. w. a.-wm 
Moral Values -~nd the, Ide~, ot. G.od, (2nd ed. ) • 
NeVI York: · The Mtl.cm1ilan Company (1918)1981. 
Stahl~ ~olandt._IBW 
.r~~ xnri\li~ce (.)~. ~Ir&;on .. on _;Whiteheacl.• (unpublished 
oc ora sser a on • · 
Boston: Boston University,. 1950. 
W-H----M---~·-·Art.(1964) 
0 J?zaotessor BP1ghtman•s Theo17 of the Given." 
Rel,• W, ~1fe, 2&(1954)~ 537•548. 
Stebbtng, t* Susan • ..-•Art. Cl926) , 
np:ro. tessw Wb.1tehead 's · 'Perceptual Object' • 11 
hn.~ Ph11*4t 23(1926}, l97.,.2U~t 
---~------~-~---.--~-Art.(l950) 
Rev. of Whitehead, PB(l9S9) • 
Mind, 39(1950), 466~475. 
Straton, Geo~ge D~··BPG 
Belief in the Perasonal1ti of God: A Study of Theistic 
Personalism rn Reae'iion. 0 No"n~t"iie!st!o l:deallsma .. Cu.npu61Isfiefi' aocto:rai Cilsserte.~Ionr. · · ·.. ·•· ,. 
New Y~kc ColumbS.e. University 1 1950. 
Strong, A. H.-sT . .. 
350 
S~atemat1e Thaol~H (Xtev.). biiaae:Cpntiio · t;ea Griffith & Rowland Press, (1SBS)l.907, 
Swabey 1 W1ll1am 0*-AFt • (1986) 
Rev. ot Whitehead• SMW(l925). 
:p~il. lev., 35(1926), 8'12~79. 
UndeV'h1ll6 Evelyn • ., ... MYS . _ 
,st1ctsa (12th ed.),. . 
F ri Yorkt E. P. Dutton and Company Inc., (l9l.l)l930. 
Urban, w .. M.-VNL 
Valuation Its Natut'e and Law.s. · 
r.oii!on:" "''be'orge' li!en &' unw!n ttd., 1909. 
--~~--M·~~--~Art.(l939) 
11B1em.ellts. of t1n1tt'tell1g1b1l1ty 1n Whitehead's 
Metapbysios.u · 
hn. Ph!l., 35(1938}, 617•657., 
------------·•Art*(l94l) 
"Whitehead's Ph1lesoftb7 of Language antt its Relation 
to his Metaphysics. · 
:tn sohilpp ( ed. ) , PANW • aoa~sav,. 
tJshenko! A. p., ...... ,Art.(l937) 
0 Negat ve Prehens1on."· 
~~· Phil. t 34{1957), 263 ... 26"1w. 
Vlastosl G!'ego!'y.-Art. (1937) 
"organ o Categeries :J.n··Wh1tshaad.u 
J£e• l.!hf.l,•" 34 (1937) ,. 263"268. 
wells, 1Ian7 x ....... pu . . 
Prooeas and Unreal!~. · · 
:New !orR: d !Ing 's · own Press, 195£>.. 
Whitehead• Alfred llorth ........ AI 
Adventures of Ideas. · 
Ua\v Yovk:u H. The 'iiacmtllan Company :t 1933. 
•·--··--··w~~~w~~__.~---~ON 
The ·, Conc;rogt flf, Na~U!',G. 
Oambr1fl.g<u univoraYty Press, 1920. 
-t-•• ,.. .......... ~-~ .................................. ,a 
The P'unct1on of Reason. · 
' lvmcaton: · Px-!nceton Un1ve%'s1t:r Pl.'ess, 1929. 
---·~----~··--~·..-•w•*•MT 
Modes of Thought., · 
· :Jew Yor!t: ifhi Macmillan cempa.n,-, l95s~ 
~~--~-••••~~~~M•*-~~·---•NL 
Natura and Life. 
" Ct'h!cago: - !he 'univeratt., of Chicago Press. 19~4. 
~~~-"~•~w~~~~-~-~~-~-··Pa 
Process.and.R~a.l1!?z-. New !or~; ~ne §ocial Science Book Store, {19B9)l94l. 
351 
• ...,. • ...,.'f!lil ................. ~---..., .. - ..... o 
f1el1gion,in,tb,e.tla1t1na• 
!IewYork: ~ flla.cmlJ:,lan Company, _1926,. 
~----~~· ... "8~·----BMI Sc!ence.and the Mod.exan.Wo:rld. 
ifew Yorri: 'll'He"lfew AiiiGrloan Library, (1925}1954., 
{Menter BookS, l4 28). 
"'" .................. - ................... ""' ....... _Artw.(l932) 
nobjeots and Subjects." 
Phi~· Rev •• 41(1932),_130•146-. 
.,...,..,.....,.,.w .... .,. ....... _ ... ..,_,.....,..........,.,.,Art,.{l.93'1) 
"Rem.arke." · · 
Phil• R~v. • 46(1957}~ 179•166.,. 
_ ........................................ ---·AZ*t.{l94l)1 
"Mathematics and the Good.n 
In Soh1lpp (ed.), PANW. eaG ... ael.., 
_..,.,..._.,._,..._..,...,.,..._..,..,...,.._APta{l94l)2 
"Immo~talitJ•" · · 
ln Scbilpp (ed.),.PANW# 682•700. 
W1dge117, Alban a ..... ~Art .. fl94a) 
Rev. ot· Brightman,. SL(l.94S). 
ov•e!' Q.\.Uit,ltt•• ao(194a),. ea. 
Wieman, Hen:£7 N.,-...SHG 
The Source of Human Good. 
·chicago a·· ·.The Un1ve:rs):Ey of Oh1oage Press, 
Will1QmS 1 Daniel D.~WP!f . , 
Vi'hat Pres~nt-Daz TP,e_o;toatans -~~ T;b.1nld.,ty~. 
uew York: Harper & iirotiiers" Pu'b!!shers, 
W1lm, E. 0-. (ed. }.-SPT 
Studies in Ph1loso~y and Theolof5:• 
1qew Yorli: ·· fhe_ Arsaon PresEt, ~2a. 
WoodbUPne 1 At s.--Art.(l95l} 
Rev. of Brightman~ PG(l.930}. 
~OBeX" Que.x*t., 8{1951) 1 2'7~.,.275. 
1946., 
1952. 
558 
....... _ ... _ ................. -Art.(19U) 
Rev. of Brightman., FG(l931) . 
,Oroz,e~,gys.rt. • 9\1932), 97•99 • 
........... --... ----Art. (198&) 
Rav., of Brightman, ML{l955)." 
Crose~ Q~~tt, 10(1953), 510•371. 
' . 
W:P1ghb1 William tt.-AX-1h (l.9&7) 
Rev. of Wh!teheadl RM(l92E!S). 
Pbil. Rev., 36 ( 192?'), 505-504 • 
• t l . . - --- < • 
353 
The ~~ p~pose of this dissertation ie to compa~e 
some of the baeic axiolog1eal concepts ·in the thought ef 
E .. Sci :Bl*1ghtman and A. N., Whitehead~ A subordinate purpose 
lies 1n a comparative evaluation and a br1$f estimate of the 
%'&levancy of their Uiolog1cal 1ns1sbts to:rJ oontempor9.17 
sooietfq, 
fh& comparative stud7 1a devel,oped 1n five special 
areas a (l) B!'1ghtman •s and Whitehead's oonce~n foX* value 
problem all ind.:teated by thG proport1on.e.te amount ot writing 
devoted to value problems in eaeb. th:tnkar and as tOa.lled fO'l!' 
by the internal e.speets of theilt thought 1 (2} the natUl'e and 
cr1taXt1a of value according to each, (3) the function .of God 
1n the iF value stl'uotUI'as, ( 4) the h.- views as to the meaning 
and so"U."POet:l of d1svalue, and (5) their eonceptiens ot the 
religious e~asion of values~ 
Brightman's oonoeMJ. t:w traluea is ind1oate4 both by· the 
quantity of his e1tings and his constant and insistent em ... 
phe.ais on the 1nte31'al ralat~on of values to religion, meta'"'"' 
physies, ethics, and society. IU.s value writings e:at.end fr'om 
the first published article with an axiological motif 1n 1919; 
"The Lisbon Earthquake: A Study in Religious Evaluation, n to 
his University Lecture, ~arsons and Valuest in 1952. 
The u1olog1oal period of Wh1ttthead r 6 thought covars a 
briefer compass ot time,. extending, appr~imately. from 
S.cienee and .the Mod$rn World (1925) tlwough his Ingersoll 
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Laotur& on "lmm.ox-te.l1ty" (1941) . ., :Howev~, a.a early as 1919 
he had insisted that values may hold the kay to the mete...-
phys1cal. synthesis of existence and in the pe~iod indicated 
he attempted to formulate such a xnetapbrs1eal value synthesis. 
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In considering the nature Qf value, ~ightman'a exposition 
is c~actarized by ala1"1ty and si.mpl1city. Values are <ie• 
. . 
scribed as 1ntr1nsio, inStrumental, potential, actual, emptvioal, 
. . 
appaz-ent• peX'Manent, t:t*ansient, catholic" and uolua1ve. The 
o:rux of his uiolog is hS.s datin1tion of true values. A true 
value is ~ liking or preter$nCe that is found. to be ooherent 
afte%" testing by the widest range :Q£ e;Jtp$r1ence. 
Wl'dkhead t a a:doloSf is more complex. His concept of 
value must be ~arstood 1n relatio~ to the natttre and tunc• 
t1on of actual entities. Value is the 1ntr.1na1o :r.-eal1ty 
achieved by an integration Qt entitiea into a h~monious unity 
of feeling. 'fhe attainment of such liUllf•:t-ealization 1s the 
value. 'fhis is the basic me$l11ng or value utilised in this 
41s:sartat1on, ~lthougb. Whitebead's late:tt cver~emphas1s on the 
wol'ld ·of auba1atant values is }:taoognil!ta4. 
Ve:r!y s1gn1t1eant for immediat$ comp£U~1son 1s the similar 
emphasis in each l'Jl8J'l on the loeus of values. ~ightman x-e-
ite~a'bes his olainl that values, to be values, must be embodie(\ 
1n the lite of some pe~acn, human Ol" divine,. while one ot the 
most clearly C~Jnunciated dieta in Whiteheadra thought is tbat 
value :vefe~s to faot:t For both., values @e only possibilities 
er potent1ala. until realued eitb.ex-in personal lite oz. in the 
conc~escence of actual entities. 
The basic c~itel'ia ot value .ln .Br.1ghtman•s thought 6l?e 
oohe~ence and the principle ot respect for personality. Fo~ 
., 
Whitehead the su.preJU$ tests are intensity,. harmol1J', stability·., 
For both men the ll.ighast values are those which exemplify- the 
maximum concreteness. Brightman a.peak$ of the interpenetra~ 
tion of values, Whitehead of the coordination ot values. f.he 
two ~$e thQt the p~o4uction and applicability of values ara 
at onoe th~ end and meaa\We of t;loedal o.x-gan1aat1on. 
For Br1ghtnl$ll, values are gl'oun~ed 1n the ultimate cosmic 
ordw as p~t ot Godt$ experience; and. because that cosmic 
oFdeF is pePSonal and rati~al, the pe~nence ot value t~tha 
J.e not only· asslU'ed,. but the OOlDlllUnioation and pppreoiat1on of 
value-~l'U".mS is made a po~Jsib1lity tw all l':'at1onal m.tnds in the 
In Whitehead's thought God is the tto:egan of noveltyil in 
that he constantly strives fw the :tleali..zation of new poten .... 
tiala 1.n the WOl'ld O·f actuality,. lie eternally ConfrontS the 
woxrld with the ideal. vision of what it can btJcome. He ls the 
lure for feeling. Eve%7 :feeble e.f.f~t tew81"4 ·value is met 
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with Go4fs eol1~1tude that eaCh achievement might not onlJ be 
m.a:tntainett but thai$ progress ehall continue •. As p1"1no1ple of 
concretion- God brings d1ffe~ent1at1on anti oz-dex-,. 1* .a., value,. 
out of the othel'WiS$ h()moge:uous onwgo1ng ot the creative e.dve.n"&• 
The compEWable function-~ ~ight~ta thought is God as 
ttcontxaollel\ of The G1ven*0 In nconcret1on11 and "con.t:rolo: 
God' a teleolog1cal function la: :revealeth 
B~igh'man and Whitehead l:"ecogn1ae that value theozty 1s 
incomplete without a cansid~ation of di~values~ Brightman 
tvns to none of the trraditio.nal and, in. his v!w, unsatis• 
i'actoey" 1 solutions to the problem o:f evil. ~ere is more 
evil in the world than is t~aoeable to human agencies, and 
~ view which ftnd~ the solut1on by attr1b~ttng evil to the 
will of God oannot be coh$xa-entl;r maintained 1n the light of 
the evidence t&'l! a rational. teleological. and goo(!. un1verS'h 
Brightman's alternative is t!nitistic the1am1 ~eh finds tn 
God a 11m1t1ng faotw that he doas not will bu.t which ls 
pJ'Etae:nt in h!a expwien.oe as a hlnder1ng. enaotie i.r:J;Wation .... 
al1ty1 tha source of the U,steleolog1ca1 aQd value•lesa 
elements tn the world. 
Whitehead uses a variety ot Wol'ds and p~aBee to express 
his eoncepfi of' dtsvalue, a~ g., wtual inhibition, mutual 
·a.estruct1ven.eaa,. diveX'gent tonE411t1es 1 diseottdant feeling, 
. . 
1noompat1bil1..ty, dest~u.ot117& t'l.Wbulenee, ineompe.tibl.e .e.lter-8 
natives, dJ.scordanoe. nzsteleological facts in Wb.iteheacl's 
thought, however, ar-e not tinalt tl'l.ey will be t:rransoendett. 
They m.a.y even aeMe a tsleolcgJ.oal function 1n the prevent10l,l . 
ot anaesthesiA, staleness .. e.nd. boredom.. A present 4isvalu.e 
is a pl*opheoy of a higb.e:tt a111tb.es1s of achieved barmOI\3"• 
The difference 'between the two men on the tunct1on ot 
evil. 1n r-elation to valu.e ma;y be indioat;ed b,- saying that, 
although Brightman gl"ants the possibility tha'b 1nt:r1nsio 
av!l ~ be an instPUmental good, he makes little o~ nothing 
of it, whetteas Whitehead asot;ibes to evil a :a1gnUicant, 1f 
not necass~, fUnction 1n the ~1gin and inorease of un1ve~~ 
aal value. 
Religion is one ot the dominant expression$ or value 
sxpw1enoe 1Q. the thought of both BP1ghtman and Wh1tehaa.d. 
Religion is an ou.t~reaah1ng dimension. ~1gb.tman 's datum .... 
selt and Whitehead's p~ehending entity enjoy the1~ axpe~1~ 
ences pivatel71 but the,- x-e.fer to ttomething beyond the self. 
Here is the eocaa1on fol' x-elig1oua faith. Por Brightman 
faith 1s an express1on of' CJonf'1denoe that the ultitna.tely 
real 1lil God. the pe~aonal. w1g1natw and austa.1ne%' of all 
values; fox- Whitehead religious faith begins 1n solitariness., 
but only as the pl'e~u1s1te to· an awBX'enesa of the larger 
meanings and values in. the.tc~al s~ctur& ot the unive~se. 
1ft Br1ghtman•s thought, to be ral1g1oua is to be vitally 
concerned about. the crig1nat1on. tn~ease. and conservation 
of values. Religion. 1s a value, as· demonstrated by the 
e.nswe!*s it providea to the facts of sutfe~1ng, death, mwal 
evil, ignorance., 11m1ta.t1on. It also helps give unity• pur ... 
pose, p~enoy to the values ot GHPer1enoe. Rational wa.r-
sh1p is always ~$ativa. 
Although th.Ewe is an undwlying exiatential strain in 
both men. a strong emphasis. on the rational and metaphy$1Cal 
aspect& or religion provides adequate stability to tha 
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ineacapabl'f subjective end emot.tve nature of religious 
experience. 
on the baSis of th1s study,, the following conclusions 
seem warranted~: 
l,. lzt1ghtmn•s p$:raonal1sm and Wh1tehee.d's panpsyehism 
oa.oh px-ov$-des &. fruitful mete.physioal g.t"ound foP the davel. ... 
opment or a t-ioh and commendable thetW7 of ve.lu.es. Bl-ight .... 
mente Q)dolo§ is emphatically eltpl1c1t• while Wb.itehaattts 
1s ~ess oleerly delineated but is everywheFe tmp11cit in his 
tt1Gtaphya1cal and rel1gious thougb:t;., 
a. B!'1gh~ and Whitehead are equall,- emph-1cal 1n 
the:bt ·1nsis~ence the.t the onl.J' looue tor, the e.ctualizat1on~ 
tteal.Ue.b1Qn, o~ appvec1a.tAon Qt values is in th~ eltp&l't&:noa 
of pe~sorm or actual entitles., !rhere is no "vacuous aotual-
i'tlr•u 
:;s . , Although Whitehead cannot,. without some mod1.t1ee.t1on, 
be nl.Gstd.f'ied as a pe:ttso.t1a11st, his simUarity to Bxtightman 
in fixing the locus of va1ues in the concrescent exper1enee 
of actual ent1t1ea~ and his a tress on. the realization and 
stabilisation ct the higher types ·of values in pex-sonal o~der 
suggest a. stvonge:r per.eonalistie $!!1phas1s than 1s usu.allJ' 
attributed to blm. 
4. llt*i@b.tman's emphasis en naioao.tettie.R and Whitehead's 
oonoept of God: as "sav1ortt provide nt)t onlr for the origina .... 
t1on, inerease, and continuation of values, but suggest the 
integral and aympa.thetic relation wh1eh God sustains to the 
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effo~t and s~uggle ot the world to achieve values. 
5. Both men subordinate ethics to ~iolcg, Whitehead 
prrobably more v:tscrousl,- than EPightman. 
a. Whil.e Bl'ightman tx-aces the SOU.l"Ce of diavalue to t\ 
.ret$rd1ng tnetor 1n God's e~pex-1enee, Whitehead_ is losica.Uy 
able to exclude the so'Ul'ce ct disvalue f'l"om God· by' attxs1bu.t1ng 
to thG freedom of actual entities the so~ce of aeathet1o 
destruction and 1ncompa.t1b1l:tty 1n the un1versth Bri~trran 
holds tbat some evils are S\W«iS .t.n that the~ have no irltrinsio 
v>sl.ue, but they ~ have instrurnsntal value. Whitehead puts 
m.we empllasis on the. axiological instrum.antal1ty of a.ll dys-t 
teleological factors. 
7 * Both tnen give a large place to the :t"el1g1ous ex• 
pression of value. ~ey agx*ee 1n tb.eb! ins!etenee on the 
. . 
D.$Oess1fl7 of a metapt.wa1eal battis fo'f! :religion. Whitehead 
finds J?el1g1on pow1ng out of 8 th<& ne.t'U.l"e of thirlgs.u Fox-
him, m.etapb:ys1os sives to xael1g1on a :aense of ba.J;lmo~ with 
the rest ot ~eality # the pa;rall.el or Jh21gbtman t a flt1endly 
a. A fruitful s1Jlthes:is of the thought of the two men 
might begin b7 :mo:re emphasis on organic relatGdness in 
:Brightma.nts pareona.11st1e pl.wml1am, while Whitehead's oon'" 
. . 
oept of God could move _ pl-&f1tably in the dbteot1on of Bl*igb.t-
mants cle~out the~sm.. Perbe.pa al.eo nwre equality or em .... 
pbas1~ on the aesthetic would enrich Bx-J.gbtman's axiology and 
le$sen· what 1s consider&d to be an excessive conoe:rn 1n 
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Whit ahead t 1 thought. 
9. The obj,ectt1on that the thought of both Brightman. 
and Whitehead 1a cu.t of touch with life 'is be.ssd on an ex-
aggerated ooncextn with the p$tt1phe~a.l alentents of theiP 
meuhod ami. style. The relevancy of their thought is ev1 ... 
denced. both by the impulse whloh their bas1e philosophical 
principles ba:ve given t-o the speculative cause of pe:Paonal-
lsm $l.ld the philosoph¥ of organism, and by the ;&Wact 1cal ap• 
pl1oat1on of their thought tQ ~al1g1oua and social situations .. 
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Wilbur Handley Mullen was born in North Head, New 
Brunawlok, Canada, :Pebruary 19, 1919, the son of Rev. 
Handley c. Mullen, minister of the Refonned Baptist Al• 
lilmoe of Oar.t.ada. •. Be attended pUblic schools 1n Maine, 
New BrunsWick, and Nova Scotia.. In 1935 he graduated from 
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